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DEMOCRACY
AND
DICTATORSHIP

DEMOCRACY
AND
DICTATORSHIP

THEIR PSYCHOLOGY AND
PATTERNS OF LIFE

Zevedei Barbu

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Part One

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

Je vois que les biens et les maux se répartissent assez également dans le monde. Les grands riches disparaissent; le nombre des petites fortunes s'accroît; les désirs et les jouissances se multiplient; il n'y a plus de prospérités extraordinaires ni de misères irrémédiables. L'ambition est un sentiment universel, il y a peu d'ambitions vastes. Chaque individu est isolé et faible; la société est agile, prévoyante et forte; les particuliers font les petites choses, et l'État d'immenses.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

Introduction

History is a picture gallery containing few originals and a great many copies.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

ONE of my first concerns, in the present study, was to find or to build up a common ground between sociology and psychology, and thus to look at the problem of democracy and totalitarianism from two points of view at once. From the very outset I felt the need to escape a purely political approach and to speak about democracy and totalitarianism as ways of life. Needless to say I have been aware of the difficulty anyone has to face when working with such a general and vague concept as that of a way of life. But, on the other hand, it was obvious to me that a common ground between two disciplines so different and opposed in their approach could not be found without resorting to a less specialized and less precise vocabulary. The concept of 'way of life' included both a specific social and political structure, and a specific type of behaviour and personality.

It seems to me that many difficulties involved in the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life can be considerably diminished by acquiring the technique of thinking on two planes, sociological and psychological. Consequently, my next concern was to establish a series of correspondences between the sociological and psychological aspects of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life. Thus, starting with the analysis of a series of phenomena characteristic of various periods of democratization both in the ancient and modern worlds, I was led to the idea that democratization is closely associated with a series of processes by which the common pattern of life of a group of individuals becomes flexible. The transitions from the medieval to the modern economic system, from the rigidly organized medieval community to the dynamic society, gradually created in the Western world since the Renaissance, from a stable spiritual world dominated by religion to a world permanently open to changes and revisions, as science progresses, are in fact aspects in the process towards flexibility of the culture-patterns of Western societies. Democracy is consequently defined as a flexible

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society, that is, a social structure open to change and novelty, and yet preserving its own basic character.

Since flexibility has thus been established as one of the key concepts in the sociological aspects of the process of democratization, I transplanted it on to the psychological level and applied it to the mental structure of the individuals living in an historical period of democratization or in a constituted democratic society. It seemed to me that the transition from a non-democratic to a democratic period is also closely connected with an increased degree of flexibility in the mental structure of man. Thus, the mechanism of adjustment of the medieval man—if one can speak in such general terms—was dominated by more or less fixed types of reaction and his mind was more rigidly organised than that of modern man round certain habits, prejudices, sentiments, and ideas. On the other hand, the mind of the individuals living in the modern era becomes more and more dominated by mental functions and structures which makes it possible for them to adjust to a complex and changeable world. One of these structures is reason, which I described as the individual's capacity to grasp the order in change, and the unity in variety. Intelligence is another function required for the adjustment to a world dominated by change and novelty. Consequently the individual living in the modern world, that is, the man who creates and maintains the democratic way of life, makes more and more use of intellectual, and less and less of emotional and instinctive functions in his adjustment. As the result of this his own mental structure is rendered more flexible, that is, more adaptable to a changeable environment.

The analysis of the same historical periods revealed the fact that the process of democratization led gradually to an individualized social and cultural pattern. Economic and political individualism, religious individualism since the Reformation as well as individualism in art which started with the Renaissance and culminated in Romanticism, are basic features in the culture-patterns of Western societies. And here again I transferred the concept of individualization on to the psychological plane. I therefore endeavoured to prove that the mind of modern man becomes more and more dominated by structures and traits which individualize his behaviour. I have borrowed from psycho-analysis the concept of the ego with the intention of covering under one term the main individualizing traits and structures of the human mind. The growing tendency noticed in the members of modern societies to individualize their adjustment to the various aspects of their world led me to the conviction that the ego became more and more dominant in their mental structure.

All periods of democratization are characterized by strong ten-

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dencies towards the rationalization of the pattern of life. The tendency towards a rational type of economy, towards a rational type of social authority, expressed in its purest form in the authority of law, and a rationalistic type of thought are the main aspects of this. On the psychological plane one can easily observe that the mental structure of the individual belonging to these periods is dominated by reason; rational attitude towards authority and towards his fellow beings, rational attitude towards things and towards the world as a whole are the main characteristics of this type of man. The combination of the processes of individualization and of rationalization, both being characteristic of the historical periods of democratization, leads to a crucial point regarding the mental architecture of the democratic personality. The behaviour of this type of personality, his social behaviour in particular, is guided by a rational and individualized type of authority. One can call it the authority of reason, of conscience, or simply, inner authority.

I have noticed also that almost all periods of democratization are periods of social and spiritual prosperity. This led me to the idea that one of the mental characteristics of the individuals living in democratic societies consists in a strong feeling of security. This is displayed as self-confidence, and trust in the power of the human mind. The conviction that his own mind is a reliable guide to his actions is deeply rooted in this type of man.

DEMOCRACY AND TOTALITARIANISM

Fascism and Communism are products of our time. Many processes, sociological and psychological, which were necessary for the democratization of the way of life in Western Europe, have, in different circumstances, contributed to the creation of a totalitarian way of life. The creation of a flexible and individualized social structure, the weakening of tradition, the decreasing importance of prejudice and emotionality in the social life of contemporary man, the confidence in reason have all led directly or indirectly to the creation of a totalitarian way of life. Change and fluidity in the structure of society are important traits of the democratic way of life; the feeling and the desire for change are also important categories of the democratic frame of mind. They are, however, counter-balanced in the mind of the individual by the deep conviction that he can understand and master his environment, however rapid its transformation. Hence the feeling of security and freedom characteristic of the democratic man.

But not all social groups and sub-groups belonging to our contemporary world could adjust themselves to a flexible pattern of life. Moreover, in many individuals and groups the change and fluidity of

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

the pattern of life aroused the feeling of instability and insecurity; the desire of change has thus turned into anxiety of change, the feeling of freedom has become fear of responsibility. Thus, the frame of mind of modern man suffered a radical change which in the long run resulted in a new type of adjustment, individual and collective. Fascism and Communism are two of the most characteristic aspects of this type of adjustment.

The basic trait of the Fascist way of life and of the Fascist personality consists in an increased importance of the emotional factors in individual and group behaviour. Since reason proved incapable of organizing a changeable and complex environment the whole pattern of life underwent a process of derationalization. A social structure based on emotional primitive bonds, emotional attitudes towards authority, irrational and magic ways of thinking in the field of culture are aspects of this process. Compared with the drive towards rationality, characteristic of the democratic way of life, Fascism is a symptom of regression in group behaviour.

Communism is rooted in the same human situation. The solution is, however, looked for in a different direction. The anxiety created in the modern working class by a series of disruptive changes in Western Europe in the early nineteenth century, the tension created in various sections of the modern Russian people by a long series of inner conflicts characteristic of the Russian culture-pattern, the insecurity created in the backward areas of poverty, have all resulted in an increased tendency towards rationalization. A super-organized economic system, from which 'the crises are forever eliminated', a rigidly organized state, a fixed pattern of historical development, are all meant to cure the basic insecurity from which many social groups belonging to the contemporary world suffer. The same crisis in the rational pattern of democracy has led in some cases to an escape into irrationality and the unconscious, while in others, to an increased effort towards rationalization. How to adjust himself to an increasingly fluid pattern of life while retaining his basic frame of mind, is a problem which the man belonging to a democratic world has sometimes failed to solve.

Though the expression has not been used, this study is permeated with the idea that Fascism and Communism are group adaptation syndromes. The evolution of modern civilization has reached a point at which the equilibrium, or the adequate adjustment of some individuals and groups cannot be attained except in the following two ways: (a) by a resurrection of the primitive instinctive and emotional forces of the mind, and (b) by a desperate effort to increase the control of consciousness and reason over all aspects of human behaviour. The former can be considered a syndrome of regressive group

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adjustment, the latter a syndrome of 'progressive adjustment'. But regressive (or to the right) and progressive (or to the left) have the same meaning when the movement starts from a state of flexible equilibrium. The main result is in both cases the same, a rigid organization of the pattern of human life. In the first case this was done in the name of the blind forces of instinct and feeling, in the second, in the name of the omniscient human reason.

Though this may over-simplify the whole problem, it would be useful to consider democracy as a group adjustment under conditions of ease, and totalitarianism as a group adjustment under conditions of stress. Hence the feelings of freedom involved in the democratic way of life and the feeling of effort and rigidity involved in the totalitarian way of life. This may serve as an answer to the questions whether, in Communist societies, individual freedom and the flexibility of the pattern of life are merely matters of time, and whether the individual born and brought up in these societies feels as free as the individual born in democracy. The truth is that the totalitarian way of life is the fruit of stress and anxiety. As such it contains in itself the seeds of rigidity; it can only develop within its own character, or collapse.

PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY

History was my main source of information. The Athenian community and civilization, the beginning of American society, the French Revolution and certain aspects of modern British civilization furnished the material for the democratic way of life. The German community under the Nazi régime and contemporary Soviet society formed the empirical basis for the study of the Fascist and Communist way of life. Certain aspects in the evolution of the modern Western world, the evolution of the working class in particular, also added material for the study of Communism.

This approach to a psychological subject seems anachronistic in our experimentalist era. An experiment with small social groups in the manner of Lewin or Moreno would have perhaps carried greater conviction for many psychologists. I toyed with the idea for quite a while and finally I had to give it up. The reasons are many. First, I could not help recognizing that with regard to the democratic way of life and even to the mental structure of the democratic personality I have learned much more from Tocqueville, Edmund Burke, Max Weber, Sombart and F. H. Knight than from Lewin and Moreno. As for the Communist and the Fascist ways of life and personality types, I had in front of me the published works of the leading representatives of these movements as well as the living examples of Soviet and Nazi societies. More useful were my own experiences, for I have

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

lived successively under three political régimes: democracy up to 1938, Fascism from 1938 to 1944, and Communism from 1944 to 1948. As I was keenly interested in, and often deeply involved in, the political life of my country of birth (Rumania), my own experiences have offered significant material for the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life. The experiences gathered from my diplomatic missions in various Western countries have also furnished material for the present study.

The experiments set up to demonstrate the specific type of organization and authority in a democratic or authoritarian group revealed less, and that in a much more confusing manner, than what I previously knew from the observation of everyday life and from the study of various democratic and totalitarian civilizations. It seems that the psychologists and the sociologists concerned with this approach are much more interested in trying out a method—the experimental method—than in the furthering of human knowledge in this field. The instrument has become more important than what it is supposed to serve. Thus I soon discovered that it was a feeling of reality that led my way towards history in order to study some important aspects of group behaviour. This gave me the opportunity of studying the patterns of life of various groups on a natural scale, and in their most accomplished forms. I could select my examples of democratic and totalitarian societies in a manner which enabled me to arrive at an idea about the main sociological and psychological factors characteristic of the two ways of life. After I had thus framed my concepts of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life I subsequently made use of the main results furnished by recent psychological researches on this matter, based on experiments, tests, questionnaires, interviews and clinical observation. The main results obtained by the analysis of various democratic and totalitarian societies were on the whole supported and completed by those obtained by the methods mentioned above. I found this proceeding useful, and if the present study has a message it is to persuade the social psychologist to appeal as often as possible to history; in the historical forms of various civilizations he will find a fertile ground for the study of human social life.

METHODS

I started the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life by the analysis of a series of concrete cases of democratic and totalitarian civilization. My main aim was, however, to use these specific social forms as empirical ground for investigating into the nature of democracy and totalitarianism. I have, therefore, consciously attempted to build up 'ideal types' of democracy and

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totalitarianism. One can say that, at this stage of my study, I applied the method of 'phenomenological reduction', that is, from the mass of empirical data, sociological and psychological, I gradually proceeded towards the determination of a few central features characteristic of the democratic or totalitarian ways of life. I may have been arbitrary, I may have made mistakes, but the conviction—that this was the best way of organizing a rich and often incoherent material offered by the study of history did not for a moment leave me throughout my work on the present study. Thus, I have found that the processes of social and cultural flexibility, or rationalization and of minimization of power are characteristic of all democratic societies. The processes of social and cultural rigidity, of the 'emotionalization' or super-rationalization of life and that of the concentration of power are, on the other hand, characteristic of all modern totalitarian societies.

I did not stop here in my search for the ideal type. Aiming at finding terms by which to cover sociological, psychological and spiritual phenomena, I defined democracy as an ethical way of life. Human personality and personal relations form the basis of the scale of value in such a society. The essence of democracy is human dialogue. Thus, I tried to point out the futility of defining democracy in terms of liberal economy. A way of life based on economic values is basically individualistic and as such it cannot form the essence of democracy. It was only during the liberal period of Europe that *homo economicus* put on an ethical mask. Thus, he worked himself into believing that by pursuing his own interests he aimed at the happiness of the many. Democracy is not a purely religious way of life either, for, this is based on 'logos', the absorption of the human essence into a transcendental order.* A balance between the divine and secular order was necessary in order to make a democratic way of life possible. And finally, democracy is not a political way of life, the essence of which lies in the external character of social authority. Strong quasi-religious and political elements are found in a totalitarian way of life. But what really constitutes the essence of totalitarianism is its complete impermeability to an ethical way of life as described above.

In order to complete the picture of the ideal types, I described democracy as a way of life dominated by the feelings of ease and

*Rousseau, who in many ways represents the type of personality characteristic of the modern period of democratization, wants to be 'in dialogue' with God. 'Je voulais que Dieu m'eût dit ce qu'il n'avait pas dit à d'autres' says his *Vicaire Savoyard*. Relationships of interdependence, if not of equality, between man and God form an important feature in the pattern of the Reformation. Angelus Silesius expresses this boldly: 'I know that without me God cannot exist for a single second.'

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

naturalness which arose from a certain harmony in the pattern of life. The Greek term *eukosmia* and what the French mean by *douceur des mœurs* are adequate expressions of this state of affairs. The totalitarian way of life is, on the other hand pervaded by extreme emotions, by the feeling of effort and rigidity, and by the tension aroused by an ambivalent attitude—the feeling of unlimited power alternates with the feeling of impotence, the feeling of insecurity is carefully covered by an inflated sense of adventure, the fear of chaos is strongly repressed by rigid organization.

Empirically minded sociologists and psychologists may find fault with a certain detachment from facts and a certain tendency towards abstract thinking displayed throughout this study. I can only say that this was necessarily implied in my approach. Here I touch upon another point regarding the method used in this study. My approach was integralist. I wished in the first place to see the democratic, the Fascist and the Communist ways of life as parts of a whole, or as stages in the unfolding of the historical process of contemporary civilization.

I have avoided any 'reductionist' view of democracy and totalitarianism and of contemporary European civilization in general. The temptation was great to consider the economic process, as Marx did, or the religious factors, as Max Weber did, as the basis of modern civilization and to infer from this the psychological changes in modern man. But this would have implied that I, as a social psychologist, know much more than I do in fact know. That is to say, I know that one specific factor of modern civilization can be considered as the originator or the cause of others. This assumption forms the basis of a reductionist point of view. I refrained as much as possible from any reductionist attitude, be it called economism, idealism, sociology—in the manner of Karl Mannheim for instance—or even psychology. I do not know, for instance, whether a series of sociological phenomena characteristic of the process of democratization preceded in time or whether they caused the psychological phenomena characteristic of the same process. I have considered the historical process as a whole and pointed to its various aspects, economic, sociological, spiritual and psychological, without assuming that they determined each other in a specific manner and order. My assumptions were that they belong to a structure and that they are conditioned by the whole to which they belong.

A reductionist attitude requires metaphysical ferment and a considerable power of belief which I do not possess. Throughout this study I was unable to decide which is more important in the historical process, the sociological or the psychological factors, society or the individual. If I have to say something about this problem, my con-

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viction is that behind all this—the individual, society, psychological and sociological factors—there lies the process of history itself which in its unfolding relies at one time on individual, at others on supra-individual factors. How to understand the structure of history, in which human personality is a basic factor, was one of my chief concerns throughout this study. It can, therefore be said that the study of democracy and totalitarianism has been carried out in the function of two variables only, culture-pattern and type of personality.

What I have just said is connected with a certain point in my approach, namely, with my political prejudices. It is only fair to say that I started the present study with strong prejudices for democracy. And although these prejudices have not diminished in vigour, yet with the advance of the present study they became mingled with the conviction that the totalitarian forms of our times sprang up from the historical process by a certain necessity. I am referring to the psychological and moral concept of necessity. Consequently as true child of my age I became partly resigned before, and partly terrified by the 'monster' of history. I seem to read in a new context the meaning of the ancient myth: Chronos creating, and then eating his own offspring. Sometimes this inner tension burst out in emotional attitudes and value judgements.

Before closing this introduction I feel I have to mention the extent to which I am aware of the main shortcomings of the present study. The canvas on which I chose to paint was too large; my ability to deal with historical facts was often too limited, and the extent to which I could rely on psychological research in this field was insignificant. I can sum up all these difficulties by saying that the nearer I came to the end of this study the more I realized that I was at the beginning. It is with this feeling that I closed the last chapter.

CHAPTER ONE

The Democratic Way of Life

'Our city is thrown open to the world.'

PERICLES

DEMOCRACY AS A FRAME OF MIND

DEMOCRACY as a political concept can be described in terms of methods or techniques of government. 'We are called a Democracy', says Pericles in his funeral speech, 'for the administration is in the hands of the many, and not of the few'. Formulae such as government of, by, and for the people, the sovereignty of the people, universal suffrage, popular and responsible government, and others are often used for the description of democracy.

But in spite of this rich and colourful collection of formulae, anyone attempting to define democracy has an almost impossible task. The reason for this lies in the fact that the validity of all fundamental concepts normally involved in such a definition has been seriously challenged by the various historical conditions in which democracy has been realised. Even Aristotle, while agreeing that the main feature of democracy consists in 'the election of magistrates by all, out of all', becomes involved in a discussion about the meaning of the concept of 'the many'. Finally he has to specify that the many who rule in a democracy 'are also poor', while the rich, who govern in aristocracy, are 'at the same time few in number'.*

Today it would be easy to prove that decisions taken by 'the many'—who are also poor—are not necessarily democratic. During the last century some absolutist monarchs were in favour of extending the right to vote to the propertyless classes in the hope that they would be more conservative, i.e., more in favour of the absolutist régime, than the well-to-do classes.

The results of a series of modern 'plebiscites' lead inevitably to the conclusion that universal suffrage, or decisions taken by majorities, are but political instruments which can serve democracy as well as other forms of government. One has therefore to take into account a number of factors influencing the behaviour of the people in political matters in order to specify under what conditions the majority act democratically. Thus one has to specify first of all that the concept of

**Politics*. Transl. Benjamin Jowett. Clarendon Press, IV, p. 152.

majority enters into the definition of democracy only to the extent to which the many possess, and know how to make use of, political power in their community. This obviously means something more than a simple political equality contained in the formula 'one man one vote'.

Self-government is undoubtedly an essential feature of democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, amongst others, lays particular stress on this. In the people's interest and participation in the life of their community, in their wish and capacity to conduct their own affairs, he sees not only the spring, but also the main guarantee of democracy. On this point he goes so far as to distinguish between self-government and good government, i.e., government carried on by an enlightened group in the best interest of the people. A democratic reform, or democratic action in general, has to 'be brought about not only with the assent of the people, but by their hand'.*

Now this is obviously true, but it requires certain qualifications. In order to make their society 'by their hand' the members of a group have to possess considerable experience in, and knowledge of, public administration. They need also certain institutions which allow them to take a share in the making of their society. But they need something more than this; they need a specific *frame of mind*, that is, certain experiences, attitudes, prejudices and beliefs shared by them all, or by a large majority.

1. One of the basic traits of the democratic frame of mind can be described as the feeling of change. The feeling shared by the members of a community that their personal and their communal life as well are in a state of permanent transformation and readjustment forms, so to speak, the first category of the democratic frame of mind. Owing to this the individual regards his society as an *open* structure, ready to keep pace with the process of general change, and with the changes taking place in its members in the first place. We classify this trait of the democratic frame of mind as a feeling, because of its general and undifferentiated nature. Considering its origins one can call it also a habit of mind, that particular habit of mind, shared by the majority of the members of a group, to adjust themselves, and to adjust the structure of their society, to the ever-changing conditions of life.

It is obvious that individuals could not have acquired such a habit had they not lived through periods of considerable historical change. Thus democratic régimes are normally preceded by periods of great change which affect the structure of society as a whole. Greek democracies followed a period of radical transformation in the structure of Greek societies. During the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. there took

**On the State of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789*. Transl. Henry Reeve, London, 1873, p. 203.

place the transition from the primitive patriarchal to an aristocratic social organization. A period of great change started then, which culminated with Cleisthenes' political reforms. New colonies and big cities were founded, new classes and ways of life made their appearance. A similar historical pattern applies to the Western world in the period preceding the rise of modern democracies. The Renaissance is but the apex of a long process of change. High above all new forms of life stands the capitalist economy which, because of its rapid development, induces in many individuals—in the inhabitants of the town in particular—the feeling of change, novelty and social growth. There was a flow of new things, new ideas, new aspirations and new forms of life for which one needed not only an open mind, but an open and fluid social pattern to integrate them all.

It is this feeling of change and social dynamism which formed the basic element in the mind of the first emigrants to America who, after cutting off all their connexions with the old society, made full use of it in building up the first modern democracy. In France there was needed a revolution before this frame of mind, of which the feeling of permanent change and transformation was a component, found expression in new social institutions. In England the process was slow, but obviously in the same direction.

The individual belonging to post-Renaissance societies had to develop to a maximum his capacity for adjustment to change and novelty. It is because of this that the feeling of change becomes a fundamental category of his mind. Sometimes the effects of this feeling remain unconscious, at other times they are projected at the conscious level as a theoretical construct. Thus the same feeling of change which was a basic trait of the democratic frame of mind, became articulated in a theory of evolution or a philosophy of progress. It is easy to prove the existence of such a phenomenon in modern culture-patterns, for there is no other period in human history in which a greater concern is shown with the rational formulation of the phenomena of change and evolution. In the early stage of this period Vico made an attempt towards the articulation of this deep mental category of modern man in a philosophy of history; later on, Condorcet, in a philosophy of progress, and later still, Hegel did the same thing by laying the foundation of a logic of change and evolution. Though it is generally held that the Greeks were less aware of the changeable character of things, one can hardly say that their mind remained completely unaffected by the feeling of change. The philosophical doctrine of Heraclitus and Thucydides' profound sense of history are characteristic from this point of view.

On the social plane the feeling of change is articulated in the conviction, and in the social behaviour resulting from it, that society is

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an open structure in a state of permanent readiness for change. 'Our city is thrown open to the world' says Pericles about his democratic Athens.

2. The feeling of change cannot be regarded as an isolated trait; the social and cultural behaviour generated by it is moulded by other categories of the democratic frame of mind. Thus, the feeling of change and any other category of the democratic frame of mind are parts of a whole.

The individuals who create or live in a democracy not only hold the belief that their society is in perpetual change, but also that this change is the direct result of their own activities. Consequently the feeling that society grows from within, by the activity of its members, individuals and corporate bodies, can be considered as another category of the democratic frame of mind.

Like the feeling of change, the feeling that the growth of society is determined from within rests on a series of habits of mind formed in certain communities by a long historical process. The first condition leading to the formation of these habits of mind in some ancient Greek communities is to be found in that complex of factors which make up the so-called genius of the race. Suffice it to mention the Greeks' fondness for public meetings, and their creative capacity in the field of social relations, in order to prove this point. But there were a series of other, more concrete, factors which contributed to the formation of these habits of mind. Most important of all is the rise and development of the middle classes in Athens, which was accomplished by the beginning of the fifth century. To these classes belonged individuals who reached and preserved their position in the existing society by their work and intelligence; moreover it was due primarily to the specific activities carried on by these individuals that new forms of life appeared in the midst of an old patriarchal society. It was therefore only natural for these individuals to possess in a higher degree than others the feeling that society on the whole grows from within by the activities of its own members. The kind of activity they led awakened in them earlier than in other sub-groups the conviction that they are the creators of their society.

There is another aspect of the Greek society of that period that contributed towards the formation of the belief that the structure of society is based on the participation of its members. This consists in the need and the effective experience of social co-operation which stood at the origin of the type of organization known as the *Polis*. The *Polis* arose as the union of several rural settlements representing tribal groups and families.* This would have been impossible

*The process is known as 'Synoecism'. A. Croiset: *Les Democraties antiques*. Paris, Flammarion, Ed. 1909, p. 275.

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without a long and successful experience in co-operation and co-ordinated social action, which, we presume, resulted in the feeling that society was in a high degree a matter of common activity and agreements dictated by the nature of common interests and experience.

In European societies, the source of these habits of mind is to be found in the experience gained by the inhabitants of the towns in the administration of their common affairs. The administrative autonomy of the towns is a characteristic feature of Western medieval society. In England the system of local autonomy was preserved throughout the modern era. It is therefore little wonder that the 'bourgeois' played such an important part in the building up of Western democratic societies. For, like the Greek member of the middle classes, the modern bourgeois possesses in a high degree the feeling that he can, not only conduct, but even create his own society.

It is not too difficult to find how the belief that society is a matter of co-operation originated in the mind of modern man. The need for, and the experience of co-operation among various social groups, divided and antagonized by a system of privileges, against an autocratic monarch formed in fact an important feature in the rise of modern societies and states. This was noticed throughout the rise of the British modern state, and formed at the same time the central motive in the prelude to the French Revolution. In the example of co-operation between the 'three orders' set forth in 1787, by the province of Dauphine, can be grasped the pattern of a new society resulting from the common activity of and agreements among its components, that is, of a society which builds up its form from within. It is this social pattern that lurked in the minds of the Pilgrim Fathers leaving the old Continent. When they settled down in America they put it into practice in its purest form. There was no constituted body or class within their small group; the individual had to be not only a soldier in the protection of his own society, but also a pioneer in the making of it. Later, the French Revolution repeated the same pattern when breaking down the old social order into its basic unity, the individuals, and subsequently trying to build up a new society from the network of individual relationships. The conviction that each individual is a maker of his own society constitutes a basic trait of a democratic frame of mind.*

*It is only fair to say that co-operation exists in any kind of society, democratic or non-democratic. But there are certain stages in the evolution of a society when co-operation becomes a highly conscious act and a first necessity for the evolution of the group. This normally happens when co-operation has to be established between heterogeneous factors, individuals or groups with different or conflicting interests. The need to compromise increases the awareness of the act of co-

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At the cultural level, this trait is articulated in various forms. In the feeling that each individual is, in his own way, an agent in the making of his society lies the seed of both the doctrine of equality and that of freedom. With regard to the former, we are only too aware that, in its most radical form as total equality, it is not necessarily a feature of democratic society. We cannot, however, help noticing that certain equalitarian conceptions arose in the culture-pattern of every community in process of democratization. In some communities, whose members showed particular inclinations towards rational thinking, such as the Athenian and the French communities, equality was worked out into an ideal concept and considered as specific to a democratic way of life. Equalitarian tendencies formed also a specific feature in the early American society. There they crystallized in the doctrine of equal rights, or more recently, in the concept of equal opportunities. Movements such as that initiated by the Levellers show clearly that the ideal of equality formed an important feature in the early stages in the democratization of the British community. The lure of such an ideal was, however, short-lived, owing mainly to the native inclination of the British people to empirical thinking. Equality was considered as an 'abstract right'.

As for the doctrine of freedom one can say that it can be found in every democratic culture-pattern. Its origins lie, as stated before, in the conviction that the structure of society is not based on a permanent and fixed order, and that, on the contrary, it results from the activity of each of its members, from their common experiences, from their interactions, deliberations and agreements. This conviction itself grows from a great variety of experiences in self-government which certain communities, or certain parts of a community, had gained. In Athens, the doctrine of freedom crystallized, at various stages of social evolution, in concepts such as: *isegoria* (equality of speech), *isonomia* (equality before the law), *isocratia* (political equality), *parrhesia* (equality and freedom of speech). In Western society its most typical crystallization is seen in the doctrine of economic liberalism, and in the conception that society is ultimately a matter of 'contract' which formed one of the basic ideological pre-requisites in the process of democratization of modern societies.

3. From what has been said so far one can easily infer that a democratic frame of mind contains also a specific attitude towards authority, as one of its categories. To start with, one can say that

operation. The co-operation between various tribal groups in the structure of the *Polis* is a case in point. Co-operation between highly differentiated social groups is found in the process of democratization of both French society—co-operation between the three estates—and American society.

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the basic element of this attitude consists in a feeling of the instability and relativity of power and authority. This aspect of the democratic frame of mind would perhaps be better understood if it were described as the awareness, present in various degrees in the members of a certain community, that the holding of power and authority implies the concession made by one part to another part of the community. In other words it implies a process of delegation.

As for the historical context of this trait one can say that the feeling of the unstable and relative character of political power was certainly aroused by those periods of rapid transformation and social unrest preceding some democracies. The contest of power between the Eupatrids and the kings, on the one hand, and among the Eupatrids themselves, on the other, had certainly something to do with the presence of this feeling in the minds of the Athenians. The same can be said about the struggle between the European aristocracy and monarchy, and between the Church and State. But this is not all. On the contrary, it would be easy to prove that in certain circumstances the contests of power, and social instability do not necessarily lead to the feeling of the relative character of authority. The formation of this specific attitude towards authority in Western man is in fact determined by a complex of circumstances. Most important of all is the process of secularization which, as will be shown later, shook the foundation of absolute authority in the mind of modern man.

Interpreting the process of democratization as it took place on the Continent—in France in particular—one is often inclined to believe that the feeling of the relative character of power and authority, so characteristic of modern man, comes mainly as a reaction from the absolutist régime preceding the democratic era. Thus the early meaning of democracy was ‘no more than opposition to the privileges of the old powers, the clergy and the feudal nobility; hence the negation of those values which served to uphold their position.’* In fact, the reaction against permanent and absolutist power constitutes only one element in the composition of the democratic attitude towards authority and power. This lies at the basis of that aspect of the democratic attitude towards authority which has been called ‘negative freedom’, and which is in fact a natural outcome of the struggle for liberation from an authoritarian régime. In this respect one has to recognize that the democratic attitude towards power and authority contains the seeds of anarchy which may grow into trees wherever the soil is favourable. There is no need to prove this by examples.

*A. von Martin, *The Sociology of the Renaissance*. Kegan Paul, London 1945, p. 4.

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But, as just stated, this is only one aspect—the negative one—of the democratic attitude towards authority. The social experience leading towards the rise of modern democracies shows clearly that the attitude towards authority could not be exclusively negative. The authority based on absolute power was undoubtedly negated, but another type of authority took its place. This is the internal authority of reason and conscience. One can speak in this case about a displacement of authority which is characteristic of modern man; the confidence in, and reliance on external and divine authority was gradually transformed into confidence in, and reliance on the powers of human reason and conscience.

But human reason and conscience are not social authority in themselves. Here comes an important point in the formation of that aspect of the democratic frame of mind which refers to the nature of social authority. The experiences in self-government, in building up new social forms and groups, characteristic of some modern Western communities, implanted in the individual the conviction that the authority based on the principles of the human mind—logical and moral—can be imparted to other individuals by deliberation. The same experiences implanted also the conviction that the authority founded on the individual's reason can be concentrated by an act of common will, and conferred as such upon a man, a party, or an institution. In other words, authority can be represented.

Therefore, the essence of the democratic attitude towards authority consists in the concept of inner and individualized authority. This authority can be concentrated by agreement and conferred upon a representative. Hence the social order is a representative order. It ought also to be said that authority is conferred, yet never entirely transferred. This is due to the conviction shared by every individual member of a democratic community, that he himself is an agent in the making of his society; hence the exercise of social power is to him an act of agreement by deliberation, rather than an act of assenting. Whenever a community of people is ready to transfer power and authority to a leader or a party there is an obvious proof that they lack the democratic frame of mind, even when this transfer is carried out by impeccable democratic methods. The best example of this kind is furnished by the German people of today. They once transferred the power to Hitler, and the great numbers of votes given to Adenauer in September 1953 give us ground to believe that they are ready to repeat the act. It is either the people's lack of confidence that they can create their own society 'by their hand,' or the existence of other factors that make it difficult for them to resist the transference of power and its concentration in the hands of a few.

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The articulation on the social plane of the feeling of the relative and representative character of power and authority is seen in the doctrine and practice of the division and balance of power, in the decentralization and minimization of power which are, in one form or another, present in all modern democracies.

4. The last category of the democratic frame of mind can be described as an attitude of confidence in reason. But before saying anything on this account we have to recognize the fact that we are aware of the existence of a widespread opinion according to which a democratic way of life must necessarily be rooted in an empirical attitude to life. It would follow from this that the organization of social life according to a rational order is the very opposite of democracy. British society is often mentioned as an example which proves the close connexion between empirical thinking and democracy.

But when we speak about the democratic frame of mind we are only secondarily interested in the cultural or ideological aspect of democracy. It is true that some democratic nations are addicted to an empirical and some others to a rational way of thinking. But this difference is not as deep as is often thought. For the action of a free individual in a flexible society is always carried out on the deep—often unconscious—presupposition that this action will be finally adjusted to an harmonious social pattern based on reason. This is what we mean here by the feeling of confidence in reason; it is a constitutional element of the individual's mind which sometimes is manifested—at the cultural level—as the cult of reason, at other times as a strong conviction that 'an invisible hand' leads man on to the right path. Very often it appears as blind confidence in order, the very opposite of the fear of instability and chaos.

Since we have to come back later to the problem of the relationship between reason and democracy, we must try now to answer the question: How did this category of the democratic frame of mind originate in modern society? While we retain a purely psychological point of view, it is necessary to start by saying that the feeling of confidence in reason is necessary as a balancing factor in the mind of the individual who has to adjust himself to a world of change and novelty; it is necessary for this individual to develop the belief that there is an order and stability behind the change, and that there are certain regulative principles which put a check upon change. Therefore free individual action and flexible, open, and even atomized society are for this type of man not only possible but even safe since they obey a certain fundamental order. Whatever the change may be, certain basic principles, certain 'fundamental human rights' have to be respected. This deep conviction is knit into the ideological

pattern of many democracies.* British democracy seems to be an exception. But in the light in which we here regard the democratic frame of mind, this exception seems to be only apparent. For, while in other communities the individuals show their confidence in a set of principles expressed by a rational doctrine, in the British community they place their confidence in a form of practical reason, in a set of norms, traditions, 'prejudices' and 'prescriptions'. While in the former case the change is checked and guided by the order of reason, in the latter, the 'expediency' has to compromise with the 'permanent' order stored in a body of prejudices and prescriptions. It is the confidence in this order that compensates for the need to adjust to a world of change and novelty. If one replaces the expression 'confidence in reason' by 'confidence in a fundamental order', this often overstressed difference between British and other democratic frames of mind becomes considerably diminished.

Individuals living in a world of rapid change, and in a dynamic social structure in particular, develop, apart from the feeling of confidence in a fundamental order, habits of mind which facilitate an adequate adjustment to a changeable environment. This is another important source of the need for reason in modern man. For reason is that complex of mental functions or habits by which the individual is able to grasp the unity in diversity, and the order in change. Reason presupposes a high degree of mental flexibility which enables the individual to compare things, to establish differences and identities, and finally to compromise. New events demand new relations, and consequently readjustment.

At the root of this type of adjustment one can certainly find the belief that there is a certain order in the nature of things. This belief was, as we have seen, displayed by both the Greek and modern man. On the other hand, this type of adjustment would hardly have been possible without the feeling of confidence in the ability of humankind, and without a strong feeling of security, both individual and collective.

To account for the feeling of security one has to start from the fact that the historical periods leading to democratization are periods of progress and prosperity. There is no need to bring proofs in the support of this assertion with regard to Athenian, British and American societies. And though the same thing can be said about Western society as a whole, during the post-Renaissance period, many people are still inclined to think that the economic frustration

*Tocqueville rightly notices that the democratic nations are fond of general ideas. The democratic historians resort much more often to 'general causes' than the aristocratic historian. (*Democracy in America*. Transl. by H. Reeve. N.Y. Alfred A. Knopf, Chap. XX.)

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of the French lower class was one of the main factors leading to the democratic changes initiated by the Revolution. This is not, however, the opinion held by Tocqueville—and he was followed by many others—who proves that the period immediately preceding the Revolution was on the whole marked by considerable prosperity. It can therefore be safely said that it was this general state of prosperity that first aroused in man confidence in himself and in his society.*

There is a strong sense of security, both individual and collective, involved in any process of democratization. This will come out clearly from what we have to say at a later stage. For the moment it will be enough to point out that this sense of security is aroused by the expanding character of society, and by the conviction, shared by many individuals, that the human mind is flexible enough to organize the experience in any field of reality. This flexible character of the mind is expressed by a particular structure whose function it is to relate the data of environment, to compromise between their various aspects, to organize them so as to make adjustment possible. This structure has been called reason; today one can speak about intelligence, or the ego, as fulfilling approximately the same functions. We shall see later that the mental structures which can be called reason, intelligence, or the ego have gradually come into the foreground of the mental life of modern man. They are the most suitable tools for adjustment to a flexible society, and to a changeable universe.

The confidence in reason being a basic category of the democratic frame of mind is manifested in a great variety of forms at the social and cultural levels. Most aspects of the democratic culture-pattern are deeply affected by rational thinking. Even more striking is the fact that any democratic period is marked by a general tendency towards rationalizing the field of social relations. In any democratic community the conviction is widely spread that society can be organized rationally, that the people meeting together and deliberating upon their own interests can find common goals and ways of action which make an equal appeal to every one of them. It can further be said that every democratic community is founded on the conviction of its capacity for self-legislation, the conviction that any diversity of interests can finally be solved in a compromise, that any new experience can be dealt with in a general scheme of action. The first Puritans landing on the barren coast of New England (1620) had the strong conviction that, by their combination into a 'body politick', they could 'enact, constitute, and frame such

*". . . in no one of the periods which followed the Revolution of 1789 has the national prosperity of France augmented more rapidly than it did in the twenty years preceding that event' (*The State of Society* . . . p. 212.)

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just and equal laws, ordinances and acts, constitutions and offices, *from time to time*, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony . . .’*

PSYCHE AND HISTORY

We have begun the study of democracy with the description of the democratic frame of mind, and thus established that its main traits consist in the feeling of change, in the deep conviction that the individuals make their society ‘by their hands’, in the relative and representative character of power and authority, and in the confidence in reason. In doing so we have left the impression that democracy is a purely psychological reality. This may be true, but it would be wrong to understand by this that democracy, ancient or modern, or the democratic way of life in general, sprang up from the mind of some particular individuals and groups, like Athena from Zeus’s head. What we really mean when we say that democracy is a psychological reality is that any democratic institution, and any democratic organization, is prepared by a series of inclinations, feelings, convictions and habits of thinking in the mind of the people long before its historical realization. At a certain period, and in a certain historical context these mental elements are translated into institutions and modes of social behaviour which together form a democratic society and a democratic way of life. This happened in various Greek communities and in various modern nations. We are prepared to go even farther and say that, when this frame of mind is lacking, democratic institutions cannot grow; if they are introduced from outside they are likely to be mutilated or to disappear altogether after a short time. The example of various Greek cities, where democracy was introduced by the Athenians (Samos), the example of Mexico, where the early American democratic institutions failed to take root, the unsuccessful attempt towards the democratization of Germany and of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, can be adduced as proofs. Democracy grows out of its own soil. This means that it requires specific experiences and specific mental changes in a community before appearing as historical reality.

But, on the other hand, one can say that the democratic frame of mind is itself an historical product. In the previous section we have endeavoured to show how the feelings, the dispositions, the beliefs and the habits of thought which make up the democratic frame of mind have grown out of a series of experiences characteristic of certain communities and certain historical periods. Thus, the conviction that society is a flexible and open structure, the confidence,

*From the constitutive act signed by this group of immigrants. Quot. from Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, p. 35. Italics ours.

common to the members of a group, that they can make their society by their hands, are mental products gradually built up in societies undergoing a process of rapid growth, in which there exists an intense process of co-operation between its members, and in which at least a number of the individuals have a considerable amount of experience in self-administration. This shows that the democratic frame of mind is itself determined by sociological factors, a fact which seems to contradict the assertion made in the previous paragraph that democracy is the product of a particular frame of mind.

We have obviously reached the heart of the dilemma, between sociology and psychology, which we lay no claim to have solved. We may, however, minimize the importance of this dilemma by the following formulation of our problem: It is obviously true that the democratic frame of mind developed as the result of a particular pattern of experiences. In modern societies these experiences are furnished by an expanding and rational economy, by quick social changes, and by certain political methods. But these experiences have no meaning in themselves. Moreover, in the flow of historical process they are more or less disconnected events. Here come the creative characters of the mind. The mental factors resulting from the experiences characteristic of a rational economy and of a changeable society formed an integrated structure with those resulting from the experiences in self-administration, social co-operation, etc. And it is the integration of these factors into a whole that forms the basic layer of a frame of mind and type of personality which can be called democratic. Thus, the members of some modern communities have gradually become aware—most of them have felt this unconsciously—that the type of social order which suits them best is a flexible society, a society open to changes according to the conditions of life of its members. But at the same time, the people became aware of something even more important, that they can realize this type of society for the simple reason that they discovered in themselves inclinations, feelings and habits of mind which directed them towards this end. They expressed this in a simple manner: A society based on flexible order, on the participation of every one of its members, a society capable of self-legislation, with a representative form of authority, in a word, a democratic society, was necessary because it corresponded to human nature. Apparently they were little aware of the fact that human nature, as they defined it, was formed by a long process and in specific historical conditions. In the following chapters we shall try to describe the main aspects of the social and spiritual world which contributed to the formation of the democratic mind and of the democratic way of life of modern European

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man. At the same time, we shall endeavour to throw light on an opposite process, how this mental nucleus of democracy grows up into history. The way a democratic frame of mind grows into history can be thought of in a manner similar to the way in which this first chapter grows into the present book.

CHAPTER TWO
A Flexible Society

Italy, always delighted by a new thing, has lost all stability
. . . ; a servant may easily become a king. AENEAS SYLVIUS

SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE FLEXIBILITY
OF MODERN EUROPEAN CULTURE-PATTERNS

IN what follows we propose to give a brief account of the most important economic changes in post-Renaissance Europe, in order to show the degree of flexibility acquired as a result by the socio-cultural patterns of various modern societies. It would perhaps be advisable to state from the very beginning that the flexibility of various European socio-cultural patterns is due to a complex process from which we detach the economic aspects for the time being.

Many sociologists, even those who cannot be called materialistically-minded, are inclined to describe in economic terms the main changes which have taken place in European civilization since the Renaissance. Consequently they speak of a new type of economy which grew up as a result of the Renaissance, and which has since dominated the modern way of life.

For Alfred von Martin, for instance, the medieval system of economy was based on small units, on 'the order of small men, peasants and artisans, who by the work of their hands earned their keep, in accordance with the necessities of their rank, their traditionally fixed needs.'*

The important fact should be noted that medieval economic activity, be it that of the 'small men' or of the landlords, is primarily agricultural. The typical economic unit is, as Max Weber calls it, the 'budgetary unit', meaning that both production and exchange are oriented towards, and limited by, the immediate necessities of consumption. The individual is completely dependent upon the group for his subsistence, while the group itself is dependent upon long, traditionally organized modes of economic activity. Therefore, the whole system provides both the individual and the group with only a small degree of freedom in their respective spheres of activity.

It is against this background that the modern capitalist economy

**Op. cit.*, p. 8.

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developed. The first step consists in the accumulation of large fortunes due to a series of historical circumstances, the commerce between European cities and foreign lands being the most important. The new type of fortune is measured, not in land, but in money. This lays the foundation of a new type of economic system. First of all, the basic economic unit in such a system is no longer the budgetary unit, but the profit-making unit or enterprise. Consumption no longer sets a limit to production. On the contrary, the chief tendency is to increase production above the level of consumption for commercial reasons. Production should be market-oriented, adapted less and less to the consumers' needs—which have in time become themselves conditioned by production, that is, manufactured—and more and more to competition with other profit-making units. The man belonging to this type of economy is, as Werner Sombart says, dominated by rational gain-seeking (*Gewinnstreben*), a fact that differentiates him sharply from the man belonging to a pre-capitalist age. Thus, the new economic order has gradually changed important aspects in the structure of man and of his society. New drives have been instilled into the way of life of European communities which resulted in a high development of the flexibility and dynamism of their social and cultural structures. Rationalization and competition are among the most important of these drives.

Since a full examination of these aspects of modern civilization is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter, we would rather focus our attention on the following specific questions: How can one account for the fact that the economic order based on profit-making enterprise uses the individual as its operational unit, thus turning the whole economic system and the whole way of life into a field of competition, emulation and rivalry between individuals? How can one account for the fact that the old economic order, based on guild organization, with price fixing and compulsory corporate activity, became broken down in the modern era, into as many units as there were individuals with initiative? In other words, how does the new economic order become individualized?

The first answer to these questions is suggested by the rational character of a profit-making enterprise. The enterprise consists in an organized action towards an end, implying choice of means and the possibility of calculating the value of each step towards the achievement of the end. What really matters is the end in view, and for this, prominence is given to the individual's initiative and abilities, rather than to his birth and rank. In no other historical period has human society been dominated by stronger and better defined rational ends than these. For their fulfilment, no socio-cultural factor is required, no particular faith, no particular ideology, no

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status, save two factors inherent in the ends themselves: money and intelligence. Intelligence is purely formal in character, its main function is to weigh and organize any circumstances of life which may lead to the chosen end.

The individualizing tendencies in the economic order are expressed first of all in the system of ownership. Max Weber considers, for instance, the expropriation of workers from the means of production, taking place at the beginning of the modern age, as one of the main aspects of the rationalization of economic activity. (By rationalization he means chiefly the organization of an activity in the view of a maximum of efficiency.) Whether this phenomenon has in the long run proved to be rational, is a debatable question. But it has certainly proved the value of the individual as a centre of initiative in the economic field, and in more than one way. It has, in the first place, proved the superiority of the individual owner of the means of production over the medieval corporate group. This superiority is measured in rapidity of decision, in willingness to accept risks, and, on the whole, in the owner's capacity to harmonize his effort with the intrinsic requirements of the profit-making enterprise. For it is generally agreed that many commercial and industrial enterprises were built up by the savings of thrifty individuals. The system of dividends, for instance, is often regarded as a method of rewarding abstention from immediate satisfaction, and thus as an incentive for increasing the original capacity of enterprise by building up an ever-growing working capital. Collective management and ownership cannot adapt themselves so rapidly and thoroughly to the conditions required by the efficiency of enterprise.

The very same process of expropriation of workers from the means of production resulted in the loosening of the ties between the individual and his community of work on the one hand, and his society in general on the other. This is mainly due to the rôle played by money in the new economic order which gradually created a new type of social integration. Both the owners, as profit-makers, and the workers, as wage-earners, have to a great extent reduced their social bonds to those which could be expressed in terms of money. In what follows we shall deal with the part played by money in the evolution of the modern economic order, and of modern society in general. But before anything else, we have to say that our interest is confined to the two following aspects of this important problem. To what extent has money contributed to the rationalization of modern European societies; and to what extent has its influence rendered the patterns of these societies more flexible, therefore more liable to democratization?

As we have already mentioned, the rationalization of an action

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consists of its organization towards a maximum of efficiency. The process of rationalization presupposed the following conditions: (a) clear ends in action, (b) freedom of choice among alternative means (assured in the economic field by free markets), (c) a minimum of waste, (d) systematic control over the various steps and conditions of action. Since all these presuppose the capacity to calculate, money is obviously the most adequate means of rationalization of human action in general and of economic action in particular. The reason for this is that money offers the greatest possibility of calculating the elements and the stages of action in order to increase its efficiency. When the components of an action and their interrelations are expressed in money that action reaches a maximum of rationality. In this case the pattern of action is reduced to money-accounting, which is obviously an ideal example of rational action.

The rational organization of economic action has gradually become a prototype of organization in modern society as a whole. Calculability and efficiency have become the dominant norms in the evolution of this society.

The following points are relevant concerning the part played by money in rendering the pattern of modern societies flexible.

A. There is no need to insist upon the flexibility of an economic order based on money as a means of exchange; it is enough to mention the difference in flexibility of transaction between natural and monetary economy or the rôle played by the 'budget' in the capacity of an economic unit to adjust itself to various conditions. Because of money, the process of exchange has become more flexible.

B. The relationship between the individual and his community is affected by the increased importance of money in modern societies. First, the relationship between the individual and the State became more flexible and objective when they began to be arranged in terms of money. This is shown in the individual's obligations to the State, paid in income-tax, as compared with his duties towards the landlord, in a feudal system.

C. Money was often used as a means of buying liberty for the individual, that is, the periodic duties towards the landlord were paid once and for all, in a round sum of money. The social status of the individual was radically changed by this. Money was used to buy freedom not only for the individual, but sometimes for a whole community. The case of Louis XIV who commercialized the municipal liberties of the French towns is well known.

D. Money induces a high degree of flexibility not only in the relationships between individuals and the State, but also in human relationships in general. A relationship between individuals stated in terms of money gains in flexibility because it can be more adequately

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defined than any other kind of human relation. First, it lasts only as long as money is involved, as long as there are paying and paid agents. Second, the engaged parties are psychologically dependent on one another only to the extent to which they are paid, or to which they pay. Their personality can remain outside the system of relationships. Thus the relationship between employer and employed is in principle not one of domination-submission, but one of a formal and impersonal system of obligations on both sides.

E. Money has considerably intensified the process of individualization which is so characteristic of the modern way of life. Work, ability, consumption, etc. when expressed in money become so flexible that one could fix the place of every individual in the dimensions described by them. This makes it possible to differentiate between the individual members of the group, and consequently brings a high degree of formal freedom. On the other hand, it brings a widening of the socio-cultural space, creating specific scope for the personality of each individual. This, as we shall see later on, is an important condition of democratization.

F. Under the impact of money, every human relationship tends to become a 'transaction'. This allows greater opportunity for the individual to find his right place in a net of relationships. It also allows more scope for change and improvement in the pattern of social relationships. It is not by chance that the theoretical founders of modern democracies stress the 'transactional' or the 'contractual' character of human society, and of the State in particular.

G. There is another aspect of the impact of money upon modern life brilliantly analysed by George Simmel (*Philosophie des Geldes*). This can be stated briefly as the supremacy of the category of *quantity* in modern civilization. The tendency characteristic of modern science to look at the quantitative aspect of phenomena is at least partly a result of this trend. The idea of steady progress by adding new small quantities to the old stock is another aspect of the same phenomenon. Most suggestive is Simmel's opinion that democracy, with its central concept of majority, is a financial conception of life. It is number that counts. In this way the author attempts to link democracy with a specific economic system. This perspective is, in our own view, far too narrow.

H. Much more significant for a democratic way of life is the lack of the 'formal character of money'. (Simmel.) Money knows no social norms; it tends to confer power and prestige to anyone who possesses it, no matter what his class and status. Because of this particular quality, money produced in a relatively short period a real revolution in a society rigidly organized for centuries. During and particularly, after, the Renaissance the individual could move

upwards and downwards within his own society according to his luck. Thus money has infused the development of modern societies with a new tempo. This caused not only flexibility, but even instability in the structure of these societies. Even by the time of Renaissance, Aeneas Sylvius seems to have grasped the essence of the era opening up under his eyes when writing about his own country: 'Italy, always delighted by a new thing, has lost all stability . . . ; a servant may easily become a king.'*

Now let us pass on to the second aspect of the modern economic order which contributed to the flexibility of the pattern of modern societies, thus preparing the ground for democracy. This consists in the competitive character of modern economic activity.

The sources of the modern competitive spirit lie in the gain-seeking which constitutes one of the central features of the modern economic system. Because of this drive, the rigid medieval economic order was gradually transformed into a fluid structure in which the individual's position was determined by his capacity to resist and to break the attack of his competitors.

There are two aspects of the evolution of the modern competitive spirit which deserve special attention because of their close connexion with the flexibility of the pattern of modern societies: (1) Competition as the driving force of economic activity, and (2) competition as an 'ideal' or as a regulative principle of modern life.

1. Competition is originally a technique indispensable to profit-making enterprise. This means that the main motive of economic activity is the drive for profit, and that one of the principal methods of achieving this is competition. But owing to a series of factors inherent in the modern economic system, competition has become in itself a motive of economic action (an autonomous motive). This would imply that one can act economically for competition's sake, or, for the values involved in the struggle with other individuals, and for the prospective pleasure of winning over one's opponent. Some economists go so far as to define the essence of economic activity in modern society, as a 'competitive game'.† This seems to us to give an exaggerated importance to the competitive spirit in modern capitalist society. In fact, the central motive of economic action in this society has always been to get as large an income as possible. But this, nevertheless, shows clearly the fact that one of the most characteristic aspects of the modern economic order consists of a perpetual race between the individual members of a community. It also shows the dynamic and flexible character of a society based on such an economic system.

*Quot. from von Martin, *op. cit.* p. 5.

†F. H. Knight, *The Ethics of Competition*, Allen and Unwin, 1935.

2. It has been said very often that modern man is an economic man. This implies that his world-outlook and his culture-pattern are dominated by economic values. That is why many students of contemporary civilizations speak about economic action and values as ideals of life, and about economic or competitive ethics as the type of ethics prevailing in the contemporary world. We cannot enter into a discussion of this important aspect of contemporary life. For our present purpose it is enough to point to the undeniable fact that, in modern societies, economic value has gradually become an independent and finally a dominant value.

The first step towards the autonomy of economic value is the conviction, rooted in long practice, that economically-orientated action can more easily attain its own aims when separated from religious, political or moral considerations. Max Weber sees in this another characteristic aspect of the rational nature of capitalist economy. 'When economically orientated action', he writes 'is dominated by a religious faith, by warlike passions, or by attitudes of personal loyalty, and similar modes of orientation, the level of rational calculation is likely to be very low'.*

The explanation may vary, but the fact remains clear that the economic values and the economic style of life gain more and more independence, and finally supremacy in the modern world. As early as the beginning of the Renaissance in Italy, the Popes had to acquiesce in the fact that money-making, and finally the style of life created by the business man, had their place in society side by side with other styles of life such as that of the monk or of the warrior.

A definite victory for the economic values of modern civilization is won in the battle of the individual with the State, with the aim of freeing his economic actions from any constriction other than that imposed by a free market. In this process lies the origin of what has been called the negative aspect of modern liberty, the tendency characteristic of modern man to reduce to the lowest possible degree the function of the State and of government in his society so as to create as large as possible an arena of free competition between individuals.

This negative aspect of modern liberty—the withdrawal of the State—was strongly supported by a series of events taking place at the beginning of the modern era. Thus an avalanche of geographical and scientific discoveries has resulted in the loosening of the ties between the individual and his society. Moreover, these discoveries aroused in the individual the feeling of a permanently open frontier for his initiative and imagination. There, in the new

**Op. cit.*, p. 194.

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territories, social organization had a relatively small importance for the success of the individual's actions, which were, at least at the beginning, economic actions. This strengthened the feeling that 'getting ahead in the world' (Knight) as an individual is a supreme command for economic action and for life in general.

But the same events and strivings, characteristic of the economic order at the beginning of the modern era, aroused in modern man something much more significant from our particular point of view, the feeling of the fluid and provisional character of his society. Thus, the conviction that the individual could build up his own society wherever he goes became an important element of his mind. Everything depended entirely upon the capacity for agreeing with others.

Owing to the influence of the economic type of action, the whole of social life had a tendency to style itself after the model of the market. Today one very often uses the expressions 'market-society', or 'competitive society' in order to describe the particular features of modern society. This means, from our point of view, that the socio-cultural pattern of modern societies has been gradually divided up into as many units as there are individual members. Each individual member works on the assumption that getting ahead in the world as an individual, in competition with other individuals, is the supreme norm in life, and that the structure of society grows naturally out of the net of competitive actions. Society is, in fact, a huge compromise, a general contract.

In conclusion, one can say that, as a result of the competitive spirit and the drive of rationalization, new processes take place within European societies which hasten their democratization. First of all 'time' becomes an important dimension of life in society. This phenomenon, so revealing for the flexibility of a socio-cultural pattern, deserves much more attention than we are able to pay it in this study. Owing to the new tempo, infused in modern society mainly by the spirit of competition, quickness of mind and alertness have become fundamentally important human qualities. Thus time has added a new dimension to the socio-cultural space in which the individual can be differentiated. Great possibility of individual differentiation means flexibility in the socio-cultural pattern, that is a democratic condition of the first order. It is no wonder that it is in the Italian cities of the Renaissance that, for the first time, the big tower clock, significantly placed in the vicinity of the market, started to strike each quarter hour. The new type of society, the flexible society, lives in time.

An account of the main economic factors contributing to the flexibility of modern socio-cultural pattern would not be complete

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without mentioning the evolution of the system of land ownership.

An important step forward towards the flexibility of modern economic order has been made with the division of big estates into small holdings. Land for those who work and live on it constituted an important point in the programmes of the European democratic movements. As a result of this, one of the main sectors of modern economy has been broken down into individual units, small holdings, run by the head of a family. The degree of flexibility and individualization of the economic system has been, in this way, considerably increased.*

There are many aspects of an agricultural economy, based on small holdings, which show its connexion with the process of democratization. The organic link between personality and ownership should be mentioned first. This makes the economic system, in many respects, more flexible. For the peasant or the farmer has a natural capacity to adjust his standard of living to the supreme interest of his independence as a landowner. A series of restrictions and losses are more easily supported by a small household than by a large agricultural unit working on a capitalist model. The individual peasant extends his personality to his own possession; he is often identified with the possessor of the land.† His land is the basis of his freedom.

It is no wonder that some of the makers of the French Revolution saw in the formula 'land for everybody', and in a society based on self-sufficient small-holders, artisans and shopkeepers, the strongest guarantee of liberty. Saint-Just grows enthusiastic whenever he touches upon this point. The highest happiness offered by the Republic consists, according to him, in 'la volupté d'une cabane, d'un champ fertile cultivé par vos mains, une charrue, un champ,

*The fact that, in the eighteenth century, the French peasant 'not only ceased to be a serf, he had become an owner of land', is considered by Tocqueville one of the main causes of the Revolution. (*State and Society* . . . p. 29.) This was the case neither in Germany, where the peasants were still literally *ascripti glebae* as in the Middle Ages, nor in England, where 'there had been peasant landowners, but, the number of them had considerably decreased'. (*Idem*, p. 30.) It is the aspirations and the struggle of these peasants towards the liberation of their land from the burdens imposed upon it by the nobility and the Church that Tocqueville considers an important factor driving towards the Revolution.

A similar phenomenon is noticed in the Athenian community. During Cleisthenes' rule, there grew up a class of peasant-holders of land, a fact which constitutes an important aspect of the process of democratization taking place during that period. (Croiset, *op. cit.*, p. 57.)

†O. Spengler makes a distinction between *Besitz* (property), as a means of self-realization, and *Vermögen* (possession or fortune), as an end which transforms the possessor into a means. Land ownership belongs to the former. (*Op. cit.*, p. 7.)

une chaumière à l'abri de la lubricité d'un brigand, voilà le bonheur'.*

A society made up of small-holders contains in itself protective measures against two anti-democratic trends inherent in the structure of modern commercial and industrial society: the trends towards super-organization and its opposite, disintegration. This system refuses over-rationalization by its own nature, that is, the tendency to put efficiency, economic and social, above everything, and to organize the group accordingly. The peasant, as landowner, cannot be rigidly organized in a system of production in which he is reduced to an executant. Any rationalization of agricultural economy has to start by the expropriation of the peasants, which amounts to their 'mutation' into a completely different social class. This is the last blow given to democracy by contemporary totalitarianism.

On the other hand, peasant society, of all societies, needs the least super-organization for the simple reason that it does not suffer from the disintegrating effects of competition.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FLEXIBILITY

One often says that the Renaissance marks the transition from 'community' to 'society'. Since lack of space does not allow us to discuss critically the foundation of this thesis, the use of the terms 'community' and 'society' in this study is but a convenient way of pointing out a series of differences between medieval and modern society.

Size is often believed to be the main difference between community and society. Though important from a psychological point of view, size is, in our opinion, not a necessary difference between these two types of social organization. The real difference consists in their respective degrees of flexibility. A community is a relatively static and rigid type of socio-political organization. It is based on a traditional—normally authoritarian—type of authority. Life in a community is dominated by religious or quasi-religious ways of thought. There, time is not an important dimension of life. 'Everything temporal is to it no more than a parable, a symbol of the metaphysical, and nature is but a reflexion of the transcendental', writes A. von Martin about the medieval community.†

The basis of human relationships in a community is primarily emotional. The individuals are linked together by bonds of blood, community of faith, mystic ties with the land, and by an age-long tradition. The inner structure of a community often, though not

*Saint-Just quoted by J. L. Talmon: *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, London, 1951, p. 162.

†*Op. cit.*, p. 2.

necessarily, shows rigidity resulting from strong barriers between sub-groups. The barriers may separate different classes, different castes, or simply the rulers from the ruled. Authority has a strong subjective character. The main reason for this lies in the fact that the relationship between ruled and rulers is regulated by emotional factors such as indiscriminate confidence, or fear, rather than by rational and practical arrangements.

This leads us to the following important point: The change from community to society means a gain in rationality of human social and political organization. By analogy with the use of the concept of rationality in the previous section, we can say that this implies, first of all, the structuring of a group of individuals in the function of a series of conscious common ends. The degree of consciousness of the common ends is such that they are not only postulated by, but experienced and expressed in a manner adequate to each individual member. Thus, the individual's conformity with the organized action of the group no longer springs from tradition and emotional compulsion, but from deliberation. As a result of this, the individual has 'conscious legitimate expectation' from his conformity with the common ends.* When the social conformity of a group of individuals is based on deliberation their social pattern is flexible, it fulfils a basic condition of democratization.

In what follows we shall describe various political aspects in the drive towards flexibility characteristic of the pattern of modern society. There is one process which shall be dealt with in particular, the minimization and decentralization of power.

Minimization of power results from the extension of the sphere of political decision in a group from one man to a section of the population, and finally to the people. The same process can be formulated negatively as the limitation of the power concentrated in a certain sector by its diffusion through all sectors of society. These are some of the main modes of minimization of power, most of them being characteristic of modern societies.

A. Even in medieval absolutist society one can find certain processes which lead in the long run to the minimization of power. This is seen not so much in the transfer of kingly power by the creation of nobility, as in the rise of an administrative body. The exercise of power, in a feudal system, led to the creation of an administrative body and bureaucracy which, because of its own technical training on the one hand, and the incapacity of the landlord on the other, was allowed more and more initiative and independence. This resulted in the limitation of the effective power of the lord. This specific form of minimization of power might be considered as a

*Knight, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

characteristic aspect of the rise of British Democracy. Albert Beebe White, for instance, thinks that the origins of self-government and democracy in England lie in the habit of medieval English kings of using local people of all classes in public affairs. As a result of this, the people were trained in the art of government. One of his main conclusions is that ' . . . the early House of Commons was a royal creation to meet the royal needs'.*

B. The political system of 'collegiality' is a rudimentary form of decentralization of power. It implies that the decision of one chief can be delayed or vetoed by another. (The system of Ephors, of the Consuls in Rome and that of the *Capitani del Popolo* can be taken as examples.) A particular case of 'collegiality' is when the chief is *primus inter pares*. Advisory bodies to a monarchic chief, and the Privy Council are other forms of 'collegiality'.

Though in no sense a specific democratic phenomenon, 'collegiality' produces a certain (limited) minimization and diffusion of power. It implies a number of persons in the same office whose spheres of authority are not always well defined. Max Weber is of the opinion that it was in terms of collegiality that the separation of power in England started.

C. The rise of legally constituted opposition is certainly one of the most important steps towards the minimization of power. Opposition implies contest of power and authority within a social organization.

Considering some concrete circumstances which have contributed to the rise of opposition in modern Europe, it seems that its origin lies in the tendency of monocratic authority to strengthen, rather than to weaken its power. Absolutist rulers were naturally interested in having round them opposing groups in order, either to keep themselves well informed, or to play the opposing interests against each other. But the advantages drawn by these rulers from their rôle of intermediary were inevitably counteracted by a gradual minimization of their power. This was the natural result of the well-known game of making concessions to the weakest in order to keep the strongest in check. In Western societies, it was through the representative bodies of various groups that a real opposition to monarchy was formed. In England, the system of the Houses of Parliament, and in France, the representative bodies of

*The thesis is—writes White—'that English kings, working in what they believed to be their own personal interest, so used the English people in government, laid upon them for centuries such burdens, that they went far towards creating the Englishman's governmental sense and competence, that Norman and Angevin royal training has been more potent than an urge to self-government: in Anglo-Saxon blood' (*Self-Government at the King's Command*, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1933, p. 2.)

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the three estates formed the basis of the minimization of absolutist power.

D. The system of political parties is another form of minimization of power. In principle, the existence of more than one party in a group implies that power is divisible. This formal condition comes to an end only when a party assumes all the power for itself.

The origin of political parties lies in the organization of various sub-groups—classes, occupational, national or family groups—on a political basis, with the view to securing power within the whole group. But whatever their origin, the parties have to define their position in the group by formulating in one way or another their manner of exercising power. This is in fact, the normal technique of recruiting supporters. In this lies another aspect of minimization of power, in the sense that the power becomes conditioned by a certain formulation, that is, it is obtained and maintained only when moulded into a programme which, in time, becomes a preamble to the position of power. Depersonalization of power is the most adequate formula describing this particular form of minimization of power. When a programme of government enters into the criterion of authority, the degree of rationality of the individual's attitude towards the order of his society has considerably increased.

E. The highest degree of minimization is obtained when power is diffused from a small circle to the whole group. In this case, the consultation of the members of the group makes the authority legitimate. The clearest formulation of this state of affairs is to be found in the democratic principle of formal, political equality, or in the formula 'one man, one vote'.

The system of universal suffrage cannot by itself guarantee the diffusion of power implied in the formula, one man, one vote. This is seen in many cases of plebiscite. The fact that, by plebiscite, authority draws its power from the group, does not necessarily lead to minimization of power. Sometimes the high degree of confidence shown by the people in their leader may incite the latter to concentrate unlimited power in his hands. This certainly happens when the attitude towards authority is strongly emotional, and when the whole political structure of the group rests on emotional rather than on rational factors.

This is the right place to stress again the idea that democracy is first of all a way of life, and that democratic techniques, though faithfully applied, may lead to forms of authoritarianism, if the way of life of the group contains powerful anti-democratic tendencies. Strong emotional integrating factors are examples.

F. The most important technical means for attaining and main-

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taining the minimization of power are: 1. Short term of office for the power-holding group or personality. 2. Liability to be recalled at any time. 3. A strictly defined mandate for the conduct of office. 4. Obligation to give an account and to submit any unforeseen matter to the people—through its representative bodies. 5. Administrative decentralization.

All the forms of minimization of power mentioned above produced various degrees of flexibility in the political structure of modern societies. Minimization and diffusion of power have the result that each individual is given the possibility of moulding the structure of his own society.

CHAPTER THREE

The Paradox of Democracy

Entre une société de fer et une de glace ou de porcelaine il n'y a pas à choisir.

DIDEROT

FREEDOM AND ORDER

AS HAS been pointed out in the first chapter, democracy is closely related to an empirical attitude to life. Such an attitude implies primarily that the flow of life is very little, if at all, hampered by pre-established norms or patterns. One can even say that the only sense of direction in the life of the individual, or of the group, is to be found in the stream of experience. Thus, an empirical attitude to life involves the highest degree of freedom for the individual, freedom which is circumscribed only by the limits of its own experience. Formulas such as *laissez-faire*, 'wait and see' or 'getting on in the world', which have been at various times applied to various aspects of the democratic way of life, express this basic freedom. The degree of spontaneity and liberty enjoyed by the members of a democratic group in their political, economic, religious and moral manifestations may easily give them the impression that the only source of norms and restrictions in life lies in themselves, in the limits of their own experience.

And yet one can hardly define democracy as a purely empirical way of life. Common observation shows that democratic institutions and a democratic way of life grow more strongly and more rapidly in those communities whose members do more spontaneously than the members of other communities *what they ought to do*. Moreover, the process of democratization met with better conditions in those communities in which the building up and the maintenance of a common pattern of life was facilitated by various historical, geographical or psychological factors. This obviously suggests that democracy presupposes a rational—not necessarily rationalistic—attitude as well, i.e. that the life of the individual within the group, and the evolution of the group as a whole, are enlightened by certain norms and principles. Therefore the concepts of freedom and spontaneity have to be applied in a specific manner, to a democratic way of life; one has to say that freedom means freedom to integrate and plan, in a social sense, while spontaneity means the possibility of

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choosing between given solutions. In both cases the paradox is obvious.*

This basic paradox is reflected in all the main aspects of a democratic way of life. A characteristic instance is given by Aristotle when trying to define freedom and equality as two fundamental concepts of democracy. Both concepts are for him easily definable on a purely rational level. But he asks himself how can one define these concepts on an empirical level, i.e. how are freedom and equality possible in a given community? In practice freedom clashes, according to him, with order. In other words, it contradicts the existence of a given pattern of life. Equality, on the other hand, comes up against hierarchy, excellence and even justice. The only way out is in a paradoxical formulation of these concepts. Aristotle does not hesitate to take this course by defining democratic freedom as freedom within the law.†

The same kind of situation is even more clearly demonstrated by modern European democracies. The authors of the French Revolution, both the ideologues and the politicians, concentrated their main effort on the question of how to work out the pattern of life of free men in a free society. Though they all regard freedom as an empirical condition of human life, they were almost obsessed with the principles by which freedom is guaranteed. They worked for the liberation of man from the chains of society, and displayed at the same time an even greater zeal for the building up of such (social) 'Institutions' by which man is forbidden to act except freely. These apostles

*It is no wonder that the ancient Greeks were the real creators of the democratic way of life. For one of their most outstanding mental features consisted in their equal capacity to enjoy and enrich the forms of life through the senses and, at the same time, to grasp more clearly than any other people the great framework of life and the basic principles of human experience in general.

†*Politics*. English Transl. by Benjamin Jowett. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Book IV, 4, and 14.

‡With the concept of equality Aristotle seems to be in even more serious trouble. His doubt is aroused by the question: How can one realize and maintain equality amongst the member of a group? Should it be 'created', if it is not found in the natural condition of the community? On this point it is worth while mentioning the particular emphasis Aristotle lays on the institution of ostracism as well as the prominence given by him to the opinion of Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia. When Thrasybulus asked Periander for advice about the trouble caused in his state by outstanding people, Periander did not speak a word, but, in front of Thrasybulus's herald, cut off the tallest ears of corn till he brought the field to a level. Thrasybulus understood from this that he had to cut off the heads of the principal men in his state. It is, therefore, obvious that, in Aristotle's eyes, equality is an ideal product of reason, an 'ought', rather than an empirical condition of life. But, we can ask, what sort of equality is the equality created by political measures? This implies that, when equality is not observed, the 'stronger ones' use their power to maintain or to create it.

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of freedom came finally to contradict themselves and formulated in the crudest way possible the basic paradox of democracy: the terror of freedom. If this means anything, it is that freedom as an empirical condition of human existence cannot be realized and maintained except by a certain degree of organization and rationalization of life.

The paradoxical character of democracy results from two socio-psychological processes necessarily involved in the democratization of a community. Democracy requires the crystallization of the experience in a group of individuals in a common pattern of life, and the liability of this pattern to be expressed in terms of conscious rational ends. This we call the process of rationalization. But democracy requires also that the common pattern of life should be flexible enough to be adjusted to the world of each individual member of the group. In this consists the capacity of the social pattern to individuate. The processes of rationalization and individuation oppose each other, yet they complete each other in the structure of the democratic way of life. Let us analyse their nature more closely.

RATIONALIZATION

Many aspects of the process of rationalization were touched upon in the previous chapter, particularly when describing the difference between 'community' and 'society'. It was stated there that, in a community, the common pattern of life is made up of emotional-irrational factors and that the individuals are linked to each other by instinctive ties of which they can rarely become conscious. Their personality submerges itself in the structure of their society. In a society, on the other hand, the pattern of communal life can be formulated as conscious ends.

It would perhaps not be entirely accurate to say that in a society, as distinct from a community, tradition loses its grip upon the mind of the individual. The important thing is, however, that in a society the store of common experience is from time to time projected into conscious goals existing in the minds of the majority of the individuals. Because of this, an important part of the common pattern of life is decided at the conscious level of the individual's mind. This does not necessarily imply that the individual is always aware of the common interests and goals which unite him with the other members of the group; it implies only that he can find such interests and goals and that he can express them in such a manner as to correspond to certain constitutive rules of the human mind. Consequently, one can say that the main difference between a community and a society lies not so much in the fact that, in the latter, the individuals are conscious of their common interests, as in their readiness and capacity

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to formulate by deliberation their common experiences and interests as conscious goals and to organize their group accordingly. In this lies the basic condition of the process of rationalization.

Social institutions in general can be considered as embodiments of the common ends of a group of individuals. But the rational nature of the interests and goals which tie up a group of individuals becomes more apparent when expressed in programmes of government, or, generally speaking, in a plan for conducting their common affairs. For in this case, it is obvious that a number of individuals form an organization to the extent to which they have found and agreed upon a series of common ends. The highest degree of rationality in the structure of a group is attained when the individual members decide not only upon the best course of their action, but also upon the most adequate form of organization for the achievement of their common interests and ends. Thus, a series of general principles and laws is established. In these lie the origins of the process of self-legislation.

Though there is no apparent need to prove that the formulation of a common pattern of life in a body of laws, or in a constitution, represents a high degree of rational organization, it would be advisable, in view of later developments of the present chapter, to throw a certain light on the rational character of laws. This character derives from the fact that they are established in the function of conscious ends shared by the members of a group. The authority of the law is based on the evident character of its purpose. (In this lies the main difference between laws and customs.) The rational character of a law is also seen in the abstract and impersonal character of its authority. Thus, both the application of and obedience to laws are primarily rational acts involving as few emotional factors as possible which would otherwise be unavoidable when the authority is a person—a king or a leader.

Common observation shows that almost all groups in process of democratization manifest strong tendencies towards a rational type of organization. This is seen in: (a) the application of certain abstract principles to the social and administrative organization of the group, (b) in the ease with which the group can formulate its pattern of life in a system of laws, that is, in a high capacity for self-legislation, (c) in a general trend existing in the culture-pattern of the group to condition the individual's social behaviour to a formal and abstract type of authority represented by the laws.

(a) The Athenian community, while still at the beginning of its democratization, was fully reorganized on a rational basis. Cleisthenes was entirely guided in his reform by the requirements of a rational administration. It is important to notice that at the basis

of the first modern democracy, American society, one can find the same type of rational organization. The federal system itself can be adduced as the main proof. There was no tradition and no emotional factors that caused the inhabitants of the various American States to form a nation and to unite into a federal system. 'The American people', 'The Federal Government' were at that period but concepts covering a rational necessity; the Union was an 'ideal notion' and the Federal Government depended on 'legal fictions'.* There is no need to prove the existence of similar processes in eighteenth century French society. There, the main aim of the 1789 Revolution was to demolish the old order based on tradition, and to frame a new society within the principles of reason.†

There is another aspect of this general drive towards rationalization worth mentioning. Any group entering upon a process of democratization changes its internal order, from one based on the right of birth, to one based on the right of wealth. In Athenian society, this change started with Solon and culminated in Cleisthenes' reform. American society starts off in this way from the very beginning, and any later attempt towards the establishment of a landed aristocracy was doomed to failure. The French Revolution brought to an end the old social order, based on privileges conferred by birth. In Great Britain, a similar process took place at a slower pace throughout the modern era. This specific change demonstrates the often mentioned connexion between democratization and the rise of the middle classes.

Whether the above change took place gradually or abruptly the results were the same: a rigid organization, based on traditional and irrational factors, was transformed into a more flexible organization based on the initiative and intelligence of the individual members of the group.

(b) The drive of a group towards a rational type of organization is seen also in its capacity for self-legislation. We are here referring primarily to the ease and rapidity with which some groups of individuals can express their common experiences and interests in a set of general principles which they regard as authoritative guides for their subsequent social action. The important thing should be emphasized that these general principles represent in an abstract form, as laws, the interests of all members of the group, or at least, of a

*Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, p. 166.

†Trends towards a rational order are noticed long before the Revolution. A highly centralized administration, the system of 'intendants' in particular, and the use of statistics to improve the efficiency of the administrative apparatus, noticed throughout the eighteenth century, are the main aspects of this. Tocqueville rightly points out that the Revolution did not create, but strengthened these trends.

majority of them. The task of the legislator—who may be an individual or a selected body of professionals—is merely to give expression to a series of already crystallized forms of collective experiences and interests. After the law is enacted, the individual members of the group feel and behave as if they themselves were its authors.

An exceptional facility for self-legislation is a distinctive mark of nearly all social groups in process of democratization. Athens had, according to Aristotle, no less than eight constitutions from Solon's to his own time. This means that within this period, Athenian society had reformulated eight times its basic principles of organization, not mentioning the multitude of more specific laws. The early American society showed an extraordinary zeal and facility for law-making. The same phenomenon is noticed in French society during the revolutionary period in particular.

This quality of a social group in process of democratization often became a vice in a constituted democratic society; the ability of a group of individuals to formulate their common interests in a set of general principles and laws turned into an excessive readiness to abandon laws hardly put in application and to coin new ones. Thus, the instability of the laws was a characteristic feature of Athenian society. The same can be said about early American society. Jefferson himself was aware that the instability of laws was 'a serious inconvenience'. On this subject Tocqueville concludes: 'Hence America is, at the present day, the country beyond all others where laws last the shortest time. Almost all American constitutions have been amended within thirty years.'*

Instability of laws may easily be considered as a weak point in the organization of a group; it may spring from and lead to social instability. But the same phenomenon is an obvious trait of a democratic pattern of life. By their facility to change old and to make new laws the individuals keep the structure of their society open to new conditions of life, hence ready to mould itself according to the ever-changing wishes and interests of its members. The facility of law-making characteristic of certain groups is based mainly on a series of traits common to their members. The individuals belonging to these groups show an exceptional inclination towards public meetings, towards discussions and debates; their interest in and knowledge of public affairs rank higher than in the individuals belonging to other groups. The Athenians, the Americans and, since the end of the eighteenth century, the French, can be given as typical examples. These are important qualities in the individual members of a democratic society.

(c) The tendency to condition the individual's social behaviour to a

*Tocqueville: *American Democracy*, p. 257.

formal and impersonal type of authority noticeable in all groups undergoing a process of democratization, constitutes another aspect in the process of rationalization. The prominent place given to judiciary institutions and the respect paid to the law are common characteristics of these groups. Athenian society distinguished itself—at least after Solon—by the existence of a great number of law courts and tribunals as well as by the readiness of the Athenian citizens to resort to law on any matters touching the maintenance of public order. Cleisthenes was praised above all for the way in which he succeeded in instilling respect and obedience to laws in the Athenian citizens.*

America offered from the very beginning the example of a society dominated by the judiciary power. While the legislative and executive powers were minimized by decentralization, the judiciary was, on the contrary, concentrated in the Federal Courts and in the Supreme Court of the United States. 'The majesty of the law', as Tocqueville puts it, is certainly a distinctive mark of American society.† And since the expression 'the majesty of the law' is mentioned, it should be said that this can also be applied to modern British society. The specific way in which this can be understood will be dealt with at a later stage.

The creation of an abstract-impersonal form of authority, and the conditioning of the individual's obedience to it, were due mainly to a series of measures of rationalization to which democratic societies were submitted. Rational methods in administration, rational principles in the making and the application of laws, and respect for the law are the most important of them. These measures have induced in the people the need and ability to use reason in their social adjustment.

Thus, the Athenian citizen could hardly use his instincts or feelings in his adjustment to the administrative system of *demes*, as he normally did in his adjustment to the old system of *phratries*. A *deme* was an abstract unit appealing to him only as a rational necessity. The same can be said about the attitude of an American citizen towards 'Federation', and to a great extent, about the attitude of a Frenchman of the Revolution period, towards the supreme reality of his society, 'the people'. Like the authority of the law, the 'Federal' authority and 'the sovereignty of the people' are primarily based on the individual's capacity for grasping the meaning of these

*Most characteristic in this respect was the institution of 'Euthynos'. Each tribe appointed an 'examiner' (Euthynos) whose task it was to sit during the regular market hours at the statue of the eponymous hero and collect the charges against the magistrates which any citizen had the right to make. The 'examiner' had then to bring the charges to the local judges. (Aristotle. *The Athenian Const.* Ed. cit. p. 49.)

†*Op. cit.*, p. 139.

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concepts. Speaking simply, we may say that he used his power of discrimination to find the necessity of conforming to the kind of order on which his society was based. This takes us straight into the nature of the process of individuation which, like rationalization, is normally found in the democratization of a group.

INDIVIDUATION

The adjustment to a rational type of authority and to a rational social order is fully attained only when the individual experiences the principles on which the authority and the order of his society are based as constitutive principles of his mind; only when his social conformity springs from logical coercion and inner evidence. This is the result of the process of individuation which operates in an opposite direction to that of rationalization.

The process of individuation depends on two categories of factors, one belonging to the pattern of life of the group, the other to the mental structure of the individual.

A pattern of life is not an indefinable abstraction, for it cannot exist unless it crystallizes in various specific forms. One can even speak about a *nisus formativus* inherent in the pattern of life of every society, in the sense that the net of individual relationships tends to crystallize in a series of more or less definite forms of life. A series of common drives, desires and aspirations, plus a series of experiences related to them, crystallize in social values and institutions which subsequently act as organizing schemes for the individual's experience. E. Spranger described six fundamental forms: religious, theoretical, aesthetic, economic, political, and social, in which the pattern of life of a group can be expressed. These forms are at the same time six fundamental models after which individuals can mould their personality. Needless to say, Spranger has not exhausted the number of forms in which the formative urge of a common pattern of life can express itself. For the formative urge of a common pattern of life is by no means confined to social and cultural values. It crystallizes also in living models such as outstanding personalities, or specific groupings, religious, political, cultural, etc. In principle, a common way of life can materialize in each individual member of the group to the extent to which the individual can live according to the requirements of his group, and yet retain his individuality.

Here we touch upon an important aspect of the process of individuation, which explains the close connexion between it and a democratic way of life. The distinctive character of a democratic way of life consists in its capacity to crystallize in as many forms as there are individual members of the group. This is properly speaking the process of individuation.

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It would be inaccurate, however, to infer that because of its capacity for individuation, a democratic social order is completely atomized, and that a democratic pattern of life does not contain anything beyond and above the individual. Its capacity for individuation should be seen entirely in the light of its flexible nature. Though a democratic pattern of life has its own character, not reducible to its individual members, it has, at the same time, the ability to integrate new conditions of life as they come, and above all the ability to adjust itself to the condition of life of its members, or to the majority of them. Flexibility, in this case, means not only changeability and expediency; it can only be defined in fact as a paradox, as the capacity inherent in a social order, or in a collective way of life, to integrate into itself the individual with his own interests, and to contain at the same time an inter and supra-individual order.*

But, as stated before, individuation depends upon factors existing in the individual himself. In a democratic society the individual's mental structure is flexible. This makes it possible for him to adjust himself to the social order of his group and to the pattern of communal life and to remain himself at the same time. Lacking a better word, we are inclined to use in this context the concept of introjection, but without the motivation attributed to this term by psychoanalysis. What we mean in the first place is that a social order or a communal way of life has to be internalized or introjected by the individual in order to become democratic. By this, individuals' attitudes towards their society are radically changed; they feel that the institutions of their society, the laws which regulate its course, and the authority which applies the laws spring up from their own life, and correspond to their fundamental expectations from life. The adjustment to their society is determined not so much by external coercion as by the internal authority of reason.

*In the capacity to be flexible lies the main difference between a democratic and a totalitarian way of life. For a totalitarian way of life cannot individuate. If it takes concrete shapes in a personality or a party, this structuring becomes exclusive. The leader or the party are, in this case, neither an individuation nor a particularization of the common way of life, but *the* way of life as a whole in its absolute form. As will be shown at a later stage, a totalitarian way of life is always 'outside' the individual members of the group. In order to adjust himself, the individual has first to lose his identity. This is mainly because a totalitarian way of life grows up without the participation of the members of the group. Sometimes the common pattern of life is borrowed from another community and forcibly applied; sometimes it is the pattern of life of the same community revived by a process of group regression (Nazism). At other times this pattern of life consists in a rigid crystallization of the experiences of a sub-group which has been subsequently applied to a large community living in different historical and geographical conditions (Contemporary Communism.)

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Needless to say, the introjection of social order and the experience of social authority as inner authority does not necessarily imply the individual's identification with his group. The structure both of society and of the individual's mind, being flexible, adjust themselves to each other. Introjection merely makes individuals feel that they are the authors of the order on which their society is based.

INNER AUTHORITY AS THE CHECK OF FREEDOM

The process of individuation-introjection shows that any democratic way of life presupposes a preliminary organization of the individual's mind so as to form in him, apart from the habit of conforming, the disposition towards voluntary action in the interest of his community. What really lies at the foundation of this mental readiness, whether reason, sentiment, or will, or a blend of all of them, is hard to decide. Important is the fact that such a phenomenon can be detected as a preliminary condition of every historical process of democratization.

George Grote comes very near the mark when considering the phenomenon of 'constitutional morality' as the keynote of Athenian democracy. In this, according to him, lies the greatest achievement of Cleisthenes' constitutional reform. For it is due to this reform that the Athenian citizen became infused with readiness for voluntary action in the interest of his community. Here is the admirable description given by Grote of this process: 'It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of constitutions will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own'. Grote sees the same phenomenon at the basis of modern democracies, 'This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority, with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a general sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish, and diffuse among the community, judging by the experience of history.*'

**History of Greece*. London, John Murray, 1862, Vol. III, pp. 131-2.

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It seems that Henry Jones Ford seizes upon the same fundamental condition of a democratic way of life, the infusion of the individual's mind with the pattern of life of his group, when writing: 'Where liberal institutions have been successful they seem to have been dependent upon some past discipline maintained by coercive authority.'*

It would take too long to show how the 'liberal institutions' in France were dependent upon the past discipline forced upon the people. It is enough to mention that the long tradition of a strongly centralized government had something to do with this. France became, before any other nation of Europe, an organized nation, and a community of people conscious of their unity. No wonder therefore that the French Revolutionaries made constant appeal to the social consciousness and patriotism of the Frenchmen: they were certain that every Frenchman would find in himself the guide to his social action.

It is much more interesting to see the development of this phenomenon—which can be called 'constitutional morality', internalized social authority, or simply, respect for the law—in American society. This society offered at its very outset a unique example of the enforcement of a drastic code of laws upon the individual. The code of laws promulgated, for instance, by the State of Connecticut, in 1650, starts with the penal laws and it is entirely based on the Holy Writ. 'Whoever shall worship any other God'—starts this code—'than the Lord, shall surely be put to death.'†

Tocqueville remarks that 'the legislation of a rude and half-civilized people was thus applied to an enlightened and moral community'.‡ But that is not exactly the point. These tyrannical laws, which were freely accepted, caused the formation in the individual's mind not only of a strong respect for the laws in general, but also of a clear awareness of certain fundamental principles upon which the life of his community—and of any human community—was based. The individual grew conscious of the fact that certain principles cannot be denied whatever the degree of freedom he may be allowed in various fields of social life. This check put upon his action, thoughts, and feelings, comes from an inner authority.

Tocqueville evidently touches upon one of the main characteristics

* *Representative Government*. Quoted by A. Beebe White, *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

† The death penalty was provided also for blasphemy, sorcery, adultery, rape, an outrage offered by a son to his parents. Intercourse between unmarried persons was severely repressed by whipping, pecuniary penalties, and subsequent marriage; lying was checked by flogging, or a fine; the attendance at divine service was compulsory.

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

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of a democratic personality, and of a democratic group, when saying that in the American civilization of his time the 'spirit of religion' combined harmoniously with 'the spirit of liberty'. By the spirit of religion he understands the main binding forces of a community of people; these included reverence for certain fundamental principles on which human society rests, and respect for the laws and institutions through which these principles work. By the spirit of liberty he means first of all individual freedom, political and economic. In American society the former is the guide of, and the check put upon, the latter. 'Under their (American) hand'—writes Tocqueville—'political principles, laws, and human institutions seem malleable, capable of being shaped and combined at will. As they go forward the banners which imprisoned society and behind which they were born, are lowered . . . a field without horizon is revealed . . .' Then he continues: 'But having reached the limits of the political world the human spirit stops by itself; in fear it relinquishes the need for exploration; it even abstains from lifting the veil of the sanctuary; it bows with respect before truths which it accepts without discussion.' 'Thus in the moral world everything is classified, systematized, foreseen and decided beforehand; in the political world, everything is agitated, disputed and uncertain.'*

In conclusion, one can say that a way of life based on the presupposition that the individual is free and independent, and that he is the author of his society, cannot arise and be maintained unless a new type of social authority is formed. This is the inner authority lying in the mind of every individual. The work of this authority is seen in the individual's respect for the principles on which human society is based, in his respect for a series of 'prescriptions' and 'prejudices', or for certain rational principles which regulate the life of his society. Without this type of authority, freedom, and therefore democracy, is not possible; it would quickly change into anarchy, or tyranny.

A democratic way of life requires therefore a specific type of personality, an individual who possesses in himself the authority and the order necessary for the maintenance of his society. It is only as a result of this that society can dispense with, or at least reduce, the use of coercive authority. The 'virtuous citizen' on whose shoulders the French revolutionaries placed the weight of the new society, the 'virtuous individual', so often mentioned and desired by Jefferson, and the 'characters' which according to Burke form the essence of democratic life, are but various specimens of this personality. It is the distinctive mark of this personality to do freely what ought to be done in the general interest of his society and of mankind. The

**Op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.

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individual possessing such a personality responds, consciously or unconsciously, to the existence of a double front in human life, a front of empirical reality and expediency, and one of ideas and permanence. This quality which is characteristic of a democratic way of life will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ideology and Democracy

Where there is no vision, the people perish. PROV. 29, 18

RATIONALISM

THE current use of the term ideology shows that it implies not only an abstract intellectual, but also a practical order, a body of ideas which determines in the mind of the individual a particular type of social action and a particular way of life. The concept of ideology, used in this sense, is opposed to the basic tenets of democracy.

But, because democracy cannot be described in terms of a specific ideology, one cannot say that it has no specific ideological character, or that ideas and theories are to it no more than the straw which it uses for its bed. It would, however, be necessary to state from the very beginning that what is characteristic of democracy is not a specific idea or theory, but a specific cultural climate. In what follows we shall describe certain motives of thought and certain intellectual attitudes which are, in our opinion, inherent in a democratic way of life.

Democracy is usually associated with rationalism. The main reason for this is that both modern and ancient democracies rose and developed in historical periods in which a rationalistic way of thinking was predominant. The most powerful rationalistic element in modern democracies consists in the assumption, which forms the touchstone of modern philosophy, that every individual has in himself the capacity of reaching general ideas. The political implication of this is that the private interests of an individual can be expressed in such a way as to form a common body with the interests of others, sometimes with the interests of all members of his group.

From this first tenet of modern rationalism to the assumption that human history and society are rational, and that there is in the nature of man a series of universal traits discovered by the American revolutionaries of 1782, is a far cry. Today it is quite obvious that the former assumption does not necessarily call for the latter. Yet, considering the historical contexts of some modern democracies, one can readily agree that the belief that individual reason is but a fragment of universal reason and that there are fundamental 'rights', was a

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psychological condition which settled to a great extent the fate of American and French democracies.

There is no need to discuss the question whether the basic tenets of modern rationalism have in the long run been favourable to a democratic way of life. A series of 'experiments' in social organization characteristic of the modern era has shown that it is one thing to hold the conviction that the world rests on a rational order, and another to act upon human society with the purpose of making it fit into that order.

But the fact that the rationalistic creeds which presided over the process of democratization of many modern societies have later parted company with a democratic way of life, does not mean that empiricism in itself has been more successful in this respect. The critics of modern rationalism have sometimes come much too quickly to the conclusion that the anti-democratic trends visible in many contemporary societies, such as political totalitarianism or the super-rationalization of industrial life, are but the tribute paid by contemporary man to the rationalistic creeds of the eighteenth century. It is obviously true that totalitarianism, planning, over-rationalization, etc., follow the pattern of modern rationalism, but their success is, at least partly, explicable as a reaction from those modern philosophies rooted in the creed that the world has to be taken 'as it is', and that the supreme principle is to go ahead in life with no awareness of any established values which give direction to human action.

As we have suggested elsewhere, democracy is rooted both in a rational and in an empirical attitude to life. First of all, democracy is not incompatible with the idea of a pre-established order in history. It is not the existence of such an order, but the relationship between it and the empirical condition of human life that really matters from a democratic point of view. A dynamic balance and harmony, as opposed to identity, or to an irremediable conflict, between a pre-established order and an empirical plane of life, form one of the most characteristic traits of modern democracy. The ideological climate of modern democracies is based on a dualism which expresses itself differently according to historical and sociological circumstances. Human action taking place in such a climate contains inseparable elements both of permanence and of local and relative expediency.

THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL SOURCES OF CULTURAL DUALISM

One has to look far back for the sources of the dualism lying at the basis of Western civilization in the Christian conception of a religious-sacred and a secular plane of life. But as the religious aspect

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of a democratic way of life will form the topic of a special section, for the moment, we would rather concentrate our attention on the secular aspects of this problem. One notices in modern Western culture a parallel development of two trends of thought, one dominated by the category of 'the universal', the other by that of 'the individual'. One emphasizes the rational and universal order in the understanding of the world, the other the contingent and the individual character of existence. The evolution of the former trend reached a peak in the period of the Enlightenment. The latter trend follows more than one line in its development. Its roots lie in the moral value assigned to the human individual by Christianity. To this were gradually added the individualistic drives inherent in modern economy, the empirical orientation of modern science, the individualistic tendencies of the art of the Renaissance, the religious individualism of the Reformation and the revival of the concept of ancient democracy during the eighteenth century.

The first attempt to balance these two trends which has direct bearings on the cultural climate of modern democracies, is to be found in the Cartesian concept of individual reason. Various attempts in the same direction are also made by a series of conceptions and philosophies connected with so-called liberal democracy. Locke's concepts of 'reason', 'natural rights', or 'natural law' are on the whole meant to establish a certain harmony between the universal and individual, between public or general and private interests. But the balance established by this type of thought is at best a precarious one. The main concern of liberal democracy has always been the individual. And it is in the interest of the individual as such that the theoreticians of liberal democracy took the trouble to create the belief that a man who is guided by self-interest is also 'led by an invisible hand to promote an end *which is not his intention.*' (A. Smith. Italics ours.)

Much more significant for the cultural climate of democracy is the balance between 'the universal' and 'the individual' produced by Rousseau and Romantic thought. Though fully aware of the incompatibility between various aspects of his personality and a democratic way of life, we hold the conviction that Rousseau foreshadows, in many respects, a type of thought and personality which is characteristic of modern democracy. Both Rousseau's thought and personality disclose a mental structure articulated at the same time by the culture pattern of the Enlightenment, based on the concept of universal order, and by the individualistic trends developed since the Renaissance which form the nucleus of modern liberalism. In this way, he can be considered as a prototype of the Romantic personality whose basic formula was 'individualized reason'. Leaving aside

for the moment, a series of problems aroused by the later development—in Hegel and Marx in particular—of the concept of universal reason, one can easily grasp that Rousseau's thought contains in itself the psychological ingredients of democratic behaviour. It presupposes that type of personality which has in itself both the condition of its own independence and freedom, and the pattern according to which this freedom has to be used in order to fit into the common way of life. A democratic way of life implies, according to Rousseau, individual freedom within a well-defined pattern; freedom for the individual's will provided that he wills also the 'general will'. Rousseau wants democratic freedom as in Athens, but for a Spartan type of citizen.

The totalitarian elements involved in the concept of the 'general will' have often been pointed out. But whenever one takes an integral view of Rousseau's thought one finds it difficult to brand the author of *Émile* as one of the fathers of modern totalitarianism. The main difficulty seems to arise from the fact that Rousseau was definitely not an integrated personality; the democratic elements of his mind could not form a harmonious structure. In this respect Rousseau was a typical example of a personality lacking the reality function. This is primarily shown by his tendency to fluctuate between two extremes. He sacrifices everybody for his own interests and, at the same time, sacrifices himself for the interest of 'humanity; he lies in seclusion, and, at the same time, makes public his own personality in all its nakedness. (This remarkable need for sincerity and authenticity is by no means an authoritarian feature.) He is equally impressed by the rational aspect of human life and by its spontaneity. *Émile* and the *Contract* appeared in the same year, as if to stress the dual articulation of life. The fact that 'the universal' and 'the particular', reason and feeling, the pattern of communal values and the aspirations of his own individuality could not be balanced in him is not necessarily a sign of totalitarian trends in his personality. The lack of integration in his personality is due to a great extent to sociological rather than psychological factors. Had Rousseau lived in a society in which individual freedom was a recognized value he would very likely have been an integrated personality. He would certainly have suffered less from the need to make a case out of his most 'personal' drives, habits and feelings. Perhaps he would not have written *Les Confessions*.

ASPECTS OF DUALISM IN BRITISH DEMOCRACY

It is much more difficult to see the sources of dualism in the cultural climate of British democracy. The rationalistic element which is prominent in French democracy shines here through its absence.

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In spite of this, a basic dualism is inherent in the cultural climate of British democracy. The terms of dualism are, however, different from those noticed in French democracy. In British democracy the integrative factors lie not in reason but in tradition, not in a set of general principles explicitly defining the nature of man, but in a store of communal values, institutions, ceremonials, and in 'unspoken understandings which regulate so much the common life'.*

The norms of life established in tradition are evidently empirical in their origin. But it would be a mistake to judge the function of tradition by this alone in British society. For one does not require great perspicacity to notice that in this country tradition has a super-empirical function. The traditional way of life, be it expressed in habits of thought, prejudices, or the law of the land, moulds with a greater precision than any regulative principle of reason the whole range of experience of the individual and of the group.

The dualism lying at the basis of the cultural climate of British democracy is defined in terms of an established order expressed in tradition, and in the novelty of every human experience, in terms of 'the old' and 'the new'. And it is the balance between these two terms that constitutes one of the basic features of the cultural climate of British democracy. This balance is expressed in the English sense of gradualness, i.e., in that kind of flexibility in the English culture pattern and in the mental structures of the individuals belonging to it, which makes possible a smooth transition in both senses between 'the old' and 'the new'. The fact that the modern English State has not developed upon the ruins of medieval society, as did some continental states, but has grown by the assimilation of that society, is often given as an example of this sense of gradualness. The British never give up an old form of life unless the new one is strong enough to fight the old and to assume for itself the authority of tradition. But during this fight the new form gradually fashions itself after the old one, while the old form takes on new characters. This process is slow and continuous. Thus, change in social life does not imply a reconstruction of the whole world outlook in the light of 'the new order' which presents itself as a new 'Messiah', but as a slow, yet not blind, flow of life. The British concepts of form and order mean tradition; the concepts of change and progress mean evolution.

There is another aspect of dualism in the cultural climate of British democracy worth mentioning. Its terms are the individual and the law. We hasten to say that these terms are not as different as they appear from those of tradition and novelty, if one bears in mind the connexion between tradition and law characteristic of this country. The British have solved the opposition between social order and

*Sir Fred Clarke, *The Educative Society*, London, p. 75.

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individual freedom by an equal respect for the supremacy of the law and of human personality.* Owing to this basic dualism, British democracy has been, on the whole, less inclined than other modern democracies to fall into the extremes of a "rugged individualism", or of an authoritarian order. Even when a strong State and strong law were necessary—the recent measures of nationalization can be taken as an example—means were found to put them first of all into the service of the human personality.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPROMISE

José Ortega y Gasset sees in Kantianism the philosophy of a merchant, for its inner structure is based on 'bargain': bargain between the outside and inner world, between an *a priori* and an *a posteriori*, between a transcendental and an immanent plane of life. We consider critical idealism as one of the most adequate expressions, at the philosophical level, of the cultural climate of democracy. Dualism, balance and compromise, which are fundamental concepts in critical idealism, show its connexion with a democratic cultural climate.

Knowledge is, according to critical idealism, a compromise between two structures, between a rational and an empirical condition of human life. Thus, in the field of knowledge, critical idealism gives no justification for a totalitarian conception of the world, for that tendency of the human mind to create a pure rational order in life.

The basic dualism of critical idealism seems to be lost in the field of moral action. This is at least the impression made by Kant's Romantic followers, who assume that, according to Kant, an action is moral only so far as it conforms to its ideal pattern as expressed by the Categorical Imperative. Consequently, in the field of moral action, the two orders, rational and empirical, are identical. But how far the Romantics—including Marx—were justified in holding that this is also the case in the political field, is quite a different matter.

The meaning of Kantian ethics should be looked for in quite a different direction. If it has a political implication, it cannot be other than individual freedom. Like *les philosophes*, and like Rousseau in particular, Kant cannot conceive freedom except for the individual who is aware of the pattern of human action in general.

*Regarding this point, Giuseppe Maranini writes: 'Throughout the Middle Ages, the English people had assimilated, synthetized and expressed in social and political institutions both the Roman faith in the "law" and the Christian faith in the human personality.' (*Miti e Realita della Democrazia*. Studi Politici. Anno I, 1, 1952, p. 92.)

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This awareness is made possible by the offices of the Categorical Imperative. As an 'autonomous personality' each human being has the capacity for free action in the line of human interest in general. Thus dualism is not superseded even in moral action. For the concept of 'autonomous personality' implies that the individual *qua* individual fulfils the General Will.

There is another aspect of critical idealism which shows its connexion with a democratic cultural climate. This refers to the picture of man emerging from it. Man has, according to this philosophy, a highly differentiated and heterogeneous mental structure. There is a high degree of independence between his faculties, namely, between intellect, feeling and will.* This independence means, briefly speaking, that human will does not always 'will' what human intellect 'knows', and *vice versa*, and that human feeling does not necessarily follow the same path as human intellect and will. The image of man emerging from this is certainly not that of a monolith. If he is a united structure, this is the result of a series of compromises and balances between various factors. Man is a forum for debate rather than a platoon of execution.†

RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

There is a widespread belief that religion gives rise to, and supports, antidemocratic trends in a culture pattern by its resistance to change and by its attachment to a form of absolute authority. This is not entirely true. The part played by religion in a culture-pattern is, in the first place, determined by its relations with other factors of the pattern, and only in the second place by its body of doctrine. There are religions, or stages in the evolution of a religion, which contributed actively to the creation of a democratic way of life. Christian religion can be taken as an example.

Because of lack of space we have to confine our present discussion to that aspect of Christianity which has contributed most to the rise of the cultural climate of modern democracies. This consists in the

*This picture of man is not entirely a creation of critical idealism. Kant himself is not satisfied with the state of discord between human faculties. He is, however, not very successful in his attempt to reconcile them.

†This image of man was destroyed by the Romantic followers of Kant. In Schelling and Hegel, for instance, dualism is replaced by the 'philosophy of identity' and by a monistic panlogism respectively. Knowledge is no longer a compromise between man and the external world, and social action no longer springs from a compromise between various wills, but from an absolute order lying at the basis of things. In spite of all this, we do not consider the Romantic Idealists as prefigurations of the totalitarian man of today, Fascist or Communist. The main reason for this is their cult of individuality. (See also last chapter.)

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Christian conception of the double structure of human life. The existence of a transcendental and an immanent order in life has created in the individuals and the groups belonging to Christian civilization a series of tensions and dynamic balances which have in the long run prepared the ground for the rise of a democratic way of life.

The ideals preached by Christianity, though working as regulative principles in life, belong to an order beyond the grave, and as such they can never be realized on the empirical level. The ideal of universal brotherhood can be taken as an example. Thus a dualism is created in life which under specific historical conditions becomes a positive element in the cultural climate of democracy. This took place at that moment in the evolution of Western man when a balance was created between the transcendental and the immanent dimensions of life. Historically speaking this phenomenon resulted from the process of secularization of life started by the Renaissance.

It would be a mistake to consider the process of secularization as synonymous with that of the democratization of various European communities. This would simply imply that the less the importance given to the sacred and transcendental dimension of life, the more intensive the process of democratization. Present-day Communism shows the fallacy of this supposition. The democratic significance of secularization consists in the fact that this process has resulted in the diminution of the religious aspect of life, thus making possible a balance between the transcendental and immanent, sacred and secular, ideal and real aspects of life. It is the balance between these two dimensions, and not the substitution of one by another, that prepares the ground for a democratic way of life.

What is the origin of this balance?

During the Middle Ages the whole realm of human life was under the domination of a religious, transcendental order. It is due to the Renaissance and the Reformation that important aspects of life were secularized. Already in the early Renaissance the Catholic Church was ready to find a compromise between the guiding values of a religious and those of an economic way of life. Making money was an 'acceptable' way of life provided that those engaged in it fulfilled certain obligations towards the Church. The same readiness for compromise is seen in the artistic field. The taste for a secular art—an art whose value lay in itself—grew side by side with the taste for a religious art. If, on the one hand, the artists of the Renaissance accepted the religious symbols as a means for expressing their artistic emotions, on the other hand religion itself threw open its gates to many aspects of secular life as seen through the eyes of those artists. In the political field a long series of conflicts, and com-

promises between religious and political authority, ended finally in the separation of the State from the Church, thus bringing secularization in another important aspect of life.

One of the most important psychological results of the separation between religious and secular life was an increase in man's self-awareness and responsibility. After the shrinking of the authority of the Church, as a result of the Reformation, Western man, as individual and group, became more and more conscious that he had to create standards of action and values in life for himself.*

This situation aroused in man an urgent need for the reformulation of the problem of salvation at a new cultural and psychological level. How could the individual, escaped from the traditional tutelage of the Church, lead his life so as to obtain salvation? The answer to this question was: By the guidance of an inner evidence which gave him the sense of value in life under any circumstance. Thus the secularization of life caused a unique spurt in the development of modern man's conscience. Since in this phenomenon lies the main democratic significance of secularization let us analyse it in some detail.

A specific psychological process is closely connected with the growth of conscience in modern man. The minimization of the power of religion has been paralleled by the displacement of an external and absolute type of authority by an inner authority. The insecurity aroused in man by his emancipation from the divine order characteristic of the Middle Ages lies at the basis of this process. As the result of this displacement, man's reliance on the supreme power and wisdom of God was at least partly transformed into reliance on human power and reason; faith in God became faith in man. Modern rationalism and humanism are the direct outcomes of this displacement. Psychologically, secularization became possible to the extent to which the transcendental order was rendered immanent, to the extent to which the historical process itself became redemptive,

*This aspect of the evolution of Christianity and of Western man in general has formed the object of many important studies, most of them agreeing upon its great significance for the development of the Western democratic way of life. Max Weber, for instance, sees an increased distance and tension between 'ideal' and 'real' as a result of the secular spirit of the Reformation. One meaning of this is that the fall of the authority of the Church had increased in man the consciousness of the necessary effort to adjust himself to the ideal order upheld by his religious convictions. One of the outlets of this inner tension was in a drive towards work, enterprise and production, in a word, rational economy, which lies at the basis of modern capitalism. Erich Fromm sees in the increased self-responsibility resulting from the spirit of the Reformation, not only a democratic phenomenon, but also the root of the fear of freedom in contemporary man, which, as we shall see later, constitutes a condition of present-day totalitarianism.

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and to the extent to which the individual's conscience took upon itself the task of guiding and organizing life.

One might believe that, because of its close connexion with the process of secularization, the conscience of modern man is oriented mainly towards the relative values of life, and that its main function is to guide and organize man's actions towards the achievement of a series of secular values—artistic, economic, political, etc. In this case the structure of modern conscience is thoroughly historical, and, it is only a means of justifying what happens on the empirical plane of life. This is not the case. Proofs can easily be found which show that part of the contents of modern man's conscience are of an ideal order, and that because of this fact he has made permanent efforts to guide and organize his life according to ideal ends. The presence of these ends in his conscience is due to the displacement and the introjection of the religious transcendental order. The makers of American democracy fought the old régime in the name of the law of God which they read in their consciences. (John Brown, for instance.) 'The rights of man' have the same character of sacredness as the voice of God. The supreme respect for human personality lying at the basis of British democracy is rooted in the Christian conception of human life. The humanitarian conscience of the French revolutionaries offers also ample proofs of its religious extraction. Their language discloses this, even when their actions take on an anti-religious character. The frequent use in political contexts of expressions such as '*évangile*', '*credo*', '*martyrologie*', '*bonne nouvelle de liberté*', show that their conscience was impregnated with the values of the transcendental world of Christianity.*

We stop here with the analysis of modern man's conscience. Its main trait consists in its dual character, in the sense that it is the source of two types of value, namely, a set of transcendental-ideal values and a set of immanent empirical values. Thus modern man has the capacity to adapt himself both to a transcendental and an immanent order of life. He is able to combine the will of God with the necessities of life. Needless to say, this was not possible before the process of secularization started. For, as we have already shown, it was primarily due to this process that the will and the reason of God based on the external authority of the Church was introjected and transformed into inner authority. This unconscious process strengthened the conviction that man could govern himself if he only had an adequate knowledge of the laws of his mind. The belief in the power of self-government, individual and collective, and the belief that man can act freely under the only 'sovereignty of his developed con-

*See F. Brunot: *Histoire de la langue française*, Tome IX, pp. 623 ff.

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science' (Lord Acton) form the basic feature of the cultural climate of democracy.

In conclusion we stress the main idea of this section as follows: Christianity became a strong element in the cultural climate of democracy at the moment when, because of its historical evolution, a balance was created between the religious and secular planes of life. The process of secularization has made this possible. But it is the balance between religious and secular life, not secularization in itself, that matters for democracy. Without secularization, Western man would have remained in an immature state and unconscious of his ability for self-government. Too much secularization and the total abolition of the divine order of life has aroused in man uncertainty and a morbid need for dependence. Deprived of the security of belief in a transcendental order, he has linked his destiny, by the ties of absolute faith, with a series of empirical forces. In this lies the origin of modern secular myths which form an important psychological ingredient in contemporary totalitarianism. It is worth noticing that those European communities whose religious development led more easily towards the balance between religious and a secular life were ready earlier than other communities for the process of democratization. 'It hath been the wisdom of the Church of England . . . to keep the mean between two extremes', says an old document. (Preface to the Book of Common Prayer.) At that time the extremes were: an excessive drive towards secularization represented by most of the Protestant sects, and the religious absolutism of Rome. It is no wonder that this community has opened up the road to modern democracy both in their own country and in America.

Secularization was necessary up to the point at which European man gained the conviction that he could follow from an inner impulse the pattern of reason and moral life instilled into him by centuries of Christian civilization. This is the real function of the so-called modern conscience which forms the nucleus of the democratic personality.

ETHICS AND DEMOCRACY

The main problem in the relationship between democracy and ethics can be formulated as follows: how can the individual act in the interest of the group if the motives of his action are in himself? In other words, how is it possible for a moral end to be of an inter-individual character, and yet not to lead to individual self-alienation? Answering these questions from a psychological point of view one can say that freedom in the moral field is possible for the main reason that, owing to the process of individuation, the individual has

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in himself the capacity for acting according to general ends.* One usually says in such circumstances that the individual acts according to reason. Needless to say, this does not necessarily imply the identification of the individual with general ends. One of the main assumptions of democracy is that the individual knows and realizes these ends as an individual. This shows clearly that democratic ethics presuppose a basic dualism, a balance between the individual and society, personality and humanity, freedom and order. Today this basic dualism is more clearly noticeable than ever for the simple reason that in some democratic societies its terms tend to fall apart and thus to form two separate ethics, universal and a relative ethics. The idea should, however, be stressed that these ethical trends are found in one form or another in any democratic cultural climate, ancient or modern.

One often makes the mistake of speaking about Greek ethics, the ethics of perfection. Such an expression can be truly applied only to a certain Greek period, to a pre-democratic, Homeric culture-pattern. With the rise of the middle classes in Athens, which reached its peak in the democratic period, this ethical ideal was paralleled by another. The end of life consisted not only in doing glorious things at any cost, but also in 'getting ahead' in the world by a series of compromises between various empirical conditions of life. The existence of the two ethical trends is fully tested by the clash between Socrates and the Sophists, by the clash between two conceptions of military action and of glory, that of Alcibiades and that of Nicias.

In modern democracies ethical dualism is disclosed by the co-existence of Christian ethics, of universal brotherhood, and of the individualistic ethics of competition. There is no need to enter into a detailed description of this phenomenon. Suffice it to say that in modern democracies these two trends, though opposed to each other, have worked together for a long time.

*If moral law is nothing but introjected communal values, it would follow that personality is not a forum of free decision, and consequently the feeling of spontaneity characteristic of moral action is but a psychological result of conforming to necessity. This would seem to weaken the ethical foundation of democracy. A few details on the process of introjection would perhaps help to dispel this impression. First of all there is no introjection without projection. The child does not in fact introject the father figure as an objective reality. The introjected figure is the result of a series of needs and desires of the child blended with a series of expectations which the father has from him. The same process takes place in the integration of a social norm in a democratic cultural climate. The introjected social norms are experienced by the individual as his own conscience; they are not only a mirror of external coercion and authority, but also a projection of his own individuality. Conscience is at least partly the expression of the individual in his relationships with others in various circumstances. It is not only a result of the individual adaptation, but also his own self-realisation.

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Democracy represents, from the ethical point of view, a dynamic balance between an ethics of the absolute and an ethics of empirical life. When this balance is upset, democracy itself is threatened. After the Periclean era the two ethics fall apart. The ethics of the absolute takes the way of idealism through Plato, while the ethics of expediency is developed by the Sophists. The ethical ideal is consequently divided. The man of that period had to choose between living according to reason or excelling in the expediency of life. Today one of the greatest weaknesses of modern democracy is seen in the conflict between Christian ethics and the individualistic ethics of competition.

DEMOCRACY AND THE DOUBLE DIMENSION OF LIFE

The dualism found in nearly all aspects of a democratic cultural climate leads us to the conclusion that the structure of a democratic way of life is defined by two dimensions, one ideal and transcendental, the other empirical and immanent. The first can be referred to psychologically as the feeling of transcendence, permanence and sacredness of life. The implications of this dual character of life are many. We can mention only the most important of them.

A. A way of life based on two dimensions, as described above, develops in man the tendency and the ability to adjust himself to comprehensive and distant goals. Distance and comprehensiveness, however, do not define the real character of these goals, but their ideal quality. Some goals of life belong to a transcendental order. This is not simply a paradigmatic order (Mannheim) or a pre-established plan of life. The order prescribed by these goals, though acting upon life, is unrealizable in the sense that it goes far beyond the empirical condition of life. As a result of this, human life has a timeless as well as an historical character. This endows the individual and the group with a high level of aspiration and a particular dynamism.

B. The first sign of the presence of a transcendental order in the cultural climate of democracy is seen in the fact that a series of fundamental concepts of democracy do not get their full meaning except on a purely ideal plane.* Freedom, equality, and fraternity are realized only in man's work and hope for freedom, equality, and fraternity. To become disillusioned because they do not become realities means not understanding their basic character and their function in human life. The attempt to realize them by any means—the realization of 'equality' in contemporary Communism for instance—springs up from the same ignorance.

*Tocqueville regards the gradual development of the principle of equality in modern society, as 'a providential fact . . . it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference . . .' (*Democracy in America*, p. 6.)

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C. The double dimension of life is one of the main sources of tolerance, as a value of the European democratic culture. Living within the frame of high ideals, and being aware of their unrealizable character and at the same time measuring one's actions against these ideals, leads in the long run to a strong feeling of self-limitation and humility. This feeling, applied to human relationships, promotes understanding for and tolerance towards one's fellow men.

D. It is worth mentioning another important significance of the double dimension of life for psychology. Modern psychology rightly depicts the human mind as having a double structure, the unconscious and the conscious. These two structures, though opposed, complement each other. At a later stage we shall see the importance of this phenomenon for a democratic form of behaviour.

E. A democratic way of life began to prevail in Western civilization at the moment when a balance between the two dimensions of life was achieved. The supremacy of one dimension, transcendental or immanent, leads to the end of a democratic and to the beginning of a totalitarian way of life. The Fascists suppressed the transcendental dimension of life by the secular myths of leadership and race. The Communists call the transcendental dimension empirical and immanent and work accordingly. In this way, any ideal is turned into an immanent aim, into a political slogan. In both types of social organization life has one dimension.

THE SCALE OF VALUES IN DEMOCRACY

It is difficult to image a democratic way of life flourishing in a cultural climate dominated by a single value. In the Western culture-pattern the condition of the independence of and balance between its cardinal values was laid down during the Renaissance. In what follows we intend to give a table of the cardinal values of modern civilization pointing also to their specific functions.

1. Religious value is characterized by the feeling that everything is based on a supra-individual and transcendental order. Its fundamental trait is defined by the concept of the sacred. The actions determined by religious ends are intended to fit into a permanent sacred order and thus to bring salvation. From the social point of view, religious value is integrative. Anthropological researches show that everywhere, and at all times in history, God or the gods are the same for a given social group as a whole and that they persuade the individual members to behave in a certain specific way, thus increasing the coherence of the group.

2. Aesthetic value is based on the concept of form. It has often been said, and we are inclined to support the view, that the category of individuality is essential for aesthetic value. The main aim of an

aesthetically orientated action is to re-create the world as seen through the experiences of an individual. Romantic art is the best demonstration of this point of view. In an aesthetic act the individual is too much concentrated on himself. That is why Spranger defines the aesthetic type of man as egotistic and anti-social. This seems to be an exaggeration, but it is nevertheless true that aesthetic value is not socially integrative.

3. Scientific value is rooted in the tendency to adapt oneself to the immediate empirical conditions of life. Its fundamental category is that of 'understanding', of establishing relationships between the elements of the empirical world. But in spite of this, the ultimate aim of scientific action is not to build up a unitary picture of the world. Scientific activity is essentially analytical; it is primarily concerned with facts or experiences, and only secondarily with their organization into a united whole. The unity attained by the interrelation of facts is provisional and relative. It is entirely dependent on facts. Change, progress and relativity are basically scientific concepts.

An analytic attitude towards the world is obviously disintegrative for the simple reason that it increases the feeling of instability and fragmentariness in life. The rapid tempo introduced into modern life by science, though it once helped to render the pattern of modern societies flexible, is today considered one of the main causes of social instability and disintegration.

4. Political value is essentially integrative. Any action determined by political ends takes place at the group level and is meant to make the individual act as a member of a group and the group act as a unit. The feeling of belonging and coercion and the consciousness of an external authority are necessarily involved in political action. That is why there seems to be an obvious connexion between religious and political values. Both of them contain the element of external authority and coercion, but their methods of coercion differ.

5. Moral value is also essentially integrative. Action pursuing moral ends springs from the consciousness of being a member of a group. Moral action is guided from within (by conscience).

6. Economic value in modern societies is disintegrative. It is rooted in the individual drive for acquisition and ownership. Contemporary Communist experiments have not yet invalidated the assumption that *Homo economicus* is not a social man.

The evolution of the scale of values since the Renaissance shows firstly a permanent tendency of all values towards a certain independence of religious value, secondly, a tendency towards autonomy existing in each cardinal value, and thirdly, a tendency towards a certain balance between integrative and disintegrative values. All these trends are closely connected with the process of democratization.

The separation of aesthetic from religious values was, as mentioned before, already noticeable in the early Renaissance. The Italian painters of the Renaissance populated the church with common faces seen in the street. 'The saints themselves appeared as *bons bourgeois*.* A new approach to nature, no longer religious, but aesthetic, appeared during the same period. The ideal of the Renaissance *literati* was to disengage themselves from any kind of *ordo* and to look at the world as personality, as an *uomo singolare* or *unico* who shaped the world according to his own style. The independence of aesthetic value reaches a peak in Romanticism, when in fact it dominates all other values.

The liberation of science from the control of religion took place during the same period. The full significance of this phenomenon cannot be discussed here. But, on the whole, the rise of science has brought with it considerable interest in the empirical and practical conditions of life. It has increased also the confidence in human power, and a belief in unlimited progress. All this was paralleled by a disregard of the transcendental order of life and by a unique readiness for change.

During the humanistic period of the Renaissance there took place the separation of moral from religious value. In this humanism can be found the basic condition of various 'secular ethics'. During that period the Christian virtues were gradually paralleled and counter-balanced by formal 'virtù', signifying 'initiative and ability and all forms of dynamic strivings by the individual'.† *Eloquentia* and *sapientia*, for instance, were qualities equal in value to Christian virtues.

We have already dealt with the separation of economic from religious value.

In conclusion, one can say that one of the main conditions of a democratic cultural climate was realized by the separation of the cardinal cultural values from religious value. This process was completed by a certain degree of autonomization of each value. As a result of this process, Western man has acquired a feeling of plurality of ends in life, and the conviction that he as an individual in a group has a certain degree of freedom in choosing the supreme goal in life. In this lies an important condition of a democratic cultural climate which we call cultural heterogeneity. Its full psychological significance will be seen at a later stage. For the moment we can say that cultural heterogeneity is a condition of mental flexibility and tolerance which are two aspects of democratic behaviour. In order to realize the importance of cultural heterogeneity it is enough to consider what

*von Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

†von Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

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are the possibilities of growing up as a personality in a cultural climate dominated by religious value and what these possibilities are in a cultural climate whose cardinal values are in a dynamic balance. The number of rôles an individual can play is considerably greater, in the latter case. This increases the feeling of freedom.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Cardinal Socio-Psychological Concepts of Democracy

The citizens should be moulded to suit the form of government under which they live. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character the better the government.

ARISTOTLE

THE cardinal socio-psychological concepts of democracy are the concepts of individuality, critical mind, objectivity, and leisure. It is perhaps necessary to state from the very beginning that, in spite of the fact that we call them 'cardinal', a certain arbitrariness in their selection was unavoidable. We can, however, offer two reasons for our choice: firstly, these concepts have been closely associated with the democratic evolution of modern civilization, and secondly, they are in many ways border-line concepts between sociology and psychology. Because of these two reasons we are convinced that any introduction to the psychological aspect of democracy should start with the analysis of these four concepts.

INDIVIDUALITY

A definition of individuality from a psychological standpoint implies the concepts of structure and of motivation. With regard to the former, it would perhaps be more appropriate to refer to individuality as a structuring process, that is, as the individual's capacity to shape and integrate in a particular way the various data of his experience. As a structuring process individuality implies the character of uniqueness. With regard to the second concept, one can say that if the psychologist does not consider individuality as a centre of motivation, or as a self-determining system, he may leave the study of human personality almost entirely to the sociologist, biologist or economist.

The relationship between democracy and the concept of individuality cannot be understood adequately without looking at the

historical aspect of this concept. One of the first examples of a civilization based on the category of individuality is offered by ancient Athens. Why, and how this happened are still unsolved questions.* We have, however, to confine our discussion to those aspects of this problem which lead us as quickly as possible to the connexion between the concept of individuality and democracy. Thus, two aspects of Greek civilization have an exceptional significance from this point of view, the emergence of 'man' as a dominant form of existence, and the emergence of the individual as a free agent in life. One can illustrate this by an example taken from a drama written during the democratic period of Athens, Aeschylus's *Oresteia*. Orestes, the central character of this trilogy, emerges gradually from the influence of superhuman forces which decide his actions into a world dominated by man. In the first stage of his development, he is the instrument of the moral laws of the universe which assert themselves impersonally ('a crime ought to be punished'). In the second stage, he is in the hands of the mystic forces of life (Furies), while in the third, he appears as an individual before other individuals, Athenian citizens, in order to be judged for his deed. In this way, the first important idea is pointed out, that men rather than the gods settle man's destiny.

Orestes is acquitted for his crime by the Areopagus. But the votes on either side—guilty or innocent—are equal. Hence, the judges are neither for the rigid application of the universal moral law, of which Orestes was an instrument, nor for the emotional mystic forces which, in spite of the moral laws, demand Orestes's punishment as the murderer of his mother. The verdict seems to mean that public order prevails over personal vengeance and family ties. Yet, the significance of this tragedy is not confined, as is often claimed, to a sociological fact, the transition of Athenian society from a primitive community, based on the organic ties of family and kinship, to a superior type of organization based on formal, rational, principles. No less significant is the psychological aspect of the verdict. The equal number of votes on each side suggests that the final decision rests with Orestes himself; he, as an individual, has to decide the meaning of his action. This certainly means that the individual emerged as an autonomous centre of decision in life, and that conscience, as inner authority, is considered as the

*Many people are inclined to stress the economic factors in the explanation of the individualistic trends of Greek civilization. Kitto, for instance, thinks that the rise of the town market had much to do with the development of the ancient Greeks as 'a race of brilliant individuals and opportunists' (*The Greeks*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, p. 70.)

main guarantee of order in life.* Historically speaking, this is the stage at which Grote would place the rise of 'constitutional morality', when the Athenian individual had already internalized the fundamental norms of life of his community. Thus, Aeschylus in *Oresteia*, like Dostoevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov*, deals with 'crime and expiation', rather than with 'crime and punishment'.

A brief note on the evolution of the concept of individuality within Western culture throws an additional light on the relationship between this concept and a democratic way of life.

1. The meaning of human individuality during the Middle Ages constitutes a highly controversial problem. The thesis held by the representatives of historical materialism, and by historians such as Jakob Burckhardt, according to whom individuality is a product of the modern era, suffers from crude 'sociologism', in the approach to the problem of human personality. Burckhardt's view that medieval man did not exist as 'individuality', but as 'class' or professional category is, obviously rooted in the over-statement of some peculiar aspects of the medieval world. In the medieval world, the meaning of individuality is a derivative one, because of the dominance in this world of a series of supra-individual forms of life expressed by religion in particular. The place of the individual in the medieval cosmos was that of an executor of a supra-individual order; his own conscience and reason are but 'emanations' of this order. The only mental categories defining human individuality were those of dependence and submission, that is, those defining man as a 'subject', or a citizen of a world rigidly organized by a supra-human force. This does not, however, preclude the existence of man as an individuality; it only means that socially man was not an agent, save in a class or professional category.

2. There is an aesthetic flavour in the Renaissance concept of individuality. The stress falls on the individual's power to create the world in which he lives. This is but an aspect of the Renaissance man's revolt against 'ordo', against any kind of pre-established form of life. One can say that the spirit of the age was to replace 'ordo' by *nisus formativus*, to substitute for a static order the creative power of life. The revolt against the supra-individual order

*Bruno Snell's brilliant analysis of the 'rise of the individual' in the Greek civilization can be mentioned in support of this view. Based on the analysis of texts, he confirms the view that, in the Homeric period, one can find little evidence for an individualized mind. He sees in the early lyrics—in the sixth century—the first clear signs of the self-consciousness of the individual. The growth of this phenomenon reaches a peak in the fifth century, being illustrated by Aeschylus' and Euripides' tragedies. The evolution of this process coincides with the democratization of Athenian society. Bruno Snell: *The Discovery of the Mind*, 1953.

of the Church, characteristic of the Reformation, is an aspect of this large process.

The main trait of the spirit of the Renaissance consists, however, in the belief that man is creative as an individual. Leonardo da Vinci, for instance, speaks of a *ragione cosmica*, and a *ragione individuale*, which he characterizes as two modes of creation, one followed by Nature, the other by man. Nature begins '*dalla ragione (cosmica) e termina nella speranza*', while man '*bisogna seguire in contrario*', from experience to reason.*

3. Romanticism brings forth a new aspect in the meaning of the concept of individuality. Under its impact, individuality is considered as a fundamental category of the universe. For, on the one hand, the universe exists only in individual forms, and, on the other, each individuality is, at least potentially, the universe itself in a specific configuration, i.e., individualized universality. Thus, the Romantic period can be described as the imperialistic stage in the development of the concept of individuality. This is mainly due to the Romantic belief that there is a relationship of identity between the logical structure of individual mind and the structure of the external world. Hegel, for instance, analyses the structure of human consciousness on the assumption that its articulation is identical with that of the world as a whole (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*).

Particular stress has to be placed on the moral aspect of the Romantic concept of individuality. The individual, as the bearer of universal order, is a moral agent whenever he acts according to his own nature; he is, from the moral point of view, 'autonomous personality'. (Kant is a Romantic in ethics.) This is a crucial point in the evolution of a modern man's conscience. The conviction that free individual action, or action controlled by inner authority, leads to an harmonious social and political world forms an important condition of modern democracy.

4. The concept of individuality characteristic of economic liberalism is also rooted in the conviction that free individual action leads to harmonious social pattern. But in the economic field, the belief in the rationality of the individual's action took on a specific character. Reason became devoid of any content, and was thus reduced to a formal faculty. By this, the structure of human individuality underwent an important change, in the sense that 'intelligence'

*The spirit of the Renaissance presupposes a similar process to that described by Grote as 'constitutional morality', the internalization of the basic principles of life, individual and social, which, during the Middle Ages, were considered as emanating from transcendental reason. The Cartesian concept of individual reason is, in fact, a final result of a long process of introjection.

became the dominant trait of the human mind. As distinct from the Renaissance and Romantic concepts of reason which involve certain social and cultural values, intelligence is defined by contemporary psychology as a formal capacity of the individual to adjust himself to the environment. This is little else but the psychological expression of that mechanism of adjustment and of that type of mental structure necessary in the economic environment of modern civilization. We shall come back to this aspect in the evolution of modern man.

5. One can distinguish in the present time two main tendencies in the development of the concept of individuality. One comes as a consequence of liberalism, and is manifested as the complete lack of the feeling of integration; the second is a result of long experience of a mechanical type of social co-ordination characteristic of modern industrial society. The former tendency leads to an anarchic type of individuality. The world is, for this type of individual, devoid of order; the individual's actions and aspirations are supported only by his own will, often against a hostile world. Existentialism is an adequate expression of this aspect of human individuality.

The second trend in contemporary civilization leads to the development of an industrial type of individuality. The condition of work in an industrial society has shaped the concept of individuality into that of a participant in a common task.

Summing up the historical aspect of the concept of individuality the following ideas should be pointed out: in ancient Athenian and in modern Western cultures, individuality was defined from two main aspects; (a) Individuality as a unique embodiment of life, and as an end in itself, and (b) Individuality as membership of a group. Both ancient Athenian and modern cultures offer sufficient proofs that the main condition of a democratic way of life is a balance between these two tendencies in the definition of human individuality; that is, individuality as an end in itself, and as a functional category. In Athens, the conditions of democracy were ripe when the individual as an end in himself was counterbalanced by the reality of the *Polis*. 'In the winning of his livelihood', says Kitto, 'he (the Greek) was essentially individualist; in the filling of his life he was essentially 'communist'.*

When the balance between these two meanings of the concept of individuality is upset democracy itself is in danger. Here one can grasp an essential difference between Greek and Western civilizations. In Athens the accent had generally been stronger on individuality as an end in itself. Consequently anarchic individualism

**Op. cit.* p. 78.

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was the disease from which this civilization died. In Western civilization, the accent seems, after many oscillations, to have fallen on individuality as functional reality; contemporary totalitarian societies can be adduced as a proof of this.

THE CRITICAL MIND

The critical mind consists in the individual's capacity to accept or to reject propositions, or to take a course of action prompted by his own judgement, by the interpretation of the situation through the formal laws of his own intellect. This is obviously an ideal case of the functioning of the critical mind, for the formal laws of the intellect are often imbued with deep unconscious factors. Whenever someone joins a political party by free decision, one can easily find that his decision was partly determined by a series of irrational factors such as feelings of friendship, family ties, and others. According to certain trends in contemporary psychology, these irrational factors play a preponderant part. We have, however, to stress the idea that a political action or attitude is not democratic unless it is decided at the rational level of the individual's mind. In other words, action in a democratic pattern requires deliberation, that is to say, the critical attitude of mind, before any decision is taken.

The development of the critical mind goes hand in hand with the dominance of intellect in man's adjustment to his environment. This constitutes a psychological as well as a sociological process. Since we have touched several times upon this problem, for the moment it is enough to stress once again the general idea that the whole structure of modern civilization has required an increase of the importance of intellect in the process of adaptation. Romanticism did, in fact, very little for the so-called rehabilitation of human emotionality. For, even after the Romantic period, the most comprehensive form of adjustment to the physical and social environment of modern man was that furnished by scientific knowledge, that is a form of adjustment based on 'objective' observation and assessment of the external world, with as little interference as possible from emotionality and will.

In no other culture has knowledge based on observation and on the formal relationship of things and events dominated the whole range of life to such an extent as in modern Europe. In fact, in most of the known cultures —Greek culture being excepted—knowledge does not spring from a specific attitude to life, but on the contrary, it is submerged in the global act of adjustment and as such is intermingled with feeling and will. In modern civilization knowledge has not only become the chief factor in man's adjustment, but human life in its entirety is dominated by it. Instincts, emotionality, will, and cultural values are at its disposal.

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From the standpoint of psychology, the critical mind can be described as that type of reaction which is characteristic of an act of intelligence. The main feature of an intelligent type of reaction consists in the distance mind (the organism) puts between the stimulus and the final form of satisfaction, or in the capacity of an individual's mind to bear the tension aroused by a stimulus as long as the search for an adequate reaction requires. At the instinctive level of behaviour, reaction is direct and urgent. In this case the mind enjoys a low degree of freedom. An act of intelligence is, on the contrary, a 'detour' reaction in which a certain degree of leisure is necessary. The aim of such a type of reaction is not only the release of tension, but also mental efficiency. This means that the organism, while reacting, disposes of enough leisure and detachment from its own action to grasp and retain the best ways and conditions leading to the pursued goal, and thus, to improve the mechanism of reaction itself. An act of intelligence is a profit-making enterprise; it brings the satisfaction of the immediate needs, and at the same time capitalizes the surplus, for the future of the enterprise. Thus, an intelligent reaction is eminently prospective, it tends to be oriented towards distant and comprehensive goals. Since this aspect of behaviour is closely connected with the problem of freedom, we shall come back to it at a later stage.

There are certain established forms of activity of the critical mind worth mentioning. The habit of preceding a course of action by a long process of mental deliberation is strongly rooted in the people living in a democracy. Pericles seems to suggest that the habit of thinking and the habit of taking decisions based on critical examination are better developed in a democratic than in a non-democratic society. 'For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection' says he with reference to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. The establishment of formal logic as a pattern of thinking is another mode of activity of the critical mind. The importance attributed to this type of thinking by Greek and Western civilizations shows its connexion with democracy. The democratic type of government, based on deliberation and leisure, is another form of activity of the critical mind.

OBJECTIVITY

We have shown in a previous chapter that democratic society is an individualized society. Bearing in mind that democracy implies a specific conception of the world, one can extend this formula by saying that the democratic world is an individualized world. This world is composed of a multitude of self-contained units, persons or things,

which are formally related to each other, and their mutual relationship neither exhausts nor annihilates their individuality. The adjustment to such a world requires the presence of a specific mental function—or attitude—which we call the spirit of objectivity.

The definition of the spirit of objectivity may vary; it might be formulated as the *adequatio rei intellectus*, or as the ability to interpret the world in the light of the formal laws of intellect (Kant). But whatever its definition, the spirit of objectivity implies the individual's capacity to look at the world through the categories of otherness, multiplicity, and of formal relationship. In what follows we shall discuss the meaning of these categories and their relation to a democratic way of life.

The most important trait of the spirit of objectivity consists in the quality of the mind to grasp 'the other', the non-self, or the non-identical—be it the external world as a whole, or specific persons and things—as having a reason for its existence in itself. Needless to say, this quality is to a great extent determined by experience and culture. Up to the age of six, the child can hardly grasp the objective aspects of the external world, for, in his world, things exist 'for himself' only. The world of the primitive is, as will be shown at the end of this section, to a lesser degree than that of the civilized man divided into self-contained units, individuals or things.

The objective spirit rests on the capacity of the individual to balance two categories of factors involved in his contact with the world, one category defining the 'me', and the other, the 'not-me'. One cannot speak about an objective attitude towards the world when one category is reduced to the other. The balance between these two categories of factors is produced and maintained by the ego. The presence of the ego signifies, first of all, that the mental life of the individual, his drives, desires and aspirations, is structurized in a unity of its own. By this, the individual differentiates himself from his surroundings which consequently become the general 'other'. But the ego also means a unity *among* other unities, i.e., the unities which are other individuals. From this specific point of view, it is important to mention that the rise of the ego in the child is a function of his relations with others, the members of his family coming first. The structurizing of the child's mind goes hand in hand with the feeling of his own separateness from others, and of others from himself. Thus, the child's ego emerges as a relational reality between himself, the external world as a whole, and 'the others', defined as other egos. In this respect one can say that the ego is a sociological category, it defines itself as a point in a net of inter-individual relationships. Therefore 'the other' which is a category of the objective spirit is inherent in the rise of the ego.

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The presence of the ego does not determine a self-centred type of action, as one is inclined to believe. Though defining the mental unity of an individual *qua* individual, the ego is chiefly a balancing structure, the main function of which is to render flexible both the inner drives of the individual, so as to make them fit the conditions of the external world, and the conditions of the external world, so as to adjust them to the inner drives of the individual. We propose the attribute of *objective* for that type of reaction which, when analysed, discloses a balance between the inner world of the individual and the external world, physical and social. Such a type of reaction is the direct result of a flexible structure existing in the individual's mind and one which compromises between the individual and the external world.*

If one looks at the historical aspect of the spirit of objectivity one can see more clearly its connexion with the function of the ego, and its significance for the democratic way of life. In the medieval world, characterized by a stable order, the individual's adjustment was dominated by the power of habit and tradition. The circumstances in which his society failed to provide him with ready-made forms of adjustment were rare. The ego played a minor part in the mental structure of medieval man, for the ego presupposes that the individual is himself an active factor in the process of adjustment, that is, it presupposes an individualized type of reaction. The Renaissance caused a radical change in the mental structure of man. The individual found himself confronted by new problems, indeed by a new world, for which the old pattern of behaviour, the old ideas, habits, feelings, etc., were no longer adequate. Hence he was more and more insistently required to work out for himself modes of adjustment to his world, and therefore more and more liable and ready to individualize his behaviour. This made a rapid growth of the ego necessary, and the dominance of the individual's mind by it. For the ego is called upon to find a form of adjustment, where secure but rigid instinctive reaction fails, and where the pattern of habit and of culturally conditioned reaction is insufficient. When adjustment cannot be individualized, either because of the rigidity of the instincts or because of a strong cultural conditioning, the function of the ego is reduced. Then the Id or the super-ego—to use two psychoanalytical terms—become dominant.

The very condition which makes for the dominance of the ego makes also for the rise of the spirit of objectivity. Objective know-

*This compromising activity is sometimes called reality function. We prefer the term objectivity to that of reality, mainly for the reason that the representatives of depth psychology have systematically failed to make clear what they mean by reality.

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ledge is the first and the most important step towards the individual's adjustment to a changeable world. Change and novelty render the established forms of adjustment—instincts and habits—inappropriate. This brings to the foreground of the individual's mind the need to 'observe' the aspects of his environment, to grasp their specific structure, and above all, their connexions. What is the structure of the world, what is the new 'ordo' which does not fit into the old pattern of adjustment, are questions which lead to the growth of the objective mind.

The study of the rise of the objective mind within modern civilization justifies the following psychological conclusion: an objective attitude towards the world, and the need for objectivity can be interpreted as compensations for the feeling of insecurity aroused in man by the fall of medieval order which was based on transcendental reason and the power of tradition. The need to reconstruct a new order in his world so as to escape the feeling of chaos led modern man to the reorganization of his environment on a new basis. He became more and more interested in the nature of things, in how they relate to and produce each other. Because of this new attitude every detail and accident became necessary for the reorganization of the world. The order of this world was guaranteed only by the chain of formal relationships among things and events. Nothing came from outside.

The insecurity aroused in human beings of that period by the fall of the medieval order had been transformed into a positive attitude towards life during the Renaissance. Interest in things and in their interdependence, guaranteed not by divine reason, but by formal laws, became a new form of adjustment which asserted itself against the old religious pattern of behaviour. By the fourteenth century, Jean Buridan already boasted that his explanation of the world could dispense with the hypothesis of the divine agencies. From this mental attitude grew up modern science which is in many ways the embodiment of the objective spirit of modern times.

An objective attitude is often conceived as opposed to a mystic or magic attitude. The latter has been described as a characteristic of primitive man. The world of the primitive, because of his magic mind, is dominated by the categories of identity and community; hence his mechanisms of adjustment are collective. The world of the primitive is not individualized, for both his physical and social environment is seen by him in the perspective of the whole. The members of his society can individualize, their behaviour to a lesser degree than modern European man; their mind is under the leveling pressure of the 'Totem'.

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From the analysis of the primitive's behaviour one cannot easily conclude that he possesses the feeling of the specific character of his personality, or that the various situations in which he may find himself have their specific character. His reactions are guided by collective formulas and are directed not so much towards the specific character of the situation as towards a general factor lying behind the things and the events of his world. Any act of adjustment to the primitive's world requires the individual's identification with his group. This type of adjustment, characteristic of the super-ego, is quite opposite to that produced by the ego. The former leads, sooner or later, to *Gleichschaltung* and communion, to the annihilation of the individual character of things and persons. The latter creates formal relations, it preserves and increases the individual character of things and persons. It is this world, based on the individual character of things and persons, that forms the framework of a democratic way of life.*

LEISURE

As the concept of leisure has been used in so many different ways, it would be advisable to start by saying something about the meaning attributed to it in the present context.

The expression 'sense of gratuitousness' can often be used to indicate certain important aspects in the concept of leisure. Thus, leisure can be defined as opposed to the concept of 'usefulness', or of the practical. It would imply in this case that attitude of mind by which someone can engage in activities without previously thinking about the useful or practical results involved in such activities. Contemplation, or the contemplative attitude, can also be used in order to circumscribe the meaning of the concept of leisure. Thus, leisure would imply the individual's ability to disengage himself from time to time from his daily cares and immediate duties, and to view life as an onlooker. In this case, leisure widens the individual's field of vision and makes him aware of aspects of life which would have been completely hidden to him had he been under the pressure of the necessities of existence.

Leisure is involved in many psychological and sociological aspects of the democratic way of life. For the sake of brevity we can only mention here a few of these.

1. To start with, leisure constitutes a necessary condition for the functioning of the critical mind. Why this is so can be easily understood when one takes into account that the main function of

*Elements of magic thought can be found not only in primitive, but also in contemporary totalitarian societies. One of the most conspicuous traits of Nazi personality and group is their inclination towards a mythical type of thought.

the critical mind is to facilitate the individual's adjustment to distant and comprehensive goals in life. Any feeling of pressure minimizes the chances of such adjustment.

Leisure is also a necessary condition for the functioning of the ego. While the Id urges the mind to react according to the rigid pattern of instincts, and while the super-ego takes the 'clichés' of adjustment existing in the cultural milieu, the ego resorts to flexible schemes in order to enable the individual to work for himself the forms of adjustment. In this case the feeling of leisure is necessary.

2. The connexion between leisure and the democratic way of life is important also from a sociological point of view. This will be seen more clearly when we describe the way of life in a totalitarian as compared with a democratic society. For the moment it is enough to mention the idea, dealt with in a previous chapter, that an important condition of the development of a democratic way of life is a long period of security and a feeling of ease, individual and collective. This facilitated the rise of a flexible social organization of the group, and of a flexible mental structure in the individual. In such circumstances, the individual is allowed a high degree of freedom in his social adjustment. The opposite happens when the group lives under conditions of stress; its organization becomes rigid. That is why one can describe a democratic group as a society organized under conditions of leisure, and a totalitarian group as a society organized in conditions of stress.

There are other aspects of a democratic way of life which show that the feeling of leisure and the sense of gratuitousness are necessary components of it. Here are a few of them:—

(a) The system of education in a democratic society should be mentioned first. It is an obvious fact that the period of childhood and of training for life is longer in a democratic society than in primitive, medieval, or contemporary totalitarian societies. While in a primitive or in a totalitarian society the individual is acquainted with the strain of life by becoming a full member of its group at a relatively early age (in Communist societies the indoctrination starts at the age of 5), in democratic society the individual lives in a world of his own up to the age of adolescence, sometimes even later. This fact has a twofold significance for the feeling of leisure. Firstly, during that long period of childhood, the individual acquires the habit of thinking that life for oneself may be as important as life as a member of one's society. Secondly, because of a long childhood, the process of social conditioning takes place slowly, smoothly, with no "trauma" and feeling of compulsion, in contrast to what often happens in a totalitarian society. This

forms a basic condition in the feeling of freedom, characteristic of the individual's adjustment to a democratic society.

(b) The democratic mechanism of government—elections, parliamentary debates, etc.—requires leisure for its adequate application.

(c) From the sociological point of view it is important to notice that leisure became a value in both Greek and modern European civilizations. This should clearly be distinguished from either laziness and sloth, or from the 'absenteeist' attitude in life involved in the medieval concept of *vita contemplativa*. In Greek civilization, leisure was raised to a cultural value by the importance attributed to contemplation and speculation. Leisure in this case was almost equivalent to spiritual activity. In modern civilization, the value of leisure is demonstrated by a specific cultural phenomenon known by the name of 'autonomy of values'. In Germany, this phenomenon was signalled—and exaggerated—by Nietzsche and his followers as a conflict between *Kultur* and *Leben*. The autonomy of culture is in fact rooted in the value attributed to that kind of spiritual activity which is not immediately controlled by, or put into the service of the practical requirements of human life. Formulas very much in use towards the end of the last century, such as 'science for the sake of science', 'art for art's sake', '*philosophia pura*', were various expressions of this aspect of modern civilization. All of them expressed at the cultural level the presence of the feeling of social security and ease in life characteristic of that golden period of modern democracies. Needless to say the autonomy of cultural values is completely absent in contemporary totalitarian societies. There, any form of spiritual activity is rigorously integrated with the basic conditions of group survival and prosperity.

CHAPTER SIX

Mind and Democracy

Presque tous les extrêmes s'adoucissent et s'émoussent.

TOCQUEVILLE

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING OF FLEXIBILITY

WHEN the complexity of situations renders the direct and rigid mechanisms of instinct and habit insufficient, consciousness becomes the main dimension of the psyche. The main indication of this is the flexible and comprehensive character of behaviour. Since no fixed type of reaction fits the situation, the whole psychological field of possible responses is kept in readiness. The reaction starts off by exploration, calculation, and tentative organization of the field. Flexibility in this case is only a particular capacity of the mind to grasp and adjust itself to a variety of conditions, actual and potential. As a result of this, the individual is not driven by established forms of reaction, but moves creatively towards the achievement of an end. Needless to say, this is not possible at the instinct or habit level of reaction.

In a democratic way of life, the individual's mind is dominated by consciousness. This means that human behaviour is primarily directed by what happens at the conscious level of the mind and it results partly, or totally, from an act of deliberation. It is true that, in a democracy, as in any other type of society, the attitude towards one's fellow-beings, towards authority, and towards social institutions in general, are results of a series of data and experiences with which the individual is presented by his society. But in Democracy the final shape of this attitude is normally determined by an individual act of deliberation and conscious choice.

We are only too well aware that in depth psychology human social behaviour is motivated mainly at the unconscious level of the mind. But depth psychology itself is an historical product; it deals with the mental structures of a type of man who lives in a critical period of modern democracies. That is why its assumptions and conclusions cannot invalidate the fact that, in certain historical periods, and in certain civilizations, consciousness plays a greater part in the mental structure of man than in others. We by no means

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suggest that in a democratic way of life the unconscious does not exist; on the contrary, its presence, as we shall presently see, is necessary. But man's world is styled by consciousness. Thus the social world is made up of independent units, the individuals, who create the structure of their society by deliberation and compromises: the physical world is also made up of independent units, things and facts, in formal relations with each other.* Historically speaking, the process of democratization is closely connected with the increase in the number of conscious factors in the organization of the group. Both in ancient Greece and modern Europe the process of democratization went parallel with the transition from a community based on unconscious bonds to a society integrated on the basis of a series of rational goals.

REASON, INTELLECT, INTELLIGENCE

Anyone attempting to define these three concepts is faced with an almost impossible task. One can, however, hardly avoid dealing with such concepts if one wants to gain an adequate idea about the main functions of the conscious level of the mind, and particularly of the part played by consciousness in the mental structure of the individual belonging to a democratic civilization. In what follows we shall look at these concepts from a purely psychological point of view, with the ultimate aim of throwing a certain light on their significance for a democratic way of life.

Though these terms have been used in different contexts, they have, from the psychological point of view, the following common traits:—

1. The function of reason, as well as that of intellect and intelligence, presupposes the presence of conscious goals and of conscious effort in the process of adjustment. This is quite distinct from the type of adjustment based on habit, sentiment, or prejudices, in Burke's sense of this word.

2. Reason, intellect and intelligence are creative forms of adjustment in the sense that they all presuppose critical analysis of the situation, deliberation on the elements presented by it, and a progressive construction of the form of adjustment; all of these imply that the final form of reaction is created on the spot, in the field of reaction. This is also opposed to habit, sentiment and prejudice, which presuppose the pre-existence of an unconscious form of reaction. Consequently reason, intellect, and intelligence imply an element of change and novelty in the situation. It is in this type of situation that their function is mostly required.

*For a more detailed discussion of the historical character of psycho-analysis see Z. Barbu: 'The Historical Pattern of Psycho-Analysis', *B.J. Sociol.*, Vol. III, 1, 1952, p. 64.

It is not easy to establish the differences between the functions of reason and those of intellect and intelligence. It seems, however, that the term reason can normally be applied to that complex of mental functions which enables the individual to find or to establish norms regarding the organization of his environment. Though its ultimate purpose is to establish general principles and laws, a mental activity is described as rational when it is directed towards particular facts and experience. As stated before, this is the difference between an act of adjustment based on reason and one based on prejudice or sentiments. A religious attitude, for instance, also presupposes a certain order, but this order is open to experience only to a small degree.

Needless to say, reason is not, from a psychological point of view, a very clear concept. It is obvious that the general principles which it establishes are connected with experience, but the nature of this connexion is not altogether clear. Considering the meaning attributed to reason by many modern thinkers one is often under the impression that its function is, to a considerable extent, independent of experience. Firstly, the principles of reason imply certain values which express the emotions and the wishes of a group of people rather than their empirical conditions of life. Secondly, the principles of reason are ideals of life, the existence of which cannot be entirely proved by experience; moreover, they are often opposed to experience. Thus, individual freedom has been considered a rational end in many civilizations, and yet its application contradicts some of the fundamental empirical aspects of human life. One can see from this that reason has certain points of contact with prejudice; it applies to life general schemes which are not supported by the evidence of experience.

Intellect is much more dependent on experience than reason. It is that structure, or, simply speaking, that part of the mind, whose function is to organize and unify the individual's experience in order to facilitate its adjustment. The activity of the intellect can neither overlook, nor supersede, experience. But, though dependent on experience, intellect has its own content. Modern philosophers usually refer to intellect as the seat of certain formal laws. Although these laws may have an empirical origin, they certainly exist prior to the experiential data which they organize. But, on the other hand, although the mental reaction based on intellect and the resulting adjustment follow certain pre-established norms, it is nevertheless true that these norms are formal; hence the individual takes nothing into account except these laws—no feeling, no external persuasion, and no social value—that might influence his attitude and his decision in a given situation. A correct application

of these formal laws to his experience is the supreme guide for his adjustment.

The difference between intellect and intelligence is perhaps one of degree. Contemporary psychology emphasizes the following three characteristic points in the definition of intelligence: 1. Intelligence is a formal capacity; 2. Its essence lies in the individual's capacity for establishing relations between things and events (Spearman), and; 3. Intelligence is the capacity of an organism to adjust to new situations (W. Stern). The main implication of this is that intelligence has no content of its own, and that the ultimate aim of an act of intelligence consists in the achievement of the proposed goal, or, more generally speaking, in adjustment itself. Thus, an act of stealing or a crime can involve as much intelligence as a medical diagnosis, or a military operation; the farmer working on his land can display the same amount of intelligence as Bertrand Russell writing his books. The real problem is, how quickly and fully they can establish relations between the elements of the specific situations in which they find themselves, and consequently work out the solution which best suits their purpose.

The most important aspect of an act of intelligence lies in the individual's capacity to grasp the specific nature, and therefore the novelty, of a situation and to work out the most suitable form of adjustment. Thus any act of intelligence involves a strong tendency towards exploration and adventure; the greater the independence from old forms of adjustment, the better. This does not necessarily mean that the individual discards the old forms and rules of adjustment, but that he keeps his mind as free as possible from them, always being ready to try them out, or to dispense with them. The important thing is to keep the mind flexible and be ready to resort to new forms of adjustment as required by the situation.

Two basic things have to be done in an act of intelligence: the mind should be quick to discover the relations between the elements of the situation; to grasp the logic of facts, and the connexion between the new elements in the situation and the interests of the individual. The former requirement implies the presence of the highest degree of consciousness, the latter the presence in the individual of a strong feeling of security.

It has been mentioned more than once in this study that reason, intellect, and intelligence are mental functions necessary for adjustment to the modern world, and consequently they have become dominant traits in the mental structure of modern man. The transition from a stable universe and a rigid social organization founded on divine order to a world of rapid change necessitated the active intervention of the individual's mind with a view to finding

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or constructing another kind of order lying at the basis of nature and society. Newton's concept of nature, and Rousseau's concept of society, are typical expressions of this basic trait in the mind of modern man.

But the transition to the modern world means also man's liberation from a series of old traditional forms of adjustment, formed during a long period of stability. This made it even more necessary for the man of the Renaissance to rely for his adjustment on mental functions and structures different from those prevailing in the adjustment to the medieval world. While in the medieval world feeling (faith) and habit played an important part in the process of adjustment, in the modern world reason and intelligence took their place. Man needed more and more flexibility and initiative to adjust to a world in transformation; he needed above all more confidence in the capacity of his own mind to grasp the relation between things, to organize his environment, and to discover new forms of adjustment. This is approximately the task of intelligence.

No wonder that the society that grew up from the soil of the modern era bears in many respects the mark of that type of social adjustment which is characteristic of reason and intelligence. This is the society suitable to an individual with a flexible mental structure, ready to take into account the new conditions of his own and of his group life, always ready to grasp new relations between himself and others and to include them in the flexible structure of his society. This is the form of society suitable to an individual confident in his own judgement, and above all, in the capacity of his mind to mould the structure of his society according to circumstances. One can find in all this the implicit belief that society is the result of conscious activity, the belief 'that abstract reason, or imagination may be utilized not only to study, but to direct the course of society', as the late followers of Locke put it.* If one adds to this, not only to 'direct' but to create, this would mean that society is the result of a collective act of intelligence.

CONSCIOUSNESS—THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE DOUBLE DIMENSION OF LIFE

The decline of the democratic way of life in Western civilization is marked, among other things, by an increased interest in the psychology of the unconscious. The prominence given to depth

*Russell Kirk: 'Burke and the Philosophy of Prescription', *J. of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1953, p. 367. Statements like this caused Burke's fulminations against the age of reason. According to him, society is the work of Providence which asserts itself—unconsciously of course—through tradition, prejudices and prescriptions.

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psychology, and to psycho-analysis in particular, is the proof of this.

A democratic way of life implies, as stated above, a considerable increase in the conscious dimension of human life: that is, the conscious motives in the individual's behaviour and conscious integrating factors in the group life. It would, however, be a mistake to consider the absolute supremacy of consciousness in mental life as the most adequate expression of a democratic way of life. Democratic man is not a monolith; his way of life is, in fact, the result of a certain balance and compromise between consciousness and the unconscious. Here are a few aspects of this phenomenon.

We are fully aware that the psycho-analytical picture of the mind does not entirely tally with our present brief description of the conscious and unconscious levels of the mind. Our present interest lies, however, in the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious factors of the mind, and in the mechanisms of reaction characteristic of each, rather than in the contents of consciousness and the unconscious. Thus, the mechanism of reaction originated in, and directed by, an unconscious factor is essentially the same whatever the quality of that factor may be. An unconscious drive impels the individual to act rigidly in an atmosphere of high tension. Hence the inflexibility and the uncompromising character of his reaction. The only aim and norm of this type of reaction consists in the pleasure derived by an immediate reduction of tension. Consciousness tends, on the other hand, to integrate the reaction in the largest possible context of life. Thus, any reaction taking place at this level acquires the character of indirectness, flexibility, and leisure.

In spite of the obvious opposition between these two mechanisms of adjustment, the main function of consciousness is to compensate for, rather than to contradict, the unconscious. Whenever consciousness is in contact with unconscious factors, such as primitive impulses, repressed drives, or complexes, it attempts to make them flexible, and thus to prepare the individual's mind for compromise. The general tendency of the conscious level of the mind is to integrate each reaction into a whole bigger than itself: briefly speaking, consciousness prepares the final reaction in awareness of 'the other', of what is not 'now', not 'here', and not 'this'.

Further, one can say that the function of the consciousness is to create rational situations; to establish relations among various specific mental manifestations, or events, and to regard their development as members of a whole. In this case an unconscious factor is harmonized with the total number of conditions of the individual's life. The function of the unconscious is, on the con-

trary, to create irrational situations: the law of a reaction motivated by unconscious factors is: 'all or nothing', 'now or never'; there is no sense of balance and harmony in such a reaction.

The individual living in a democratic civilization is characterized by a balance between the conscious and unconscious structures of his mind. Though based on a fundamental duality, the psychological structure of this individual forms an integrated whole. One could say therefore that an important psychological condition of a democratic way of life appeared at that moment in the mental evolution of modern man, when the conscious dimension became strong enough to counterbalance, but not so strong as to suppress entirely, the unconscious dimension of his mind.

A characteristic aspect of our time is that the balance between the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of mental life can be easily upset. Thus, contemporary civilization and the mind of contemporary man can no longer be considered as in equilibrium, but as ambivalent structures, in the sense that they oscillate between too much consciousness and rationality, and too much unconsciousness and irrationality. This is the beginning of a totalitarian civilization and of a totalitarian type of man. Fascism, with its inclination towards mysticism and irrational forms of life, constitutes the pole of the unconscious; there, man's behaviour is dominated by unconscious factors. Communism shows, on the other hand, oscillation towards the pole of consciousness. One can speak in this latter case of a super-consciousness (something equivalent to the medieval concept of 'super-rationality') which brings under its spell the whole realm of life. Excess of rationality is the main symptom of a Communist civilization.

There is another important aspect of the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. This is its compensatory nature. The main function of consciousness is to grasp and to adjust to the empirical conditions of life. The transcendence of these conditions is mainly the work of the unconscious, in the sense that whenever an unconscious drive cannot be gratified at the empirical level of life, this level becomes overlaid by means of a series of unconscious mechanisms such as displacement, sublimation, idealization, and projection. The final result is a new dimension of life which grows as a compensatory world to the empirical one; this is the world of dreams, of art, philosophy and religion.*

*We are not prepared to support the view that the transcendental dimension of life can be entirely explained by the work of the unconscious. The idea expounded here is that the double dimension of life, empirical and transcendental, is expressed, on the psychological plane, by the work of consciousness and the unconscious. In terms of depth psychology the unconscious contains the mechanism of

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The world created by the unconscious has an autonomous and ideal character. This means that it represents an opportunity for the empirical wishes of the individual without thereby becoming itself empirical. A work of art or a religious experience can easily satisfy an unsuccessful love, or a failure in a practical enterprise, and yet, this does not take the form of an empirical satisfaction, that is, it does not furnish the experience of realization in an empirical sense. Hence the feeling of transcendence, and of an ideal world whose origins and construction are inaccessible to consciousness.

But the important point is that in a democratic way of life, the transcendental world is institutionalized as such; it constitutes an acceptable mode of life having its aim in itself. This does not happen in a totalitarian way of life. In Communist civilization, for instance, the transcendental dimension of life is repressed; any ideal form of life—art, religion, philosophy—has to be rendered immanent, thus becoming controlled by the empirical condition of life. In a democratic way of life, the transcendental world can be at the service of the empirical condition of life, without the individual being aware of this. In a totalitarian way of life, on the contrary, the products of the unconscious are consciously put at the service of the practical requirements of life. Thus the spontaneity and the freedom involved in their creation are lost.

The work of the unconscious, as has been expounded above, is of some importance for the experience of freedom. Lewin and Freud have pointed to the importance which the imaginary level of life has in many tensions created in the individual and in the group by frustrations and conflicts. The part played by Christian religion, with its ideal of universal brotherhood, in smoothing the inter-individual and inter-group conflicts in Western societies can be adduced as an example. The displacement of aggression upon an ideal form of evil and danger (the Devil) can be considered as one of the decisive factors in the rise of the spirit of tolerance in modern man. The satisfaction of the individual's drives at an imaginary level produces deflection and, therefore, an increase in the flexible character of his behaviour.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FREEDOM

It has been shown previously that the intelligent type of reaction requires leisure, and that situations of stress tend to produce reac-

ideal formation by which it creates a compensatory world to the empirical one. At the conscious level of his mind, the child has but a series of experiences proving that his father does things he cannot do. His unconscious, however, produces an ideal form of these experiences which is expressed in the feeling that his father is almighty.

tions of the instinctive type. The real difference between these two forms of reaction can be assessed in terms of freedom. In this context freedom has two aspects: (a) the degree of freedom displayed by the reaction itself in its development towards its final form; (b) the relative independence of the ego in the situation; the ego may preserve a certain distance from the situation which increases the exploratory power of the mind.

Any situation of stress, normally produced by a high degree of frustration, lessens the degree of freedom in human behaviour. Köhler and Birch, amongst others, noticed that animals, after a long period of food privations, failed to behave intelligently. The whole reaction field became narrowed down to a stereotyped and inadequate reaction. The animals 'threw' themselves in one direction or another, without being able to calculate the results of their reactions, or to combine them in a final form of adjustment. Under mild food privations, on the other hand, the field remained fluid and transparent; the animal saw and calculated the implications of its reactions.* Lewin notices that a child who normally shows a high degree of flexibility and imagination in his play, resorts to stereotyped reactions when frustrated; for instance, the blocks are used merely as things to bang about.†

In a situation of high tension the individual seeks an immediate answer. In most such cases intelligence gives way to instinct. An instinct operates in terms of maximum of urgency; 'now or never', 'all or nothing', 'in this way and in no other', are the normal formulas of instinctive reaction. This obviously lowers the degree of freedom in the field of reaction.

In conclusion one can say that frustration in general, and increase of pressure in particular, produce a low degree of freedom in the psychological field, and can, consequently, be considered as psychological factors contributing to anti-democratic behaviour and to an anti-democratic way of life. There is no difficulty in proving this point with regard to individual behaviour. That is why we should like to spend more time, in what follows, in discussing this problem in terms of group psychology.

One of the basic conditions of democratization consists, as already mentioned, in a long period of stability and security in the life of a group. In such circumstances, the social and cultural pattern of the group becomes flexible, and consequently the system of inter-individual relations allows a high degree of freedom.

*Birch, H. G.: 'The Rôle of Motivational Factors in Insightful Problem-solving', *J. Comp. Psychol.*, 38, p. 296, 1945.

†Barker, R., Dembo, T., and Lewin, K.: 'Frustration and Aggression: An Experiment with Young Children, *Univ. of Iowa. Stud. Child Wel.*, 18, No. 1.

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Croiset underlines the fact that, in the fifth century, the Athenian community reached a certain degree of stability and security. 'Elle n'était pas alors une cité de conquête et de combat'.* The fact that the process of democratization, in the modern world, starts in Great Britain and Switzerland, the countries enjoying the longest period of stability in Europe, is significant from this point of view. Tocqueville counts isolation and stability amongst the first conditions for American Democracy. The lack of imminent danger which made the maintenance of a standing army unnecessary is related to the rise of British Democracy by Macaulay, and to the rise of American Democracy by Tocqueville. The fact that the strongest democracies are today in those countries less afflicted by the insecurities of modern life, such as Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Great Britain, can also be adduced as a proof that stability and security are important conditions for a democratic way of life.

When the members of a group are frustrated in their need for security, the social pattern of the group becomes rigid. European medieval communities offer good examples of groups organized under conditions of stress. The insecurity dominating European societies after the downfall of the Roman Empire is responsible for this phenomenon. Fascism is also given as an example of a group under conditions of stress. This will form the subject of the second part of the present study. For the moment we advance the following general idea:—

Any frustration, and any inner or external conflict which brings about a real threat for the group, tends to diminish the degree of freedom of its pattern of life. A great frustration can produce either an accumulation of aggression in the frustrated group, or fear and insecurity. In both cases the degree of freedom becomes lower. An aggressive group is always liable to a rigid military type of organization. Fear and insecurity in a group of individuals work very often in the same direction, towards a rigid social organization and the concentration of power in the hand of a 'strong' man, regarded by the members of the group as their 'saviour'. The reduction of fear and insecurity seems, therefore, a necessary condition of a flexible type of organization in a group. No wonder Roosevelt listed 'freedom from fear' among the conditions of democratization in the present world.

**Op. cit.*, p. 72.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Democracy and Everyday Life

'We live at ease, not like the Lacedaemonians who undergo laborious exercises which are to make them brave.'

PERICLES

'La vie n'est pas très ornée mais très aisée et très paisible.'

TOCQUEVILLE

LIFE AND PRINCIPLES

THE feeling of ease is by far the most general trait of mind in a democratic society. Though we call it a feeling, it is in fact a parapsychological factor; something which exists in the pattern of life, and yet can never be entirely translated into terms of individual consciousness. In a democracy, the pattern of life itself has the character of naturalness, of something which only the Greek term *Eukosmia* can translate; it radiates the elements of the conviction—perhaps never fully articulated at a conscious level—that the problems of life can be solved within the normal exercise of the mind. The limits of the supernatural are well defined, and there is little inclination to resort to 'extraordinary' measures. Thus, the possibilities of tension, which lead necessarily to a rigid organization of life, are rigorously circumscribed. What the individual cannot achieve by himself, he can achieve in co-operation with others. Any tension is immediately absorbed into the whole of life in exactly the same way as a slight poison is absorbed and annihilated by a healthy organism. The individual manages to keep his impulses and aspirations flexible; groups, classes, or corporations seldom create situations of mutual exclusion in their interrelations. State and the individual, on one hand, and leadership and masses on the other, do not form separate poles in the pattern of life.

It would not, however, be completely accurate to conclude from this that democracy is the realm of spontaneity. On the contrary, the individual and the group show strong inclinations to live according to, or to observe, certain principles even in their everyday life. In post-war Britain, many people belonging to various classes imposed upon themselves considerable restriction in smoking,

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prompted mainly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer's exhortations. It is nevertheless true that this is not a very common example, and that one might well be induced to see in it some condition of stress, or even some anti-democratic traits lurking in the British way of life. This compels us to state again that what is characteristic of democracy is not the existence, or the absence, of certain well-defined principles, or prescriptions, but the specific relation existing between these principles and prescriptions and the individual.

One usually says that in a democracy, the individual appropriates the norms and the rules of life by a process of free acceptance, or by assent. This on no account implies that, in a democracy, it is pure chance that decides upon the individual's beliefs and attitudes. In a democratic, as in a totalitarian way of life, the individual is presented with a well-defined social and cultural world, in which the stimuli are prearranged so as to encourage and discourage the formation of certain kinds of beliefs and principles. The characteristic of a democratic way of life consists, however, in the fact that the individual constitutes by himself a selective centre, and the external factors leading to the formation of certain beliefs and principles are organized in the function of his own needs.

PERSONAL FEELINGS

In a democracy, an individual carrying out a specific task, or performing his social duty, defines his position in the function of two factors: the accepted norms of action, and the individuals with whom he is in contact. The particular way he himself, and the other individuals involved, feel about the situation is always reflected in the performance of his action. Thus, the guiding principles of life are never rigidly applied. This is due to a series of modes of social experience, or inter-individual relations, specific to democracy which we call personal feelings.

We cannot give a definition of a personal feeling. We hope, however, that after a few examples, the meaning of this aspect of the democratic way of life will become clear. For the moment, we can only reformulate an idea mentioned above by saying that by personal feelings we understand a series of states of mind which define the way an individual in a community perceives himself as well as the others with whom he is in contact, as personalities. The main personal feelings are manifested under the following forms.*

*We do not deal with the so-called sympathetic feelings which occupy a central position in a Christian civilization, for the simple reason that it would take us too long to explain to what extent, and in what circumstances, the individual behaving on the basis of these feelings considers the personalities of others as values in themselves.

1. Tactfulness is manifested in the flexible character of relations between individuals, or of a course of action, as a result of their being conditioned by the specific personality of the individuals involved in them. Thus tactfulness should be distinguished, first of all, from 'tactics', the latter being manifested in the flexible character of a course of action undertaken with a view to facilitating the achievement of a fixed goal. The personalities of the individuals involved are used as simple means. The distinctive mark of tactful action does not consist in the lack of a guiding principle, or of a general goal, but rather in the adjustment of this principle to the personalities of the individuals concerned. Thus, the pattern of a tactful action is determined both by its proposed goal, expressed as an idea, or a value, and by a series of particular psychological factors aroused in the interplay of human inter-relationships taking place in the course of action. The method of breaking bad news in a civilized society, when the principles of truth and reality have to enter into compromise with the feelings of the individuals concerned, can be taken as an illustrative example of tactfulness. A political compromise can be taken as an example of tactical arrangement. While in the former, the interests of the parts concerned are fused, in the latter, each part keeps the original aim concealed with the purpose of using it in the battle in more favourable circumstances.

One often says that there is only a difference of degree between tactfulness and tactics. It is, however, obvious that in a democratic way of life the accent normally falls on tactfulness and real compromise in human intercourse, whereas, in a totalitarian way of life, the accent falls on tactical arrangements. In a totalitarian way of life the goals of action dominate and often crush the personality of the individuals as well as the specific structure of the groups concerned.

2. Politeness is another form of behaviour based on personal feelings; it is, in fact, partly involved in tactfulness. It can be defined as a tactful intervention in a system of inter-relations, with the main intention of facilitating the free manifestation of the personalities of the individuals concerned. This is done by arousing in them the feeling that their weaknesses are spared, their good qualities are noticed, and that their personalities occupy a necessary place in the situation.

3. Decency is another form of behaviour under which personal feelings can be shown. Since it is closely connected with politeness, it may well be considered as another aspect of the same trait. Decency can be defined as a tactful withdrawal from social situations with the view of producing in others the same feeling of ease

which we have just defined. Thus, what the polite man does through his intervention, the decent man does through his non-interference. In decency, there are crystallized all those feelings defining the respect for the personality of others, and for anything through which that personality manifests itself, i.e., those feelings which define the values of 'privacy'. Decency is closely related to what one usually calls the *unassuming* attitude or character which forms a distinctive mark of the democratic personality. It is also necessary to mention that an unassuming attitude does not mean self-denial or abnegation; it implies only a certain self-limitation, and self-effacement with the object of not denying to others the opportunity of free manifestation as a result of one's own privileged position.

Of a certain sociological interest is the fact the French show their personal feelings, that is, the way they perceive themselves and others in social situations, more in the line of politeness, while the British do so in the line of decency.

4. The sense of humour constitutes another aspect of personal feelings. Its essence lies in the capacity of laughing at oneself. Though its ways and means are different from those of decency, the sense of humour leads to the same self-effacement in order to produce the feeling of ease in others.*

The lecturer in his class produces the feeling of ease in his audience by exposing jokingly his own limitations and weaknesses. He may produce a similar result in himself, by reducing the inner tension resulting from his shyness. Laughing at others can also be considered as humour, if by exposing the weakness of one person one produces the feeling of ease and spontaneity in other persons involved in the situation. Ridiculing others, and important people in particular, comes into this category. This trait is better seen in the French *esprit* than in the English sense of humour.

The most intimate connexion between a sense of humour and the democratic way of life is seen in the fact that a sense of humour helps the individual and the group to create and to maintain a high degree of flexibility in their pattern of life. A sense of humour prevents the individual from making a serious and important case of himself, or of others, when living in exceptional circumstances—fortunate or unfortunate. Thus, a sense of humour often helps the Briton to be 'a good loser', and to avoid in this way tension between himself and his competitor which might have led to authori-

*In some communities the sense of humour is considered as a high social value. The Scots, for instance, seldom miss an opportunity of praising themselves for their 'dry humour'. In these cases the individual uses humour as a social technique, in order to excel rather than to be self-effacing. But it is nevertheless true that this kind of excellence seldom embarrasses the personalities of those present.

tarian behaviour in both. It may also help to avoid the oppressiveness of an unfortunate experience and consequently to reduce the 'trauma' created by such an experience. Even after the 1940 defeat, the French often referred to the unfortunate incident as *cette drôle de guerre*.

Here is the proper place to mention that the sense of humour presupposes a balanced and self-confident mind. His ego being strong enough, the individual can easily accept the bad as well as the good points of his personality; the self-defending mechanisms are relatively weak. The sense of humour transforms personal glory and misfortunes into simple incidents in life. One is strong enough not to succumb under the tension normally created by such experiences, and one always has the courage to look at the other side. Thus the sense of humour makes the person who possesses it easy to live with.

Sociologically it is important to point out that the sense of humour is widespread among two great democratic nations, the British and French. One of the most striking traits of a totalitarian community and personality is certainly their lack of humour. This is demonstrated by both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. The sense of humour has little scope in a culture-pattern, or in a frame of mind dominated by deep tensions. 'Alle Revolutionäre sind humorlos', says Spengler.*

Very little has been said about the social significance of personal feelings. Many consider them simply as 'manners', and as such they refer to the social entertainment of a specific social stratum, rather than to the structure of personality or to that of a culture-pattern. Many others think that personal feelings are unnecessary relics of an old world and do not fit into the structure of a democratic society. Thus, too much display of such feelings is often considered as a sign of insecurity and a lack of spontaneity.

For us, personal feelings have a particular social and psychological significance. They demonstrate a specific attitude to life which can be described as interest in human personality. In this respect we entirely agree with Bertrand Russell when he says that one of the striking characteristics of Communism consists in 'a complete absence of kindly feeling'. †

We should like to close this section with a brief consideration of another series of emotional factors whose significance for a democratic pattern of life is a controversial matter. Such are the emotional complexes of ambition, jealousy, envy and love.

With regard to ambition our present interest lies mainly in its

**Jahre der Entscheidung*, München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlag, 1923, p. 143.

†'The Intellectual Error of Communism', *World Review*, March, 1950, p. 41

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object and direction. In democracy, the main object of ambition consists in the increase of personal prestige. Alcibiades, who is the prototype of ambitious man, living in the last phases of a great democratic civilization, says about himself, 'And where is the injustice if I, or anyone who feels his own superiority to another, refuses to be on a level with him?' It seems that in a democracy, ambition can be defined as a dynamic factor of individual differentiation, of the individual's betterment, and of the feeling of superiority, in a specific matter. It would be inappropriate to infer from this that ambition necessarily leads to concentration of power—the superiority of an individual over others—and therefore to the weakening of democracy. In a democracy, ambition is a general feeling; each individual has it for himself. This results in minimization, rather than in concentration, of power. In democracy, 'l'ambition est un sentiment universel; il y a peu d'ambitions vastes', says Tocqueville.*

The situation is quite different in a totalitarian society. Communists do not like even the use of the word 'ambition'. In their society, ambition seems to take the way of self-annihilation; the ambitious man sacrifices himself in order to increase the prestige of the party. Ambition thus becomes equivalent to obedience.

In a democracy ambition is institutionalized in the system of ownership, in social status, in personal glory and in other ways. All these are recognized values. In a totalitarian society, the only institutionalized form of ambition is in obedience and faithfulness to the leader. Thus, in a democracy, ambition constitutes a driving force leading towards differentiation and individuation, according to the size of property, social status, power of originality, etc. In totalitarian society, it leads to the construction of a social monolith based on the hierarchy of power.

Jealousy and envy are described by Communists as emotional resultants of an economic system based on private ownership, that is, of the system lying at the basis of Western democracies. As such they are bound to disappear with this system; perhaps this makes psychologists such as V. V. French and F. Alexander consider jealousy and envy as specific traits of the emotional pattern of democracy.† It is, however, difficult to support this view. For, in the first place, there is little evidence that jealousy is weak or has completely disappeared in Communism. The fact is that the manifestation of this feeling has there taken a completely new direction. In a Communist society, infidelity towards one's own friends, wife, or parents is often experienced as infidelity towards the party and the

* *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, Paris, Calmann Levy, 1888, p. 554.

† Alexander, F., *Our Age of Unreason*, N.Y., J.B. Lippincott Co.

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leader, if the person towards whom the infidelity was manifested happens to be in a closer association with the party, than is the infidel. On the other hand infidelity towards, or betrayal of an individual does not arouse jealousy if motivated by a greater fidelity towards the party. The infidelity of one member of the party towards another is not experienced by the individuals concerned as jealousy, if its direction is to greater fidelity towards the party. Thus the tendency is to depersonalize this feeling rather than to annihilate it, to turn it into an emotional state which defines the attitude of an individual towards an institution or towards a principle, rather than towards another individual.

Here we touch upon an idea which opens up a comparative view between the emotional patterns characteristic of democracy and of totalitarianism. In a democratic society, feelings like ambition, jealousy or love are individualized; hence the individuals are the only terms in the function of which these feelings are experienced and assessed. An individual is jealous of another because the latter is not faithful to himself, because he does not respect himself as a personality. An individual loves another because of the intrinsic value of his personality.

The feeling of love can be given as an illustrative example of individualization. One of the immediate results of love is an increase of self-awareness and self-importance. When two individuals are in love, they are unique in each other's eyes; they are the supreme value to each other. Their love is conditioned by their own personality, and by nothing else. But this way of feeling is much more characteristic of democratic than totalitarian society. In this respect Vera Gerassimova significantly warns contemporary Soviet writers of having lost the habit of dealing with love stories. She quotes from a novel where a young man stops suddenly in his love confession, by saying, 'This is not the right moment; I have to go to vote on the resolution taken by the factory committee.'*

TOLERANCE

Recent researches in the field of social behaviour seem to show that tolerance emerges as one of the basic traits of the democratic personality. Its main aspects are: adherence to liberal values such as liberal views in religion and family life, and lack of racial, class and national prejudices. Thus, like personal feelings, tolerance requires the same flexibility of mind which is rooted in the conviction that human personality is a value in itself.

In what follows we shall discuss the main aspects of the spirit of tolerance in modern European societies.

**Literaturnaia Gazeta*, June 22, 1952.

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As mentioned in a previous chapter, one of the important sources of tolerance in modern man lies in that trait of Christian civilization which we have called the double dimension of life. There is no need to insist on this again.

The increase in social and cultural heterogeneity characteristic of the modern world, as compared with the homogeneity of medieval communities, is another important source of the spirit of tolerance in modern man. The greater the variety of social and cultural factors contributing to the formation of a personality, the greater the chance of developing in that personality tolerant attitudes in life. The religious development in seventeenth and eighteenth century England offers a good example of the connexion between socio-cultural heterogeneity and the spirit of toleration. It was during this period that the medieval unity of English society was broken down owing to the appearance of various religious groups. The important fact, mentioned by many students of this period, is that the spirit of tolerance cannot be attributed to the inner doctrine of these new religious groups: of all these only the Independents and the Levellers genuinely believed in religious tolerance. R. Niebuhr suggests that the tolerance displayed by the people of that period was the result of practical reason; in a society split up in various religious faiths, each hoping to prevail upon the entire nation, and none of them strong enough to achieve this end, the only working solution was religious toleration. One can say about tolerance what Niebuhr says about democracy in general, that in a sense 'it is the fruit of a cultural and religious pluralism created by inexorable forces of history.'*

From the motivational point of view, tolerance is closely connected with the feelings of security and stability. The connexion between these feelings and the democratic way of life has been dealt with previously. Our present considerations are confined to the connexion between tolerance and frustration on the one hand, and between tolerance and the feeling of security on the other.

**The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness*. London, Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1945, p. 85.

The remarks made by K. Lewin on the rôle played by the heterogeneity-homogeneity of the 'life-space' in the formation of the individual's attitudes are revealing from this point of view. He describes the life-space of the American child, in contrast with that of the German child, as possessing a high degree of heterogeneity. 'The school'—writes Lewin—'may be a region of rigid discipline and little freedom, whereas the atmosphere of his family life may be soft and provide plenty of freedom'. (*Resolving Social Conflicts*, N.Y., 1948, p. 10.)

Needless to say, the attitudes formed by the American child are, owing to the diversity of factors entering into their composition, more flexible, therefore more tolerant than those formed by the German child.

When an attitude or a habit is formed under conditions of stress it tends to be rigid. A habit formed in early childhood under pressure of punishment, or the habits and attitudes formed in the army can be given as examples. Many religious beliefs are emotional systems built up under conditions of stress, fear and insecurity. This is the principal reason why individuals holding such beliefs are intolerant in matters of religion. When a scientific conception, a philosophical conviction, or a political attitude is formed as an answer to a frustrated need which keeps the individual's mind under the pressure of a high tension, it tends to be dogmatic and authoritarian. A psychologist who becomes Freudian because of his own complexes, a politician who becomes a Marxist in order to relieve by this a great tension created in his mind by his class prejudices, a new nationality taken in order to solve a series of conflicts with the former one, tend to become dogmatic, authoritarian, or chauvinist respectively. The mental structure of a convert, of a fanatic or of a renegade forms the proper ground for the study of these phenomena.

When, on the contrary, an attitude, or a belief is formed in conditions of leisure, when it is not conditioned by emotional factors aroused by frustrated needs, it tends to be flexible. The formation of the in- and out-group attitudes can illustrate this statement. In Transylvania, for instance, where the two cohabitant groups, Rumanians and Hungarians, have been in conflict for centuries, the in- and out-group feelings are exclusivist on both sides. In Switzerland, on the other hand, where a series of historical conditions have led to co-operation among various ethnic groups, the individual has formed flexible and tolerant in- and out-group feelings.

Niebuhr, in the work mentioned above, points to another problem regarding the connexion between tolerance and lack of inner tension. Commenting on the rise of religious tolerance in England he writes: 'It must be admitted that toleration in religion could not possibly have been achieved in any modern democratic society had there not been a considerable decay of traditional religious loyalties. Tolerance is the virtue of people who do not believe anything, said Gilbert Chesterton, quite truly.*' Thus Niebuhr associates tolerance with the weakening of religious faith, and with the weakening of certain emotional factors in human behaviour. Historically this is the result of the process of secularization which took place in the post-Renaissance European societies.

Summing up what has been said so far about the psychological sources of tolerance, one comes to the following main ideas: Flexibility in attitudes and in behaviour in general is the result of

**Op. cit.*, p. 91.

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the individual's adjustment under conditions of leisure. This type of adjustment is dominated by intellectual factors. When, on the contrary, the modes of reaction-attitudes, beliefs, ideas, are formed under conditions of stress, in situations dominated by emotive factors, they tend to be rigid, thus leading to intolerance.

The few researches done on the psychology of tolerance give—as far as they can be systematized—a certain support to the ideas expounded above. Eugene L. and Ruth Hartley, using a test of social distance which they complemented with clinical observation, found that the tolerant individuals are interested in imaginary activities, in theories and ideas; that they work with singleness of purpose towards distant goals, that they are serious about moral questions, etc. Obviously, integration at theoretical level and work in the function of distant goals shows, first of all, the presence of leisure, and the lack of that kind of tension which produces directness and rigidity in behaviour by its urgent character. The intolerant individuals, on the other hand, display a mechanical outlook, unwillingness to accept responsibility, dominance of emotional factors, and compulsive reaction by which they tend to escape inner tensions. All this constitutes sources of rigidity in their reactions, and, therefore, intolerance in their character.*

DEMOCRACY AND LANGUAGE

For a general characterization of the language of a society in process of democratization one could easily use the observation made by Thucydides with reference to the social instability of Athens; 'The meaning of words had no longer the same relation with things, but was changed by them (revolutionaries) as they thought proper.'† The structure of the language itself becomes more flexible in the sense that—interpreting Thucydides by Saussure's terminology—the link between *signe* and *signifié* becomes in many cases looser. New meanings are given to old words, and new words are coined to designate old things.

If one takes the French Revolution as a process of democratization, one can select the following phenomena:—‡

1. The shift in the meaning of a group of words by their displacement from one field of reality to another. A series of religious expressions such as *évangile*, *credo*, *martyrologe*, *Bonne Nouvelle de Liberté* were displaced from a religious, and inserted into a political context.

*Hartley, E. L. and R.: *Tolerance and Personality Traits*. In *Readings in Soc. Psychol.*, N.Y., 1947.

†Thucydidee, Transl. B. Jowett. Oxford, p. 222.

‡Brunot, F., *Histoire de la langue française*, Tome IX^e p. 623 and following.

2. The tendency, existing only in the early part of the Revolution, to break down the pattern of the language by the invasion of words and expressions coming from various *patois*. This tendency was counterbalanced by *une politique de la langue* towards standardization which was obviously an authoritarian trend of the Revolution.

3. An important aspect of the loose connexion between words and things is shown also in the inflation of the revolutionary vocabulary with emotional factors. The emotional potential of words such as *nation*, *patrie*, etc., was such that their meaning had the tendency to overflow any empirical and logical connotation. Brunot rightly calls them *mots d'illusion*.

From the socio-psychological point of view Tocqueville's 'reflections' upon the development of the English language in America are of exceptional importance. (*Democracy in America*, Chap. XVI.) As compared with the language of an aristocratic society 'where few words are coined because few things are made', the language of a democratic society (American) has a strong tendency towards change. 'In the midst of this general stir and competition of minds many ideas are formed, old ideas are lost, or reappear, or are subdivided in an infinite variety of minor shades.'

Most revealing is the specific direction in the development of these two categories of languages. The English language in America developed its vocabulary from the jargon of the parties, the mechanical arts, or from the language of trade. If new words are introduced in an aristocratic language, they are usually taken from the Latin, the Greek, or the Hebrew. After the fall of Constantinople, the French language was invaded by new words all having Greek and Latin roots. In the English language Milton alone introduced over six hundred words derived from the same languages. It is clear therefore that the rigid structure of an aristocratic language cuts off its connexion with the actual life of society.

The rigid stratification of an aristocratic society is reflected in the structure of its language by a sharp distinction between the learned language and a great variety of dialects. Tocqueville makes the remark that there is no *patois* in the New World, and that it is disappearing in all countries touched by democracy, where words coming from all *patois* are intermixed in the common pool of the language. This reflects the intermixture of ranks, and the fluidity induced in the structure of society by the principle of equality. The results of this fluidity are not always favourable to the structure of the language itself. In fact, it is precisely because of this that the language of a democratic community is, according to Tocqueville, inclined towards ambiguity in the use of words.

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It is a common practice in a democratic society to make a certain innovation in language by giving 'an unwonted meaning to an expression already in use.' This introduces a certain ambiguity in the meaning of many words, and makes it possible for various individuals to modify these words according to their own purposes. The result is that the meaning of such words remains in an unsettled condition.

Closely connected with this is the passion for general ideas and generic terms mentioned by Tocqueville as one of the most characteristic features of a democratic language. 'Democratic nations are passionately addicted to abstract expressions because these modes of speech enlarge thought and assist the operations of the mind by enabling it to include many objects in a small compass'. The examples given by Tocqueville are 'capacities', in the abstract, for men of capacity, without specifying the field in which their capacities are applied; 'actualities' used in the same abstract way, and the French word *éventualités*. Finally, he gives as another example his use of the word 'equality' in an absolute sense. This inclination existing in the language of a democratic society 'enlarges and obscures the thought', at the same time. 'With reference to language', concludes Tocqueville, 'democratic nations prefer obscurity to labour.'

The tendency to 'ambiguity' and 'obscurity' is evidently one of the most characteristic aspects of a democratic society. It reflects at the language level the fluid pattern of this society. The fact that the language itself preserves a high degree of flexibility greatly facilitates the functioning of the ego and consequently the process of individuation. The possibility of adjusting to his own experiences the structure of the language and the meaning of words increases in the individual the power of self-realization. This also constitutes the safest guarantees against 'clichés' and stereotypes in language which are the mark of a totalitarian culture-pattern.

The preference of a democratic society for vague and general ideas and for generic terms can also be considered as a symptom of flexibility characteristic of both the individual and the group. Let us take the example given by Tocqueville referring to his own use of the word 'equality' *in abstracto*. As we have often said, one of the main features of a democratic structure, individual and social, consists in its capacity to guide its empirical activity according to a set of ends, which, though existing in the individual, act as transcendental forces. Equality is one of these ends. In a true democracy there is always a dialogue between an empirical and transcendental dimension of life. As soon as a concept like equality is taken from its abstract world, and considered as an immanent (empirical) end

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of life, democracy is in danger. Supposing we specify and say 'economic equality', and take the necessary measures for its realization. This very action will lead to a strong and permanent exercise of force in the introduction and maintenance of economic equality. The democratic character of society will be lost by this. Soviet society is in fact an example of a concrete immanent meaning of the concept of equality.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Democratic Personality

He should know how to govern like a free man, and how to obey like a free man.

ARISTOTLE

PERSONALITY AND THE CULTURE-PATTERN

ONE may conclude from the previous chapters that a democratic way of life expresses itself in a specific type of personality. We are, however, unable to give a straight answer to the question, whether a democratic personality creates a democratic culture-pattern, or a democratic culture-pattern creates a democratic personality. Moreover, we are inclined to think that this kind of question leads nowhere, and for the time being both a democratic culture-pattern and a democratic personality could appropriately be considered as aspects of a great process in the historical evolution of certain societies.

That type of personality is democratic which shows enough flexibility in its inner organization, in its attitudes, feelings, ideas and action, to understand other personalities as 'others' and not as its own projections, to co-operate and to construct a way of life on the basis of free exchange of experience with others; that type of personality which is flexible and free enough to avoid its rigid integration with the culture-pattern of its own group, particularly when that group is exclusive towards other groups.

Though the California research on 'Authoritarian Personality' will be more fully dealt with in the second part of the present study, it will be useful to sketch here the portrait of the 'liberal non-authoritarian' personality emerging from it. The liberal personality—which is but another term applied to the democratic personality—is flexible, intrceptive, and has great capacity for intense personal relationships. It is opposed in its main traits to the authoritarian personality, which is rigid, extrceptive, repressed, conforming, stereotyped in its thinking, and intolerant of ambiguity. In social behaviour the liberal personality has less need than the authoritarian personality to perceive similarities between his own and others' values and attitudes. His reactions to others will be more individualized, his evaluation more objective. On the whole, he is

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better equipped than the authoritarian to use subtle personality cues.* There is no need to insist upon the similarities of this description of the democratic personality, based on clinical interviews, projective tests, and questionnaires of social attitudes and, the description put forward in the present study, based on the structural analysis of various democratic culture-patterns.

ORGANIZATION BASED ON THE EGO

In his study of the structure of sentiments V. V. French comes to the conclusion that people with highly organized philosophico-religious beliefs have firm ego structures. They consciously recognize and accept both strength and weakness as parts of their own selves. People with less organized philosophico-religious beliefs are, on the other hand, considered as having weak ego structures; they accept only what is good as part of their own selves, repressing and suppressing what is bad.†

Interpreting the above data in the light of what has been said so far with regard to the psychological aspects of democracy, the following points are important: Highly organized persons have a positive orientation in life; they have worked out for themselves a system of sentiments which springs up naturally and harmoniously from the basic condition of their personalities. The system of goals and aspirations set up by their beliefs integrates their personality as a harmonious whole. Consequently, there is no inner conflict and repression in their minds. Their beliefs are sources of security for their personalities; this leads to the development of a strong ego structure.

Less organized persons have adopted the same philosophico-religious beliefs on the basis of a system of motivation which has not entirely grown from the specific structures of their personalities. Their beliefs are conventional; moreover, they often use them as shields, furnished by their society, against trends and tendencies in their personalities which are at variance and even in conflict with these beliefs. Unlike the personality with a strong ego structure, this type of personality contains in itself the source of permanent tension; all tendencies contravening its system of beliefs have to be strongly repressed. In this inner tension, and in the repression resulting from it, lies the basis of an anti-democratic personality. For tension itself, as already pointed out, leads to

*The general results of the California research are published in T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick and others; *The Authoritarian Personality*, N.Y., Harper & Brothers, 1950.

†French, V. V.: 'The Structure of Sentiments', *J. of Personality*, 15, pp. 247-82, and 16, pp. 78-108, 1947.

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insecurity and consequently to a rigid mental organization. Thus the anti-democratic person represses rather than harmonizes or integrates the divergent drives of his personality. One way of doing this is by rigidly submitting to, or rigidly applying, the conventions of his society. In this case the authoritarian personality is excessively conformist, bigoted, or a fanatical nationalist.

But the main point in what has been said so far is that the democratic personality regards the forms of his society as his own; he expresses these forms in terms of his own experience, and accepts them without arousing an inner conflict. In this case, one can speak about a fundamental correspondence between the structure of personality and the structure of society, whereas in the case of the authoritarian personality, one can speak about a basic—unconscious—conflict. This is but another way of saying that democratic personalities make their society 'by their hands', while authoritarian personalities accept it from outside.

This goes hand in hand with V. French's observation that persons with highly organized philosophico-religious beliefs show greater differentiation and greater integration within the structures of their personalities, less unconscious components and less intensity than persons with less organized beliefs. Of exceptional significance here is the finding that there are fewer unconscious elements in the structure of highly organized persons. This means in the first place, that their personalities are adequately expressed at the conscious level of their mental structures, that is, the beliefs they hold and the attitudes they display do not conflict and therefore they do not repress the deep strata of the mind. Their mental structures are flexible enough to keep the balance between the various drives of their personalities, and to integrate any experience without the dangers of inner conflict. The personality structure is not normally threatened or devastated by unconscious factors let loose from time to time by defects in the mechanism of repression, thus causing irrational behaviour.

DEMOCRACY AND PERSONALITY VARIATION

Because of its elasticity, a democratic society allows for a high degree of differentiation in the personalities of its individual members. In principle, each individual can develop his own personality as a unique mental structure resulting from the free adjustment of the individual to his environment, and, at the same time, from his capacity to adjust the environment to himself. This lies in the nature of the process of individuation-introjection.

But it ought to be noticed that a democratic way of life, though elastic, has its specific and well-defined character which it tends to

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preserve by facilitating the development of that type of personality which best suits it. This, however, is not carried out by forcing individuals into uniformity, but by providing a great number of social and cultural dimensions in which their personalities can develop. The greater the number of dimensions the stronger the democratic character of a social and cultural pattern. In what follows, we shall deal with the main traits of a democratic way of life which facilitate the differentiation among the personalities of its individual members.

1. A high degree of heterogeneity of cultural factors contributing to the formation of personality results not only in a high degree of mental flexibility in every individual, but also in a great inter-individual variation. The individuals are offered various possibilities of developing their personalities, according to the various aspects of the culture-pattern.

2. The double dimension of life characteristic of democracy is another trait facilitating inter-individual variation. In democracy, the individuals can form their personalities round various ideal values which are sometimes in opposition to the empirical condition of life. Thus, the individual can become the citizen of an ideal world. This mode of personality integration is allowed by religion, by philosophy, by art or science, to any of which the individual can entirely dedicate his life.

3. The cultural climate of democracy is defined by a series of dimensions, religious, artistic, scientific, political, economic and moral. Each particular dimension, and each configuration of two or more, offer various possibilities of personality structuration. Some of the fundamental personality types are, as E. Spranger has shown, determined by the organization of the individual's mind round one, or a configuration, of the above mentioned values. It follows that the greater the differentiation and autonomy of cultural values, the greater possibility of differentiation among the personalities of the members of a democratic society. In an authoritarian culture-pattern, this differentiation is non-existent; one value is supreme, be it religious (hierocratic culture), economic (Communism), or political (Nazism).

4. There are series of other important differential traits which have been dealt with elsewhere, such as time, or the tempo of life, the spirit of competition and others. But since the list of these traits differs from democracy to democracy, it would be advisable to formulate the problem of individual variation in democracy as follows: A democratic culture-pattern is pluri-dimensional with regard to the process of personality formation. It is organized in such a manner that any one of its trends, aspects and levels offers

possibilities for the development of the individual's personality; each of its points can be transformed into the 'niche' which moulds someone's personality. As shown in the series of previous chapters, the flexibility of a democratic culture-pattern is such that any one of its members can individualize the language, the attitudes towards authority, towards various institutions, and, in principle, all forms of reaction necessary for life in a group.

We have chosen present British society to illustrate this aspect of a democratic way of life. The reasons for this are various. By saying relatively little about British Democracy we might have left the impression that we are among those who over-stress the aristocratic elements in contemporary British society. It also means neglecting a series of aspects of the British community which can easily be given as examples of a democratic way of life. In this sense one can hardly find, in the present democratic world, a better example of a pluri-dimensional culture pattern than that of the British community. But since it is hard to handle such a vast sociological and psychological reality in order to test an idea, it would be advisable to concentrate our present interest on a few specific aspects of the British way of life and to show their significance for the process of personality variation.

In Britain, individuals are differentiated according to their social and economic class.* For, unlike America, and to a greater extent unlike France, here the classes are visible in people's behaviour. Individuals can differentiate their personalities according to their religious beliefs to a greater extent than in any other democratic country, with the exception of America. Britain being a highly industrialized society, individuals can differentiate according to their professional interests and training. But, as we do not consider any of these forms of differentiation as specific to British society, we cannot insist on them. We should like instead to pass on to a series of other aspects of the British way of life which have a particular significance for the process of individual differentiation. Let us start with A, time, and B, hobbies.

A. In the American culture-pattern, the dynamism and variety of life is to a great extent aroused by the extension of the present into the future. The rapid tempo of change and the hope for tomorrow make the individual permanently aware of the large range of possibilities for the development of his personality. In Britain, the dynamism and variety of life are mainly due to the extension of

* Pierre Maillaud, though brilliant in his analysis of the English way of life, confounds class struggle with class consciousness, and thus draws inadequate conclusions with regard to class differences in this country. (*The English Way of Life*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1945, Chap. 2.)

the present into the past. More than any Western nation the British have—though sometimes unconsciously—an accurate sense of the past; of the presence of the past rather than of its pastness. This renders the life-space of the individual belonging to this community richer in possibilities of development. Things and forms of life which in any other society would be considered dead, are here alive and endowed with the same significance and value as the newest ones. In manner of dressing, the Victorian style intermingles harmoniously with Dior's so that everyone has a great variety at his disposal by which to display his taste and personality. In art, philosophy, and literature, a new architect, a new poet or a new novelist, however great he may be, cannot even temporarily weaken in people's taste and manner or feeling the continued presence of Wren, Shakespeare or Fielding. The British as a community refuse, except on very rare occasions, to be driven—moved is a better word—by an event, or an idea, to the point of acting uniformly as a crowd. A 'new look' in dressing, art, or philosophy, may captivate certain individuals, or even a certain section of the population, but seldom the community itself, as may happen in other countries. Taste, in this country, cannot crystallize itself in a general 'idea', and thus regiment the whole community. For some, this is lack of taste; we prefer to call it fondness of variety.

One can even say that in Britain there is a certain resentment against uniformity. This is seen in many great and small things; it is seen in people's fondness of provincialism, in the pride they take in their system of local administration, and in many other aspects of life. In some churches of England and Scotland pre-established forms of prayer are hardly used; the minister and the congregation have, so to speak, to improvise for themselves.

B. The inclination widely spread among members of the British community to have a hobby, and particularly the institutionalization of this inclination, constitute another proof of the possibility for individual differentiation offered by the British culture-pattern. For a hobby is obviously rooted in the individual's desire to develop his personality along a particular line which makes it possible for him to break away from his rôle as a member of society, and thus, to be himself. Hobbies are, on the whole, expressions of the feeling of privacy and desire to differentiate, which are experienced with a unique intensity in this country. Thus, animated by these feelings, the individual members of the British community develop their personalities in a great number of directions, and in a great variety of forms. They earn the mark of 'uniqueness' and 'specificity' in a great variety of sports, in bird watching, in horse and dog racing . . . In Great Britain one is 'somebody'

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as a Cambridge blue, or doing 'excellent footwork at cricket'.

To be 'oneself', and 'on one's own' is a tendency which deeply affects everybody in this country. There is no other community in which the individual resents vertical relationships with others with a greater intensity, and relationships of sub- and super-ordination in particular. A clerk, a servant, and even a charlady, when taking up a new job, feel that their first concern is to find out what they are 'supposed to do'. Once this is achieved, they have won their independence, for, later on, whenever someone asks for their services their first reaction is to make sure whether they are supposed to do this or not, and to act accordingly. Thus, any individual avoids being dependent upon others in the exercise of his job; he makes himself responsible to a kind of abstract authority which consists of certain rules and requirements established by agreement, or by tradition, and which define 'what he is supposed to do'. Even waiters in restaurants are obedient to nothing but to what they are supposed to do; hence, they reduce to a minimum their positions as 'executants' of the customers' wishes. They listen to their customers as long as they need to know 'the menu' they want; after that, the job is wholly in their own hands, and the customer has no choice but to wait.

If in certain cases the relationships of sub- and super-ordination are unavoidable, the general tendency is to 'localize' them as carefully as possible. If the pupil, the student, or even the soldier is compelled to accept a position of subordination in the class-room or barracks, he is ready to forget all about it as soon as he leaves these places. In any other country a student or a pupil would be pleased to greet his teachers, and thus to show consideration and even dependence; he would even try to catch his teacher's attention. It seems to be different in Great Britain, or at least in Scotland. Here the students or the pupils rarely behave in this way; when out of the class-rooms they are 'themselves'; no longer students or pupils.

The taste for local administration, for private enterprise and personal initiative, for provincialism in language, as well as the aversion for general ideas and theorizing are still strong in this community. There is nothing more foreign to their minds than the attempt to oppose life with ideas, or to mould its free course through a body of doctrine or to a pre-established scale of values. It is paradoxical to notice that the same community which gave birth to Puritanism behaves as if the human mind has no power to guide the impulse of life; mind's activity and products are subservient to life as this manifests itself in all its variety of individual forms. The greatest wisdom is to seize and respect this variety. In

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theatres and concert halls, Britons share round their applause almost equally among different performers and items. This is a sign of their understanding of variety rather than lack of taste. At a dress show in Britain the models are of all ages, all shapes, and of all sizes; the display is for everybody, starting with the slender young girl and ending with the plump figure of a conscientious housewife. On these occasions one feels the presence of a world of beauty, of a world of unreal and sublime forms, less than on similar occasions in Paris; instead one has a strong feeling of reality and of the great variety of forms under which life manifests itself.

It is only natural that this specific drive for differentiation should be compensated by a series of tendencies for integration. To mention only a few examples, this is seen in the readiness obvious in every Briton to join as many 'clubs' as possible, to form associations or to organize his activities socially.

The same integrating tendency is seen in the curious English fondness for uniforms. In this country, each club, each association, each theatre or picture house, has its own uniform. We call this tendency 'curious', for, as the previous sentence proves, the individualistic spirit of these people has turned their fondness of uniformity into a real taste for variety in uniforms. Thus the spirit of differentiation seems to be triumphant over all. This proves again that Tocqueville was right when describing the main trait of British democracy as the drive towards freedom and differentiation, as opposed to the drive towards equality characteristic of French democracy.

Part Two

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NAZISM

‘Dort auf der Insel kein Staat, sondern eine Gesellschaft freier Privatmenschen, die Geschäfte machen, hier an der Grenze nach Osten, nach “Asien” hinein Staat im strengsten und anspruchvollsten Sinne, aus der Tradition der Ritterorden erwachsen, welche Kolonisation trieben; dort statt der Autorität des Staates der Parlamentarismus privater Gruppen, hier statt des wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus die Disziplinierung der Wirtschaft durch die politische Autorität. Staat und Partei sind Gegensätze. Partei und Autorität sind auch.’

OSWALD SPENGLER

CHAPTER ONE

Dictatorship of the Right

‘. . . nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few.’

DAVID HUME

THE German political régime of the period between 1933–45 is generally known under the name of Nazism or Hitlerism. Though lasting a relatively short time it embodied in its doctrine and practice the most characteristic totalitarian trends of our century. Like Italian Fascism and many other Fascist movements, Nazism was a dictatorship of the right, a political organization based on exclusivist and aggressive nationalism under the personal dictatorship of a leader.

From the political point of view Nazism was characterized by the concentration of absolute power in the hands of a leader who exercised it by means of his own party organized in a military manner. It was a typical one-party system in which democratic electoral methods were replaced by occasional plebiscites on issues selected by the leader.

From the economic point of view Nazism was a case of a controlled economy. In principle the system of private ownership remained untouched. Free enterprise, however, was considerably limited by the interference of the State in the processes of production and distribution.

The Nazi régime required the individual's total integration with the aims of his group as represented by the leader and his party. Nazis were against that kind of life which allows the individual a 'quiet' fulfilment of his social duties. They asked for enthusiasm and sacrifice for the common cause. Nazism was firstly a *stato d'animo* (Mussolini) and only in the second place a political formula.

At the cultural level Nazism was a case of directed culture, with an official ideology, coined by the leaders of the Party and enforced upon the whole cultural activity of the community. The cultural outlook had a strong mystic character, without being religious; it was idealistic, and yet not oriented towards spiritual

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values; it called itself revolutionary, and in spite of this it was not progressive, but on the contrary, traditionalist. The ideal of man was embodied in the strong man or in the possessor of political power.

CONCENTRATION OF POWER

In contrast to what happens in a democracy, the main process taking place in Nazi society is the concentration of power which leads to a rigid organization of the pattern of life. It ought, however, to be said from the outset that some of the main aspects of the concentration of power displayed by the Nazi régime are not typically German. They belong to the pattern of Western civilization in general. The increased power of the State, as expressed in its final stage by the doctrine of *étatisme*, is not a German product. The same can be said about the concentration of power in the economic field which reaches its apotheosis in the monopolist system, or about the political concentration of power resulting from certain aspects in the evolution of the party system. But in spite of all this, Nazism may certainly be considered as the classical case of the concentration of power in twentieth-century Europe. For it clearly shows how an omnipotent State is quickly built up as the result of specific historical circumstances, how the monopolist system is developed to the maximum by the technique of compulsory cartels, and adds to the concentration of power by integrating itself with the omnipotent State, and finally, how a single political party swallows up all the component bodies of German society.

Today, judging by the results of nearly two centuries of democratic civilization, there is little doubt that in a somehow paradoxical way the rise of a powerful State as the symbol of unity and integration was decided by the pattern of modern democratic revolutions.* Moreover, the rising power of the State forms one of the main features in a society based on political and economic individualism, and particularly when individual freedom grows as a reaction from an absolutist régime of the medieval type. One needs, however, a dialectical sense of social evolution in order to grasp this truth. For the growth of the State should be seen as a process which counterbalances the crisis of social integration created by political and economic individualism.

*Tocqueville had already seized upon this phenomenon in the early days of the democratic era. 'I am of the opinion'—he writes—'that in the democratic ages which are opening upon us, individual independence and liberties will ever be the product of artificial contrivance; that centralization will be the natural form of government'. (Quot. by Mayer, J. P.: *Prophet of the Mass Age*. London, J. M. Dut & Sons, 1939, p. 48.)

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It is obviously true that the equalitarian aspirations unleashed by the French Revolution weakened the integrating factors in modern societies, and that economic liberalism caused the 'withdrawal of the State'. But it is also true that, parallel with this, one could notice in all Western societies a persistent tendency towards the building up of a central power symbolized in the authority of the State. Soon after the first World War, the Jeffersonian ideal of democratic government, 'he governs best who governs least', could not be applied even in America. There too, 'rugged individualism' had led, by reaction, to an active and responsible government, and to a considerable increase in the power of the State.

During the inter-war period German society was placed in a special position from this point of view. The tendencies towards the growth of the power of the State were stronger and more numerous there than in other Western societies. In the first place, the idea of a strong central power has always constituted a basic principle in the organization of this society. The main characteristic of the Prussian type of society was described by O. Spengler by the concept of 'Informsein', i.e., a society in which individuals are rigidly organized for the performance of a collective task. A series of political, economic, and social conditions characteristic of the inter-war period had speeded up the centralization of power. Thus the abdication of the Kaiser, as the symbol of the State, the instability created by the inter-party struggle in the Weimar Republic, and the economic crises had all increased in the individual members of German society the need for a strong central authority.

Certain tendencies towards the centralization of power can be found at the root of modern economic liberalism in the sense that 'wealth can be used to get more wealth'.* The system of monopolies is the result of the accumulative character of wealth, on the one hand, and of the competitive nature of economic activity on the other, both being features in the system of economic liberalism. This has contributed in more than one way towards the concentration of power in modern societies. The system of monopolies, for instance, made possible the rigid organization of the whole economic field according to the interests of a few individuals. But this is only the beginning of a long process. Threatened by the power of the big monopolies, the representatives of small trade, members of the middle classes, as well as the organizations of the working classes sought the protection of the government. It was therefore in their interest to have, or to build up, a strong State which could take their side successfully. In answer to this, and particularly to the attacks coming from the working masses

*F. Knight, *op. cit.*

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organized by the Socialist and Communist parties, the representatives of big capital resorted to similar measures; they also sought the protection of the State, which they too wanted to be strong. Thus one can say that the concentration of power in the hands of a central authority representing the State has been to a considerable extent the result of the tension existing between various interest groups and of their competition to win the protection of the State. This is an almost universal characteristic of contemporary Western societies.

But again, Germany found herself in a special position. After 1918, the German industrialists were faced with an exceptionally difficult problem. Disorganized work and trade, a quasi-socialist Weimar Republic, the activities of a strong Communist Party and heavy international competition, all added to their difficulties. On the other hand, the middle and the working classes had to suffer in the first place the consequences of inflation and unemployment. In all strata of society there was readiness for the acceptance and the creation of a strong protective government. It was one of the tasks of the Nazi leaders to exploit this.

In many modern democracies the evolution of the party system has shown certain trends towards the concentration of power. R. Michels has described this as a tendency towards oligarchization which he found in nearly all Western political parties, socialist, conservative and liberal. Oligarchization results from the tendency of these parties to base their activities on a limited number of members, and to consider the electorate as a means of obtaining power, as well as from the natural inclination of the leaders to organize the party so as to consolidate their own position. 'Who says organization says oligarchy', concludes Michels.*

The phenomenon which has sometimes been called 'partitocracy'—the rule of the parties—can also be described as centralization of power in modern societies. It was caused by the competitive character of political parties in democratic societies which sometimes resulted in a sort of political monopolism. In such cases, a party, after winning an absolute majority, considered itself the only representative of the people, with a tendency to eliminate all other parties from the political field. The political régime was thus liable to become a one-party system.

Germany's particular position from this point of view is obvious. In the Weimar Republic there were two main political parties both having an oligarchic structure, the Social Democrat and the Communist parties, each of them striving towards the monopolization

*Robert Michels: *Political Parties*, English translation Eden and Cedar Paul, N.Y., 1915, p. 401.

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of power. The rise of a new party, of the right, displaying the same tendencies, was therefore in the nature of things.

Nazism and Social Classes

Most students of Nazism are inclined to look at the origins of this movement from a purely economic point of view. Lenin can be considered among the first who, from a Marxian viewpoint, foresaw a certain stage in the evolution of Western civilization which might be described as Fascism. The interests of various national economic systems will lead, according to Lenin, to an aggressive type of nationalism for which racial and nationalistic doctrines will be the most adequate ideological weapons. Basing his view on this thesis, Dr. F. Neumann writes: 'German National Socialism is nothing but the dictatorship of a monopolized industry and of the big estate owners, the nakedness of which is covered by the mask of a corporative state'.* Charles Bettelheim sees the core of Nazism in the aggressive policy of the magnates of German industry, who have in their hands '*tous les leviers de commande*'.† Often Nazism is called simply a 'dictatorship of monopoly capitalism'.‡

All these views imply that the structure of Nazism is closely related to the interests of the socially and economically upper strata of German Society. The main piece of evidence which is constantly produced by the supporters of this thesis is the fact that the Nazi movement was, particularly at its beginning, financed by many outstanding representatives of German industry. But today there is little doubt that this fact did not influence the structure of Hitler's movement, except in minor tactical points. In fact Hitler and his party could never be considered the 'puppets' of the German upper classes. L. von Mises obviously speaks the truth when saying that 'Thyssen and the rest paid him (Hitler), but they did not bribe him.'§ On the contrary, the party organization, its aims, and the attitudes of its members could hardly fit into the interests and way of life of these social strata. Even Nazi bellicosity has little in common with the aggressive expansionistic attitude of the German industrialists. As we shall see later the two types of aggression are widely different in their sources and modes of manifestation.

Another opinion, also widespread, is that Nazism was a lower-middle-class movement. Karl Mannheim, amongst others, offered

*'The Decay of German Democracy', *Pol. Quar.*, 1953, p. 526.

†*L'Économie Allemande sous le Nazisme*, Paris, 1946, p. 81.

‡Brady, R. A.: *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, London, 1937, p. 33.

§*Omnipotent Government*, New Haven, 1944, p. 210.

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statistical evidence in its support. It is on this sociological view that Erich Fromm bases his psychological interpretation of Nazism. The main mental traits of the Nazi group, embodied in his concept of 'authoritarian character', are characteristic features of the lower-middle classes. This point will be taken up at a later stage. For the moment it is enough to say that the statistical evidence on which this thesis is based is not conclusive. The membership list of 1935 shows the following figures: 32 per cent manual workers; 20.6 per cent, white collar employees; 20.2 per cent, independents; 13 per cent, officials; 10 per cent peasants; 3.4 per cent, others.* The figures seem to show a certain preponderance of the middle-class element. But the point is that categories such as white collar employees, independents and officials can only arbitrarily be considered as together forming a social class. This type of approach to Nazism suffers from the ambiguity inherent in concepts such as the middle class, the lower-middle class, or petty bourgeoisie, which are often applicable only in very general terms. Many individuals who are believed to belong to these classes are in fact in a transitory state socially, and as such, they can better be described as classless. As will be seen later, classless individuals and groups have special significance for the structure of Nazism.

In conclusion we cannot see in the class approach to Nazism more than a comfortable hypothesis. As such it served the theoretical outlook of those intellectuals whose minds were tinted with an economic or Marxian way of thinking. Any realistic approach to Nazism should, in our opinion, start by considering it as the outcome of an ethnic group—the German nation—living under conditions of stress caused by specific historical circumstances.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NAZI MOVEMENT

The German Workers' Party founded by Anton Drexler, in 1918, formed the political nucleus of the Nazi movement. It was, in fact, one of the many organizations hastily built up to fill the political vacuum caused by the defeat of 1918. As its name suggests, it had from the outset a double character, socialist and nationalist. When Hitler, then a corporal in the army, first came into contact with it the whole organization had no more than forty members, and its activity was limited to occasional discussions among the members of its committee, at the 'Sterneckerbrau' Munich beer cellar. Hitler joined the Committee in September 1919. From then on his only job was to reorganize and develop Drexler's group.

The work done by Hitler in these early years of the Nazi move-

*Mannheim, K.: *Diagnosis of our Time*, London, 1943, p. 167.

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ment is seen in a series of structural changes as well as in a rapid increase of its membership. In 1920 he renamed the party the National Socialist German Workers' Party, and introduced the use of the swastika as its symbol. Both the name and the symbol were borrowed from the Austrian Socialist Party. Soon after, other nationalist and antisemitic organizations joined in. The German Socialist Party of Julius Streicher, a Bavarian schoolmaster suffering from an obsession about the 'rape of Christian girls by Jews' joined in 1922. Already in 1920 Hitler had established contact with the army through Major Röhm. In this way the party opened its doors to a special category of people, dynamic, desperate, and with authoritarian habits. They were ex-soldiers and officers, all of them former members of the notorious *Freikorps*. During the same year, and with the help of the army, the party collected the necessary funds for a weekly newspaper, *Volkischer Beobachter*.

But, though significant in themselves, these details cannot show either the extent or the importance of the changes undergone by the movement as the result of Hitler's activities. First of all, the class and the nationalistic character originally involved in the structure of the party were, if not completely discarded, reduced to mere tactical weapons. By 1921, when Drexler was kicked upstairs as Honorary President, and Hitler made President, the party, already had a new character. It no longer appealed to a specific group, social, economic or ideological; it appealed in the first place to all people who were discontented with the existing state of affairs, to those who suffered most from the political confusion of the Weimar Republic. These people could be found in all social classes and groups. The party, like a river, moved right and left, to collect the waters from all over the place: from here a dynamic group of ex-officers, from there a mystic and romantic circle of intellectuals, an enthusiastic youth organization, or a group of frustrated business men . . . The most important thing was that the party no longer addressed a specific sociological, economic, or professional category, but a psychological one, the discontented, the confused and the disinherited. Politically, these people were in a state of disengagement; a determined leader could do whatever he pleased with them. Hitler seized upon this psychological reality, and in this lies his political genius.

There was no lack of response, in the Weimar Republic, to this appeal. In 1922 the leadership of the party was completed with Alfred Rosenberg, an architect, born in Baltic Russia, who had strong anti-semitic, anti-catholic and anti-Russian views, then with Rudolf Hess, Hermann Goering, Robert Ley and others. Goebbels and Frank joined the leadership in 1925. Electoral successes

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followed relatively soon. The Nazi votes were 810,000 in 1927, 6,406,000 in 1930, and 13,733,000 in 1932.

What are the reasons for this rapid success? People such as Brady, for instance, rightly count the weakness of the Weimar Republic among the chief factors leading to the rise of Nazism. The compromising attitude of the Social Democrats, their tolerance towards the upper classes, Junkers and capitalists, 'promoted the interests of the right'.* But why? The answer to this question is implied in the belief strongly held by the representatives of the economic approach to Nazism, Brady being one of them, that the Junkers and the capitalists are in themselves of the right. But this is by no means identical with what Hitler included in his idea of the right. L. von Mises—though himself an economist—insists on two political and ideological factors contributing to the rise of Nazism, nationalism and socialism. It is quite true that nationalistic and socialistic trends can easily be found in the cultural field of post-war Germany. But one cannot help wondering what the socialistic way of thinking had to do with people like Goering or Rosenberg and with thousands of youngsters and peasants who joined the Nazi movement in its early days. Goering explicitly said, and there were many of the same opinion, that he did not care very much about the 'ideological stuff'.

The answers offered by the representatives of the economic and sociological way of thought to the problem of the rise of Nazism, though illuminating in themselves, always leave the impression that something important has been omitted; that beyond class interest and ideological trends there lies a reality which, if known, offers a clue to this problem. We define this reality as a general state of mind characteristic of the German group as a whole during the inter-war period. Nazism is primarily an articulation at the political and cultural level of this state of mind. Nationalistic and socialistic trends of thought, controlled economy, as well as excess of militarism, are important features in the social climate leading to Nazism. But they are, rather, symptoms of a deeper reality of a psychological nature. A collective state of mind contains the factors which can explain both the tremendous success and the specific structure of Hitler's movement. Something more will be said, at a later stage, about the application of the concept of a collective state of mind in the present context. For the moment let us proceed to its description. Space only allows for a picture painted with a broad brush.

During the period of the rise of Nazism the German nation lived in unique conditions of stress and insecurity. The defeat of

**Op. cit.*, p. 28.

1918 is usually mentioned as the starting point in the development of this situation. Quick structural changes such as the downfall of the monarchy, the collapse of the army, the appearance of new political parties are also important contributing factors.* A series of inner contradictions and tensions within German society in the post-war period are in our opinion more important than the defeat itself, or the downfall of the Empire, for the understanding of this specific condition of stress and insecurity. Many demobilized soldiers and dismissed officers refused to go home and integrate themselves with the new conditions of life. They formed special military organizations, *Freikorps*, offering their protection to peasants threatened by raids of starving townfolk, and to landlords from the eastern territories. And though the early Weimar régime used them in its struggle against the Communists, they became a menace to authority and security in the state by their independence and mercenary spirit. But, apart from the activities of the *Freikorps*, there were many other sources of instability and insecurity in the Weimar Republic. The Social Democrats were confused. Their manœuvres between a strong Communist movement, deeply rooted in the German working classes, and the anti-Communist feelings of other classes and of the army in particular, resulted in a complete lack of orientation and of a programme. In this way, an inefficient government increased even more the frustration of the population. To this should be added a series of revolutionary attempts and Communist uprisings. Thus, the whole social atmosphere was loaded with tension, anxiety, and a spirit of brutality. The political parties took on a military character, each of them possessing fighting organizations.

The frustrating effects of economic crises, of unemployment, and particularly of the inflations of 1924 and 1929 are so well known that there is no need to enter into details. A word should be said about the contribution of the international scene to the situation of stress of the German group. Loss of colonies and national territories, military occupation, the reparation payments, and finally the French military occupation of the Ruhr district all intensified the insecurity. To all of this should be added the tensions caused in Bavaria—the birthplace of Nazism—by a series of separatist movements.

What are the most important psychological effects of this

*Sometimes too much stress is laid on these general factors. The Kaiser, for instance, is often considered as the symbol of authority and security in pre-war Germany. His abdication was therefore bound to result in a deep crisis of authority which affected the position of every German father in his family. This caused a strong need for authority which drove the German youth into Hitler's hands.

exceptional situation of stress? Perhaps the loss of the frame of reference for the behaviour of both group and individual is the most comprehensive symptom of this. The collapse of old institutions followed by a relatively long period of instability weakened and destroyed in many individuals the sense of discrimination and orientation in social life in particular. Since nothing remained unshaken, and certainly nothing unshakable, people swung from a state of naivety to one of desperate incredulity. All opinions were equally good, or all equally meaningless. They lived in a *Meinungschaos* which produced in them apathy and complete detachment, and at the same time anxiety and readiness to do something, to do anything.

This state of mind affected, consciously or unconsciously, most individual members of German society. But the main problem for the social psychologist as well as for the political scientist is not the extension of this state of mind, but rather why a movement of the right, Hitler's movement, presented itself as the best answer to it. Why could not Socialism or Communism play this rôle, for both exploited the feelings of frustration and insecurity in the masses, and both promised a stable social order? The answer to these questions is, in essence, simple. The Nazis offered to the people the quickest and the most radical way of relief from a situation of stress and insecurity. While the Socialists kept on talking vaguely in the name of peace and democracy, while the Communists promised a narrow class policy, the Nazis attacked the Versailles Treaty, promised economic autarky and employment. While the Socialists tied up the destiny of Germany with that of European democracy, and the Communists with that of Soviet Russia, the Nazis stirred up the feeling of pride of a heroic nation which is not only the master of its own destiny, but is called upon to master the world.

In principle there could be no competition with this kind of language addressed to a group in a condition of stress. It gave immediate outlets for the feeling of guilt and for the need of aggression, and provided a solution to the need for security in the near future. The Socialists and Communists were doomed to failure since the Nazis provided for the deeper and more immediate needs of the masses. They spoke about dignity to the humiliated, about power to the defeated, about the organic stability of human society to people who were experiencing the ruin and disintegration of age-old institutions. The society they spoke of was not an idea, and not of the future, as was that propounded by the Communists, but of the past, of the glorious German past.

There are two main means by which the Nazi leaders assured

their success. The first consists of a specific mental quality found in most of these leaders which can be called compulsive determination. As will be shown later, Hitler and other Nazi leaders belong to a specific mental type with strong tendencies towards oversimplification. Their rare ability to find solutions to any kind of problem, the radical and solemn tone in which they announced their decisions, even the most absurd and banal ones, constituted a particular attraction for people living in a chaotic world. The second means is of a more complex nature than the first; it even contradicts it. The Nazis displayed also a remarkable lack of a fixed programme of government, a certain disengagement with regard to any precise policy. To know the state of mind of the masses and to satisfy it by hazy and fantastic prospects was their first tactical principle. Thus they can be described as masters of subjective methods in politics. This resulted, on the political plane, in demagoguery, and on the economic plane, in a fluid and compromising scheme usually known as the two-front economic policy. Since the former characteristic is well known we reserve a few words for the latter.

Precarious though it was, the Nazi economic order rested mainly on Hitler's ability to play on the contradiction between two groups of interests, the industrialists and Junkers on the one hand, and the workers on the other. From the very beginning Hitler spoke with two voices. With one he addressed the economically upper classes, emphasizing the Nazi repudiation of any class programme in the economic field. In the language of these classes this meant that no revolutionary methods were to be used against them. (Hitler's speech to the German industrialists, 20th February 1933.) With the other voice he addressed the working classes, preaching a new type of socialism. (Hitler's speech to the workers of Rhein Metal Borsig Plant is characteristic of this aspect.)

The socialist flavour of the Nazi economic order was ostentatiously advertised by a certain check put on free enterprise by the system of compulsory cartels and by other forms of State control. But at the same time the spirit of private initiative and profits was generally encouraged. The State itself created by its aggressive policy large scope for the expansion of big monopolies. The alliance between the State and big monopolies was an obvious fact, although its terms were never explicit, for the same State showed great concern for the well-being of the masses and found devices—temporary of course—to reduce unemployment, to raise wages, etc.

One of the sources of Hitler's success in this difficult enterprise consisted in the simple fact that he never regarded the industrialists

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or the industrial workers as belonging to two constitutive interest groups, but rather as members of the German nation undergoing conditions of stress. He looked at their frustrations and insecurity rather than at their group or class interest. The common factor in all classes was insecurity. To the industrialists he showed the danger of Communism and of international competition. These dangers were real enough to make the capitalists prefer the Nazi order in which they were simply transformed into managers of their own enterprises. With the workers Hitler exploited their fears of exploitation and unemployment, and above all their equalitarian aspirations, by denouncing material equality as 'extrinsic and mechanical' and by wilfully diverting 'the gaze of the masses' from material to spiritual things.

There was a bit of everything in the Nazi economic order. With the middle classes and peasantry the Nazis entertained their prejudices against Communism and their respect for private ownership. From this point of view one can say that the Nazis tried to please everybody. That is why it is hard to maintain that the movement had a class character. Though our reasons are different we nevertheless agree with von Mises when he writes: 'The German entrepreneurs and businessmen contributed their share to the triumph of Nazism, but so did all other strata of the nation.*' In the following section we shall see who were the first and most reliable people to form the movement.

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY

It would be true to say that, sociologically, Nazism, as a political and spiritual movement, represents a cross-section of the German nation during the inter-war period. It answered a state of frustration and insecurity widespread in all strata of the population during this period. It would also be right to infer from this that the cadres, and particularly the leadership of the party, were made up of individuals and groups who suffered more than others from frustration and insecurity.

The core of the party was formed by socially nondescript people, frustrated in their efforts to achieve a certain status in their society, the prototype of whom is Hitler. The demobilized soldiers and officers, former members of the *Freikorps*, formed an important Nazi group. Goering and Röhm are typical. Unemployed youngsters, émigrés, and students also found a point of attraction in the movement. To this is added a number of intellectuals frustrated in their aspirations, as Goebbels was, or incapable of adjusting themselves to the cultural climate of their time and consequently

**Op. cit.*, p. 210.

escaping into the mythical world of the past, like those belonging to the Thule Society of Munich. From the historically constituted classes Nazism attracted in the first place the peripheral elements. From the working class it attracted 'the flotsam, the strugglers living on the fringe of their own class, the workers of odd jobs, and the unemployed.'* In the upper classes the party appealed in particular to aristocrats who identified themselves with a highly inadequate concept of their own class; they joined the party in order to re-make the position once held by the Junkers in Imperial Germany. Peasants who were by their aspirations above their group, or by their poverty below it, were also attracted to the movement.

All the individuals and groups mentioned above have one trait in common: they all can be called *déclassés*, that is, people who failed completely or partly to integrate themselves with one of the institutionalized forms of their society. They also suffer from lack of social attachment. In this way the *déclassés* can, by analogy with psychopathic personality, be described as sociopathic personalities. As the psychopaths are liable to all forms of delinquency, so are the sociopaths liable to political delinquency in particular, that is, they are breakers of the political order of their own society. More will be said later about the connexion between psychopathic and sociopathic personality. For the moment we consider the socio-pathic personality in itself. It should be mentioned in the first place that industrial society has a great capacity for creating sociopathic groups. Its fluid character and its rapid growth are among the main causes of this phenomenon. The impersonal character of this society and the mechanical type of integration required by it have also contributed to this. The situation of post-war Germany is characteristic from this point of view. The instability of that period forms an additional factor contributing to the creation of non-integrated individuals and groups.

The Nazi movement can be considered as the meeting point of all individuals and groups with an unstable social status; it evolved as a result of the disrupting processes taking place in the post-war period. It is, therefore, the classless element, rather than a particular social class, that should first be considered in order to understand Nazism. As opposed to any socialist party—obviously a class party—and to any democratic party normally based on a particular social group, Nazism represents in its structure the entire nation on a reduced scale. This is one of the first factors determining its totalitarian character.

*Konrad Heiden, *Der Führer*, London, 1944, p. 33.

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STATE OF MIND, OR NATIONAL CHARACTER

Few psychologists interested in the origins of Nazism could escape the temptation of using the concept of national character. Most of them deal at large with the 'famous' and 'perennial' Germanic aggression, with the Germanic mysticism, ethnocentrism, authoritarian family, etc. Though far from expressing a definite opinion on this point, we feel that the concept of the national character is too much of a theoretical construct. Examples of aggression, collective or individual, can easily be found in every nation. Consequently we started to trace the origins of Nazism in a collective state of mind historically limited to the inter-war period. This is the state of mind created in a group of individuals under conditions of stress. A rigid social organization, certain mystical inclinations, group-centrism and aggression are normally involved in the behaviour of a group living under such conditions. To us the problem of the German national character is secondary as a determining factor in the rise of Nazism. Thus one can speak about various mental features of various individuals and groups belonging to the German nation as they are expressed at the cultural level. Here are included the family system, old customs and traditions, philosophies supporting aggression—Nietzsche for instance—totalitarian views (Hegel), mysticism (Schelling), etc. All these were skilfully used by Nazi leaders as cultural symbols to express a state of mind existing in themselves and in the masses. (But so also were used a series of other ideologies—racial and socialistic—which are not entirely German products.) In this way the Nazi way of life became articulated at the cultural level. The next chapter will deal with this aspect of Nazism.

CHAPTER TWO

The Weltanschauung of Nazism

My acts are always based upon a political mode of thinking. HITLER

THE AGE OF UNREASON

THE *Weltanschauung* of Nazism rests on the assumption of the irrationality of human nature. Human action, and human will in general, is guided by instincts, intuition and feelings. Will has its end in itself, and it reaches its purposes more adequately if not embarrassed by reasoning. Though doubting the ability and power of reason, Nazis are neither sceptics nor nihilists. According to their convictions, will and feeling provide human knowledge and action with a greater degree of certainty than reason. Human action, though basically irrational, leads by itself to order, to a new type of order. For, while the fundamental category of rational order is that of equality, and agreement between equals, the order springing from the irrational factors of the human mind rests on the feeling of 'distance' (Nietzsche); it expresses itself as power hierarchy. Man's most important virtue consists in the fact that he can impose his will by force, and fears force at the same time. This human quality becomes the main feature of the Nazi way of life. Man's wisdom is shown in his ability to discover the leader and to let himself be ruled by him. Needless to say, this wisdom is by no means the work of reason. For will and affection guide the people towards the choice of their leader, rather than reason. The leader himself would very seldom, if at all, use reason to get the consent of the people. His strongest weapons consist in his power and its capacity to fascinate and to dominate.

As to the nature of society, Nazism is radically opposed to the rationalist conception of the Enlightenment. Social organization, whatever its size and ends, cannot be subject to debate and 'contract'. One of the great faults of the nineteenth century was to create and foster the belief that society could be organized rationally by discussions and programmes. As a result society has gradually become the prey of the corrupting reason of the politicians. The truth is that society is founded on irrational factors, its essence lying in the primitive emotional bonds which unite a group

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of individuals and which cannot be changed by reasoning. Society is a mystery of nature, an *Ungegeben* which reveals itself only in symbolic forms and in words loaded with emotional forces, in myths, in the action of the group, or finally in the personality of the leader. It is on no account a matter of reasoning.

Nazis do not believe in the rational nature of history. Therefore, they resort to force in order to organize society and to give shape to the historical processes. To say that the Nazi *Weltanschauung* is a reaction against the nineteenth-century rationalism is to overestimate the importance of ideology in this political movement. It is true that the Fascist ideologues made frequent references to the protagonists of modern irrationalism such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But in spite of this, it is very hard to see the development of their thought as a systematic reaction from modern rationalism. This makes it even more necessary for us to construct their world outlook from the implications of their statements about various aspects of life. With the exception of Giovanni Gentile who is in fact a rationalist* there is no Fascist who has ever made the attempt to think out the answers to the fundamental problems posed by a Fascist way of life. For Fascism there is no Joseph de Maistre, for instance, to throw over the fundamental assumptions of Rationalism. Many of the fundamental aspects of the Fascist *Weltanschauung* seem to float in an atmosphere of ambiguity. This is due to various causes. First of all Fascism, and Nazism in particular, was a short-lived régime. Secondly, ideology was for this régime little more than a tool for the exercise of power. Thirdly, and this is the most important cause, a strong element of ambiguity and ambivalence lies at the root of Nazism as it lies at the root of any behaviour, individual or collective, based on conditions of stress. This idea will be taken up at a later stage of this study.

THE TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY

The Italian Fascists, Gentile in particular, rightly invoke the name of Hegel when defining the totalitarian character of Fascist society. The pattern of such society is ultimately given by the Hegelian 'concrete Idea', that is, the Idea which has reached the state of its full realization. At this stage the contradiction between ideal and real, universal and particular, potential and actual, totality and multiplicity, is superseded. The Idea lives adequately in its concrete forms of manifestation, and these forms represent adequately the Idea, or the whole, they belong to. On the social plane, this means that society as a whole or pattern is realized in each of its members, and that the life of each individual is a particu-

*See *Genesi e Struttura della Società*, Sansoni, Turin.

lar case in the life of its society. Consequently society is not merely a concept, or a general term for a multiplicity of individuals, but exists in the same way as the individual himself. It has a will of its own, the work of which is seen in all integrating and coercive forces holding the individuals together and leading them towards common ends. Hegel himself gives several examples of society as being concrete in its existence. The State, 'the people' as 'organic totality', a great personality (Napoleon) are the most important of them.

Although the Fascists made use of the machinery of the State in order to curb the centrifugal tendencies of the individual, the State in itself, being too abstract, too formal and too rational, could not adequately incorporate 'the totality' of individuals. The totalitarian reality of the Italian Fascists is the Corporative Society which is an intermediary term between the individual and the State. In this way Fascism distinguishes itself from both Socialism for which the State is all, and from democracy for which the individual is all. The Corporative Society is the 'concrete Idea', that is, the form in which the individual integrates himself naturally with his group.

In Nazism the 'totality' is created by irrational factors exclusively. The main totalitarian category is that of *Das Volk*. For Nazism also the State is a means. 'It is a basic principle, therefore, that the State represents not an end but a means . . . Its purpose is in the maintenance and advancement of a community of human beings with common physical and spiritual characteristics'.* The bonds between the individual and 'the people' are fundamentally emotional. The way in which the totalitarian reality of Nazi society is expressed suggests the presence of a magic and symbolic form of thinking. Words like 'Fatherland', 'German', etc. were loaded with such an emotional power that the mere perception of them created in individuals the feeling that they all are one. The Rumanian Fascists used to symbolize their 'totality' by a tiny bag of Rumanian soil which they carried with them as a talisman; whenever the bag was shown by one of them, there was no sacrifice in the world a *legionar* would not make for his country.†

'The people' as a manifestation of the totalitarian reality is,

**Mein Kampf*, quoted by E. R. Huber: *Verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen Reiches*, Hamburg, 1939. pp. 54-5.

†We are under the impression that Schelling's thought may more appropriately be connected with the Nazi *Weltanschauung* than that of Hegel. The latter is too much of a rationalist. The Nazi totalitarian reality is rather Schelling's concept of the 'Absolute', governed by the law of identity, than the Hegelian Idea. It is the whole, prior to its differentiation. The revival of the Schellingian philosophy in the last years of the Nazi era can be adduced as a proof of the connexion suggested by us.

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however, not specific to Nazism. The two specific forms of the Nazi totalitarian reality are: A. 'Race', B. The Leader.

A. 'Race' constitutes the most accurate form of totalitarian reality. 'Race' is the voice of the group in the individual. This is the basic assumption on which the Nazi leaders had developed their own ideas about the Germanic Race. The purity of the race came first, for the purer the race the stronger its binding forces over the individual. Purity in the racial character means first of all superiority, in the sense that the totalitarian reality is more adequately represented. Consequently Nazis appealed to those racial theories which demonstrated the superiority of the Germanic Race on the ground of its purity. (Houston Chamberlain.) On the psychological level they had systematically worked for the creation of strong positive in-group and negative out-group feelings in the members of their own society. (See point 4 of the programme of the Nazi Party.)

B. The totalitarian reality is manifested also through the personality of the *Führer*. The *Führer* is first of all a charismatic figure, the *geniale momentum* of the German nation. He is 'the bearer of the people's will' or 'the objective people's will'.*

In conclusion, the unifying forces of Nazi society, whatever their name, are irrational. Consequently, they do not allow any deliberation concerning the conforming behaviour of the individual. The individual's mind cannot be divided about their acceptance. Nor can the members of the group divide themselves into *pro* and *contra* and follow the decision of the majority. With regard to the interests of the group as expressed by the *Führer*, there cannot be partial or gradual consent, but unavoidable unanimity. The formula is all or nothing.

THE SCALE OF VALUES OF NAZISM

The dominant value in the Nazi *Weltanschauung* is the political value. In order to understand the nature of this phenomenon it is necessary to point out that the dominance of political values implies social integration produced by external authority. A few data regarding the historical background of Nazism will make this idea clear.

We have shown in various places that a high degree of instability experienced by the German society after the first World War ranks among the main historical conditions of Nazism. This socially disintegrating process had been translated on the psychological plane into an intense, almost morbid, desire for unity. The same social instability had been translated on the psychological

*Huber, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-200.

plane in a state of apathy. Arendt* describes this state in German society as '*verzweifelte Urteilsunfähigkeit*' or '*Meinungschaos*'. Anyone with definite opinions would have to stand the chance of becoming 'authority'. Hitler, as we shall see later on, was certainly the man. Only unity could counterbalance this state of insecurity. Nazism is a political answer to this situation. Its leaders had from the very beginning realized that there were factors in German society which worked for unlimited concentration of power, if only that could be shown to be in the interest of group unity. The situation called, therefore, for the supremacy of the political value in the German culture-pattern. Thus the Nazis resorted to persuasion in all its forms, such as a strong police, a strong army, and propaganda based on scientific methods. All realizations in the field of culture, their ideology, their art, their myths, their economic system served the same purpose, the unity of the group.

In what follows we shall analyse the significance of the fact that the Nazi culture-pattern was dominated by political values.

A. The first implication of this was that the group as a whole lived under a condition of stress. Order and unity within the group constitute, therefore, elementary conditions for survival.

B. When life, individual and collective, is under a condition of permanent threat the process of objectivation is poor; life does not project itself in objective norms and values which form pre-established regulative ends for the individual's and group's behaviour. In the pattern of life characteristic of Nazism, human action could not be moulded according to a pre-established set of values. For the world of values was a vacuum. The most striking characteristic of this pattern of life was that action had its end in itself; it was the supreme value. On the ethical plane this enhanced a chronic crisis of human conscience.

This phenomenon has induced many people to see materialistic trends in the *Weltanschauung* of Nazism. Trevor-Roper, for instance, calls Hitler 'a complete and rigid materialist'.† Ethical materialism, however, can hardly be applied to a man with such a strong feeling of adventure and so little sense of reality. We can talk in this case about a strange ethical phenomenon which can be called the *mystique* of action. The urge for action is in Nazi society of such an intensity that it could not be fashioned by any scale of values. This basic urge is manifested in Hitler's fascination with 'great' actions and plans. 'Great' means in this case something 'absolute', something which cannot be defined within a

*Dr. Hannah Arendt: 'Bei Hitler zu Tisch', *Der Monat*, 37, 1951, p. 80.

†Hitler's *Table Talk*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953, Introduction p. xxxiii.

definite conception of history, or within a certain scale of values; it is in fact a purely psychological category and as such it can be defined only by the feeling of 'the extraordinary', 'unheard of', 'breath-taking . . .' The Empire he wants to build up, the *Autobahnen* he wants to construct—from Berlin to India—and the monuments he intends to leave to posterity can hardly be judged within a given system of political, practical or artistic values. In all his 'plans' there is something beyond reality and beyond the human condition.

Any human feeling and any cultural value is regarded by Hitler as being subordinated to his 'great' actions. He speaks about love as 'a competition in which the most Nazi of he-Germans deserved the most conventionally well-proportioned of she-Germans'; children are to him 'material of conquest and colonization'; moral values are simply prejudices. In his utter incapacity for looking at the events of life in the light of a spiritual order, or rather in his incapacity for spiritualizing life, lies the root of Hitler's 'lack of human note' that impressed so many people who knew him.* The only thing Hitler unreservedly admires in man is his power and will for action. He admires Stalin as 'a beast', reverences Mussolini for his determination, and the only thing he seems to like in the British race is its self-confidence.

The same thing can be said about the Nazi group as a whole. For it was not the unity and the action of the group in order to achieve certain pre-established ends but rather unity and action in themselves that formed the basic character of Nazi society. As compared with Communism, Nazism has no philosophy of history. This was substituted by the *mystique* of action. 'Action has buried philosophy', said Mussolini entering Rome.

The *mystique* of action forms a fundamental trait in the *Weltanschauung* of Nazism. That is why we should like to analyse its significance in more detail.

C. The Nazi culture-pattern bears in many respects the sign of a disturbing ambivalence in the group situation. The feeling of insecurity reaches such a degree of intensity that one can say that life and death present equal chances. The first term of this ambivalence is expressed, at the ideological level, in the *mystique* of action and adventure, while the second in the *mystique* of death. Both trends coexist in the Nazi *Weltanschauung*.

To start with it is worth while mentioning that the success in Italy of Gentile's 'activism', of the philosophy *del atto puro* is symptomatic. In Nazism, we have no such clear conceptualization of existence; there philosophy is almost buried under the urge for

*Zoller, A.: *Hitler Private*, Düsseldorf, 1949, refers to this, p. 49.

action. We can, however, find a series of trends all of them pointing in the same direction. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for instance are officially supported. A series of mystic concepts forming the foundation of the racial ideology comes under the same category. The essence of these consists in their dynamism rather than in their epistemological function. Concepts such as 'Germanic', *Führer*, 'Jewish', etc., are in essence simple words covering an irresistible urge for action.

Both Mussolini and Hitler consider action as the starting point of political society. The people feel their solidarity and the necessity of social organization only when they act in common. Therefore make them act or want to act before anything else. Common action is all; discussion and reasoning are a waste of time. Hitler could never get tired of repeating that his movement is 'a political fighting force' and not 'a debating society'. Both Mussolini and Hitler built up a political 'movement' before having a positive programme of government.

The *mystique* of death forms the other basic trait of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. Sometimes death is seen as a positive value, as a beautiful end to an heroic act. In one form or another the cult of death is noticeable in all Fascist organizations. In Rumania, for instance, the 'Iron Guard' had instituted the 'team of death', or 'nikadors' as the *élite* of the movement. The 'nikadors' did not hesitate a moment to bring death upon the enemies of their organization, and did not—so they said—fear death for themselves.

But, in Nazi society, death often appears as an obsession with the dread of life, as a feeling of fear and insecurity. Hitler, for instance, sees himself surrounded by hostile forces; Nature itself hides hostile intentions.* This basic emotional theme is instilled into the whole Party: all its members live and act on the assumption that their country is about to be assassinated by powerful enemies.†

D. Nazi ethics is an outstanding example of ambivalence. Both life and death as pure concepts are considered as supreme values. There is nothing between or above to give meaning to life or to death.

In the Nazi *Weltanschauung* life has its end in itself. We hasten to say, however, that there is little of a hedonistic or Dionysiac attitude involved in the Nazi conception of life. Concepts such as plenitude of life or full life with no further determination seem to

*See *Table Talk*, pp. 5 and 87.

†This feature of Nazism is crystallized, at least partly, in Existentialism. The concept of *angst*, the negation or the ignorance of any objective values—thus reducing existence to an individual act of living—are in our own opinion traits in German society which enter into the structure of Nazism.

cover what the exponents of Nazi ethics consider as the supreme value. The highest degree of life, plenitude, is attained in the exercise of power. That is why the ideal man is the political man. But this very point shows the ambivalence of the Nazi ethics. For power has, in the Nazi world, a specific meaning. It primarily means struggle and fight against dangers and death. Life as an exercise of power means 'adventure' or *vivere pericolosamente*. Among the early slogans of the Italian Fascists there is one most revealing on this matter: *Me ne frego*, i.e., I do not care, or more adequately, 'I am not afraid'.

Death is also a supreme value in the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. This is shown in the cult of self-sacrifice, individual and collective. But here too we have to notice that, in the Nazi world, there is no system of ideal values which gives meaning to the act of dying. To die for what? The answer to this question lies in one of the most characteristic aspects of Nazi ethics. Lacking a system of values which would give meaning to life and death, they supply the individual and the group with a series of *Ersatz* values. The Party, the Leader, the Fatherland are among these values. Therefore to live and die for them means to realize positive values in life. But as long as the Party, the Leader, and the Fatherland are not themselves integrated in a set of values Nazi ethics remain obviously an *Ersatz* ethics. The Party and the Leader were ethically free to do whatever they liked with the individual's faith in them; the Party and the Leader acted in an axiological vacuum. Their only conscious end for action consisted in the enjoyment derived from the exercise of power, in the doctrine of total war, or 'scorched earth war'.

E. There is nothing in the Nazi *Weltanschauung* that might give objective support to human action. Action derived its goal and strength from itself, according to the method of auto-suggestion (Coué). The world from beyond is destroyed by the atheistic mood prevalent in the Nazis and the imminent spiritual world by their crude vitalism. The main cause of this state of affairs should be looked for in the incapacity of life to project itself in a system of objective values. In the same trait is to be found the origin of the irrationalistic trends of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. And since a system of values constitutes the natural medium of rationalization, we can attribute to the same trait the Nazis' incapacity for giving 'reasons' for their actions. The Nazi basic argument 'we will because we will' translates an important characteristic of their own way of life. They could not formulate their action in the function of conventional values, or in terms of objective conditions of life, because they were utterly incapable of compromise. Anybody attempting to compromise was in their eyes a liar and a traitor. The rigidity and

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the urgent character of their action was such that it could never be formulated save in terms of its total success. Consequently the Nazi had no real use for diplomacy. They always preferred the language of war. Any treaty turned in their hands into a *Diktat*.

The main characteristic of human action in the Nazi pattern of life consists in the fact that it is not value-oriented. Its driving force is always deeply buried in the unconscious structure of mind, wherefrom it springs up with the force characteristic of compulsive behaviour. Hence its rigidity.

MYTHS AND MYTH-MAKING IN THE NAZI *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

The Nazi world is heavily populated with myths, the central figure of which is the German group. Mythical symbols such as the Master Race, Fatherland, *Der Führer*, etc., are variations on the same theme. Here we have to bring in again the idea of life's incapacity to project itself into a system of objective values. The post-war German society was so intensely obsessed with its survival as a separate group that it completely failed to formulate any of its experiences in a system of universal modes of life. As such it had no open door to humanitarianism. This shows a sharp contrast between Nazi and Communist societies. For the working-class acts on the assumption of the universal humanitarian end of its own action, which in turn leads to classless society, i.e., to its own sacrifice for the sake of humanity. This is not the case in Nazi society. Its ends are in itself as a closed group.

The Nazi way of life has no ideal dimension; it has no imminent rational order, like Communism, and no transcendental order like democracy. The group is absorbed in its own empirical condition of life. Its power of idealization does not go far beyond a series of incoherent and loosely-shaped wishes and fantasies about its vital strivings, its past and future. This morbid obsession with itself works its way out in myths and in action-anxiety, which are both ways of escaping from insecurity and fear of death. *VITA ACTIVA SUB SPECIE MORTIS*.

CHAPTER THREE

Nazism as Regressive Behaviour

Me ne frego!

EARLY MUSSOLINIAN SLOGAN

THE concept of regression has often been applied to the behaviour of the Nazi group and of the Nazi leaders. This obviously implies that Nazism was a pathological phenomenon. For the moment, we use the concept of regression as a working hypothesis and regard various aspects of the Nazi way of life by analogy with what happens in regressive behaviour of the individual.

THE GERMAN CULTURAL LAG AND NAZISM

The Western democratic institutions could not instantaneously incorporate into their system all the beliefs and attitudes characteristic of a previous absolutist régime. All these attitudes and beliefs, repressed by the process of democratization, form the cultural lag of modern society. In this case, it can be called the authoritarian lag of modern society.

The authoritarian cultural lag works in the manner of an unconscious dynamic structure. In a democratic culture, the people often revert to a despotic rule when the democratic formula cannot provide them with adequate satisfaction. The reversion to this old pattern of authority is positively meant to bring a greater degree of security and stability than that available in democracy. This process of reversion explains to a great extent the frequent appearance of dictatorships in a democratic era. Gilbert, for instance, refers to the Napoleonic régime as 'a reversion to an authoritarian rule after a too drastic attempt to impose democracy on an authoritarian culture'.*

Nazism is obviously a regressive adjustment of the German society of the inter-war period. Yet one can hardly say that the Napoleonic and the Hitlerian régimes belong to the same category of social and psychological phenomena, as Gilbert seems to suggest. Though not altogether denying the presence of some regressive elements in it, one can easily see that the substance of Napoleonic dictatorship consists in the consolidation of a society deeply disrupted

*Gilbert, G. M.: *The Psychology of Dictatorship*, N.Y., 1950, p. 5.

by new and advanced ideals. Some elements of a democratic revolution remained throughout this régime, in spite of Napoleon's personal dictatorship. There is nothing of this kind in Nazism. If one could speak about a certain consolidating action of Nazism, this would be in a quite different sense. For Hitler made little, if any, use of the 'advanced' social and cultural elements of contemporary society. In this he is different from Napoleon and from many contemporary dictators of the right, such as Kemal Atatürk and even Mussolini. As compared with Hitler, Napoleon was an enlightened tyrant. This places him in a different social and psychological category.*

The reversion to the medieval absolutist symbol of authority is only one aspect of Nazi society and not even the most significant one. Undoubtedly the symbol of the Kaiser as an absolutist ruler, and the Prussian pattern of society, both revived by Nazism, are symptoms of regression. But the main symbols of power and social integration are the charismatic leader and the feeling of the 'organic unity' of the Germanic group. In this way the reversion reached by Nazism goes back to a patriarchal type of human organization. This fact calls for an enlargement of the concept of cultural lag.

The concept of cultural lag is based on the social function of repression, that is, a culture-pattern or a way of life is repressed by another in the evolution of a group. The democratic culture-pattern for instance had 'repressed' medieval absolutism. From the purely sociological point of view we can speak about the conflict between two culture-patterns, or about the oppression or suppression of one pattern by another. Psychologically we speak about repression, meaning in the first place that the conflict has been internalized by the individual, who builds up in his own mental structure a repressing mechanism directed against the old culture-pattern. Now, since the repressed culture-pattern forms a dynamic structure in the unconscious, it may come out during periods of crisis in the evolution of the group. Consequently, regression occurs when a group reverts to an old and repressed pattern of organization because of its incapacity to integrate with the pattern offered by its contemporaneous historical level.

Nazism is an outstanding example of how a repressed patriarchal pattern becomes a substitute for all other later developed social patterns. Firstly the German group under Nazism, in its pressing

*Nazism borrows from contemporary civilization only the techniques of the concentration of power and of the organization of a rigid social order. It is in this respect no more indebted to this civilization than modern Japanese society. In both cases the technological factor of Western civilization was used to build up a patriarchal society.

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need for integration, had skipped over both the secular and pragmatic rationalism which forms the essence of modern democratic society, and the transcendental (moral) rationalism of medieval society. The *terra firma* of the German group's regression into the past is formed by a social pattern based on emotional solidarity. At this level the group reaches such a degree of integration that it shuts itself within a world of its own with no capacity for moral standards towards other groups. This is the pattern of human relationships and group formations characteristic of primary groups, such as the small size family belonging to modern European society or the big-size family of a primitive tribe.

This deep layer of inter-individual relationship and group formation cannot be enlightened by any ideology in the usual sense of this word. It is accessible only to symbolic and mythical forms of representation. Thus, what is commonly called Nazi ideology is but a heap of myths symbolizing a pattern of social integration deeply repressed in modern man. The symbols of the individual's identity with the group are expressed by racial myths, by the use of uniforms or by the method of *Gleichschaltung*. The symbol of the paternalistic position of authority is expressed by the myth of the providential leader and so forth. All these beads of symbolic thought were put together on the string of emotional logic.

MYTHICAL THINKING AS A REGRESSIVE SYMPTOM

Mythical thinking consists in a 'system' of symbols whose meaning overflows the empirical and logical condition of human knowledge. Take for example the function of the concept of 'Jew' in the Nazi world. Its empirical condition consists in the religious difference between a Jew and a Christian. On this basis it can be used as a discriminative concept. The Nazis, however, built up on this empirical and logical basis a long series of meanings: Jews are for them the worst enemies of the German people, an assertion which obviously has little if any empirical foundation. Then follows: Jews are the worst enemies of human civilization, and finally, Jews are the symbol of evil in the world. 'Jew' has in this last context a symbolical function. It arouses contempt, hatred, aggression, etc., in any situation no matter the empirical or logical conditions in which it is used. In the Nazi culture-pattern the function of such concepts is neither empirically nor logically circumscribed. These concepts operate under the category of the 'whole' in the sense that they take their significance from the Nazi world as a whole. The Nazi world is really at stake when the word 'Jew' is uttered. To the extent to which the concept of 'Jew' participates in the meaning of the Nazi world as a whole it may be considered as a negative form of the concept of

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'Totem', i.e., it defines indiscriminately the non-entity of the Germanic group. The positive and negative totemic symbols constitute the totalitarian basis of Nazi society.

One of the main problems of Nazi organization was to facilitate a close communication—or rather communion—between the individual and his group. Mythical thinking was the best means for this. Verbal symbols such as 'Fatherland', 'Germanic', *Führer*, 'Jew', etc., aroused in the individual, by their emotional tone, a primitive feeling of belonging. But there were also other means of communication between the individual and the group, such as uniforms (Brown Shirts), insignia, gestures, ceremonies, cults. Perhaps the most important of all was the salute 'Heil Hitler' whose function was to bring any social encounter between individuals quickly under the auspices of the group. Art was also considered as a means of participation in the group, that is, art that takes the mind off the individual back to an heroic patriarchal type of society. Wagner, and to a certain extent, Stefan George, served this purpose. A certain quality of the voice could also be used in order to induce in the individual's mind the feeling of the presence of the group: a generally high-pitched voice bursting out at certain intervals in explosions of rage or pathetic invocations as if a secret power from the outer world worked behind the speaker. Sometimes completely meaningless expressions were used to create in the individual the same 'totalitarian' states. '*Eia, Eia, Ala*' (D'Annunzio) was one of those expressions at the sound of which the Italian Fascists used to get enraged.

SOCIALIST ECONOMY AS A SYMPTOM OF REGRESSION

Hitler called his régime 'National Socialism'. State intervention is undoubtedly the main socialist feature of this régime. We see in this another regressive aspect of Nazism.

The facts show that socialist and collectivist features in the economic field appear regularly when a society finds itself under conditions of stress. Times of war best illustrate this. When its security is threatened the group reverts to a lower and less flexible level of integration which recalls in many respects the pre-individuation period of human society. Socialism is one of the modern expressions of this process of reversion. It should only be added that the main socialist features existing in the various economic systems of today are in fact remnants of war economy.*

*Max Weber: *Der Sozialismus*, Vienna, Phöbus, 1918, and Peter F. Drucker, *The New Society*, London, Heinemann, 1951, offer economic data in support of this thesis.

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THE CAUSES OF REGRESSION

The springboard of regression is the insecurity created by frustrating conditions of life. The main function of this mechanism is therefore to supply the individual or the group with a basis of security. This is the meaning of the group's or individual's reversion to an old pattern of behaviour. In other words, the present situation, superseding by its complexity the limit of the group's adaptability, requires the reversion to an earlier simpler form of adjustment.

Erich Fromm's thesis on Nazism may be given as an illustrative example of how the concept of regression has been applied to this phenomenon.* The perspective of individual freedom opened up by the Renaissance and the Reformation has, according to Fromm, reached a critical point in our era. The thirst for freedom arose in modern man as a reaction from medieval society; it grew up in step with the dissolution of the primary bonds characteristic of the medieval community, and in step with the weakening of the integrating forces of religion. But, as Fromm notices, if some results of this wide process led to modern democracy, some others led to social disintegration. Modern society has not supplied the individual with integrating values strong enough to compensate for the loss of the bonds of the medieval community. Thus, in many contemporary societies, the need for freedom has gradually become aimless. The individual is free to realize himself, feeling, at the same time, that there is nothing outside to give sense to his life, and thus to separate his freedom from vacuum and nothingness. Here Fromm rightly points out that as long as freedom meant freedom *from* (medieval anti-individualistic society) the experience of freedom in modern man had a full meaning. The moment of crisis is marked by the projection of the experience of freedom into the future, as freedom *for*. To this type of freedom modern society has failed to give a satisfactory answer. The main symptom of this crisis is shown in the insecurity, loneliness and fear of personal responsibility unavoidably implied in the experience of freedom in contemporary society in which the socially and spiritually integrative values are on the verge of disappearance.

The direction in which the crisis of freedom is solved, suggests the Dostoevskian formula outlined in *The Grand Inquisitor* (Brothers Karamazov), escape from freedom into security by an indiscriminate acceptance of external authority.

Nazism is, according to Fromm, one of the historical forms of this escape from freedom. The individual escapes the burdens of

**The Fear of Freedom*, London, 1942.

freedom and responsibility by his unconditional surrender to a despot and by his uncritical acceptance of a body of secular beliefs and myths arranged for him by an authoritarian régime. In this case, regression consists in the fact that the urgent need for integration and belongingness provokes a reversion of some groups to a pre-rationalist and pre-individualist type of civilization.

There is no doubt that Nazism is partly determined by the fear of freedom and responsibility in contemporary man and by its positive aspect as an escape into authoritarianism. Fromm's only mistake is that he lays too great a stress on the importance of this process in the psycho-genesis of Nazism. Consequently he completely fails to see an opposite process which has been taking place in modern society parallel to that described by him as 'fear of freedom'. This is the type of integration produced by modern society which is—as E. Durkheim suggests—a counterbalancing process to the disintegration and specialization inherent in large-scale organizations. We can talk therefore about excessive integration, and responsibility existing in contemporary man side by side with excessive freedom and lack of responsibility. Paradoxically enough, this process has also contributed to the rise of Nazism. This has happened in two main ways: On the psychological level it has gradually led to the annihilation of the individual's personality by the weakening of his critical mind. On the social plane it has gradually created a type of civilization whose main characteristics consist in a high degree of inter-individual dependence—a factory type of society. This made it all the easier for the Nazi leaders to create a highly integrated society.

In conclusion Fromm's view is important as an illustration of the dialectics of freedom in modern society. As long as freedom is predominantly negative, meaning freedom 'from', it represents a positive value. The moment it becomes prospective, as freedom 'for', it leads to self-denial. If the answer required by freedom 'for' is not given, it arouses in the individual insecurity, fears, aloneness, and consequently desires for belongingness, a desperate need for *Mitsein*, as the existentialists put it. An authoritarian civilization would be an answer to this fear of freedom. This answer denies, however, the legitimacy of the question. But on the other hand if a positive answer is given, by laying down the sense of freedom in a rational order, in a clear-cut philosophy of history the final result would be the same, i.e., freedom negates itself. Nazism represents the former attitude towards freedom in contemporary society, Communism the latter. We take again the opportunity of emphasizing an important idea of this study: Nazism results from the irrational, Communism from the over-rational factors of contemporary civilization.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NAZISM

THE EFFECTS OF REGRESSION

The effects of the process of regression undergone by German society during the inter-war period can be studied under two main headings. A, The authoritarian character, and B, the process of *Gleichschaltung*.

A. Fromm considers the concept of authoritarian character as the key concept in the psychology of Nazism. Generally speaking, the authoritarian character is the outcome of the structuration of a series of mental factors produced mainly by the process of regression. Anxiety, insecurity, and repressed desire for belongingness, are a few of them. The main point is that the structuring of these factors forms the basis for an individual as well as for a social authoritarian character. The latter is defined for the first time by Fromm as a structural characteristic of a group.

The main trait of an authoritarian character consists in an ambivalent attitude towards authority. This means that the authoritarian personality and group fall into the extremes of dominance and submissiveness. On the political plane, an ambivalent attitude towards authority leads to an authoritarian organization. For in this type of organization, based on a rigid hierarchy of power, the individual can satisfy both his need for belongingness-submissiveness by his complete integration with the group and by his obedience towards the higher-ups, and, at the same time, his need for dominance towards those below him in the system.

With regard to the social basis of the authoritarian character, Fromm concentrates his attention on the lower-middle classes which, according to him, form the background of Nazism. As mentioned in a previous chapter, we look at this problem from a different angle. Nazism is the outcome of the German group as a whole. It is the whole group that undergoes a process of regression. Therefore the group as such is liable to authoritarian behaviour.

One can, however, distinguish various levels of crystallization of the authoritarian character. The post-war German group as a whole constitutes the first level. In this case the authoritarian traits form a loose structure; they are, so to speak, in a floating state. The German lower-middle classes represent a new level in the structuration of various authoritarian traits. At this level, the structuration takes on a more permanent character than in the German group as a whole. The reasons for this are various. One can say in general that these classes suffered more than others from the effects of the economic crisis, and therefore they were to a greater extent affected by the process of regression. There is, however, one class which felt the effects of the economic crisis even more than the lower-middle

classes—the working class. And in spite of this, one can say that the working class suffered less from the feeling of insecurity than other classes. For, unlike any other class, this class had a social philosophy on which it hung its desires for security. The German working class, like any other European working class, had long before the outcome of Nazism built up another type of authoritarian character which forms the basis of Communism.

The third level in the structuration of the authoritarian factors is formed by the *déclassé* group of post-war Germany. One finds in these people additional reasons for insecurity and need for belongingness. Finally, the highest concentration of authoritarian traits is realized in a series of abnormal personalities such as Hitler, Hess, Goebbels, who had displayed throughout their lives pathological forms of authoritarian behaviour. Thus the authoritarian character emerges in four stages of intensity and purity. It is seen firstly in a diluted form in the German group as a whole, then reaches higher and higher degrees of intensity in the lower-middle classes, in the sociopathic group (*déclassés*), and finally in the psychopathic group. Nazism arises as the integration of these superimposed levels of authoritarian behaviour within German society.

THE PROCESS OF *GLEICHSCHALTUNG*

B. Technically, *Gleichschaltung* is used in order to indicate the process of co-ordination and conformation of German organization of all types with the pattern of the Party. Ultimately, this process led to the identification of the individual with the interests of the group as they were represented by the leaders of the Party. One can describe the process of *Gleichschaltung* as the reversal of the fundamental values of democracy. For it brings with it the weakening and sometimes the annihilation of all the values founded in the concepts of individuality, critical mind, objectivity, and sense of leisure.

On the individual plane, *Gleichschaltung* produces a rigid integration of the individual's mental life round one specific factor. In other words the whole dynamics of personality comes under the rigid control of a single or of a few ideas or feelings, loosely symbolized by 'Race', 'Führer', 'Fatherland', etc. This works in the manner of an obsessional mechanism. On the individual plane, the process of *Gleichschaltung* works for the identification of every individual with his own society and thus for the creation of the totalitarian reality. The sense of values in the Nazi world is given by the degree of group identification. Thus the individual realizes himself by self-annihilation.

The regressive elements involved in the process of *Gleichschaltung* are better seen when we consider the irrational roots of this process.

Gleichschaltung represents a primitive mode of social integration, and it is, in this sense, the outcome of what some psychoanalysts call an inferior type of super-ego. Flügel describes the function of an inferior type of super-ego as consisting in the individual's identification with his environment. In this case the ego cannot counter-balance the anarchic and anti-social character of the primitive drives of the Id, except by creating forms of identification between an individual and the other members of his group. In more intelligible words, the ego produces the illusion that the individual is one and the same reality as the group. Consequently the destructive character of his primary drives ultimately turns against himself. A rudimentary super-ego is forged in this way and is projected in a series of myths about the common origins of the members of the group (descent from the same Gods), a series of cults about the ancestors, and a common tradition. These are the main integrating forces operating in patriarchal societies.*

The appearance of such a structure in the Nazi group, and in German society as a whole, is undoubtedly the result of regression. This primitive super-ego is projected in the Nazi myths which, following the culture-pattern of the twentieth century, sometimes take the form of scientific theories. These myths are produced by a series of primitive integrating drives operating within the German group. In their turn they strengthen the in-group ties and even bring about the individual's annihilation. All that is good, pure and healthy comes from inside the group. Thus, the individual's capacity for love is entirely absorbed within the group. On the other hand, the same myths help the projection of the individual's aggression towards the out-groups. All that is bad and morbid comes from outside the group.

In conclusion the process of *Gleichschaltung* means the identification of the individual with his group, which group in its turn fails to integrate itself at an inter-group level. In other words Nazism implies the structuration of the group below the international level of integration which forms one of the distinctive notes of modern Western civilization. The norms of group behaviour are determined by the group's obsession with itself rather than by its relationships with other groups. For the authoritarian group is incapable of compromise and flexibility, thus incapable of being aware of another as equal. 'Europe and the rest of the world can perish in flames. What is it to us? Germany must live and be free', says Röhm.† The group lives in a monadic primitive world fashioned upon the formula: One group, one world.

*Flügel, J. C.: *Man, Morals and Society*, London, Duckworth, 1945.

†Heiden, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF REGRESSION

The outburst of a series of irrational factors—mainly repressed desire for security and belongingness—has undoubtedly created in contemporary man certain dispositions which precipitated the rise of Nazism. As we shall see at a later stage, the psychology of the unconscious applies well to Nazism. And yet it seems very difficult to determine the degree to which the irrational factors contributed to the structuration of the Nazi society. It is enough to mention some 'rational' conditions of Nazism in order to understand this difficulty.

A. A strong aggressive policy is not necessarily the product of irrational factors set free by regression or otherwise. It might as well be based on the reality principle. The policy of power which animates the U.S.A. in the present circumstances is very little, if at all, determined by irrational factors. On the contrary, it looks like a realistic adjustment to the world situation as created by the post-war position of the Communist bloc.

B. A series of social techniques permitting the concentration of power in the hands of the few should also be taken into account.

C. The reaction against Communism, and the structuration of various political forces in Germany, as a means of resistance, cannot be considered as an irrational factor, but rather a rational orientation in the political reality of post-war Germany. Many people joined the Nazi movement out of a rational calculation, i.e. they had chosen the lesser evil of the two.

D. The rôle played by international capital in the post-war German economy, and the policy of appeasement of the Great Powers, can also be considered as rational factors contributing to the rise of Nazism.

E. On no account should one overlook a series of 'historical accidents' all leading towards Nazism. One of these was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30th January, 1933.

Hindenburg made a grave decision and took on himself a responsibility which most probably another head of the State would have avoided. His friend in arms, Ludendorff, wrote to him on that occasion 'By the appointment of Hitler to the Reich Chancellorship you have put our holy Fatherland at the mercy of one of the greatest demagogues of all times. I prophesy that this unholy man will plunge the Reich into chaos, will bring unimaginable misery to the nation, and coming generations will curse you in your grave for what you have done.*' It is difficult to assess how much Nazism owes to Hindenburg, to his judgement and character, but it certainly owes something.

*Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

CHAPTER FOUR

Pathological Factors in Nazism

Say what you will about Hitler, but don't accuse him of
being moral. GOERING

THIS chapter deals with those aspects of Nazism which can be described as various forms of mental disorder. In the course of our discussion we shall distinguish two aspects of the sources of the psycho-pathological features of Nazism: a psychogenetic and a sociogenetic aspect.

PSYCHOGENESIS

As an illustration of the psychogenetic approach to the pathological aspects of the Nazi way of life we propose to describe briefly the psychopathological traits of Hitler's personality.

All the psycho-analytical portraits of Hitler agree on the important point that he showed strong paranoid symptoms. Excessive aggression and obsessional reactions are among the most important of these. Various data regarding Hitler's private life lead to the hypothesis that these manifestations were connected with a series of unsolved oedipal conflicts, his repressed hatred towards his father in particular. His father's violent character, his addiction to drink, and the fact that Hitler was aware of the rumour that his father was a bastard with Jewish blood in him, are the main data brought in support of this supposition. In the same unsolved oedipal conflicts lies the source of a series of other traits of Hitler's personality such as (a) his mother fixation; (b) his latent homosexuality, or as Gilbert very cautiously puts it ' . . . his emotional attachment to men (was) stronger than to women*', and finally (c) a series of revulsions from alcohol, meat, etc. . . .

For the understanding of the psychogenesis of his obsessional character one has to mention the projection and displacement of his aggression. The excessive aggression resulting from strongly repressed infantile conflicts is projected by the ego upon the external world. Firstly the universe as such was for Hitler imbued with disruptive and hostile forces. Nature and destiny were for him sources of a capricious and hostile power. No human power over nature

**Op. cit.* p. 64.

can be justified. 'But a simple storm is enough and everything collapses like a pack of cards'.* In this respect Hitler's ego is either in defence or in attack against the world; never in peaceful co-operation.

In the social world, his aggression was first of all projected upon the enemies of his country, i.e., the main signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty. This process was paralleled by his identification with his own victimized people. But the most effective outlet for his obsessive aggression was his antisemitism.

One can distinguish three stages in the development of Hitler's antisemitism. The first, though perhaps not the most important, is closely connected with the oedipal conflicts mentioned above. The origin of his hatred towards the Jews and persecution of them lies in the displacement of his hatred towards his father. An important detail of Hitler's life supports this psychoanalytical hypothesis. Apparently his father was the illegitimate son of a Jew in whose house his grandmother worked as a servant. Gilbert gives this information, as not yet verified. But he rightly points out that the important thing in this case is not the truth itself, but the obvious fact that Hitler was aware of this allegation. The conclusion would be that his antisemitism was at least partly prompted by his unconscious wish to clean himself from his violent, drunken and morally impure father. On the other hand, the displacement of his aggression or death wishes on Jews might have served to modify his negative attitude towards his 'bad father', and thus to preserve the good father figure.

The second stage in the development of Hitler's anti-semitic attitude consists in another traumatic experience which occurred later in his life. While in Vienna as a young painter he became infatuated with a 17-year-old girl. According to Greiner† this was a deep and desperate love which was met with constant rejection by the girl. The end seems tragi-comic, but was not so to Hitler. The girl married a promising young business man, who happened to be of half-Jewish parentage. Gilbert relates various incidents connected with this unfortunate love affair—a threatening letter sent by Hitler to the young business man, scenes in the street, etc.—all showing Hitler's outbursts of rage against the dirty Jews who dared to violate Christian girls.

The third stage in the development of Hitler's antisemitism—by far the most important of all—is determined by cultural factors. In Vienna during his youth, and later on in Germany, Hitler had met with strong antisemitic feelings, sometimes antisemitic ideologies

**Table Talk*, p. 5.

†Gilbert, *op. cit.* p. 32.

and movements (the Christian Socialist Party of Karl Lüger, and a series of youth organizations such as the Pan-German *Burschenschaften*, in Vienna, and the German Nationalist Party of Anton Schönerer). All this helped him to project on to Jews his repressed aggression.

There is no doubt that Hitler's personality lends itself freely to the psycho-analytical vocabulary. As mentioned before, the Oedipus complex constitutes the central concept from which radiate traits such as homosexuality, sexual impotence, masochism, sadism, and others. Since the task of discussing the legitimacy of these concepts as applied to Hitler seems to be difficult, particularly in a *post mortem* analysis, we have to resort to a less ambitious scheme for the understanding of Hitler's abnormal character. Thus, we take insecurity as the key concept of our present analysis and show the various modes under which it was displayed by Hitler. For the feeling of insecurity is so deeply rooted in Hitler, that we can designate him as the prototype of the personality built up on this feeling and consequently as a model of Nazi authoritarian personality.

The formative years of Hitler's life show a strange coincidence of events arousing frustration and insecurity. His father, a bastard, suffers from lung trouble and dies of haemorrhage of the lungs, when Hitler is only 10 years old. He creates by his authoritarian and violent behaviour a permanent threat to Hitler's expectations of tender feelings. His mother dies of cancer of the breast while Hitler is still in his teens. Being unhappy in her marriage, she turns all her affection towards her son Adolf, thus causing in him a negative attitude towards belongingness and sentimentality. The envy and jealousy of his step-brothers form an additional source of insecurity. Later conditions of his life, such as his own lung trouble, which contributes to his failure in the *Realschule*, his failure as an artist, his hard years in Vienna, etc., come to foster this first layer of insecurity. On the social plane, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the country of his birth, the defeat of Germany, the country of his ideals, his lack of social status, all these constitute further sources of insecurity in him.

The main forms of manifestation of the frustrated need for security in Hitler's personality can be described as follows:—

A. Perhaps the most characteristic of all these manifestations is his strong need for self-assertion which indicates his urge to prove to everybody—to himself in the first place—the secure basis of his personality. His aggressiveness, his thirst for adventure, his 'iron will-power' are but various dimensions of his need for self-demonstration. On the fantasy level, his projection of himself as the

providential leader of the Master Race is rooted in the same basic insecurity. All these manifestations of insecurity are anti-social.

B. The frustrated need for security is also manifested in Hitler by the denial of any desire for belongingness and security. 'I do not need security', or 'I do not care' are the usual formulas for this mode of acting out a basic insecurity. Characteristic in this respect is Hitler's insensibility, and even hostility, towards the most important tender bonds in life. Love and family are in his eyes outweighed by the practical necessity of having children; religious feelings are signs of weakness; moral affection is a prejudice.

C. A further series of manifestations of the same basic insecurity noticed in the so-called *esprits certitudiens* of which Hitler is a typical representative, is closely connected with what has been said under B. The main symptom of this is seen in Hitler's readiness to give a 'definite' opinion on practically all circumstances of life. Doubt in thinking, lack of opinion, as well as scruples in action are for him amongst the greatest evils produced by modern democracy. 'Hitler's real superiority'—writes an able interpreter of his life—'rests on the fact that he has an opinion in any situation, and this opinion fits without the slightest difficulty into his *Weltanschauung*.'* Not only has he an opinion but he expresses it with the strongest possible conviction as if the whole world testified to its truth.

It is precisely this horror of vacuum and uncertainty that drives his mind to work out quick answers to every problem and thus mend the flaws of his universe. In this lies another aspect of his personality, and indeed of any *esprit certitudien*, namely, his simple-mindedness. Hitler finds everything marvellously simple; the whole world is for him a simple 'system' of meanings easily seen by 'virgin' minds. It is only the Jews, the intellectuals, and the military professionals that complicate matters.

D. Another mode of playing out a fundamental insecurity, also noticed in Hitler, consists in the deep desire to be accepted and loved by the group. In Hitler, this is a compensation for his repressed desire for belongingness, and can very well be considered as another form of self-assurance. To this aspect belong Hitler's identification with the German group and his particular need for 'loyalty'.

Hitler's group identification is facilitated by a series of traits common to his personality and to the German group during the inter-war period. Both the structure of his personality and of the German group are built up on the feeling of insecurity. In this respect, Hitler's remarkable capacity for grasping the dominant symbols of the German culture-pattern of his time is worth mentioning. He could instinctively find the most efficient expressions to stir up, and

**Op. cit.*, p. 89.

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at the same time to alleviate, the basic insecurity of his people. To their feeling of inferiority he offered the myth of the Master Race; to their repressed self-assertion, an aggressive policy; their feeling of guilt was played out by his exceptional ability to create scape-goats. These qualities of his mind brought him outstanding political success. Success, in its turn, made his mind leap from one extreme to another, i.e., from lack of security and sense of belongingness, to over-confidence, to a great sense of responsibility, and finally to his identification with the will of the people; from the status of an outcast, to that of a providential leader.*

Hitler's identification with the German group raises the more general problem of his attitude towards society. Many investigators in this field seem to hold the opinion that Hitler had a strong super-ego. This was formed as compensation for his weak ego which was incapable of mastering his strong anti-social drives. In this sense Hitler built up a party in order to create in himself the comfortable feeling that he was not an outcast, and that the fundamental tendencies of his personality were not immoral.†

The use of the concept of the super-ego in the analysis of Hitler's personality involves ambiguities in its meaning. If one takes the super-ego as a structure the function of which is to repress the anti-social impulses in the individual, by creating inter-individual modes of behaviour, then Hitler had a strong and a weak super-ego at the same time. For it is perfectly true that he integrated himself with his group, but the group itself was an anti-social group *par excellence*, and became even more so under Hitler's rule. Moreover, Hitler created a party based on the rule of force which appealed to the individual to the extent to which the individual himself had strong anti-social needs. In other words, Hitler created a society of sociopathic personalities organized in the manner of the *Fuks Divisionen*. In this sense, one cannot infer from his group identification the existence in his personality of a strong super-ego structure. We can hardly

*The demand for absolute loyalty made by Hitler of the party members has been often connected with his homosexual inclinations. The party seems, according to this view, a strange love affair. Yet, one can hardly avoid the common observation that the need for loyalty is a characteristic of many revolutionaries who did not show any signs of homosexuality. Saint-Just, Robespierre, Lenin, Stalin are a few of them. It is more likely that great need for the loyalty of others is a characteristic of that type of personality which is built up on the feeling of insecurity. Any neutral or critical attitude towards such a personality is bound to arouse his insecurity and suspicion. The emotional logic of this personality is 'all or nothing', complete loyalty, or treason.

†According to O. Fenichel the identification with one's own group consists in an unconscious process the effect of which is that the individual objectifies and satisfies his aggression in out-groups, and his Eros in the in-groups. This overcomes a basic ambivalence in his personality.

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say that an anti-social psychopath who joins a 'gang' has a stronger super-ego than one who acts on his own.*

The case of Hitler seems to be that of a psychopathic personality who integrated himself with a group in order to gratify his own anti-social tendencies. We see in this a victory of the basic impulses of the Id rather than the victory of the super-ego. This is characteristic of most personalities built up on the feeling of insecurity of which Hitler is the prototype. This is also the most striking feature in the Nazi type of authoritarian personality. As we shall see in the next chapter, this type of personality suffers from an incapacity to project his own experience at an inter-individual level and thus to create objective norms of behaviour based on self-restraint (unassuming character) and compromise with others.

One has to recognize, however, that Hitler's personality is not absolutely deprived of the capacity to project social modes of behaviour. The image of an heroic society, the myth of the Master Race, the dream of a united, strong Fatherland are proof of this. But they are far too vague and as such unfit for the standards of contemporary society. Moreover, their function was mainly to compensate for the fundamentally anti-social tendencies of his Party and to a certain extent of the Germanic group. As such it is hard to consider them as the manifestation of a well-constituted super-ego. They suggest in fact the smouldering ashes of a collective unconscious, a stage in the evolution of mankind at which one can hardly distinguish the function of the super-ego in the individual. For at this stage, the group exists primarily as an 'organic' necessity for the individual. The repressing forces—repression being taken as a psychological mechanism—of the primary impulses are weak. Thus the individual's life is integrated with a super-individual order by the pressure of external forces—coming from inside (fear of the stronger) and from outside the group—rather than by the functions of an inner structure of his own mind. In conclusion, the individual's identification with an anti-social group cannot be taken as a sign of the existence of a strong social function in his own mind.

Hitler's personality obviously occupies the central place in a study concerned with the pathological aspects of Nazism. Pathological behaviour, however, was also displayed by other Nazi leaders such as H. Goering, R. Hess, and H. Frank. One could classify the main psychopathological symptoms in the Nazi leaders under the following heads:

*This basic ambiguity can be avoided only if one creates a distinction within the concept of the super-ego, and say that Hitler had a 'socially' strong but 'morally' weak super-ego. This distinction sounds artificial, for the simple reason that social integration normally implies moral qualities.

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1. Aggressive paranoia—sado-masochism—latent homosexuality. Typical representative: Hitler.
2. Narcissism—typically displayed by Goering.
3. Passive paranoia, latent homosexuality, mystic sentimentalism, typically represented by Hess.

SOCIOGENESIS

Can one explain the origins of the pathological aspects of Nazism only by the presence of certain psychopathological traits in the Nazi leaders, or has one to resort, for the solution of this problem, to certain qualities of contemporary German society and culture? One is on safe ground when talking about the presence of psychopathological traits in Hitler and other Nazi leaders from the simple fact that a certain amount of empirical evidence is available. In his study, Gilbert made use of reliable psychological methods. But when trying to analyse the pathological elements involved in the German culture-pattern, during the period preceding Nazism, one can hardly rely on any systematic research, psychological or anthropological. In this case the psychologist's only choice is to give his own interpretation to a series of historical facts selected by him as symptomatic for the mental structure of the German group during the period under consideration. The hypothetical elements have to be very strong indeed. And yet, this hypothesis seems to be necessary. For Hitler's paranoia or Goering's narcissistic traits, symptomatic as they were, could hardly create a series of psychopathological trends in the Nazi group, or in the German group, had they met indifferent or hostile surroundings. The fact is that they built themselves on elements found already in German society and culture.

In what follows we describe some of the main aspects of contemporary German society and culture which disclose the existence of certain abnormal and pathological traits in the individuals belonging to this society and culture.

1. The concept most accurately covering the main pathological symptoms shown by German society during and immediately preceding Nazism is that of a sociopathic group. As in the case of sociopathic personality, the sociopathic character of the group is motivated by a basic insecurity, and, as in the case of psychopathic personality again, the acting out of the feeling of insecurity leads to a morbid urge for self-assertion of the group. Hence the authoritarian character of its organization, its policy based on force, and its anti-social behaviour.

Insecurity can be considered as the main cause of German society's failure to adjust itself to twentieth-century democratic civilization; it prevented the German group from projecting its aspirations on the

values created by this civilization. This basic insecurity destroyed the frame of reference for the aspirations of the German group.

The lack of an adequate frame of reference has a particular sociological importance, which in the case of Nazism has received too little attention. This is the group trait that can explain to a great extent the importance played by the *déclassés* and psychopathic personalities of the Nazi movement. For it is this sociological category and this personality type that can more successfully crystallize the various mental factors in a group with a lost frame of reference. Its disorientation, its fears and revolt against a hostile environment, and finally its urge to escape into adventure, all these find their highest expression in that type of personality and group described by us as sociopathic.

We hasten to say that we cannot describe the whole of the twentieth German society as having a well-defined sociopathic structure. Its general state of insecurity and its incapacity to integrate with European democratic civilization can be considered only as a fertile ground in which a sociopathic structure could develop.

2. It has been often remarked that some important features of the modern German culture-pattern show a certain degree of abnormality in the reality-testing function. This consequently creates and maintains a certain defectiveness of the reality-testing function in the individual members of German society. If one understands by the reality-testing function a congenial flexibility of the individual's and group's behaviour which enables them to compromise between divergent factors existing in their inner structure and in their environment, then the defectiveness of this function in the modern German culture is obvious. At the theoretical level this is shown by that striking incapacity of modern German thought to reach a balance between the mind and the external world, and in its repulsion from dualism. Kant's theoretical philosophy is an exception.* German idealism could be taken as a symptom of delusional trends within modern European civilization. In every field of human creation Germans have used to the maximum their power of thinking and their imagination to substitute for rather than to beautify, enrich or compromise with the external reality. 'Culture versus Nature' is primarily a German product. The same incapacity to compromise is displayed in the practical field by the *Realpolitik*. The self-

*A series of studies of philosophical anthropology such as those of Mario Pensa (*Das Deutsche Denken*, Zürich, 1948) and George Santayana (*Egotism in German Philosophy*, London, 1939) throw a certain light on this point. Both lead to the conclusion that German thought upsets the balance between the internal and external world established by the classical thought—of Greek origins—by creating an overpowering 'Self' with imperialistic tendencies towards the external reality.

centredness of the individual and of the group to the extent of denying the existence of the external world in its own right forms the main symptom of defectiveness in the reality-testing function in modern German culture.

What has been said above has led some people to see certain specific psychotic features in German culture. R. Brickner, among others, speaks of a paranoiac German culture, wondering whether this is curable or not.* The paranoiac symptoms most frequently referred to are self-centredness, self-glorification, and obsessional forms of aggression. Gilbert takes up this point, and sensing the difficulty involved in the application of clinical concepts to culture-pattern and group behaviour, reformulates the whole problem in new terms. Thus, he distinguishes between 'clinical' and cultural pseudo-paranoia, only the latter being characteristic of German society. This means that one can find certain paranoiac trends in the German group, although its members—with the exception of a few Nazi leaders—cannot be classified as cases of clinical paranoia. The members of the Nazi group, and of the German group as a whole, behaved as if they were paranoiacs, for their personalities were directed by their culture. Their perceptions, emotions and thoughts were conditioned by a process of cultural learning to such an extent that they showed signs of delusional behaviour. In the totalitarian State created by Nazism—Gilbert concludes—the national behaviour resembles paranoia, i.e., behaviour based on systematized delusions (innate superiority) and aggression.

It is easy to agree with Gilbert about the necessity of reformulating the clinical concepts before applying them to the group and culture-pattern. But by overstressing the difference between clinical and pseudo-paranoia he seems to give too great an importance to social and cultural factors in the explanation of the pathological aspects of the Nazi way of life. Thus, it is hard to agree with him when he says that most of the individuals who were perfectly integrated with the German culture-pattern under the Nazi régime, had their reality-testing function impaired, and therefore were not liable to clinical paranoia. Before deciding upon this problem it would be advisable to take into account the following points. A. The identification of an individual with the German culture under Nazism could be taken as a sign of defectiveness in his reality-testing function. There was in that individual a readiness to distort the world in a particular manner—paranoiac—and the Nazi culture-pattern presented a proper medium for this; he used it as a means of expressing his own mind. B. It is hard to believe that the members of a group in which a paranoia personality emerged as an absolute leader had their reality-

**Is Germany Incurable?* Philadelphia, 1943.

testing function impaired. The acceptance, the admiration of, and the identification with such a leader showed various degrees of defectiveness of the reality-testing function in the members of the German group. Hitler synthesized in his personality a series of cultural and psychological traits of contemporary German society; he could carry on with his career of adventurer and fabricant of myths because he found both the reality-testing function weak in most members of the German group, and features of the German culture which facilitated his task. C. Finally the question whether the individual members of the Nazi society suffered from clinical paranoia seems to us less relevant than Gilbert suggests. 'Clinical' implies social maladjustment and action for reformation. In Germany, Hitler and his Party had to a great extent institutionalized the paranoid type of behaviour by a mythical way of thinking, by a militaristic organization of society, and by an aggressive policy.

3. Compulsion is also connected with Nazism. It is seen in the rigidity and repetitiveness of behaviour-pattern such as saluting, mechanically executing meaningless orders, and generally speaking, in the German fondness for discipline. Gilbert is again of the opinion that the compulsive traits in the Nazi group cannot be regarded as compulsive behaviour in a clinical sense, but as cultural pseudo-compulsion. The Nazi régime had intensified the militaristic character of German culture to such an extent that the individual carried on the group behaviour rituals with little possibility of resistance. There was no scale of values to put a check to his rigid loyalty to the group. He would exterminate people *en masse* to satisfy this loyalty. Cultural pseudo-compulsion consists, therefore, in the culturally conditioned tendency of the individual 'to carry to the extreme the repetition of group behaviour rituals'.* Gilbert makes clear that the individuals themselves showed no signs of clinical compulsive behaviour.

Here we have to point again to the irrelevancy of the concept of 'clinical'. Since the members of the Nazi society could act out their deep-seated anxieties—their fears of persecution, for instance—in an institutionalized form, one could say very little about the clinical aspect of their compulsions. Perhaps the following approach would take us a step farther in the understanding of this aspect of the Nazi way of life: The motivation of the compulsive behaviour characteristic of the German group lay in the anxieties created in the group by specific historical conditions as mentioned elsewhere. It was therefore, the acting out of this 'general' anxiety that led to a generalized form of compulsion. As long as the individual belonging to this group accepted this pattern of behaviour—be it under

**Ibid.*, p. 273.

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Prussian absolutism, under Bismarck, or Hitler—the right conclusion from this would be that they had in themselves some conditions of compulsive behaviour.

What has been just said is not meant to minimize the part played by a series of cultural factors in the behaviour of the members of the German group under Nazism, but rather to establish a balance between the cultural and personal factors in the determination of this behaviour. This will more clearly be seen in the last chapter of this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

Nazi Authoritarian Personality

Trust your sword rather than the portcullis. ICELANDIC SAGA

INDIVIDUATION IN A THREATENED SOCIETY

THE structural analysis of various Western societies has led us to the following conclusion: Various processes taking place within contemporary Western society in general, and German society in particular, have gradually built up a specific pattern of development in the human personality. The psychological analysis of this type of personality can give us the clue to the understanding of some important aspects of Fascism and Nazism in particular.

If we have to describe in a single word the structure of the field leading to that form of individuation which contains in itself the basic conditions of authoritarian behaviour, we would say 'insecurity'. Recent psychological researches, based mainly on clinical and experimental methods, have little quarrel with this general assumption. For they nearly all stress the fact that authoritarian personality presupposes individuation in conditions of insecurity.

The rapid tempo of change of modern societies, and the social instability resulting from it, are usually considered as the most general sources of insecurity in modern man. The twofold meaning of instability and relativity of social forms, in a civilization based on individual freedom, should be pointed out. Change in itself does not produce insecurity as long as it is believed to be *for the better*. This presupposes either the existence of a strong faith in the rational character of social evolution, or a sustained empirical proof of the increased well-being of the majority of individuals, as a direct result of change. When these two factors are weak, or do not exist at all, change becomes a source of insecurity in the individual. This is the case in many contemporary Western societies.

Another important source of insecurity in contemporary man can be described as follows: During the twentieth century the Western culture-pattern offers very few outlets for the individual's frustrated need for security. In this lies one of the main conditions of the process of individuation characteristic of Fascist authoritarian personality. This very condition also shows the main difference between

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Nazi, medieval, and Communist authoritarian personality. For medieval man integrates himself with an autocratic social order by transferring his need for personal security and freedom into a transcendental world, with which he is linked by faith. The need for security and freedom in Communist man is, on the other hand, satisfied by his reliance on the power of secular reason. But, as shown before, the structure of some Western culture-patterns of the twentieth century offers little support for the belief in either the transcendental or secular order. Consequently, the modes of experiencing security and freedom are, in these cultures, almost non-existent.

This is the cultural topography of the individuation of Fascist man. Its formula is: man-in-a-hostile-world; human life is guaranteed neither by a steady empirical progress, nor by a rational order. Human personality grows in the vacuum left by the fall of transcendental religion, and at the ebb-tide of a rationalistic era. In this existential context, insecurity often amounts to desperation. The main binding force in life seems to be a blind will to exist. The grotesque Hitlerian 'we will because we will', or 'who has, has' represent a basic mental condition in contemporary man.

The list of the causes of insecurity is not complete without taking into account the specific situation of modern German society. This has been, however, dealt with elsewhere.

SOME ASPECTS OF INDIVIDUATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF INSECURITY

1. One of the most characteristic features of a personality which has grown up in conditions of insecurity consists in a low degree of self-integration. The feeling of insecurity constitutes a constant source of instability in the structure of this personality. The conviction that the circumstances of life are stronger than himself forms one of his pervasive traits. His self-confidence and self-initiative are usually weak, save where insecurity is repressed and over-compensated.

The relationship established by this type of personality with the external world shows signs of deficiency in the reality-testing function. Personalities formed under conditions of insecurity are much more inclined than any other type to blame external circumstances for their own failures. They have the feeling of being surrounded by a hostile world to which they react in an ambivalent manner: expressing either excessive aggression, in order to break down the hostility, or total submission.

There is considerable projection at work in these personalities. Their thwarted self-assertion and their excessive number of repressed tendencies form in the unconscious a pool of aggression and,

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when they escape the repressing forces of the ego, are projected upon other people or upon the external world in general. In this case their own impotence is seen by them as others' impotence, their own aggression as aggression in others.

Concluding this section, one can say that the first characteristic of the personality which has grown up in conditions of insecurity is a weak ego structure. This is shown in its low degree of self-integration and in the defectiveness of its reality function.

2. A personality with a weak ego structure has a particular tendency to form a compensatory structure, to build up a hypertrophied or inflated ego which displays a high degree of integration. This phenomenon lies in the 'logic' of the process of individuation in conditions of insecurity and it is the work of the mechanisms of repression, compensation and projection. The same desire for security which forms the basis of inferiority and lack of self-confidence may lead, if strongly repressed, to an excessive need for self-assertion and superiority. Weakness becomes 'fear of weakness',* and positive tendency to overcome insecurity. In this case, the centre of the personality is formed by what we have previously called the urgent need for self-demonstration. In common language one would say that these people are full of themselves. On the social plane they like to be noticed by others and to enjoy prestige.

The inflated ego personality sets high standards for himself. He worships great personalities and often identifies himself with one of them. Goering, for instance, identified himself with Siegfried. Identification with the *Führer* was a common phenomenon in Nazi youth.

Repressed desire for security can be compensated by a categorical denial of the need for security. In this case, the individual represses any passivity and need for belongingness in life. He exhibits an exceptional, mostly animal, courage and an intense drive for adventure. Anything that gives order to life is regarded as an obstacle to his self-assertion and may form the target for his aggression. The supreme value to him is 'reliance on oneself'. 'Trust your sword rather than the portcullis', as the motto of this chapter says.

3. A weak ego often determines a high degree of integration with the group. This is a means of escaping insecurity and lack of personal initiative. Personalities with a weak ego structure identify themselves for choice with those groups which compensate both for their need for security and for its compensatory drives, the need for power, adventure, and showmanship. Military organizations are a great attraction to these personalities.

4. Strong repression is another important aspect of the process of

*Adorno, T. W., and others: *The Authoritarian Personality*; Harper & Brothers, N.Y., 1950, p. 801.

individuation under conditions of insecurity. The great number of privations and frustrations operating during the process of individuation build up in the structure of the mind strong defence mechanisms of which repression is among the most important.

Common observation shows that repression of the fundamental tendencies often results in an attitude of frugality in life. Yet, when repression is strong—and this is the case in the process of individuation under conditions of insecurity—it may result in a certain indifference to, and even aversion from, a series of fundamental drives—such as food and sex—and the emotional states related to them. This can be manifested under various forms, such as an attitude of superiority towards ‘vulgar pleasure’, or strong aversion, obsessional nausea, and aggression towards people indulging in such pleasures. It might also lead to an ascetic ideal as it did in many Nazi leaders. This last attitude was a common trait in *legionari*, a Rumanian Fascist movement combined with religious revivalism.*

There are two mechanisms which play a predominant part in strongly repressed personalities: A, Reaction-formation and B, Projection.

A. A repressed tendency may turn into its own opposite and seek for satisfaction under this new form. A strongly repressed hostility is often disguised in excessive amiability and politeness; a repressed sexual impulse may appear as abstention; a desire for dirtiness, as an exaggerated cleanliness, etc. Strongly repressed anti-social tendencies—aggressive or narcissistic—may turn into rigorous morality. Loyalty to, and identification with the group, resulting from a strongly repressed anarchic tendency, constitutes a typical reaction formation in Nazi personality.

B. Another mode of acting out a strongly repressed tendency is by projecting it upon others. A repressed immoral wish or desire for dirtiness is projected upon other people who consequently become targets of hatred. Thus the individual not only cleanses himself of dirty intentions and immorality but sees himself as a champion of morality and cleanliness.

The projection upon others of one's own desires which are repressed because they are socially unacceptable, forms the basis of the

*Various recent researches on the structure of authoritarian personality have brought to light rich material regarding this point. Else Frenkel Brunswik in her study of the ‘antisemitic personality’, which, though not identical, has many traits in common with the Nazi personality, shows that at the question ‘What would you like to do most if you had only six months to live?’ very few people holding antisemitic views referred to sensual pleasure. (Else Frenkel Brunswik, R. N. Sanford: ‘Some Personality Factors in Antisemitism,’ *J. of Psychol.*, 1945, 20, pp. 271–91 and *La Personnalité Antisémite*, Les Temps Modernes, 1950, 60, pp. 577–602.

scapegoat mechanism. This is the main concept used by psychoanalysis for the explanation of the antisemitic traits in Nazi Germany and of other forms of national prejudice.

Concerning the structure of Nazi antisemitism many psychoanalytical studies stress the fact that the antisemitic personality in general suffers from strong desires for dirtiness, moral and physical, which, being strongly repressed, are projected upon Jews. Consequently the Jews are hated because they are dirty, licentious in matters of sex, or have lax moral standards in matters of money. A strongly repressed sexual impulse in Hitler and Julius Streicher—to mention two outstanding cases—makes them suffer from an obsession with the rape of Christian girls by Jews.

The value of this thesis is that it stresses the rôle played by repression, as a purely endopsychic process, in national prejudices. It fails, however, to give a clear idea regarding the existence of strong repression mechanisms in the great majority of the members of the German group. This is usually attributed by the representatives of this thesis to the authoritarian methods used by German parents in bringing up their children. For us the origin of repression lies in the nature of the process of individuation under conditions of insecurity, of which the parental attitude towards the child is only one aspect.

Needless to say, the mechanisms of repression and projection do not completely explain the antisemitic attitude in Nazi Germany. A series of cultural factors should be taken into account. The chief of these is the objective difference and conflict between two ethnocentric cultures: German and Jewish.*

5. Individuation in conditions of insecurity constitutes one of the main causes of ambivalent attitudes to life. A strong mechanism of repression is closely connected with this phenomenon.

The most general aspect of ambivalence can be seen in the conflict between the open and the deep layers of personality. At the deep level, one finds immoral tendencies, which are covered, at the manifest level, by moral strictness, charity, ascetic aspirations, etc.; at the deep level, aggression, antisocial and anarchic tendencies, covered, at the manifest level, by strong social feelings, spirit of sacrifice, obsessional preoccupations with order and social constructiveness; at the deep level, insecurity, but at the surface, woolly

*We do not deal in great detail with the antisemitic aspect of Nazism for the simple reason that we are not quite certain whether or not antisemitism should be regarded as a key factor in the structure of authoritarian personality or authoritarian group in the way this idea is presented by T. W. Adorno and others in *The Authoritarian Personality* (N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1950). Antisemitism seems to be a problem of its own, a free-floating psycho-social factor in modern civilization. There have been democratic groups showing antisemitism (France) and authoritarian groups which did not (Soviet Russia and Italian Fascism).

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optimistic ideas. The deep layers of insecurity craving for help and belongingness are, at the manifest level, covered by a high cult of 'discretion', by suspicion towards everybody, and often by a real veneration for the 'unique and strong man'.

PATTERNS OF INDIVIDUATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF INSECURITY

The main trends of the process of individuation in a psychosocial field of insecurity can be described as follows:

1. The individual grows excessively self-centred. The basic formula of this personality type is: 'Nobody loves me . . . I love myself'. The manifestations of this basic formula of individuation are varied. The individual is highly preoccupied with himself, and at the same time has a strong tendency to relate himself to others. His need to be accepted and loved forms a central point in the development of his personality. Social abilities are developed to the maximum in this type of personality. Exactly what these abilities are depends to a great extent on the dominant values of the group. Verbal abilities seem however to rank among the top social abilities in nearly every group. In this sense the individual will show keenness about using the cultural symbols of his own group. But his urgent need for acceptance directs him towards those ideas and that kind of style, written or spoken, which have the highest circulation. The public platform and journalistic writing are among the most adequate means for his ends. He is likely to manifest a marked aversion from heavy and highly elaborated ideologies.

This type of personality possesses a certain degree of psychological insight, but this is limited by the difficulty of making others like and accept him. For, though in contact with others, he is incapable of dialogue. The striving for acceptance by others is seen in a series of other traits of this personality such as amiability, manners, and inclination towards showmanship. In political life, this type of personality manifests remarkable inclinations towards demagoguery and servility; in religion, strong aptitude for pharisaism; in art, preference for formality and grandiloquence. In the economic field, he makes a good 'contact man'. Homosexual trends are often present in this personality, always obsessed with the desire to be loved. This is one of the dominant patterns of individuation in German society during the inter-war period. Goering, von Ribbentrop, Hans Frank, von Schirach are examples of these trends existing in the German culture-pattern. The German group itself showed a strong inclination towards self-centred affection. Nazi nationalism is usually regarded as a case of group narcissism.

2. Individuation under conditions of insecurity might form para-

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noid tendencies in the personality. While in the narcissist, insecurity and the need for acceptance are essentially feminine, being displayed in a prostitute manner, they are essentially masculine in the paranoid. Basic insecurity develops in the individual an excessive need for self-assertion which is discharged aggressively either towards the external world or towards himself. The basic formula of this pattern of individuation is: 'If you do not accept me, I will kill you all, or I will kill myself'. This is but a paraphrase of what Saint-Just once said addressing the enemies of the Revolution, who apparently were the whole French nation minus the members of the Jacobin Club. The process of individuation involves in this case an inner contradiction: the individual's world is sharply divided into two categories: partisans and enemies. The former category embodies the 'security' space of the individual wrapped up in his love and confidence. The latter becomes a symbol of insecurity, attracting to it all the individual's hatred and suspicion. The individual is utterly incapable of an unemotional, rational relation with the world.

Though possessed by a morbid need to be in relationship with others, this type of personality is incapable of being in dialogue. When he dominates or hates, he annihilates the other; when he submits, he annihilates himself.

This type of personality is dictatorial and charismatic in politics, and in religion *visionnaire* and 'possessed'. He displays strong tendencies to Messianic action in every field of life.

Hitler's personality is based on this pattern of individuation. The German group as a whole also shows similar traits, such as strong in-group positive, and strong out-group negative feelings. The 'total war' formula used by Nazism, corresponds to the basic formula of this pattern of individuation: 'If I am not accepted I will kill you all, or I will kill myself'.

3. A third form of the process of individuation in conditions of insecurity can be that of the individual's withdrawal or detachment from the world. The formula is: 'I do not care, I am not responsible, I am in fact nobody'. The personality resulting from this form of individuation displays schizoid tendencies. The individual cuts his emotional ties with the external world to the degree of impassibility. He suffers even more than the two previous types from anti-social tendencies.

A totalitarian society of the Nazi type is fertile ground for such personalities. Their social integration is purely mechanical, for their social behaviour is controlled by the formal principles and discipline of the group, rather than by their actual relationship with others. The authoritarian group cultivate resistance against responsibility and confines their rôles to that of being 'executants' of orders. Gilbert

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describes S.S. Colonel Hoess as an outstanding example of this type of personality. As the commandant of the Auschwitz Extermination Camp he ordered the extermination of more than two million Jews without any obvious emotional participation. Such a personality is completely 'desensitized'. Aggression and crime to him are merely techniques in the execution of the laws of destiny hanging over his head.

The German group as a whole showed schizoid features by its self-centredness, isolation and desensitized aggression.

These are the main trends in the process of individuation under conditions of insecurity. They can be spoken of in terms of psychopathology as narcissistic, paranoid and schizoid trends. It would, however, be advisable to conceive them primarily as vectors existing in the psycho-social field of the process of individuation. The personality structure tends in such circumstances to develop in the directions indicated by these vectors. Even when a particular personality shows no signs of clinical narcissism, paranoia or schizophrenia, he would manifest in some way or other preferences towards modes of life compatible with these. In Germany these preferences were manifested in a great majority of the population primarily by their attachment to, and even identification with, leaders who showed manifest signs of narcissism, paranoia or schizophrenia. These leaders were, so to speak, ideals of individuation.

We are using here the terms narcissism and narcissistic not in a strictly psycho-pathological sense. Narcissism is not a disease at the same level as paranoia or schizophrenia; it is a symptom found in all neuroses and psychoses. The narcissistic personality is not a well-defined type either. The emphasis here is put on modes of individuation. Individuation is a psycho-social term, an intermediate concept between the concepts of individuality and that of social environment. It is meant to designate a series of trends and vectors existing both in the individual and in his social environment. These trends and vectors are attributes of the psycho-social field, i.e., social-economic, cultural and mental conditions of the group which direct the formation of the personality of its individual members.

Though clinically different, these types of individuation have a common basis from the psycho-social point of view. The result of them all is an unethical personality and ultimately an unethical group. Since this formulation seems to contradict one of the fundamental aspects of Nazi personality, the spirit of self-sacrifice, we should like to say a few words on this matter.

We consider the Nazi authoritarian personality as suffering from the incapacity to relate itself to others in terms of inter-communication. His relations with others are not invested with moral values

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such as altruism and objectivity. For the authoritarian personality has a permanent inclination to see *the other* in the function of his basic need for security. He is guided in his relationships by the pressing question: Is the other for or against me? Does he or does he not strengthen my own position in life? This basic need prevents the authoritarian personality from projecting his relationship with others into a set of objective values. 'The others' are good or bad, not because of their intrinsic qualities, or because they fulfil social values. They are good or bad because they are partisans or because they are not.

One often characterizes Nazi authoritarian personality as suffering from split morality in the sense that it shows one moral standard for the in-group and another for the out-groups. This social aspect of authoritarian personality disguises its true nature, that is, its chronic moral crisis. For one of the main characteristics of this personality consists in a total absence of moral standards. Hitler and all Nazi leaders applied essentially the same formula to their relationships with Party members and with outsiders. There were no objective values by which Party members were considered good or bad people. The leader's personal feeling of confidence supplied the only criterion of judgement in this matter. As soon as the leader felt that some members were critical, 'objective', or 'neutral' he would throw them into the enemy camp or liquidate them, no matter whether or not they had a real attachment to the Nazi cause. The test all Party members had to pass was to satisfy the Leader's demand for personal loyalty. 'The laws are valid only because they bear my name', said Hitler to Hans Frank when the latter asked him to give a legal form to the Röhm affair in 1934.*

Even when strongly integrated with the group, this personality finds itself in a state of self-sufficiency. As a narcissist he is self-sufficient because he polishes his own personality with the values of his civilization only to make himself conspicuous and loved; as a paranoid he is incapable of half-way meetings with others, and as a schizoid he is incapable of interest in the external world. This incapacity of being in dialogue—while integrated in the group—forms the main symptom of the moral crisis of Nazi personality. Nazi society can paradoxically be defined as unethical society.†

THE CRISIS OF INDIVIDUATION AND THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

The spirit of conformity carried as far as group identification shows deficiency in the process of individuation. As we have already

*Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

†Raubtier Gesellschaft.

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shown, the Nazi personality is easily inclined to take on stereotyped modes of reaction, and to mould his emotionality according to the pattern of the group, to think with 'official' ideas, to avoid personal responsibility, and on the whole to reduce his behaviour to a few clichés offered by his own group. 'Think for yourself' does not apply in this case.

Deep analysis reveals a certain connexion between insecurity and lack of individuation. According to this view, insecurity is reflected first of all on the emotional pattern of personality. The insecurity produced in the child by his parents' behaviour—mother-separation, negligence, and other factors determining instability in the environment—prevents the child from acquiring a unilinear sense of values in life. The first layer of ambiguity in the world of values is determined by the internalization of the parental figures. For they are internalized as good and bad figures, according to their behaviour, at the same time. The other elements of the environment being themselves in a state of instability cannot help the child to escape from this primary ambivalence. Many psychoanalysts interpret the spirit of conformity and group identification in the authoritarian personality as defences against this fundamental ambivalence. In this way the values of one's own group become the criterion of good and right, while those of the out-group become the criterion of bad and wrong. The basic ambivalence is solved by a rigid distinction between good and bad at the conscious level.

Yet, in spite of all this rigid social integration, the Nazi personality suffers from lack of integration. For the inner integration of this personality is weak. His weak ego, his lack of self-reliance, cause him to form a conventional super-ego. Thus he sticks desperately to conventional opinions because he has neither the initiative nor the courage to form his own; he adheres mechanically to the prejudices of his group because he fears his anti-social and anarchic tendencies; he identifies himself with the group in order to maintain his precarious mental balance. The ideas he holds, the feelings he displays and the prejudices he fanatically defends are shields against himself. They act as external forces and the individual has no power to transform them into an internal structure. The moment an idea becomes his own—not supported by external authority—its sense becomes ambiguous, and consequently the individual would be no longer sure of its validity. That is why this type of personality is afraid to individualize his behaviour.

Part Three

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMUNISM

Par requirre de trop grande franchise
et libertés chet-on en trop grand serveigne.

CHAPTER ONE

The Historical Pattern of Communism

INTRODUCTION

COMMUNISM is 'the revolution' of our time, the reversal of and the substitution for the modern way of life. As such it cannot be confined to an economic change in modern societies, however radical this may be. Recent events have made it sufficiently clear that neither industrialization, nor inner contradictions in the system of production, nor even class struggle, are necessary conditions for the rise and development of Communism. There is, however, a common element at the basis of all Communist movements of today. This is a widespread discontent and anxiety among the members of a community. Communism in the present world is a ready-made formula for such a state of affairs. It contains in itself both efficient techniques for demolishing an old social order, and the idea of a completely new society. Modern Communism embodies in itself efficient sociological, ideological, and psychological techniques of adjustment to periods of social and moral crisis. A brief analysis of the historical context in which modern Communism arose will illustrate these broad assumptions.

THE MEDIUM OF INCUBATION

Communism as an idea of a new society and a new way of life gradually developed during the last century. Its most marked period of formation is that following the Napoleonic wars. Four important sociological elements are fused in its structure: (a) A period of deep social crisis; (b) The rise of the modern proletariat; (c) Strong beliefs in reason and progress; and (d) A democratic type of humanism.

(a) The period between 1830 and 1848 is generally considered to have been productive of revolutions. It was during this period that the optimistic mood of the beginning of the century began to wane; the belief in 'one increasing purpose in history' (Hegel) and in the 'silent revolution' of industrialization could no longer retain their hold upon the mind of the people. On the contrary, the atmosphere was impregnated with discontent, anxiety and revolt. It was almost generally held that the old order, social, political, economic and

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religious, was incapable of satisfying human needs. The history of the intellectual movements of this period can be offered as proof of this.

The same period is marked by a series of deep economic crises. Hunger riots in Germany and France, the potato famine, the commercial and industrial slump of 1847 are but a few aspects of this. 'The hungry forties', as this period is often called, remains even today a typical example of a period of insecurity, anxiety and revolt.

(b) It was during this period that one of the main contradictions of the modern economic system came into the open for the first time, that is, the contradiction between capital and labour. Increased production and plenitude of goods not only failed to bring general prosperity, but even intensified the contrast between the rich and the poor. It became a commonplace to note that the accumulation of wealth and the multiplication of machinery brought concomitant impoverishment of the workers. This is the aspect of the development of the modern economic system which was, and still is, used by those who hold the opinion that contemporary Communism was entirely determined by the economic conditions characteristic of the process of industrialization. Their argument runs as follows. The modern economic system contains in itself features, such as private ownership of the means of production, incentive based on profit-making, accumulation of wealth, etc., which have contributed to the proletarianization of the workers, thus preparing the ground for Communist revolutions. This argument rests, in fact, on a gross oversimplification of the historical context in which Communism arose. Firstly, it is hard to explain the rise and the structure of the modern proletariat in purely economic terms. Secondly, the Communist way of life is not the creation of the modern proletariat in its narrow sense of industrial proletariat.

It is obviously true that the economic crises following the period of the Napoleonic wars had greatly intensified the impoverishment of the workers; it is also true that this was due to certain basic features of the economic system itself. But this alone cannot explain the rise of the modern proletariat, of a group situated at the periphery of society developing sociological and psychological traits of its own. In fact the proletariat is evolved as a result of an over-rationalized system of human relations. This basic feature of modern societies was particularly brought into evidence by the economic difficulties of the period mentioned above. One can see in that situation how, on the one hand, the owners of the means of production behaved as if the entire field of human relations were a matter of rational calculation, and how, on the other hand, the employees, completely separated from the means of production, tended to cut

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off all relations with their employers which could not be expressed in terms of money. As 'wage-earners' their attitude was to regulate their relations with the rest of society according to the objective laws of the market. It was, therefore, only natural that the employers should regard all the elements of the situation created by the crisis from a purely rational point of view. Cuts in the number of employees and wages accompanied other 'rational' measures such as cuts in profits and expenditure, rise in prices, and the acquisition of new markets. The workers were subjected to the same rules as all other elements of the enterprise; they were 'merchandized'.

One should add the fact that the majority of workers were former peasants, or poor townfolk, attracted to industry by the prospects of good pay. They severed all ties with their former environment and integrated themselves with the new society as simple 'employees'. Thus, their wages constituted their only means of subsistence as well as their only tie with society. Unemployment and cuts in wages aroused in them, not only material frustration, but also the state of mind characteristic of an outcast. The workers felt that they did not belong to the society in which they lived. This state of mind lies at the root of the process of proletarianization. In this sense, 'proletarian', or 'proletarian condition' covers a wider sociological and psychological reality than an economically frustrated group. It refers to a number of individuals insufficiently integrated with their society, feeling insecure, isolated and even rejected by their society. Moreover, these individuals associate their employers, and the order supported by them, with a threat to their existence, against which they have to fight.

The beginning of modern working class movements falls within the period mentioned above. They originated in the need felt by the industrial workers to lead an organized action for the protection of their interests. Thus between 1830 and 1850 there took place the first industrial strikes. What is most characteristic of these early movements is not a well-defined conflict between the employees and the employers, but rather the intensity of the workers' revolt and aggression; they regarded all authority and social order as threats to their survival. The uprising of the silk workers in Lyons (1830), for instance, was a desperate rebellion, compared by a journalist of the time (Saint-Marc Girardin) with the barbarian invasions which destroyed Roman civilization. Engels, in his study of the conditions of the working class in England (1844) found the atmosphere heavily laden with the spirit of revolution.

There is one aspect of this complex process which deserves special attention. This is the growth of the self-consciousness of the industrial workers as a 'class'. As class consciousness forms the key

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concept of the last part of this study, we confine ourselves here to outlining the historical context of its birth as follows:—

1. The industrial workers became conscious of themselves as a specific group in a period of social crises of exceptional intensity.

2. They grew conscious of themselves while they were in permanent conflict with the employers' group and with the whole order which they supported. In time, this conflict reached such a degree of intensity that the whole of society was perceived by the workers as an enemy of the working class.

3. At this stage the self-consciousness of the working class underwent a process of inflation; the proletariat became ready for the mission of creating a new society opposed to that of its employers.

This is the right place to clarify the following point: Though the industrial proletariat was ready for the demolition of the old order, Communism, as a way of life, cannot be considered as its creation. The first Communists, the Communists of the 1840s, were intellectuals belonging mainly to the middle classes. The motivation of their thought did not derive from economic frustration, but rather from a general dissatisfaction with the existing order. The Communism of the 1840s was an emotional and intellectual reality, a diffuse state of mind, in which anxiety, revolt, and hope intermingled with the idea, of a new society, the realization of which lay in an indefinite future. Many constituent elements of today's Communism were present, but as ideas only, such as the idea that political revolutions had ended, and that the era of social revolutions had begun, the idea that class conflict was a factor in the historical process, or the idea that mass uprisings were justified by the defects of the liberal system. But it was only later that the industrial workers were linked with these ideas because, as a social group, they were discontented and ready to rebel. The fusion between the discontented intellectuals and the industrial proletariat marked a decisive step in the formation of contemporary Communism.

(c) During the first half of the nineteenth century the belief in the power of human reason was still strong. It was, however, in some ways different from that prevailing in the previous century. One notices, during this period, an increasing stress put on practical reason, or applied science. One of the main trends of the rationalist spirit of the period was represented by the group of the *École Polytechnique* (Saint-Simon, A. Comte) which aimed at the extension of positive science in the field of society. The belief that the application of the rational principles of the human mind will solve the practical problems of life, individual and collective, was one of the main psychological features of the period. 'Control' over production and

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distribution, 'organization of labour', and 'association' were regarded by many people as magic formulas. The idea that things went wrong because the *laissez-faire* system allowed too much scope for spontaneity, as well as the idea that intelligent and conscious planning was the only remedy for this, were in the air.

There is another aspect of this problem worth mentioning on account of its special relevance for the origins of Communism. The rationalistic creed entered upon a critical phase. There was a certain disillusionment concerning the metaphysical rationalism of the Enlightenment and the idealistic panlogism of Hegel. Were not the deep crises of the period clear proof that reason had failed to keep its promise to bring happiness to mankind? This disappointment did not, however, lead to a complete discrediting of reason. For, on the other hand, there was sufficient proof—in the field of the natural sciences, for instance—of the advantages and the progress brought about by a rational way of thinking. Consequently the attitude towards the power of reason seemed to be ambiguous, and this was reflected in the minds of the makers of Communism. For, on the one hand, they believed that only reason could lead mankind to happiness, while, on the other, they knew that simple 'knowledge' of the rational character of human existence, or the 'idea' of this, were not sufficient guarantee that progress led towards a more rational way of life. And as if they mistrusted the power of reason, they wanted to make sure that it kept its promise; they worked out in detail schemes of reason as applied to human life, i.e., certain specific principles of social organization, certain stages in historical evolution—five, at most—which were declared dogmas of human life. Moreover they entrusted a specific social body—the working class—with the execution of the programme of reason. Thus, reason could no longer fail to realize itself.

The psychological aspect of this phenomenon will be analysed at a later stage. For the moment one mentions the obvious fact that both in the ideologues of Communism, and in the industrial proletariat, the insecurity was so deep that only a rational, almost mechanical, demonstration of their final victory could bring the necessary relief. Human reason had thus become an instrument of human will and frustrated feelings. In this lies one of the main sources of Communist dogma and of the totalitarian way of life in general.

(d) Towards the mid nineteenth century, the belief in democracy reached a peak. Democracy was on everyone's lips. Democracy was the 'sovereign and universal word which all parties invoke, all seek to appropriate as a talisman', wrote Guizot in 1849.* Reverence for the people or for humanity *en masse* and a certain mistrust and

* *Democracy in France*, January, 1849, N.Y., p. 10.

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hatred of the bourgeoisie could be found nearly everywhere. The future was for the many and the poor.

All these feelings and ideas are reflected in the minds of the makers of Communism. But in this respect too, Communism is the result of a critical stage in the democratic belief in the masses. The moment of crisis was brought about by the democratic revolutions of 1848. The relatively poor results of these revolutions were taken as proof that the masses were not conscious of their power, and certainly not determined enough to lead an organized struggle for their rights. Hence the necessity for organization and leadership for the masses. This is the stage in the democratization of European societies which crystallizes in Communism. For the makers of Communism are possessed by a strong belief in the future of the masses, but this future can be made a reality only if the masses are led by an *avant-garde*, i.e., only if the masses are dominated by a few.

In conclusion, one can describe Communism as a new form of adjustment created by individuals and groups in a period of intense social crisis, in a culture-pattern where the belief in reason and the cult of the masses are dominant traits. In this brief description one can easily grasp the basic contradictions of the Communist way of life. The people who created it were strongly emotional; they suffered more than other members of their community from the feeling of insecurity. But, in spite of this, they sought the solution of their own problems at a purely rational level. Thus their basic insecurity became alleviated by a style of life rigidly organized by reason. This basic contradiction between emotionality and reason is clearly reflected in the Communists' attitude towards nature, society, and authority in particular. Communism was also created in a period in which the cult of the masses was at its height, but the masses' lack of political experience made the need for their organization and leadership strongly felt.

These are the main forces in the social and psychological field of the mid nineteenth century which have gradually become articulated in the structure of Communism at new historical levels, and in new geographical settings. The articulation at the ideological level comes first historically.

THE IDEOLOGICAL ARTICULATION OF COMMUNISM

In the treatment of Communist ideology we have to confine ourselves to that system of philosophical, political, and economic thought known as Marxism-Leninism. Knowing the social and psychological field in which this system crystallized, it is not surprising to notice that the ideas of 'struggle', 'contradiction', and 'opposition' occupy the key position in its structure. At the very foundation of this

ideology lies the attitude of opposition to, and revolt against, modern European civilization; its first aim is to 'demolish' this civilization and to build up a substitute for it. Consequently, concepts such as 'materialism', 'objectivism', 'dialectics', 'scientific', 'class struggle', etc., gain full meaning only as opposed to idealism, subjectivism, dogmatism-staticism, metaphysicism and individualism which are, according to Marx, the main evils of modern thought.

It is convenient to distinguish two aspects of the Marxist system: A, Dialectical materialism, and B, Historical materialism.

A. Dialectical materialism is the explanation of the world through dialectical logic. It is a method of understanding as well as a general conception of the world. The fundamental principles of dialectical materialism are firstly, constitutive forms of the external world, and then, categories of the mind. They are as follows:—

1. The priority of matter in the world constitutes the first principle. By this principle Marx reverses Hegel's idealistic position in metaphysics. For, according to Marx, life, mind, consciousness, and ideas in general are but attributes of matter. Engels goes as far as to express the hope that it will be possible in the future to demonstrate how life was created from the inorganic, hence how consciousness appeared.* Lenin makes in his *Empirio-Criticism* an attempt to prove that matter exists before, independently, and outside consciousness.

The principle of the materiality of the world, though fundamental for the doctrine of dialectical materialism, is not clearly worked out. The main difficulty lies in the fact that Marxists approach this essentially metaphysical problem in an anti-metaphysical manner. Thus, they come up against serious difficulties when trying to give a definition to the concept of matter. For Lenin, the only specific quality of matter is that of 'objective reality'. 'Matter is a philosophical category serving to show the objective reality given to man by his sensations, which copy, photograph, and reflect it, without its existence being subordinated to them'.† Later, Deborin seems to slip slowly into an idealist position, when conceiving the essence of matter as 'the sum of mediations, i.e., relationships and links'. Mitin believes that this difficulty is solved if matter is defined as '... the whole world existing independently of us'. He seems not to realize that the ideas of other people are included in his definition of matter.

In the Soviet culture-pattern the principle of the priority of matter is in fact reduced to a practical attitude towards life. This is expressed in the belief that a change in the material (economic) conditions of life entails a change in the whole of society.

* *Anti-Dühring*, French transl., Paris, 1946, p. 99.

† *Empirio-Criticism*, French transl., Œuvres Complètes, Ed. Soc., Paris, Vol. XIII, p. 97. English transl. in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, London, Lawrence and Wishart.

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2. The second principle of dialectical materialism is the principle of the whole, or the integralist principle. According to the doctrine of dialectical materialism, nature and the world as such constitutes an organized whole in which things and events are in dynamic inter-connexion.

Recently the integralist principle has been re-formulated in the principle of 'partisanship' which constitutes one of the guiding ideas of the Soviet culture-pattern. The root of the concept of 'partisanship' can be found in Marx's conception of the class character of human thought and action. Lenin takes a step farther in this direction when considering the Party, and not the working class as a whole, as the true expression of a Communist society. But the concept of 'partisanship' has only recently been recognized as one of the dominant ideas of Soviet culture. This was done by A. Zhdanov in 1947.* According to the principle of 'partisanship' every fundamental idea, scientific or philosophical, should involve in itself the conditions of Soviet society as these are seen at a given moment from a central point of view. This central point of view is the Party, or rather, the leadership of the Party. The full meaning of an idea can be grasped only after it has been completely integrated in the structure of Soviet society as represented by the Party. Pokrovsky's and Marx's ideas, for instance, were true and objective within a social structure thoroughly engaged in the struggle against the *bourgeois residuum* characteristic of the early Soviet society. After that, their meaning was lost. Zhdanov himself criticizes G. Alexandrov's book, *The History of Western Philosophy*, by accusing the author of having become infected with the 'objectivist' spirit of bourgeois schools, and having forgotten class warfare and the Party outlook in his consideration of Western philosophical thought. The fact that Alexandrov allows to Hegelian philosophy its progressive aspects is, for Zhdanov, a fallacy for the specific reason that this weakens the class consciousness of Soviet youth and undermines Party vigilance. Hence class and Party conditions force Alexandrov to 'assert that Marx found nothing progressive in the whole bourgeois philosophy and that it was he who built up everything from the very beginning.

It is important to stress that the whole to which the integralist principle refers is not of a theoretical character. Western students of Communism often make the mistake of judging the validity of a Communist idea according to its consistency with the theoretical system of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. It is in fact not the theoretical whole to which knowledge is referred, but the empirical, practical, and above all political, whole. Thus it would not be absurd to learn

**Problems of Philosophy*, No. 1, Moscow, 1947.

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that Soviet philosophers cannot give a proper definition to the concept of 'totality', unless Soviet agriculture is fully mechanized. It is noticeable that the discussion of 'possibility' and 'reality', as categories of matter, broke out in the middle of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. More stress on 'possibility' was Trotskyism, while more stress on 'reality' was Stalinism. This concrete-integralist meaning of any concept should never be overlooked when judging the truth, or objectivity, of Communist ideas.

3. The principle of contradiction, or the power of the negative is the third principle of dialectical materialism. Its clearest formulation to our knowledge, is given by Lenin in his *Philosophical Notebooks*. A 'unity of opposites' lies, according to Lenin, at the basis of everything and every event. Every form of manifestation or affirmation is possible only at the expense of a form of repression and negation. But, at certain moments, the repressed and negated part of things and events wins over the manifest part, and consequently things and events turn into their own opposites. This process constitutes the main form and source of change and evolution in the world, material or spiritual. In the social plane any domination by a class involves the repression (oppression) of others. Change and progress in the structure of society occur when the oppressed classes overthrow the ruling ones and organize the whole of society according to their own way of life. Class struggle is therefore the source and the mechanism of progress in society.

The same principle is re-formulated at the present level of the evolution of Soviet society by Zhdanov. Since Communist society is a classless society the source of social progress can no longer lie in the class struggle. According to Zhdanov the process of class struggle is replaced in Communist society by the practice of criticism and self-criticism. By the practice of criticism and self-criticism the Party becomes aware of the existence within itself of two contradictory positions, or groups of factors; the 'old' and the 'new', the regressive and progressive. Thus progress is due to the struggle between the 'old' and the 'new', i.e., to the Party ability to supersede the old forms of life.

4. The principle of evolution is the fourth principle of dialectical materialism. Two important aspects of the Marxian concept of evolution are of a particular interest. 1. Matter—the material aspect of every form of existence—constitutes the source of transformation. Social and mental forms of life are but reflections of material changes. We can call this an infrastructural explanation of evolution. This mode of explaining the process of evolution has a deep meaning in Communist societies. It means, first of all, that any process of change takes place upwards, i.e., it starts in the basic strata of reality,

i. e., in the material condition of society. 2. Change and transformation are dialectical. This means that change in nature and society cannot be conceived as continuous lines, but a system of dialectical leaps. A form of life does not develop by a natural process of growth, for at a certain moment it becomes superseded by another form, and thus, a new level in the evolution of life appears. Consequently, the contradiction and struggle between the forms of reality constitute the principle of change. This reveals the revolutionary conception of change underlying Communist thought and action.

B. Historical materialism consists of the application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the historical process. Thus, in accordance with the principle of the priority of matter, the doctrine of historical materialism stresses the idea that the economic factor lies at the basis of human society and civilization. By economic factor, or economic activity, Marx understands mainly the system of ownership of the means of production. Thus the system of ownership forms the 'infra-structure' of society, while human social, political and cultural forms constitute a 'super-structure'. The changes taking place in human society and civilization are in essence determined by the changes in the structure of human economic activity. For Marx there are five fundamental stages corresponding to five economic systems: 1. Primitive Communism, 2. Slave society, 3. Feudalism, 4. Capitalism, and 5. Communism. The evolution—or better, the revolution—from one to another occurred in a dialectical manner, i. e., by the development of the inner contradictions existing in each social and economic structure. The negated social forms, the oppressed social classes, grew out of their own society. At a certain moment in their development, they were able to impose their own way of life upon the rest of society, and thus to create a new stage in the historical evolution of mankind. Therefore the class struggle forms the fundamental condition of the historical process.

The last stage in the class struggle is described by Marx and Lenin as the struggle between the bourgeoisie and working class. Marx displays on this point a magnificent dialectical skill and an acute sense of tragedy which reminds us in many ways of the adolescent playwright in him. He describes the rise of the modern proletariat as the result of the inner contradiction and of the power of the negative in modern industrial society. The proletariat is the product—the son—of modern Capitalism. But capitalists, as the typical representatives of the dominant classes in modern society, are at the same time described as the oppressors and therefore the negation of the proletariat. This process of negation reaches a dramatic stage when the proletariat is robbed of its human quality and becomes simple

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merchandise. By this the value of a worker, as a man, is completely dominated by the value of his work on the market.

The struggle and the victory of the proletariat is regarded by Marx as the 'negation of the negation', as the 'expropriation of the expropriators' the result of which is the overthrow of the capitalist stage in human society and the coming of its opposite, Communist society. To oppose the society from which it has sprung up, constitutes in fact the first condition of the rise of the proletariat. Thus, while the bourgeois society is a class society, Communist society is classless; while the nation State forms the characteristic of the former, the latter is international, and so forth.

We should like to end the description of the ideological factors of Communism by mentioning Lenin's contribution to its political aspect. This concerns the nature of historical evolution. Some of Marx's interpreters held the view that since the principles of Dialectical Materialism lie in the nature of matter, historical evolution leads by itself to its final end, Communism. This way of thinking was known as 'mechanicism' or 'economism' and became a central idea of Social Democracy. The ideas of class struggle and revolution play a secondary part in this conception of the historical process. Against this interpretation Lenin stresses the active rôle played by the working class in the evolution of mankind. According to him the historical process, though based on objective laws, must be 'helped' by the conscious action of the working class organized by the Party. The relation between the working class and the Party is 'dialectical', i.e., a relation of opposition and mutual conditioning.

CHAPTER TWO

The Political Articulation of Communism

The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. For party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good; they are formed in defiance of laws, from self-interest.

THUCYDIDES

THE PARTY

THE Party is the totalitarian reality in a Communist society. It is 'the whole', as Lenin calls it—the society itself becoming conscious of its unity. In the Soviet Union, the Party is referred to as 'the organizing and guiding force of the Government', 'the heart and the brain of the people', 'the guide and the teacher of the workers'. The Party can, at the same time, be conceived as an organism in its own right, a *corpus mysticum* of any Communist society.

In what follows we shall mark the main stages in the development of those political organizations which have finally crystallized in a Communist party of the Bolshevik type. Our attention is primarily concentrated on the gradual articulation of class consciousness into a specific political body. This will prepare a certain basis for the psychological considerations following at a later stage.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE PARTY

The fact that the Party has grown up as a political expression of the working class tells relatively little about its structure and particularly about its tactics and programmes. The working class is merely the raw material from which the Party is forged. For it is only a small section, the most 'conscious' elements, or the *avant-garde* of the working class which acts decisively upon the structure of the Party. Therefore, the process of becoming conscious of the proletarian condition of one's own class constitutes a basic factor in the rise of the Party. This process implies in fact something much more than the spontaneous development of the industrial workers within the historical conditions of the last century, or of the Russian working class during the first decades of our century. It implies the damming up of a wide and diffuse historical process whose main

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stages can be outlined as follows: 1. The growth of the social importance of the industrial workers, which is a natural implication of industrialization. 2. The formation within the group of industrial workers of an upper stratum which used their 'organizing' and political activities as a means to rise in the social scale, and thus to escape the condition of manual workers. Their main ambition was to become 'leaders' within their own group. 3. The blend of this group of workers with middle-class intellectuals. 4. This was followed by the indoctrination of the industrial workers with a particular ideology, and by the development from within this group of a specific type of leadership, in which religious-messianic elements are intermingled with concrete political action. All this amounts to the 'transfiguration' of the working class.

The first step in the building up of the Communist Party consisted in the transformation of the passive nihilism and anarchic mood which was, towards the mid nineteenth century, a basic attitude of the industrial workers towards their society. In psychological terms this meant the transformation of a negative into a positive attitude. The early workers' movements, whether they were led by socialists, communists, or anarchists, were guided either by a mystic faith in their final victory, or by a purely anarchic drive. For the Blanquists there was no precise plane leading to socialism; all that was needed was a mystic faith in the outcome of a victory of the proletariat. Bakunin himself, though a typical representative of a combative anarchism, had no clear idea about the social meaning of anarchic action. He disapproved of Marx's attempt to impose upon the workers a Prussian type of organization. The Proudhonist and Bakuninist workers were against the use of strikes and against the organization of the working class, even when these were initiated by recognized working-class authorities (The First International.) On the whole, it would be adequate to describe this type of anarchism as regressive in a social sense, that is, as the individual's revolt against the super-rational type of integration required by industrial society. It might be that at the root of their revolt lay the golden era of a primitive society described by ideologues like Rousseau.

Marx was not alone in realizing the reactionary and regressive frame of mind of the industrial workers during the first half of the last century. Nor was he alone in demonstrating the necessity for workers' organizations against the employers and their society. He was, however, amongst the first who understood that this struggle could not be conducted on the basis of compromise and gradual improvements, but on the basis of revolutionary action; only revolution could satisfy the workers' desperate revolt. The meaning of revolution was, in Marx's mind, equal to social cataclysm. Workers

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have nothing of their own to secure and fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurance of, individual property'.*

Certain traits of Marx's personality explain the direction in which he interpreted the workers' state of mind. By his origins, and particularly by his personality structure, he was detached enough from his society to see a positive meaning in the workers' revolt. Moreover, he took the trouble to justify it. But what was important in his thought was not the justification of the proletariat's attitude in causal, but in teleological terms. The proletariat was right in its boycott of modern society, because it could create its own society; it was the treasurer of a new world. In this Marx was much more systematic and convincing than most political thinkers of his time. Knowing the depth of the proletariat's frustration and revolt he grasped the truth that the quickest relief would be brought by a mathematical demonstration of the proletariat's victory rather than by vague and partial promises. Consequently he started to work out the proletariat's need for victory and its Messianic feelings into a rational system. He and Engels produced the scheme of the proletariat's mission, indicating the 'necessary' stages in the evolution of human society and synchronizing all this process with the innermost wishes of the proletariat, i.e., total victory. At the same time they stressed the need for unity and struggle in the working class. Most important is their language, which is hortatory rather than explanatory.

Thus, the mind of the proletariat became gradually infused with a certain clear purpose—a new society—and with precise methods of achieving it. Its passive and destructive nihilism began to turn into a constructive attitude towards human history. This state of mind formed a basic factor leading to the formation of a new type of political party. This was a class party, less interested in society as a whole than in the fulfilment of a pre-established programme of evolution of the working class; less interested in progressive measures than in total revolution, and less interested in the present than in the future.

When Lenin, at the beginning of this century, built up the first party of a 'new type' he based his action on these mental traits created in the proletariat by its own position in modern society, and by a series of ideologies instilled into the working class by various groups of intellectuals which had in common with the working class a deep revolt against the order of their society.

The party organized by Lenin has a class character only from the ideological point of view. Lenin had to choose between two extreme

**Communist Manifesto*, London, The Communist Party, 1948, p. 11.

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possibilities regarding the political action of the proletariat: courageous and revolutionary action carried out by isolated individuals, or slow action carried out by the working class as a whole in its 'spontaneous' development towards a dominant political rôle. He solved this dilemma by creating the Party as a synthesis between these two extremes. The Party is conceived by Lenin as the organ of the most active and determined elements of the whole of society, united by their resentment against the existing social order, and by their belief in the historical mission of the proletariat. On this point Lenin writes: 'We must have our men everywhere, in all social strata, in all positions which allow a knowledge of the resources and the mechanisms of the State'.* It is obvious that Lenin includes in his call also '... a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole'.†

What Lenin wants most is a stable organization, at least a stable leadership composed of people trained in class struggle. He asks for full-time revolutionaries who should stop working in factories and live at the expense of the organization, 'people whose profession consists in revolutionary action'.‡

Here comes an important point. The party conceived by Lenin, though the party of the working class, consists of professional revolutionaries who have become conscious of the historical mission of the proletariat. This historical mission of the proletariat is in fact an idea existing in their minds for which there was no immediate need to consult the working class as a social body. Thus the Party is from the outset *for*, but not necessarily *of* the working class. It forms an advanced detachment in the struggle of the working class for its historical fulfilment.

Who formed the basis of the Party? To answer this question, one has to go back to the concept of sociopathic personality and to apply it in this specific context. The *avant-garde* of the working class is, made up of people who, for one reason or another, failed to integrate themselves with their society. The *déclassés* in a broad sense, or the 'disinherited', form the body of élite of the *avant-garde*. Though the feeling of disinheritance is wide-spread in the group of industrial workers, adherence to the Party cannot be considered as being decided by the simple fact of belonging to this group. This adherence is rather a personal matter, being related to the particular way in which the feeling of disinheritance is experienced from case to case. Those individuals, belonging to the proletariat or to other

*Lenin quoted by J. Monnerot: *Sociologie du Communisme*, Paris, p. 40.

†*Manifesto*, quot. Ed. p. 11.

‡Lenin, quot. by Monnerot, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

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social groups, who could find a social substitute for their feeling of disinheritance, and a positive meaning for their resentment against their society formed the basic strata of the Party. The 'idea' rather than the reality of the proletariat provided a strong bond between these people, and at the same time, an efficient remedy for their personal feelings of disinheritance. This shows an important trait in the individuals attracted to the party 'of a new type'. They had an outstanding capacity for socializing their personal resentment; the drive to form a group of their own in order to provide better conditions for the solution of their personal problems was a common trait among them. They claimed that the new type of social group resulting from their unity belonged to the working class. But, at the same time, they stressed the uniqueness of their group by distinguishing themselves from two categories of workers, who together constituted by far the majority of the working class, that is, the workers who accepted passively their proletarian condition, whom they scornfully called *Lumpenproletariat*, and the workers who deserted their class by integration with the bourgeois society, called 'opportunists'.

Once socialized, the resentment of the above-mentioned people grew in intensity. The fact that they formed a group of their own contributed to their complete detachment from their society, and intensified in them the belief in their aims and ideas. The ideology of the group—the Party ideology—was to them not only a body of ideas but the protective shell of their own lives; outside it, they could perceive nothing but hatred and danger.

What has been said so far suggests the idea—which can be proved by the examination of most of the Communist Parties of today—that the basis of the party 'of a new type' is not made up of people who belong to the working class, or to any other class, but by people *who do not belong*. It is not the reality of belongingness, but the desire for belongingness that constitutes the driving force of the Party. It is not the industrial workers as an integrated group that prepare the ground for a totalitarian organization crystallized in the Party, but rather their desires for belongingness, unity, and social strength. In other words, it is the incapacity of modern society to integrate its members in its own structure that constitutes the first condition in the rise of contemporary totalitarian societies. Therefore the foundation of the Party is made up by those products of modern society, individuals and groups, which over-socialize their anxiety for belongingness and integration. Those who form the core of the Party are people who, because of a long period of insecurity, live under the pressure of a strong desire for a radical change in themselves and in their society. In Lenin's opinion, whoever joins the

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Party undergoes a process of transfiguration. One meaning of this is the following: He who is weak becomes strong, he who is alone becomes a 'comrade', he who is insecure becomes ruthless and dogmatic.

THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER WITHIN THE PARTY

Marx and Engels point out that Communists are 'in their practice the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties'.* On the other hand they make it quite clear that the Communist party takes the power from the proletariat, and that in a Communist society all the power should be in the hands of the proletariat. But the relationship between the Party and the proletariat, i.e., how the Party gets and maintains power, constitutes for a certain period a confusing point in the evolution of contemporary Communist society. The Party is an *avant-garde*, and as such it works out the 'line' of the proletariat's political action. But does it take the 'line' from the proletarian masses, does it rely on their spontaneity, or does it create this line in its headquarters? Lenin is obviously against the spontaneity of the masses, for the masses need a brain and that brain is the Party. But he cannot solve unambiguously the relationship between the Party and the masses. The problem is solved later in the practical field in the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin.

In his writings Trotsky gives the impression that had it not been for the appearance of a particular type of personality in the foreground of the Party, the prototype of which is Stalin, the rôle of the Party in Russian Communist society would have been different. In other words, the concentration of power in the hands of a few top leaders, or the personal dictatorship of one leader, would have been avoided.

This is in fact an academic argument. Bearing in mind the historical conditions—certain psychological factors being here included—in which Lenin created the party 'of a new type', one can readily notice that the mechanism of power and the position of the Party in Communist society are decided *in nuce*. Lenin's Party is in the first place the organization of those individuals and groups who are sociologically and psychologically at the periphery, of, or completely outside, society. The Party rises as a form of socialization of the insecurity, resentment, and the desire for belongingness prevailing in the mind of these individuals and groups. Moreover, Lenin's Party is the meeting point of a series of strong conflicts existing within modern Russian society. All this points to the psychological conclusion that only a strong authoritarian organization could completely satisfy these types of men and groups, and that only an

**Manifesto*, Quot. Ed.p. 13.

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organization of a military type could adequately serve their cause. The main qualities which made one eligible for such an organization were determination, ruthlessness, need for domination and destruction. As we shall see later, Stalin represented at its best the type of man required. His victory is therefore written in the birth certificate of the party 'of a new type'. In this sense, the opinion that Stalin is the creation of the Party, the first new man, seems to carry considerable weight.

By itself the structure of the Party decided that the holders of power should quickly be reduced to smaller and smaller groups. Thus, during the revolutionary period, the Bolshevick Party had quickly assumed all the power for itself by banishing all other parties. Within the Party, the power was concentrated in the hands of a Central Committee, consisting, during 1917-19, of no more than twenty members. In the first stage of the revolution the Committee itself became dominated by six powerful individuals: Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Stalin. Within the Central Committee there were two organizations: The Politburo—formed in 1917—and the *Orgburo* (organizational bureau), formed in 1919. They represented in fact two influential groups. In 1922 there came into being the Secretariat of the Committee placed at the very top of the pyramid of power. Stalin was elected to the Secretariat in 1922, becoming, within a few years, the indisputable leader of the Party.

In what follows, we shall describe two mechanisms of the concentration of power characteristic of the Party 'of a new type': A. Bureaucratization and B. Bolshevization.

A. The practice of class struggle in Russia increased the prestige of the Workers' Committees. The main reason for this lies in the skilful propaganda these committees made for themselves. Any important success was normally attributed to the 'excellent' leadership, and any failure to the recalcitrance of the masses or to the 'criminal' action of the class enemy. These committees—functioning clandestinely—were constituted mainly of professional revolutionaries, who, through long practice, became experts in the technique of organization. Throughout the conspiratorial period the meetings of these committees were held in secret—even today the meetings of the Communist committees take place preferably during the night—and their decisions were communicated to the rank and file as a fixed line of action. One of the main points in the activity of these committees was that their decisions had to be based on 'unanimity'. A split in Committee was regarded as one of the most dangerous things for the political action of the proletariat. Majorities were not enough, for the resentment of the minority might have resulted in

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a definite split, and finally, in the collapse of the whole organization. These conditions regarding the functioning of such a committee determined its monolithic structure as well as its liability to fall under the exclusive domination of one of its members, usually the secretary.

This mode of functioning and organization remained typical for the Party even after the conspiratorial period was over. The professional revolutionaries, the technicians of political action, formed the Party committees in Soviet Russia, and in any other Communist societies. They took decisions, insisting always on unanimous consent, which decisions were consequently communicated to the Party as its own line. The rise in the hierarchy of the Party of those who were skilful in committee work, i.e., of the *comitards*, was thereby assured.

Stalin's gifts were first of all those of a *comitard* and of a technician of insurrection. His capacity to communicate with the masses was very limited, and it was in any case by far outweighed by his ability to pull the strings in a committee, in order to assure unanimity for his point of view. His success within the Party was obviously based on shrewdness, and innumerable machinations, all of them justified by the same principle, the necessity of unity in action. 'Unity of view in programme, tactics and organization forms the basis on which our party is being built. If the unity of view crumbles, the party, too, crumbles'.*

Krupskaya—Lenin's wife and secretary—obviously referring to Stalin, writes: 'The *comitard* was a man of self-assurance; he was aware of the enormous influence of the Committee upon the masses; in principle he did not allow any democracy within the party'.†

B. A definition of the process of Bolshevization is by no means easy to formulate. To start with, this process can be conceived as something similar to the radicalization of a political organization, i.e., the taking over of the key positions by those members who hold extremist views on the specific line of their own organization. This is naturally followed by the elimination of those members who manifest readiness towards compromise with other organizations. One can speak of an 'acute' and a 'chronic' aspect of Bolshevization existing in every Communist party. The periodical purges refer to the former aspect. As a result of a purge there are eliminated from the Party firstly, all those leaders who cannot show enough flexibility to accept the official line of the Secretariat. At the same time, there are also eliminated those Party members who are potentially in conflict with

*Stalin quoted by Deutscher, *I. Stalin, a political biography*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1949, p. 59.

†*Souvenirs sur Lenine*, p. 174, English Ed., p. 93.

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the official line, as a whole, or with some of its points. These are people who were accepted in the Party on tactical grounds, or as a matter of political expediency. The Social Democrats, for instance, were incorporated with the Party mainly on such grounds, and were subsequently purged by degrees. In France and Italy, many peasants joined the Communist parties on account of their desire for large-scale land-reform, or on various other grounds, none of them belonging to the specific political programmes of a Communist party. Most of these peasants are far from being Communists. Yet they are kept on the membership lists for the simple reason that the Communist parties in France and Italy need action, for the time being, on a large basis. A turn in the line of these parties might result, at any moment in their elimination and consequently in the reduction in the membership list to those who joined the Party unconditionally. There are phases in which the Party closes its doors, shutting out all members accepted under the title of 'relatives', 'friends', or 'guests'. During such periods the Party is no longer 'a hospitable patriarchal family, welcoming any sympathizer in its midst' but '. . . a fortress, the doors of which will be opened only to the worthy'.*

One can speak, as we have said, about a chronic process of Bolshevization. Any turning in the party line produces its victims. The result of this is that the members who identify themselves with the line, who are always where the Party is, rise gradually in the hierarchy of the Party and become its leaders. Thus, the power concentrates in the hands of those who display the greatest capacity for discipline, the greatest determination in carrying out the orders, and who are ready to sacrifice everything for the unity of the Party. The Party becomes in this way a perfect medium for the exercise of absolute power by a leading group or by a personal leader.

In order to complete the meaning of the phenomenon of Bolshevization we find it necessary to look at it from a purely psychological point of view. What happens when a Party member becomes a 'Bolshevik'? How can we define this particular type of man?

Combativeness is perhaps the most outstanding mental trait of a Bolshevik. This does not necessarily imply that he is a quarrelsome man or an hysterical aggressive. On the contrary, a Bolshevik gives the impression of being self-possessed and inhibited. His combativeness is socialized in an almost military manner; it is displayed, not at individual, but at group level. When the Party gives the signal for attack, defining the target at the same time, the Bolshevik becomes automatically aggressive. Thus the Bolshevik, though giving the

*Stalin quoted by Deutscher, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

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impression of self-possession, is always ready for attack, always in search of an enemy. Once the enemy is identified and the attack unleashed the Bolshevik becomes ruthless in the extreme.

It is precisely the lack of combativeness and ruthlessness that Russian Communists object to in the Western Communists, and it is the combative and ruthless type of man that they try to create the world over, through the process of Bolshevization. They are aware of the difficulty of this task, for they often notice the regrettable fact that, in the West, not even the Party leaders are Bolsheviks, i.e., true Communists. Stalin called Togliatti 'a professor who could write a good article, but did not know how to rally the people and to lead them to a goal'. Of Thorez he said; 'Even a dog which does not bite, bares its teeth when it wants to frighten someone. Thorez cannot even do that much'.* Here Stalin obviously touches upon the main point regarding the personality of a Bolshevik. For the Bolshevik is a man living permanently under the need to bite. It should only be added that he barks very little. This is a point which differentiates him from a Fascist.

I myself was surprised how far the Western Communists differ from the true Bolshevik type. Between 1946 and 1948 I had the opportunity of knowing some of the Western Communist leaders, and being previously well acquainted with the Bolshevik type prevailing in the Russian Party, I could hardly help feeling that, with very few exceptions, all these leaders were in danger of being 'purged'. And I would not be surprised in the least to see this happening as soon as the Western Parties undergo a true process of Bolshevization.†

Needless to say, not all the members of the Russian Party are Bolsheviks to the same degree. During my participation in the Paris Peace Conference (1946) I was often under the impression that Vishinsky's aggression and combativity were not exactly of a Bolshevik type. Too often and too quickly he flared up into a rage as if everything was to him a personal matter, and often I really expected him to let slip the word 'I', a fatal word for every Bolshevik. On the other hand, Molotov's combativeness, dull, even, and conveying the feeling that there was no retreat, was in itself of a much more Bolshevik type. This can hardly be surprising, knowing that Molotov grew up as a Bolshevik, while Vishinsky, a bourgeois lawyer, joined the Party late in life.

*From Stalin's conversations with a group of Yugoslav Communists, Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1953, p. 283.

†My impressions were strengthened by the observation made by the leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party about various Western Communists who visited Rumania during that period. Their 'joviality' and their incapacity to 'bare their teeth' was a shock to the Rumanian Communists, who were by then thoroughly Bolshevized.

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COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM

The Communist Bolshevik Party has been built up as the political articulation of the modern proletariat. It has gradually moulded its inner structure in the function of an ideology. Mistrusting the 'spontaneity' of the proletariat, the Party has detached itself from the masses and become exclusive possessor of the idea of a new society completely opposed to modern democracy. In Russia first, and then in various other countries, this image of society has been enforced upon the existing society. Thus, one can say that, at the present stage, Communist societies are the product of an idea. The Party moulds the individual and his society according to an idea which comprises in itself the present and the future possibilities of man. This idea of society would sooner or later suppress every empirically constituted and naturally-grown form of society. State, nation, family would 'wither away', and even the Party itself, for the Party will become 'the whole'. Thus, human history would become the field of technology; instead of a 'natural' there would be a 'manufactured' society, a society machine.

The proletarian ideology rose and spread as the imagery of a series of traumatic experiences characteristic of the modern proletariat, of Marx, and of the Russian people. It bore in many respects the mark of 'dreamlikeness' and escape from unsatisfactory conditions of life combined with the hope for absolute happiness. And yet this can hardly be called an escape into unreality. The psychological concept of 'reality-fantasy' has a relative meaning on the social plane. In the last century, European society was continually fostering the proletariat's imagery, introducing new contents into it, so that today this imagery, this artificial growth, takes the form of reality. In the meantime the delirious self-consciousness of the proletariat has adjusted itself to its own imageries, creating in this way a new type of mental balance and a new sense of reality. Individuals born and grown up in a Communist society have no other sense of reality, except that which allows them a satisfactory adjustment to the social world created after the proletarian ideology. Any other type of adjustment seems to be unreal.

CHAPTER THREE

Russia and Communism

Having ideas in one's head which can never be applied is a torture, a terrible torture.

N. KATKOV

INTRODUCTION

THE outburst and the success of the Communist Revolution in Russia is a surprise for many people even today. The main reason for this is that the economic conditions of this country were not ripe enough at the time when this event took place. We see, however, in this phenomenon an undeniable proof that Communism is not simply an industrial revolution, but rather the total negation of Western civilization. Marx was obsessively inclined to turn the existing order 'upside down', and he grasped and fostered the same inclination in the working movements of his time. When he learned that his ideas had fallen on good ground in nineteenth century Russia, and that certain aspects of Russian rural economy supported a communist system of ownership, he considered the possibility of revising some important points in his system of thought so as to fit it into the structure of an agricultural society.*

If one accepts the view that Communism is the revolution of modern society, the explosion of a series of tensions existing in that society, then one can look at the modern Russian culture as a characteristic, almost unique, centre of tensions, and consequently infer that it was good ground for this revolution. We have, however, to recognize that, considering the variety of problems involved in the study of Russian society and culture, we can hardly do justice to this part of our study. Our present aim is to show how a series of tensions existing in this society had produced in many generations

*The view that Marx was ready to revise his opinion regarding the rôle of the industrial proletariat, and to create a theory about the historical mission of the peasantry is based mainly on Marx's correspondence with the Russian populist, Vera Zasulich. Marx was asked by Vera Zasulich whether, in his opinion, Russia could skip the capitalist stage of evolution, on account of certain features in her system of land ownership. Marx's answer to this question has been differently interpreted. Wetter, analysing the text of both letters, is inclined to think that the answer is in the affirmative (*Il Materialismo Dialettico Sovietico* 1947 p. 86). It should be added perhaps that the answer was a diplomatic 'yes', but none the less positive.

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of Russians a negative attitude towards modern European society, and the desire to create another form of society completely opposed to this. In other words, our present aim is to outline the social and psychological field in which the birth of the Bolshevik type of personality took place.

CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO CULTURES

An important characteristic of modern Russia is the specific position of the ruling strata within Russian society as a whole. One notices in the ruling groups a strong tendency to identify themselves with the civilization of Western Europe which had little in common with the native civilization of Russia. Thus the tension between the ruling groups and the masses, naturally existing in an absolutist régime, was increased even more by a difference of cultures. If one had to describe in one word what was most characteristic of the Russian ruling strata one would say that they always had an 'experimentalist' attitude towards their society. As a result of this, Russian society has been submitted to a long series of 'planned reforms', and its development has been under the pressure of a specific programme of progress. In what follows we describe the main stages in this characteristic mode of development.

A. The builders of the first Russian State, the Varangians, came from outside Russia. While they applied their programme of political organization, the Russian peoples looked upon them as complete strangers whose manners and language they did not understand. B. Later, a similar process took place when Ivan III and Ivan IV enforced upon the people the idea of Tsardom, after the model of a Western Empire, the Third Rome. C. Russian nobility was created in a quasi mechanistic manner; the Tsars sent their duty men to various parts of the country where they were given land and serfs. D. The reforms of Peter the Great can be considered as a climax in this long process. The forced hair-cutting and beard-shaving are in fact tragi-comic aspects of the same basic experimentalist attitude towards the historical process. Peter the Great's reign is a unique example of a society moulded by a 'technocrat'; he shaped the historical process in the manner a carpenter shapes his wood. E. The post-Napoleonic period, and particularly the age of the 'Great Reforms'—1859-64—can be considered as another climax in the process of Westernization. F. Communism is obviously the latest stage in this process, and, in our opinion, the highest stage in the experimentalist attitude towards human history. Both society and the individual are permanently measured against the yardstick of a fixed plan of evolution.

The process of Westernization and the methods used for its

fulfilment resulted in one of the most intense conflicts ever created by the encounter of two civilizations. It can in many respects be compared with the tension produced by the clash between Christianity and the Greco-Roman civilization. The encounter between Western and Russian culture-patterns became in time an inner conflict within modern Russian society, in the sense that the two cultures became two ways of life open to the Russian individuals and groups. In this way, Russian society can be considered as typical example of a group living, for a long period of time, under conditions of stress caused by an intense inner conflict. Though we consider this phenomenon as one of the main sources of the Communist type of man and society in present-day Russia, we can only give a brief description of its main aspects. The analogy with the acting out of an inner conflict by an individual forms the basis of the following considerations.

Any period of radical change, when two ways of life conflict with each other, produces a high degree of introspection in the individuals belonging to it. The permanent need of choice and re-orientation in life makes this necessary. The inclination of modern Russian writers towards psychological analysis, and their important contribution to the knowledge of the human mind, are phenomena closely connected with the existence of an inner conflict in modern Russian civilization.

An inner conflict in the structure of a society and culture constitutes an important source of insecurity, ambiguity and apathy. These are normally noticeable in some outstanding individual members of that society, but it can also be seen under various forms in the group as a whole. The inclination often found in nineteenth century Russian intellectuals towards vague ideas, the anxiety manifested by these intellectuals about a lost meaning of life, their feeling of helplessness, are symptoms of this state of mind. In this atmosphere, many intellectuals—Goncharov for instance—answered Chernyshevsky's 'What is to be done?' by an absolute 'Nothing'. This is an important aspect of Russian nihilism.

This negative mental climate is often paralleled, or compensated, by a strong attachment to general ideas which give ultimate meaning to human life. Almost every Russian intellectual considered himself a 'seeker for Truth'. Besides, in the pre-revolutionary Russia there existed thousands of religious groups 'seekers of God'. To be tormented by 'accursed questions' seems to be a characteristic of the 'Russian boys' (Dostoevsky). All this is obviously the outcome of the profound need to escape an inner conflict and state of ambiguity. We are inclined to see in this phenomenon an almost general trait, psychological and cultural, of periods of social unrest and confusion.

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Of particular interest is the Russians' attitude towards ideas. This can be described as 'existentialist', or even more appropriate, 'totalitarian'. There is no other modern European community displaying such fanatical ideas as the Russians. They have a special ability for condensing the whole world within the limits of one single idea, and of playing out their whole lives around it. 'Sometimes I felt that the fate of the whole world might hang on the outcome of some single meeting, or conversation, or argument', writes N. Berdyaev as a true representative of the 'Intelligentsia'.* Some Russians, members of the 'Intelligentsia', are obsessed with the application of Darwinian principles to human life; others feel in the same way about the Marxian system of thought: At the root of this attitude lies the same basic conflict existing in the core of their way of life. Thus, they seem to be always searching for a formula of life, a total idea, with which they identify themselves in order to escape the ambiguity of their culture-pattern. The evolution of Russian thought in the last century shows an almost obsessive preoccupation with the formula of a new way of life completely distinct from existing social forms. This is an aspect of that mood of 'total revolution' which had burst out in a series of rebellions throughout the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

A strong conflict within a culture-pattern often produces in the individuals belonging to it a negative attitude towards cultural values. This is a rationalization of the difficulty experienced by the individual in the process of social adjustment. It is worth noticing that nineteenth century nihilism quickly became a widespread mode of thinking in Russia. Moreover, the Russian cultural climate speeded up the transition from a passive to an active type of nihilism, and thus prepared the basis for social anarchism. This was primarily due to the important fact that, in Russia, the object of destruction was more readily identified than in Western Europe. The object was the despotic régime of the Tsars. But the following important point should be clarified: As a result of enforced Westernization, many Russians had formed, long before the rise of European nihilism, a hostile attitude towards Western institutions. It was therefore hardly surprising that nineteenth century nihilism and anarchism became in Russia more radical than anywhere else in Europe. European nihilism and anarchism became, in Russia, rationalized aggression and destruction, in the sense that the negation of Western values became itself an ultimate value. This is an important attitude which entered into the composition of Bolshevism.

The exceptional capacity of modern Russian society to create

* *Dream and Reality*, London, p. 8.

'deracinated' people, or outcasts, is closely connected with the nihilistic trends existing in this society. Generally speaking, any rapid and radical turning in social evolution is bound to sweep aside various groups of individuals who may never catch up with the subsequent development of their society. The enforced tempo of Westernization in Russia and the conflict between the native Russian and Western way of life resulting from this, is a case in point. Many members of the Russian upper and middle classes, and of the 'Intelligentsia' in particular, could not satisfactorily integrate themselves with either of the two conflicting ways of life. They held a neutral, critical, or aggressive attitude towards all the values of their civilization, and thus isolated themselves.

The outcasts—who here include all varieties of non-conformists—constituted a problem in modern Russian society. There was a streak of 'outcast' in every great Russian writer of the nineteenth century. This is seen in Pushkin's spirit of political rebellion, in Dostoevsky's criticism of 'Western formalism', in Turgenev's 'social reformism', in Tolstoy's 'freedom from culture and conventions', in Goncharov's 'Oblomovism', and finally in the 'refuse of the world' of the late nineteenth century 'Decadence'. Often the outcasts are spoken of in terms of a new social category and of a new human type. They become favourite heroes in literature, described as 'superfluous people' when they are passive nihilists, or as revolutionists when they are active nihilists. In their isolation the outcasts dream of and act for a new society and civilization.

One of the main causes of the violent clash between the 'old régime' and the revolutionary order in France consisted, according to Tocqueville, in the fact that the new society was primarily the mental product of a particular type of man, *les philosophes*, who lived outside their own society and protested against its injustice. The Russian outcasts are in a similar position. They construct in their own minds the image of a new society as a protest against the society with which they failed to integrate themselves. Emotional factors such as their insecurity, their frustrated desires for belongingness, and their resentments are all woven into their idea of a new society and of the men who compose it.

The atmosphere created by the outcasts constituted the *milieu* for the formation of a type of man with a completely new outlook in life, the fanatic and 'total' revolutionary, who regarded the destruction of his society as a sacred duty. Nechaev, who is often considered as an early embodiment of the Bolshevik revolutionary, wrote in his *Revolutionary Catechism*: 'A revolutionary is a damned man; he has no personal interest and affairs, no sentiments, absolutely nothing of his own, not even a name. His mind is dominated by one

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interest only, one thought and one passion; the revolution. The only science known to him is destruction. He despises and hates with all his heart the order of present life.*†

When Lenin launched the formula of a party made up of 'professional' revolutionaries, at the beginning of the century, the mental structure of such a type of man had already existed among the outcasts of Russian society. It only remained for him to provide such a group of revolutionaries with an ideology and with methods of action; to transform this incoherent group into a political movement able to face the problems of its own time.

One of the outcomes of the conflict between the Western and the Russian ways of life consists in the split of the 'Intelligentsia' into 'Westerners' and 'Slavophiles', which took place in the first half of the last century. To know which of the two trends contributed most to the rise of Communism in Russia is not easy. The important fact is that the split itself shows, firstly, the specific nature of the crisis existing in the Russian culture, and, secondly, the pressing need for a radical solution. For the Westerners, the only way out from the conflict was a rapid and radical Westernization. It is not so easy, however, to define the political position of the Slavophiles. They were by no means for a *status quo*. For their discontent with Tsarist Russia was sometimes deeper than that of the Westerners. Since it was their belief that Russia did not belong to the West, they stressed the distinctive character of the Russian way of life. They opposed to the individualistic trends of Western civilization the Russian congenital inclination towards various forms of collectivism; to Western urbanism and formalism they opposed a simple and primitive way of life typically represented by the Russian peasantry. Thus both groups, the Westerners and the Slavophiles, prepared the ground for a new Russia, a better one, fertilizing in this way the roots of the Russian Communist movements.

The outcast character could in a way be extended to the 'Intelligentsia' as a group. This was, by and large, due to the process of Westernization which created a big gap between the educated strata and the rest of society. As a result of this one could often notice in the members of the 'Intelligentsia' the presence of a feeling of self-accusation and guilt for not being able to help the backward masses. These feelings were particularly manifested by those intellectuals who belonged to the nobility, and who were usually called the 'repentant

*Retransl. from the Italian, quot. from Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

†The Revolutionary Catechism is sometimes attributed to Bakunin. Boris Nicolaievsky describes Nechaev as an impostor and ordinary criminal (B. Nicolaievsky and O. Maenchen-Helfen: *Karl Marx, Man and Fighter*, London, 1936, p. 347).

noblemen'. At other times, the same feelings of isolation and superfluousness came out, in the Russian intellectuals, as a desire to intermingle with the lower strata. And as fanaticism is a characteristic of the Russian mind, this desire was experienced by many intellectuals as a Messianic calling. Consequently they gave up their own way of life, and identified themselves with the lower strata of their own country. Tolstoy for instance suffered periodically from this feeling. The 'populist' movements as a whole can also be considered as an outcome of this impulse. And, finally, Communism itself has very much profited from this tendency. For Marxist ideology, and later on the activity of the Party, offered to the 'Intelligentsia' a good opportunity for the satisfaction of their chronic thirst for humanitarian action, and an excellent remedy for their feeling of guilt aroused by their isolation from the masses. The intellectual should, according to Lenin, eradicate any difference between himself and manual workers. This idea fitted well into the frame of mind characteristic of the most Russian intellectuals at the beginning of the century.

A glimpse at the growth of the revolutionary idea in Russian imaginative literature may prove rewarding. First of all one can readily agree that most of the characters depicted by this literature radiate a strong feeling of ambivalence in life. They are either too passive or too active, either too humanitarian or too destructive, too vague, or utterly obsessed by one precise idea. In the evolution of these characters one can grasp the same stages and aims as in the evolution of Russian society and of the 'Intelligentsia'. From a vague, almost lost, sense of life there gradually grows a strong urge for destruction which, in time, becomes enlightened by the aspiration towards a new formula of life. Pechorin, Lermontov's hero, travels extensively in order to kill his boredom, or silence his anxiety. He does not belong anywhere, for he cannot overcome the deep inner conflict of his culture. Gogol's Chichikov also travels; he is a strange individuation of the old culture-pattern, a 'dead soul' himself who got lost in nineteenth century Russia. Goncharov's creation, Oblomov, is the quaint essence of a loss of the sense of life. The inner conflict of the Russian culture reaches such an intensity in him that it kills in his mind any initiative for action.

The way out from this existential stagnation is gradually discovered. Pushkin's *Eugen Onegin* lives under the compelling desire to do something, however absurd, until finally he kills his best friend. His crime is motivated by a blind need for excitement. Some of Turgenev's heroes are perfectly enlightened as to the 'what is to be done'. But Dostoevsky considers Turgenev's solution far too simple and inadequate. He laughs at Turgenev's 'French manners'.

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His Raskolnikov lives in all its intensity the dilemma of the Russian way of life, displaying, at the same time, a certain sense of action towards its solution. Raskolnikov strives towards the integration of his personality, the elimination of the duality of the Russian way of life, by his final choice for a Christian way of life. The same way is taken by Nekhludov, the hero of Tolstoy's *Resurrection*. The spirit of his struggle is Christian, yet his methods and means remind us in many respects of those used later on by Communists. For example, he divides his land among the peasants who live on it.

The sense of action increases in intensity and clarity in later literary products. Sanine, the famous hero of Artzibashev, is an active nihilist; he lacks only integration with a social group to be a Bolshevik.

RUSSIAN MESSIANISM

There are few modern European nations which have not in one way or another shown Messianic tendencies. The Russian peoples seem, however, to display these tendencies with unique intensity. The idea of a great mission which Providence entrusted to the Russian peoples appears recurrently, be it as a striving towards *Imperium Mundi*—the Third Rome—or as an aspiration towards spreading 'Orthodoxy' throughout the world, and more recently as *Panslavism*, the belief that Moscow, the capital of the united Slavs, will become 'the guide of liberated humanity' (Bakunin).

The causes of this phenomenon varied in the course of history. We are, however, inclined to think that the repression of the native culture by Westernization had much to do with the development of Russian Messianic feelings. The repressed, inferior Russia became in the minds of many Russians 'mother Russia', 'holy', or 'universal' Russia. Thus, at the root of Russian Messianic feelings lies an inflated ethnic consciousness resulting from a long period of humiliation. This mental mechanism is illustrated by the rise of the Jewish Messianic idea, as well as by the outburst of German nationalism, during the inter-war period. In modern Russia the most specific source of frustration and humiliation consists in a ruthless autocratic régime and in the tension created by the process of Westernization.

The universalistic and Messianic character of Marxism came as a new promise for many individuals and groups belonging to Russian society. The Bolshevik leaders were particularly concerned with the fusion between Russian Messianic feelings and the Messianic trends of the proletariat. It ought only to be said that Communist society constitutes the meeting point of three Messianic trends, i.e., that of the modern proletariat, of the Russian peoples, and the Jewish

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Messianism brought in by Marx. Thus the dynamic of Communism is explicable by the convergence—perhaps a unique phenomenon in human history—of three forms of inflated group consciousness: The consciousness of the frustrated modern proletariat, the consciousness of persecuted Jewry of all times, and the consciousness of the Russian peoples—the Russian ‘Intelligentsia’ at their head—whose patriarchal way of life was ruthlessly repressed. Its exceptional power to appeal to the poor and to the failures lies in this web of feelings which led to its birth.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Rational Dynamics of Communism

ACCORDING to the followers of Marx and Lenin, Communist society emerges from modern European society with logical necessity. The individual accepts, therefore, the Communist way of life as soon as he grasps within his own consciousness the logic of human society. The only psychological factor implicated in this process consists in an act of awareness on the part of the individual, a reflection in his mind of the historical reason. Once this has occurred, the mental life of the individual is captivated by the mechanism of history. Thus, psychology is superseded by sociology, and this is, in its turn, superseded by economics.

Though it would be easy to prove that neither Marx nor Lenin ignored the part played by psychological factors, such as hatred, envy, and insecurity in the building up of Communism, we confine the present discussion to the rational motivation of Communist behaviour.

SOME RATIONAL FACTORS IN COMMUNIST BEHAVIOUR

By rational motives in Communist behaviour we understand those motives which are based on phenomena and processes whose existence in the social environment of the individual can be proved in such a manner as to satisfy the present scientific methods and the logical requirements of contemporary man. Those motives are also rational which can be justified in the function of values characteristic of contemporary civilization. Here are some of the most important of these motives:

1. The anarchy of production and the periodical crises inherent in a competitive economic system should be mentioned first. The abolition of private ownership and its replacement by a collectivist system can at any moment be formulated in terms of rational necessity irrespective of its practical consequences. Common observation shows that many people have become Communists or fellow-travellers solely because they thought it necessary to correct the insufficiencies of the economic system of private ownership. Many other people, who could not formulate these objective difficulties of modern society in a rational system, but who saw these difficulties all the

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same, turned Communist from a legitimate desire to change some aspects of their society. We consider also this desire to change an objectively unsatisfactory position as another rational motive in the acceptance of Communism. Many Italian and French peasants, supporters of the Communist parties, find themselves in this position. They have joined the Party for the wrong reason, hoping for a land reform which will make them the masters of the land they work and live on.

2. Though they are of an emotional nature, we consider sympathetic feelings as belonging also to the category of rational motives in Communist behaviour. Compassion for those suffering from material privation, the sense of social justice and other humanitarian and Christian values, belong to this category. There are individuals who join a Communist organization in the hope that the causes of this state of affairs will disappear in the society foreseen by such a movement.

3. Two important trends in modern civilization, rationalism and scientism, can also motivate the acceptance of Communism.

Communist ideology continues the line of European rationalism initiated by the Enlightenment. Thus it formulates at a new level the conviction of the rational nature of history and man. This makes an exceptional appeal to many intellectuals of today and to many other categories of people. For this conviction supplies them with the necessary weapon against mysticism and ignorance. By the acceptance of the Communist ideology, many intellectuals have the genuine feeling that they integrate themselves with the most valuable and progressive trends in the evolution of contemporary civilization. Those who are familiar with the logical stringency and the scientific armour of Marx's *Capital*, for instance, can well understand the importance of systematic rational thought and a rationalistic attitude to life in the acceptance of Communism.

Communists claim that their ideology is scientific; they consider dialectical materialism as 'the science of science'. This obviously constitutes another rational motive in the acceptance of Communism. For many intellectuals have adopted Communist ideology on the ground that it is more scientific than any other philosophy of today, and that it stands uncompromisingly for the supremacy of the scientific values in life. Whether this is true depends a great deal upon the definition of science. It is nevertheless true that Marxism is, by its materialism, against mysticism, idealism and religion, which are in the eyes of many people the main enemies of modern science and consequently of the modern conception of progress.

There is no other philosophy of today more likely to stimulate man's pride to become the master of nature than Marxism. In

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biology, Lysenko advocates the idea that the scientific control of nature enables man to create new forms of life, thus foreshadowing the image of a man-made and man-controlled universe. Soviet economists, historians and sociologists work on the assumption that human society is rational and therefore bound to respond to human rational influence upon it. Speaking about the rôle played by the Soviet writers, Stalin significantly coined the expression, the 'engineers of the human mind'. 'Engineer' is undoubtedly the word which covers the most valuable attitude towards life in a Communist society.

The lure of science and romanticized scientific attitude in life constitute one of the greatest attractions of Communism. In backward agricultural countries, Communism has the appeal of an advanced industrial stage the fruits of which will be enjoyed by all. Many intellectuals of south-east Europe and of China, and many peasants as well have joined the Communist movements of their own countries as a result of having in mind the advantages of industrialization in a collective agricultural system.

Desire to find a remedy for the anarchy of production, sympathetic feelings for the victims of exploitation and of social injustice, reaction from mysticism, and the desire for integration with the rationalistic and scientific values of contemporary civilization have undoubtedly led many individuals towards Communism. But these 'motives' alone cannot explain the specific psychological aspects of a Communist organization in the way in which this is being realized in Russia and in many other countries. On the basis of the rational motives mentioned above one can easily understand the acceptance by many individuals of an economic system based on collective ownership, or of a social structure based on the principle of collective responsibility. But all these traits, however important they are in themselves, are nevertheless peripheral for the understanding of a Bolshevik type of organization. Such an economic system, or such a social structure, can be built up without the abolition of the moral value of human personality, and by methods acceptable to the moral and intellectual standards of Western civilization. Instead of this we see that present-day Communist societies are in many ways a denial of the fundamental value of Western civilization. They replace the value of personality by that of the group, the critical mind by dogmatism, and desire for freedom by desire for excessive domination or excessive submission. These are aspects of Communism which cannot be understood in the light of the above-mentioned rational factors.

The fact is that the Communist Parties often recruit and select their members in complete ignorance of their rational motives for

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joining these parties. The fact that someone holds a Marxian view in economics or philosophy does not necessarily make him a good Communist. The most important qualities making him eligible and valuable for the Party are ruthlessness, aggression, submission, and, above all, a great capacity for hatred. The members displaying these traits have a far greater chance than any others to pass the test of Bolshevization. They have the necessary ability to retain their hold on the wagon of the Party however winding and jolty the road may be. This shows that there are a series of other mental factors which play a greater part than the rational ones in the process of becoming a Communist and in the specific structure of a Communist group.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Irrational Dynamics of Communism

The curtain was dropped, my favourite saint of saints was sacked, and I had to call for new Gods.

MARX IN A LETTER TO HIS FATHER

INTRODUCTION

IN this study we have more than once pointed out that the structure of contemporary Communist society could be better understood as the progressive realization of an idea of society than as the organic growth of a community of people. The origin of this idea of society lies in Karl Marx's interpretation of a series of trends, economic, social and psychological, characteristic of nineteenth-century European society. Later on Marx's follower, Lenin, re-shaped Marx's social philosophy in the light of the social conditions in Russia at the beginning of this century.

Both Marx and Lenin projected their own personalities into their work, theoretical and practical, to such an extent that one could rightly presume that without them the Communist movements and the structure of the Communist Party and society would have been considerably different from what they are today. In what follows we propose to discuss some of the main aspects in the structure of Marx's and Lenin's personalities which can be recognized as elements in the personalities of most individuals who integrate themselves with a Communist organization.

KARL MARX'S PERSONALITY

It is a striking fact that the development of Marx's personality bears a strong resemblance to the development of the working class in the historical conditions of the last century. Marx can be considered as a unique case of frustrated and repressed personality. One of the main frustrating conditions of his life lies in his Jewish origin. The fact that his family decided to become Christian, though a common phenomenon at that time, shows all the same that the adjustment to German society of that period constituted a problem. Considering the later development of Marx's personality, his political aspirations in particular, one can readily agree that this feeling of

separateness, the feeling of the 'never to be washed off Jew', as Heine put it, constituted a centre of traumatic experience in his life. As in many similar cases, this condition led to an uncommon power of introspection, to 'more depth' (Heine), to the apprehensiveness and irritability which are characteristic of his behaviour.

His multilateral gifts and his difficulties of choice in life can be considered as other sources of frustration for his personality. At the age of 18, Marx shows clearly the signs of a self-seeking man. In inexplicable haste he writes poetry, lyrical, satirical, dramatic, as well as volumes of metaphysical effusions. His initial intention is to become a lawyer, but he buries himself in the study of philosophy, and finally becomes an economist. As such, he is still open to radical changes in his line of interests; he gives the impression that he would have done well in history, or in any other social science, had chance led him that way. He could have arrayed the forces of his great intelligence on any front of social life, as soon as he had a glimpse of hope for a final victory.

But all this considerable intellectual capacity proved in the long run of little help for his need to succeed, for 'his hankerings after fame as a common poetaster'.* The trouble seems to come from the fact that he does not like the easy way. Moreover, he seems to throw barriers in the way of his success. It is very likely that the need for self-assurance and self-assertion reached in him, at a very early age, such a high degree of tension that he could not be satisfied by adjustment to recognized values. Self-fulfilment can be achieved only by revolution. Marx, like his hero, the proletariat, always lives under the desire to break the chain of institutionalized life.

Such an intensive need for self-assertion on the one hand, and such a spread of energy in so many directions on the other, were bound to bring frustration. Marx is frustrated first of all in his artistic aspiration. The poet Chamisso refuses the publication of his literary essays. Then in one of his desperate moods, he writes to his father: 'The concern caused by Jenny's illness, the failure of all my work for which I "swotted" in vain, the resentment caused by having been compelled to make my own idol from a conception which I hated (Hegel), made me ill . . .' 'Once recovered I burned all my poems and all my sketches for short stories'.† Marx was then 19 years old.

This on no account means the end of high hopes and desperate strivings for self-realization. But the awareness of failure—of hitting

*Franz Mehring paraphrasing Marx's father, in: *Karl Marx*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1948.

†Letter to his father, 10th November, 1837, retransl. from French. Marx: *Œuvres Philosophiques*, Tome II, A Costes, Paris, 1935.

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beyond the mark—grows steadily in him to the point of forming a centre of his own, an insecure, pessimistic Marx. And the more he becomes aware of this part of his personality, the more possessed he becomes with the desire to overcome it by a revolutionary act of self-assertion. When Engels meets Marx for the first time, in 1844, he finds in him an arrogant, revengeful and intolerant Marx side by side with a pessimistic one.* This is exactly the pattern of feelings disclosed by Marx himself in the above-mentioned letter written seven years previously. Enthusiasm and over-confidence intermingle with 'a veritable rage of irony', doubt and despair.

There is another source of frustration in Marx's personality which illustrates clearly the irrational dynamics of a Communist totalitarian. Marx's highest aspiration is to be a political leader and to excel as such in the practical field of social life. How this ideal of life came to take hold of the mind of a man endowed with so many and various intellectual gifts is not easy to understand. It may be that he felt intuitively that there was no fuller satisfaction for self-assertion than in the exercise of political power.

But the same drive for political power can be interpreted as a form of rationalization of his basic insecurity. By this he seems to throw a series of impenetrable barriers across the way leading to self-realization, so that any bitterness, any amount of rage and revolt, and finally any failures, become *a priori* justified. This looks very much like the case of the pessimistic, grumbling girl who believes the reason of her unhappiness lies in the fact that she is not a man and therefore cannot become a soldier. When she is told that she can, at any moment, join the army, she candidly answers that she wants to join the 'Foreign Legion', one of the few, if not the only military institution where women are not allowed.

But whatever its interpretation, this drive in Marx's personality proved to be a source of frustration throughout his life. A series of circumstances, internal and external, stood in the way of its fulfilment. Marx's Jewish origin undoubtedly constitutes a certain difficulty from this point of view. But far more important is the fact that, contrary to his expectations, no proletarian revolution took place during his life-time. And there is a third frustrating circumstance, which is of an internal nature; Marx has very few of the qualities necessary to a man of action, no outstanding political talents. His work in the First International showed him an irritable man with not enough flexibility for the work of co-ordination which is required even from an authoritarian leader.†

*'Marx as Writer', *Times Lit. Suppl.*, 8th September, 1950, p. 558.

†Marx's management of the International constitutes a controversial issue. Mehring, for instance, is inclined to think that Marx displayed enough flexibility

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Marx's need for power remains frustrated throughout his life. His mind has the difficult task of creating substitutes for it. This makes Marx a typical case of a political man *manqué*, and one who can never entirely express himself in a substitute rôle. As a young man he gives himself enthusiastically to poetry, but the demonic man of action within him breaks through the poetical imagery. He becomes deeply unsatisfied with 'this thoroughly idealistic poetry' where 'real things vanish' giving way to 'a diluted and shapeless sentimentality' (letter quoted). This feeling of the 'unnatural' seems to translate the deep reality of his own personality, the desire for power, which cannot be satisfied in poetry. Later, he attempts to find an outlet in philosophy, which proves again to be a poor disguise for his need for action. His style is aggressive and full of invective, like that of a political debate. The prime aim of philosophy is to 'demolish' the old order, and then to suppress itself by becoming 'practical action'. As a political pamphleteer, Marx shows the same attitude, but in an extreme form. He writes with the sword and curses like a proletarian turned into a general by a revolution. Marx's ambition as an intellectual is to write a book which will turn the whole world upside down. And even this ambition, which today seems so legitimate for the father of Communism, led him to frustration: he dies before finishing this capital book, with his mind full of doubt as to its final shape and its effect. Thus, Marx finds in his intellectual migrations little or no satisfaction for the basic need of his personality. With a remarkable intuition of this basic condition of life, he writes at the age of 16: 'We cannot always take up the profession for which we feel ourselves suited; our relations in society have begun to crystallize more or less before we are in a position to determine them.'* Fundamentally he remains a 'stranger', a displaced person in any of these territories. Perhaps this particular aspect of his inner life makes him so apprehensive of the process of 'self-estrangement' in mankind in general, and in the proletariat in particular. †

and spirit of tolerance and did quite well in managing the General Council. The fact remains, however, that after ten years of existence, the General Council lost almost all its influence upon the workers' movement in England and on the Continent, and that this was perhaps to a great extent due to its leadership. Giuseppe Mazzini, referring to Marx's activity in the International, described him as 'a German, a man of penetrating but corrupting intelligence, imperious, jealous of the influence of others . . . who has more hatred, if righteous hatred, in his heart than love.' (Nicolaievsky, *op. cit.*, p. 271.)

*Mehring *op. cit.*, p. 5.

†It is obvious that interests in poetry, drama, philosophy, and science constitute for Marx forms of self-alienation. Sometimes this deep process rises in Marx to a conscious level. He gives the impression of looking at himself from

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Concluding from what has been said so far, one can say that the main characteristic of Marx's personality consists in a strong inner conflict resulting from the impossibility of self-realization. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe this as a succession of conflicts and tensions between an unconscious structure dominated by a strongly repressed desire for power and a conscious structure (the conscious ego) which can offer only substitutes for the satisfaction of this desire. In his own terms the inner tension is aroused by an 'infra-structure' which is in 'permanent revolution' in order to create an adequate 'super-structure' for itself. The phenomenology of this conflict in Marx's personality is rich and varied. In what follows we can mention only a few aspects which, in our opinion, are revealing for the psychology of the Communist totalitarian man.

1. Ambivalent attitudes can be considered as among the most characteristic symptoms of this conflict. We have already referred to states of enthusiasm, rage and omnipotence followed quickly by pessimism and despair. Marx's attitude towards Hegel discloses ambivalent feelings clearly. Hegel is for him the great master of dialectics, and, at the same time, the author of 'an odious philosophy'.*

A series of other ambivalent attitudes can be found only after a careful analysis of the texture of his thought. First of all his style as a writer bears the mark of an ambivalent personality. The dry scientific style of *Capital* contrasts sharply with the romantic, speculative, and frequently sentimental style of his philosophical works. All his works, the political ones in particular, show a mixture of objective argument and of the careful consideration of facts, with a tendency towards easy generalization, based on a disturbing reliance on personal intuitions. Marx's attitude towards Man discloses another aspect of his ambivalent personality. He sees the greatness and uniqueness of man in his power to create his own history, in his revolutionary substance. But at the same time he writes in his last book: 'My standpoint, from which the evolution of economic formation of society is viewed, as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for

outside, and perceiving a multiplied image of himself, like a series of satellites without a sun, or rather like a series of statues of himself. 'There are moments in life which put a rigid barrier to the past, indicating at the same time a new direction.' In such moments ' . . . we would like to raise a monument to what-we-have-lived, to what is lost for the action point of view and remains only in our feelings'. These are moments when Marx 'sacks his favourite Gods' and calls for new ones. (Quot. letter.) He breaks with himself whenever he passes into a new field of reality in the search of self-realization.

*Preface to the second edition of *Capital*, p. xcv, transl. from French, Molitor Ed., A. Costes, Paris, 1946. (Also quoted letter.)

relations whose creature he socially remains.* The ambiguity regarding man's responsibility in history, which was later developed as 'mechanicism' and dialectics', as Trotskyism and Stalinism, and moreover, the ambiguity of the Party's position in Communist society—*avant-garde* or direct expression of the masses—are all rooted in Marx's ambivalent attitude towards man.

Another sign of ambivalence can be seen in Marx's need for identification with the social group of the proletariat. A man fundamentally incapable of compromise in his relations with others becomes the founder of a collectivistic way of life. This aspect of ambivalence in his personality becomes, as we shall soon see, an important problem in the evolution of the Communist Party. Marx himself solves it on a purely ideological level by identifying himself with the absolute truth expressed in his philosophy of history.

2. According to what we have said so far the reader acquainted with contemporary psychopathology may be expecting us to apply to Marx the clinical concept of paranoia. We are, however, not prepared to take this step, for, on the one hand, our knowledge of Marx's life is not deep enough to support such a view, and, on the other hand, Marx's personality displays such a complexity of traits that any separate clinical concept fails to describe it adequately. But there are some symptomatic paranoid manifestations worth mentioning. The final conclusion remains entirely with the psychopathologist who would take the trouble to study Marx's life from his own point of view.

Thoughts of aggression and persecution abound in his writings. We have already mentioned the 'rage' followed by disillusion aroused in his struggle against the Hegelian philosophy. Sometimes he conveys the feeling that he lives surrounded by a hostile world. 'Free scientific research in the field of political economy attracts upon itself the most violent, mean, and abominable passion ever experienced by the human mind, i.e., the fury of private interests.† It should be added that Marx means by 'scientific' research his own and similar research. A few pages later he describes how the German bourgeoisie '. . . has attempted to organize the conspiracy of silence round Capital'.‡ Sometimes he rises above this universal hostility in a splendid isolation, comforted by the feeling of his superiority.

*Preface to the first edition of *Capital*, Ed. cit., p. lxxx.

†*Capital*, quoted Ed., p. lxxx. and p. lxxxix.

‡Suspicion was shown by Marx in various forms. He had some responsibility for the spread and frequent revival of the rumour that Bakunin was a tool of the Tsarist police. Thus, Marx initiated an attitude of suspicion and denunciation which has become characteristic of most members of the Communist parties of today.

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On one of these occasions he quotes Dante: *Segui il tuo corso et lascia dir le gente.*

But as a rule his aggression cannot be expressed at such an abstract philosophical level. He more often projects it on various aspects of the external world. Following his writings one can see how his aggression becomes systematically organized round the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois world. We say the bourgeois world because Marx's aggression against bourgeoisie means aggression against the social and spiritual order of his time; it is a kind of diffuse oppression similar to that of the proletariat of his time.

3. The conflict with the world forms a closed circle in the development of Marx's personality. The discontent and the aggression resulting from his own failures were projected on to various aspects of the external world as injustice and hostility against himself. This increased even more the feeling of frustration, and raised the conflict with the world to such a tension that finally no compromise was possible. Under the impact of this tension his conscious ego grows outside the real world into a world of its own, outside the present world into a world of the future. In this lies the source of the Messianic character of Marx's thought. The weak man in a desperate struggle with a strong enemy comforts himself by believing that the Gods are on his side. Marx inflates his ego so that the world should submit to its dictates.

The development of the Messianic character of his personality follows various stages. One can discover in the young Marx a pressing tendency towards self-overestimation. This looks like an attitude of bravado or sheer boasting. Characteristic from this point of view is a passage from the quoted letter to his father: 'During my indisposition I have read Hegel from one end to the other, acquiring at the same time a close knowledge of most of his disciples.' What sort of indisposition it was, and how long it could last so as to give him time enough to read the whole of Hegel, is a puzzling question. Keeping in mind that at the time when this letter was written (1832), Hegel had already published his main works, this is simply incredible.

Later on his Messianic tendencies are expressed at a socio-cultural level. Marx objectivizes his repressed desire for success in the struggle for progress of a particular social class, and in a philosophy of history. From now on he would speak no longer on behalf of himself, no longer on behalf of subjective individual factors, but on behalf of the proletariat and of a set of objective laws of history which would lead the proletariat to its final victory.

4. The specific quality of Marx's genius consists in his exceptional power of transferring at the rational level the deep emotional factors resulting from a series of traumatic experiences in himself and in the

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modern proletariat. Perhaps the expression 'rational level' is, in this case, misleading. It would be more appropriate to say that Marx transfers in the key of consciousness a series of unconscious factors. For, on close examination, one notices that Marx's thought displays in a curious way a logical deficiency. The impressive strength of his argument is not always, and not exclusively, based on logical stringency. There is always something in Marx which works on the mind of the reader from beyond the logical concatenation of his ideas. He conveys the impression that he knew the answer to all problems he deals with, before giving any thought to them. Matters which perplex anybody, Marx calls 'self-evident'. In this specific aspect of his mind is to be found the origin of his dogmatism, which we shall discuss presently.

Marx gives expression to his own and the proletariat's repressed desires in the theoretical construction of historical materialism. The final victory of the proletariat becomes, therefore, a necessary stage in a rational argument. But, at the same time, he unconsciously takes all measures to disguise the emotional substance of his thought and to construct defences against its subjective character. His materialistic conception of the world, and his naïve realism in the field of knowledge can, from the psychological viewpoint, be considered as fulfilling this particular purpose. Marx sincerely believes that his ideas and theories mirror the basic processes which the external reality undergoes. The fulfilment of his predictions is thereby assured.

There are other ways in which Marx disguises the emotional and subjective character of his ideas. He takes a great deal of trouble—perhaps too much trouble—to make people believe that he did not reach the truth expressed in his philosophy by any mystic, personal, metaphysical process. His thought merely expresses the logic of facts. But he is somehow aware that no logic would incontrovertibly prove the materiality of the world, the economic laws of historical materialism or of the historical mission of the proletariat. Then he would say that the logic he speaks of is not the logic of individual consciousness, but that of class consciousness. On this point the Marxian thought takes a turning never met before in the whole history of philosophy. Marx claims that his fundamental ideas are meaningful and form a rational whole only within class consciousness. Thus, the standards to which they ought to be referred are not the standards of the individual mind, but the requirements for political action of the proletariat which are reflected in the structure of class consciousness.

Class consciousness considers true and objective those ideas which enlighten and support the deep-seated need of the proletariat for

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overcoming its insecure position. The stronger this need, the stronger the attachment to these ideas, and consequently the more dogmatic becomes the truth expressed by them. These ideas are not the result of the immediate experiences of Marx or of the proletariat. Therefore their validity cannot be assessed according to how they fit the empirical conditions of life. They are the projection of a 'complex', aroused by a series of frustrating experiences in the early history of Marx and the modern proletariat. As such, they work as fixed ends in every experience. That is why Marx, and after him all Communists, do not submit their ideas to the test of facts or of everyday experience; ideas are, for them, true or false according to the ends they fulfil. Life in a Communist society has a strong resemblance to life in a religious community; actions and ideas are eschatologically justified.

Though Marx defines class consciousness in purely rational terms, its emotional substance is only too transparent. Marx's hostility towards emotional-irrational factors in life could certainly be interpreted as a defence mechanism. His obsession with the idea of pruning the human mind of the weeds of sentimentalism, of utopianism, and of 'fetishism' springs from the same need for self-defence. Also significant from this point of view is his obsession with the phenomenon of consciousness—with the striving of life, of social life in particular, to become self-conscious. Proletarian society is perfectly conscious of its own structure and functioning, a society working like a concept. The obsession with the phenomenon of consciousness is a trait Marx and the German Romantics have in common.*

If one tries to formulate in a general conclusion what has been said so far, one would say that the underlying process of Marx's life consists in a deep crisis of individuation. None of the successive rôles taken by him throughout his life satisfied his deep strivings and aspirations. In order to establish a balance between himself and his environment he became, through his father, a Christian, then poet, philosopher, economist, political pamphleteer, professional revolutionary, etc. He moves from country to country . . . but all in vain, for there always remained something in himself that could not take shape and be satisfied. As a result of this, Marx appears through his life as a man incapable of fulfilling the demands he made upon himself, and incapable of giving up. We think that these de-

*What German Romantics mean by consciousness is certainly a false consciousness, or the Unconscious in disguise. This may be one of the reasons why Hegel's ideas, for instance, led in the long run to mysticism and irrationalism, in Fascist society, and to dogmatism, in Communist society. Hegel's ideas seem to be overloaded with emotional factors which slacken the critical mind, when accepted. To be with Hegel or with Marx always involves a certain danger of 'conversion' and total devotion.

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mands spring from his urge for power and his insatiable need for security. The awareness of this insatiable 'Self' made him hate any compromise, any flexible and evolutionary progress, and any free and peaceful arrangements between human beings, things and events.

He projects his own situation as a man of power, sentenced to perpetual disguise, upon his society and formulates the first principle of his social philosophy, namely, the dual existence of human society as infra- and super-structure. Social life is for him an intricate texture of substitutes, compromises, illusions, and mystifications. We cannot be ourselves because of the money we possess, because of our class, because of our ideas. In their turn, social classes, the State, religion, etc. are only masks of real life. Reality and truth are beyond them, in the 'infra-structure' the main task of which is to hide itself under the veil of illusion and deception. Marx is passionately fond of describing life's impotence to grow to its proper forms. But, at the same time, he is fascinated by the problem of how to pull off the masks and reveal the reality as 'infra-structure'. For as long as it can hide itself it remains an essentially evil force, a source of unhappiness for mankind. When he finds it, he calls it 'capital', and never ceases to denounce its machinations. He recognizes in 'capital' the greatest source for 'power' in his society. Is it not a projection of his own 'infra-structure', the lust for power which tortured him so much?

With his keen power of reading through and beyond the appearance of life, Marx's true vocation might have been that of a psychologist. But even here he is the victim of self-deception, self-estrangement, in his own words. He denies to himself this natural inclination of his mind, and this denial is radical, for psychology means nothing to him. Thus all his feeling for depth was extraverted, leading him towards the foundation of depth sociology and socio-analysis.

LENIN'S PERSONALITY

Three men were very close to Marx: Engels, Trotsky and Lenin. They expressed three different ways in which his inner conflict could be acted out and his personality integrated.

Engels is the first to call Marx a 'genius', that is, the most free of men, a man who creates his own world. This would imply that Marx's personality could have been integrated at the fantasy level. Therefore Marx would escape from, rather than realize, his desire for power and security. Though Marx is extremely sensitive to this 'epithet', he feels all the time that his personality remains something apart from his ideology. Ideology is, after all, a 'super-structure', a plan for action, not action itself, tactics to win the power, not power itself.

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Trotsky is the embodiment of Marx's insatiable desire for development and assertion, the embodiment of his suspicion of the limiting external circumstances which might bring the expansion of his own self to a halt, before its full development. Weakness and fears might lead the proletariat to compromise with the bourgeoisie, or to accept an established order before its historical mission is fully realized. The Marx of Trotsky is 'permanent revolution', a Marx satisfied in his tendency for domination, but who lives in the vacuum created by his destructive action.

Lenin ignores both Marx the prophet, who had the tendency to annihilate himself by identification with an absolute order as expressed by his ideological work, and Marx the revolutionary, who tended to annihilate himself in permanent revolt. Lenin sees a Marx acting at reality level. This is neither a universal nor a self-seeking Marx, but Marx in the historical setting of Russia at the beginning of this century. But Lenin does not eliminate anything essential from Marx, for the sake of making him fit into a given sociological reality. He examines the *sociological feasibility* of Marx as a system, and devises, by the means of a series of compromises between an ideology and a sociological reality, the necessary stages in the realization of this system. Thus Lenin is the first man who had a glimpse of the death of Marx's philosophy *qua* philosophy.

The first idea derived from the study of Lenin's life is that, in contrast with Marx, he possesses the main qualities of a political man. He manifests early in his life an anxiety to assert himself against authority, and, at the same time, an exceptional capacity for leadership. Unfortunately we know Lenin only when these traits of his personality are socially integrated, in the sense that he is already a member of one of the many Russian revolutionary movements. His resentment and aggression take therefore, at an early stage in his life, the form of an organized social action with the precise objective of overthrowing the Tsarist régime. Whether authority-anxiety is, in Lenin, a deep personal factor, remains an open problem for us. What we know is that Lenin is the son of a civil servant (schoolmaster), and that in Tsarist Russia civil servants were a kind of officers in the army. When he was 17 years old, his eldest brother was executed (1887) for having taken part in an attempt against Alexander III. As a result of this, Lenin is excluded from the St. Petersburg University. Apparently, already at this stage his destiny is settled; he consecrates his life to the 'revolution'.

A series of factors contributed to the development of Lenin's personality in this specific sense. First of all, at a very early age, he assimilates Marxism. After this he is never in doubt, or in search of the ends of his revolt. Secondly, Russian society was a natural

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climate for revolutionary action throughout last century. In this society Lenin finds the most efficient type of revolutionary in late nineteenth-century Europe. He himself grows up in this revolutionary atmosphere.

Because of these conditions, the fundamental question, 'What is to be done?', has for Lenin a concrete and precise meaning. He wastes no time with general questions, such as whether and when the conditions of revolution are ripe. He knows that revolution is necessary in Russia. Therefore his main question is, 'What is to be done', *here and now*, with *these* people, against *this* enemy, and within *this* ideological pattern.

Marx studied Clausewitz assiduously, Lenin has the science of strategy and tactics in himself. He is flexible and unscrupulous; devoted to his own idea, and, at the same time, paying full attention to everything in his environment which may lead in one way or another to its realization. The proletarian movement is for Lenin primarily a question of tactics which, like any tactics, consists in a series of compromises between a final end and the real conditions of the situation, and in the ability to make every factor of the situation work for this end, as long as this is necessary. Thus, unlike Marx, Lenin shows himself a master of compromise. First of all, he creates a compromise between the two theses which divided the Russian socialists over a long period of time, that of the spontaneity of the masses and mechanicism. This compromise is the Party of 'a new type' which mobilizes the masses, and, at the same time, integrates them in a rigid organization with a fixed object of attack. The Party is, at the same time, an *avant-garde* and a brake on the working class. He builds up a Party based on the activity of professional revolutionaries, and yet, he is more than once against the *comitards*, or the 'technicians'. He is against them, whenever he feels that the Party becomes, because of their activity, the prey of 'routine'.* It is not Lenin's democratic feelings, as Trotsky suggests, but rather his gifts as a great tactician that determine this attitude in him. There are grounds for believing that even the bureaucratic and monolithic structure of the Party is regarded by him as a tactical stage.

Lenin never loses his quality of tactician even in his intellectual work. As soon as he feels that his ideas get the better of him, he

*In 1917 and 1918, Lenin based the political line of the Party on the 'Soviets', a fact which created a conflict between him and the technical body of the Party. Thus he clashed with his own creation. He accused the 'comitards' of stupidly repeating a formula learned by heart, instead of studying the originality of a living situation.

In 1923, just before his death, Lenin was ready to open an attack against Stalin as the chief 'comitard' in order to render the structure of the Party more flexible.

beats a retreat. 'One step forwards, two steps backwards' remains always his first tactical principle. He applies it during the NEP, making a quick return to liberal economy, and on many other occasions. His favourite mythological figure is Antaeus. Lenin writes books as a tactician, not as a dealer in ideas. With the exception of his *Philosophical Notebooks*, where, because of his isolation in Switzerland (1914-16), he gives himself up to intellectual activities, all his books spring from, and are meant to solve, actual situations in the political struggle of the Party. The *ad hoc* character of his books always prevails over their ideological structure. Even his main philosophical work, *Empirio-Criticism*, is a polemic with his political opponents.

In the explanation of Lenin's particular sense of reality, of his gifts for compromise and his power to create social forms one has to start from the important fact that he grew up in an organized group of revolutionaries. Whether these qualities of his are the result of education exclusively is a question which we cannot answer now.* What is important is the fact that his revolutionary tendencies were, at a very early age, integrated in a socially organized action. In this way he never experienced the drama of the Russian revolutionary 'Intelligentsia', expressed in Katkov's words: 'Having ideas in one's head which can never be applied is a torture, a terrible torture.'

We have, however, to stress the idea that Lenin's concept of reality is, in the social field, identical with the revolutionary Russian society. In this respect he can rightly be considered as a genius of realization. No one before, or after him, could more easily find the way from potentiality to actuality, in the social field, the passage from vague aspirations and a variety of almost meaningless discontents to an efficient, organized revolutionary movement. This subterranean reality was his own reality, and his work led to its expression in the Party.

Because reality is, for Lenin, the reality of the revolution, his capacity for compromise is limited. Lenin uses, in one way or another, all the elements of Russian society with the express purpose of creating the conditions of Communism. But, throughout his activity, he never really compromises with non-revolutionary society. He never goes half way to meet the non-revolutionary elements of society. His meaning of compromise is rooted in Marx's advice to the members of the Communist League, in 1850, which can be paraphrased as follows: befriend your opponent in order to liquidate

*In all his public activities Lenin proved his great political skill. The events of 1907-9 are often given as an example in this respect. Then Lenin used the pressure of outside groups (Mensheviks) in order to break the opposition coming from his own organization (Bogdanov, Rykov and Krassin).

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him more easily. This is the meaning of compromise instilled by him into the Communist Parties all over the world.

Lenin is ruthless and unprincipled, but eminently tactful from the point of view of political action. Towards the *bourgeois* world he has no morality, though he is completely integrated with the values of the revolutionary world. His behaviour can be described as a form of moral immorality. For he is so closely integrated with his Communist order that he can claim—he did in fact—that his disruptive activities are moral and even humanitarian.

Though at the moral level he completely identifies himself with the idea of Communist society, he seems to preserve a certain intellectual flexibility which is completely lost in his followers, as we shall presently see.

STALIN'S PERSONALITY

When Lenin died, Communist society was still in a fluid state. He preserved to the very end of his life the character of a tactician; he was ready to exploit new possibilities and to engage new forces. This differentiates Lenin both from Marx, who is wrapped up in his 'idea' of a new world, and from Stalin, who is caught in the reality of the new society. The Party as a stable form of organization is the only reality in Stalin's eyes. His only task is to make it work efficiently. To exploit possibilities and to let the Party open itself to new forms of life is against its own interests. Less debate means less dissension which results in a greater capacity for action. As early as 1911 Stalin called the polemic between Lenin, Trotsky, Martov and Bogdanov, concerning vital points of orientation, a 'storm in a glass of water'. Lenin himself after his quarrel with Bogdanov, Rykov, and Krassin, fearing that much discussion would harm the unity and the efficiency of the Party, turned to Stalin as to a saviour. And it was at Lenin's recommendation that Stalin was in 1912 co-opted on to the Central Committee and made responsible for the delegation of this Committee in Russia.

Stalin is usually referred to as to a bureaucrat and a consolidator. This means that once he takes the leadership, the Party, as the expression of Communist society, can no longer grow from within, its potentialities being exhausted. Nor can it change its structure as the result of its contact with the external environment. There is no inner effervescence in the structure of the Party, because the Party has already produced its type of man and its type of action. Thought and action become *cliché* and routine in character.

If from what we have said so far the reader will understand that Stalin as a personality had no influence upon the structure of the Party, we are ready to recognize that our own ideas regarding this particular

point can hardly be organized to such a degree as to lead unambiguously to a clear-cut conclusion. This situation seems to arise from the difficulty of using in this context the concept of personality as an individual having his own feelings, his own ideas and will which leave their specific mark on society and history. Though recognizing that in this way we throw a serious obstacle in the way of psychology, we are tempted to suggest that, at this stage in the evolution of the Party and of Communist society, it would be profitable to abolish the classical concept of personality and to replace it with the concept of the Party, as a collective personality. For whenever we try to analyse the influence of Stalin on the evolution of the Party we have to face the same difficult problem. Is his action prompted by his passions and by his impulses, or is that action the result of a general atmosphere, of a series of trends, habits of mind, mechanisms existing in that collective organism called the Party? One thing seems certain: Stalin's success is not due to his popularity in the Party and even less to his popularity in Soviet society. We are inclined to think that his success is due to the fact that he always was 'the Party man', the man who knew how to ride on the line indicating the 'necessary' evolution of the Party. His utterly 'anti-democratic' attitudes are certainly rooted in the fact that he never sought to make his action accord with the opinion of the individual members of the Party, but rather with the spirit of the Party—with a complex of factors, economic and psychological, which held together that strange collective organism. Those who know something about the rôle played by the *line* in a Communist society, about its power, its independence and its caprices, will understand that such a position is possible. There is much truth in the assertion that Stalin is the first outstanding example of 'the new man', a man whose personality is identified with the Party.

But this is not the whole truth. For there is another perspective, completely opposed to the one mentioned above, from which Stalin's personality can be viewed. This is Stalin as an individual with an iron will, who works his way up to the top of the Party, most of the time struggling with individuals and groups representing views opposed to his own. This is the man who finally creates a new stage in the evolution of the Party and of Communist society called Stalinism. The mental make up of this Stalin, if analysed, may disclose important psychological factors in the composition of contemporary Communist society.

Since a choice between these two views is difficult, we would rather leave room for both and conclude the present chapter as follows: If Stalin's political activity proved that behind it there was a personality having its private interests and ambitions, this might

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be considered as the last case in which a personality, in the usual sense of the word, stood at the head of the Party. After Stalin's death the Party can no longer be considered as an agglomeration of individuals shaped by the will of one leader. The Party is itself an organism which functions like an integrated personality. We would not hesitate to look upon it as upon a new form of life individuation. Its leaders bear less and less the mark of personalities. The struggle between them will look less and less like a struggle between independent individuals which might put the Party in danger, and more and more like a struggle between the cells of an organism. Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, or Khrushchev are cells rather than organisms. Who can sense the pulsation of a personality under words like the following:

'Our friends respect us because we are strong, and will respect us only as long as we are strong. The weak are not respected. If we are respected it means that we shall not be hindered in our task of construction. It is wrong and dangerous to overestimate one's strength, but still worse to underestimate it, because then one is liable to be stricken by panic.'*

Stalin's elementary and depersonalized style is pushed here to an extreme. There is little wonder that Malenkov started his own régime with the battle against 'the cult of personality', and against 'the mastery of *individual* formulations and quotations' of Marxist-Leninist theory. The positive aim of this battle consists in the confirmation of 'the collective character' of the Party's leadership. (From Beria's act of accusation. Italics ours.)

**Manchester Guardian*, 7th March, 1953.

CHAPTER SIX

The Psychology of Dogma

DOGMA AND MYTH

As has been previously shown, the most striking feature of the Nazi way of life consists in the inclination of the individual belonging to it towards mythical thinking, on the one hand, and in the readiness of his culture-pattern to provide his mind with myths, on the other. If one has to define, in the same succinct way, the specific psychological feature of the Communist way of life, this undoubtedly consists in the individual's dogmatic attitude to life, and in the readiness of his culture-pattern to provide his mind with elements of dogmatic thought.

One usually defines dogma as an idea which can neither be checked by the logical functions of the individual's mind, nor revised in the light of subsequent experience. It should be added that dogma implies the imposition of an idea by means other than the stringency of the rules of human understanding.*

Myths stand for hope or horror, dogma for the most rigorous form of knowledge—for concepts. Myth-making rests on the power of the imagination to mould emotional factors; dogma, on the other hand, rests on the power of the intellect to transpose emotional factors into its own key, while failing to change their irrational nature. The fathers of the Church moulded the emotional need lying at the basis of Christianity into a set of fundamental truths. Marx, Engels and Lenin did the same with their own emotional tensions and with those of the modern proletariat as well. While in myths we have to do with more or less complex projections of emotional factors, in dogma we are faced with the *conversion* of emotionality into reason, or with the conversion of unconscious into conscious forms of experience. Thus myth reveals itself for what it

*Marxists call any idea or any ideology dogmatic which persists after the material conditions which gave rise to them have been superseded. In this sense, Stalin speaks of a dogmatic and a creative Marxism (*The Problems of Leninism*.) Recent experiences have, however, proved that this distinction is superfluous. For, though the material conditions were quite different in South-East Europe, the Communists applied, in 1945, the same precepts and methods as in the Russia of 1917. The Soviet attack on Tito offers a recent example of a dogmatic rather than a creative Marxism.

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really is, while dogma is a false merchandise, emotionality and irrationality disguised as intellect. The process of conversion explains to a great extent the compulsory and intolerant character of dogma. The certitude, the universality, and the rigidity inherent in dogmatic knowledge is the reflex, at the level of consciousness, of a repressed emotional situation resulting from precarious and insecure conditions of life. This arises as a defence mechanism when the admission to consciousness of the emotional situation of insecurity makes the adjustment to life difficult or impossible. From this primitive basis, dogma-making develops into an autonomous mechanism of the mind, in the sense that the individual or the group develop negative attitudes towards anything subjective and emotional, and against anything unstable and circumstantial. This goes hand in hand with the growth of a compulsory need for putting any experience of life under the protection of an objective and absolute order.

Marxian dogma is rooted in the need of Marx and of the modern proletariat to repress their emotional experience of insecurity, created in them by various conditions of life. It expresses, at the same time, the need, deeply seated in Marx and the proletariat, to convert their 'cases' into general problems, the desire of the proletariat to become 'universal'. The result of this repression is that, today, the proletariat justifies its ideas and actions not by its traumatic experience and the emotional result, but by the 'objective' qualities of the working class, and by the universal laws of history. Its emotional need has been converted into the objective and rational order of the world which cannot fail to assert itself.*

*Psycho-analytical thinking offers another example of dogma'ism in contemporary civilization whose origins are similar to those of Marxism. It is known that Freud arrived at the formulation of the basic concepts of psycho-analysis by self-analysis, i.e., by the awareness of his own 'disorders'. This particular and subjective basis of the psycho-analytical concepts has been converted into a set of objective laws of the human mind. The concept of the Oedipus complex can be taken as an example. For Freud, the Oedipus complex is a constitutional element of the human mind, existing in all individuals and in all historical times. In this way the subjective and circumstantial character of Freud's knowledge becomes a law of the psychological universe. Freud's great concern with the 'scientific' character of psycho-analysis is significant in this respect.

A great proportion of psycho-analysts are like Freud. They are converted to psycho-analysis because they have personal experiences which fit into the psycho-analytical pattern. But almost instantaneously they reach the conviction that psycho-analysis is the only explanatory system of mental life and consequently psycho-analysis is 'the science' of the mind. This phenomenon cannot be understood except by assuming that the conversion of their own 'complexes' into objective laws of the psyche constitutes for them a form of acting out their 'trauma' and therefore is an inner necessity. In this way they try to escape their 'peculiarities' by generalizing them by the means of a theory. The modern

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MARXIAN DOGMA AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF RELIGION

J. Monnerot uses *le déplacement du sacré* as the key psychological mechanism in the rise and the development of Communism. He understands by this the repression of religious experience which takes place in modern man under the impact of science, on one hand, and the displacement of the repressed religious need into various fields of secular activity on the other. This constitutes, in our opinion, a useful application to sociology of two fundamental psycho-analytical concepts, that of repression and that of displacement. That is why we should like to show its importance for the understanding of the Communist way of life.

The origin of the specific relation between religion and Communism is illustrated by the critique of religion made by the Hegelian group of the left, Marx being one of them. Starting from the Hegelian scheme of the historical embodiment of reason, F. Strauss attempted to determine the historical element in the structure of Christianity. Thus, the empirical conditions of Jewish society and of the Greco-Roman world constituted for him important elements in the rise of Christianity. L. Feuerbach, another representative of the same group, was the first to formulate a radical critique of religion from this specific point of view. The origins of religion are, according to him, purely empirical. Moreover, no transcendental element enters into the composition of religion. 'God is man's son' is the inevitable conclusion of Feuerbach's point of view.

Feuerbach's critique constitutes the starting point of Marx's view on religion. But it is the starting point only. For Feuerbach, though maintaining that religious modes of representation are projections of the material conditions of man, does not go deeply enough into the implications of this assertion. He declares himself incapable of understanding the manner in which the material conditions of human life are transformed into religious representations. Between

proletariat proceeds in the same way; it generalizes its own case and transforms the world into a universal workers' society.

The dogmatic attitude of psycho-analysts does not consist in the personal and subjective source of their knowledge, but in their tendency to subtract this knowledge from the influence of any personal and relative factor. They mistrust and suspect anyone who discriminates between various aspects of their doctrine. If psycho-analysis is accepted it should be accepted as an indivisible truth, and its practice carried out in an 'orthodox' manner. Like Communists they have their own heretics, and like Communists also, they systematically fail to see the point of view of their opponent. A Freudian would explain any anti-Freudian attitude as a 'defence mechanism', as a refusal to recognize the sexual essence of the psyche. A Marxist would call his opponent a 'bourgeois', meaning by this that he has strong economic and social reasons for opposing Marxism.

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these two categories of factors there is an unconscious process, a vacuum. It is precisely on this vacuum that Marx wants to build up his own view on religion. To start with, he arbitrarily fills the vacuum with reason. Consequently religion becomes, for him, a purposive action. It is, in fact, a tool created and used by the ruling classes for their economic and political purposes. It is worth while analysing the bearing of this conception on religious experience, and on its repression in particular, in a Communist society.

Marx has an ambivalent attitude towards religion. As a representative of scientific rationalism, he sees in religion a simple 'mystification' of reality, and as such, opposes it, as he opposes any form of faith. From this point of view, he is in a far more advanced position than Feuerbach. For him religion is not only a purely empirical phenomenon, but a disturbing element in the rational scheme of the universe, an ill-intended action, and an important source of man's exploitation by man. Here Marx is in almost the same position as Freud; religion is a form of maladjustment, and as such it should be 'suppressed' by reason.

As mentioned before, Marx's period is one of enthusiastic belief in the power of science and reason.* This makes it easier for him to find outlets for repressed religious feelings and needs. The rational order of history, extracted from the 'scientific' analysis of modern society, and expressed in the doctrine of historical materialism, captures all his faith and power of worship. Therefore, unlike Feuerbach, Marx shows signs of an exceptional power to displace religious needs in other fields of activity. For Feuerbach God is dead, and in that he is a representative of European nihilism. Marx's mind cannot be kept for long in a negative position. If God is dead he 'calls for new Gods'; he even sees the concrete image of Him in the modern proletariat.

Marx's attitude towards religion is that of a disillusioned fanatic, rather than that of a cold scientist resigned to a Godless universe. He uses the rationalistic critique of Christianity only to pave the way for another Messiah.

It is the same psychological pattern that works in the proletariat. The proletariat's position towards religion is only indirectly affected by the progress of science. Its faith is primarily shaken by its misfortunes which led to its lack of solidarity with modern society. The

*Marx and Engels only express a current opinion when they claim that the salvation of mankind will come from science. In the society conceived by them, the throne of religion will be usurped by science. 'In the history of natural science', writes Engels, 'God is treated by his defenders as Frederick Wilhelm II was by his generals and servants in the campaign of Jena. Little by little the whole army capitulates; the fortresses one after another fall in front of the advance of science which ends by conquering the infinite domain of nature with no place for the Creator's refuge.' (*Dialectique de la Nature*, Paris, 1950, pp. 264-5.)

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Marxian doctrine and the activity of the Communist Party precipitated the repression and the displacement of the proletariat's need for religion. They produced a positive and a negative transference of religious need, at the same time. For, according to the Marxian doctrine, the God who failed to help the proletariat is not its own God, but the God of its enemy, the ruling class. Thus, the old God became the bad God, and as such, it was expelled from consciousness. But in spite of this, the modern proletariat was even less prepared than Marx to accept a Godless universe. For the same doctrine which helped it to expel the old God, helped it to create its own Gods. The operation which takes place is the displacement, rather than the suppression, of religious need. Once the religious need was detached from a transcendental object, it was successfully displaced upon various empirical objects such as the 'human species', the proletariat as a social class, the Party, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev . . . This process is still operating in various forms, depending on the historical setting of various Communist societies. The basic formula is: Your God is dead, long live 'our' God.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

According to an opinion supported in many psychological and sociological quarters, Russian Communism is in essence a religious phenomenon. More precisely, it is an example of secular religion. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the repression of religious experiences taking place in modern society in general, and in Communist society in particular, and in the displacement of religious need upon a series of empirically definable situations such as an ideology, a political party, or a leader.

We do not question the existence of the processes of repression and displacement in Communist society. Yet we can hardly agree that this results in a real religious phenomenon. Since the analysis of such an important question of principle would take us far beyond the purpose of this study, we have to confine ourselves to the main points of our own position as follows:

The transference of the repressed need of sacredness does not mean that a new religion is created, nor even that a new kind of religious experience is in course of development. It merely means that man is in need of an absolute point of reference in life, in need of a dogmatic knowledge, or in need of establishing a relationship of absolute dependence between himself and a certain empirical condition of life. There is more than one way of fulfilling this need; it can be fulfilled by metaphysics, by art, by science, or by a political act. It can also be achieved by the simple act of friendship or love. But, though all of these manifestations are motivated by the human need for abso-

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lute dependence and security, none of them can be said to touch the essence of religion. For, apart from its motivation, religion consists in a particular expression of human inner experiences rooted in the need for absolute dependence. In this expression, which takes place at the conscious level of mind, lies the essence of religious experience. Briefly speaking, the essence of religious experience consists in the freedom of the individual's consciousness to link itself by 'faith' with a transcendent world, to call that world 'God', and to base the meaning of life on this. Religion is opposed to any act by which man limits himself to an empirical condition of life.

The mistake of those who consider Communism as a religious phenomenon springs from the fact that they take too narrow a view of religion. They reduce religion to some particular condition of mind such as projection, compensation, or, generally speaking, the urge to escape an empirically definable insecurity. All these are, in our own opinion, aspects of religion, but they do not make religion. They form the contents of the psychology of religion, not of religion itself.

The psychology of religion starts off from the point that religious belief is an answer to a state of insecurity. Consequently, it studies certain empirically definable states of insecurity, in children or in certain communities, and infers from this the rise and development of religious behaviour in general. The interest of psychology is concentrated on motivation, which is defined as a certain state of insecurity in the human mind. But the psychologists often gloss over the important fact that, from this angle, they can never grasp the essence of religion. For at this level of motivation they cannot quite distinguish between a religious experience, a crime, or incest. An historically and empirically conditioned state of insecurity can express itself as an outburst of religious feeling, as an aggressive war, or as a collapse of any kind of faith.

It is true that religion, as the need for sacredness in life, is the answer to a state of insecurity in man. Yet this state is not a 'certain' state created under certain empirical conditions. It is rather *the state* of insecurity and incompleteness which characterizes the human condition as a whole. Religious experience transcends the historical condition of man in that it answers the insecurity of the human condition in general. We hasten to say that this insecurity of the human condition in general is not a metaphysical phenomenon. Its peculiarity is that it is far more difficult to define than any specific state of insecurity and thus it cannot readily form the object of an empirical science.

These are the main reasons why we think that Communism, though displaying a series of religious symptoms, is not a religious phenomenon. Communist dogma manifested in the Communists' belief in

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the Marxian doctrine, in their readiness to accept the words of their leaders as sacred, is rooted in a certain need for security, created in the modern proletariat and in the Russian people by specific historical conditions. The immanent rational order as described by historical materialism, the belief in the historical mission of the working-class, and the worshipping of Communist leaders satisfy this particular state of insecurity. These manifestations are no more religious than the child's belief in the strength of his father, or the adolescent's worship of his girl-friend. They do not answer the fundamental need for the sacred and transcendent in man. The first proof of this is the fact that in Communist society religious need is experienced by people alongside political dogmatism. The 1936 Constitution makes only a start in the acknowledgement of the existence of a genuine religious need in Soviet Russia.

In conclusion one can say that Communist society displays a crisis for the sacred in life, rather than an impulse to make life sacred. True religion cannot exist in a culture-pattern where life is deprived of its transcendental dimension. The dogmatic assertion of an immanent rational order, and the belief in the Party and its leaders as the agents of this order, do not have a religious meaning. They do not express a need to transcend an empirical condition, but rather a strong need for the rationalization of an empirical state of insecurity created in a group.

COMMUNIST DOGMA AS A SYMPTOM OF OVER-RATIONALIZATION

We have said already that dogma and dogmatic inclinations result from the invasion of consciousness by unconscious irrational factors, disguised in rational forms. The emotional conditions of Marx and the modern proletariat, their fears, their insecurity and hopes crystallized at the conscious level of the mind in a series of scientific laws which demonstrate the rational articulation of the world. How can we prove that the fundamental concepts of the Marxian doctrine are disguised emotional factors? The main proof consists in the fact that their acceptance or refusal is on no account determined by the logical norms of human understanding. Who can prove empirically, or who can conclude from the logical analysis of the data furnished by nineteenth-century science, the materiality of the universe, or the economic substance of human society, or the destiny of the modern proletariat which is described in such precise terms by Marx? Man's decision on issues like these comes from behind, sometimes in spite of, the rational laws of his mind. It is faith, rather than scientific proof, that has the last word on these big issues. The modern proletariat regards the fundamental ideas of Marxian philo-

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sophy as absolute truth, and not as empirically founded concepts, for the simple reason that they justify in an objective manner its emotional situation, its fears, aggression and hopes. In this lies the main source of the dogmatic character of these ideas, and of the unflinching belief Communists have in the truth which they express. Any doubt about these ideas, and any allowance made for their opponents, constitutes a relapse to insecurity and darkness over the future of the proletariat and of those identified with it.

We cannot understand the origin and the function of dogma in Communist society except as an excess of rationalization. This process can be viewed from two main aspects, a cultural and a psychological one.

One of the main characteristics of the period in which Communist ideology crystallized consisted in man's tendency to establish scientific laws in the field of history and of social sciences. Marx himself extended the power of reason, under its most precise formulation, as scientific laws, in the field of economics and sociology. By implication he extended the same rational pattern in the field of psychology, to the extent to which he considered psychological phenomena causally connected with social and economic factors. In this field, however, rational laws, functioning according to the model of physical science, cannot be maintained without falling into a dogmatic attitude, that is, without entrusting these laws with power which does not entirely derive from the facts to which they refer. This is precisely what Marx does. He bases his scientific claim in the field of sociology and psychology upon a set of absolute truths. The materiality of the universe is the first and the most important of these truths. If every sociological and psychological phenomenon depends ultimately on material factors, then the claim to treat the field of sociology and psychology in the manner of physical science is fully justified. Thus, the prestige of science characteristic of his period made Marx apply its pattern in all fields of life, the result of which is an excessive rationalization which is inherited by his followers. The frequent use of scientific language made by Marx and by present-day Communists is often a simple means by which they declare their ideas objective and sacrosanct.

From the psychological point of view the process of over-rationalization is rooted in the emotional state of insecurity, intensively experienced by the modern proletariat. Rationalization is, in this case, something like a compulsory ritual, by which the proletariat acts out a deeply repressed desire for security. Thus, the mind of the proletariat has a permanent need to accept and create schemes of understanding and action, by which its position in life is assured in advance with mathematical certitude.

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This is the proper place to say something about the almost obsessive concern with 'reason' and 'consciousness' so characteristic of Communists. Communists flatter themselves that in their own world the economic, social and political processes are very little, if at all, subjected to chance. In contrast with Fascists, they never base their actions on feelings or momentary impulses. Consequently they are never too tired to state to themselves and to others the 'reasons' of their action. Any task given to a Communist has to be based on rational motives. He is asked to repeat and to appropriate the whole range of reasons presented according to the Party line until it is made certain that there is no place for doubt and no need for further debate in his mind. At their meetings, Communists debate for hours and days on points, which to any outsider seem trivial details, until the reasons for their final decision appear clear in the mind of each member.

The Communist trials illustrate best their excessive need for rationalization. In the first place, they never pass sentence without trial, as the Nazis often did. Moreover, they are never satisfied if the defendant accepts his sentence passively. They ask him to analyse himself and to find the reasons for his offence or crime, and they prepare him to this end by various techniques. He has to *argue and to plead* against himself. Bukharin can be mentioned as a typical example.

Needless to say, the 'reasons' offered by defendants have a peculiar character. They are intelligible only to the mind which accepts as dogma the principles of dialectical materialism. For when a Communist rationalizes, he does not justify his action in the light of logical thought, but interprets his own problems according to the requirements of class consciousness, with the structure of which we shall deal in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Communist Type of Personality

'To our grandfathers a house, a well, a tower, even their clothes were infinitely more familiar. Every object was for them a vase in which they preserved something human. Nowadays we are invaded from America by empty and indifferent things, things which are the product of imagination and which deceive us by their likeness to life. A house in an American sense, an American fruit, or a vineyard have nothing in common with the fruit and vineyard which moved the feelings and the thoughts of our ancestors.'

R. M. RILKE

THE COMMUNIST PATTERN OF INDIVIDUATION

We have so far described the most characteristic factors, sociological and psychological, contributing to the rise and development of the Communist way of life. Our approach has been essentially analytical. The factors dealt with were regarded as parts or traits of various culture-patterns, of various groups, and of various personalities, such as Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. In this final chapter we endeavour to look at our subject from a structural standpoint. Namely, the various stages, and traits of modern Communism, spread throughout the modern period of various communities, will be regarded as forming a structure of their own, basically opposed to the democratic way of life. We refer to this structure as the Communist pattern of individuation, in the sense that it contains the dynamics and the main characteristics of the contemporary Communist way of life. The individuals developing within this structure are inclined to form a Communist type of personality, and to build up a Communist type of society. We fully realize that an adequate description of the composition of the Communist pattern of individuation requires a deeper socio-psychological knowledge of the modern era than is available at the present. In what follows we can but outline the main social and psychological factors entering into its composition.

1. The disruptive changes in the emotional pattern of Western man taking place during the modern era form, in our opinion, the basic element in the Communist pattern of individuation. Firstly,

secularization brought about the detachment of human feelings from the sacred symbols of life. Secondly, the dissolution of the medieval community compelled the individual to sever his emotional ties with the secular symbols of absolute power, as well as with all values of a traditional way of life. A period of deep crisis in human emotional behaviour had thereby begun and its effects are visible throughout the modern era. The crisis was produced by a lack of an adequate object for human emotionality which was previously adjusted to a system of absolute beliefs and values. One can speak, in this context, of a period of free floating emotionality during which man was in search of objects which could satisfy his basic emotional needs; Godlike objects, which could absorb all his needs for love, dependance, security, and faith, or Satanic objects on which he could project all his hatred and aggression.

The disorganization of the system of beliefs aroused in man a state of instability and availability for any sort of belief, however absurd. The first clear signs of this were visible towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the midst of the rationalistic spirit of the age, one could notice a strange resurrection of mystic beliefs. Tocqueville describes the period preceding the Revolution as 'a strange instance of belief in every form of absurdity'.* This is the period of innumerable sects and mystic doctrines such as those of Swedenborg, of the Martinists, Freemasons, Illuminists, of the Rosicrucians, Mesmerists and others.

While the need for objects of emotional attachment and faith aroused a state of credulity, the search for these objects set to work the process of displacement of man's religious faith. The modern period of secular myths started in this way. The myth of Nature was built up to the extent to which man, freed from his ties with the sacred order, found in natural objects scope for his need for admiration. The myth of man grew up during the same period under a great variety of forms. The myth of human reason and science, the myth of humanity, of individuality, of the State, the myth of the proletariat are the most important of them. The human mind was ready for any species of enthusiasm.

The rapid change in the system of beliefs, and above all, the readiness for any sort of belief had, in time, a structural effect on the human mind. Towards the end of the eighteenth century one could distinguish the prefiguration of a new type of man in Western civilization. This was a man with inflammable mind, a fanatic, and, at the same time, a man who had no fundamental faith, no stable set of values which guide and put a check upon his imagination and will. His enthusiasm and determination showed that he was

**The State and Society in France*, p. 281.

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thirsty for security, rather that he was secure in himself. Surprisingly near to this type of man were the representatives of the second generation of revolutionaries in France who, according to Tocqueville ' . . . no longer knew either to what to cling, or where to stop; thus arose *a hitherto unknown species of revolutionists*, who carried their boldness to a pitch of madness, who were surprised by no novelty and arrested by no scruple, and who never hesitated to put any design whatever into execution'.* It might well be that Tocqueville drew this picture after some outstanding figures of the Revolution, but it is also very likely that, owing to his exceptional fondness for 'ideal types', he refers here rather to a series of tendencies existing in the atmosphere of the Revolution, that is, to a climate of individuation, rather than to particular individuals.

2. The same process which set human need for faith on endless wanderings led to the liberation of human reason from the fixed order of the medieval world. Man is, however, much more adjustable in his intellect than in his emotionality. Once escaped from the tutelage of divine reason, he directed all his curiosity and power of understanding towards Nature and himself. One can see in this the beginning of modern philosophy and science. But this does not interest us here. The important point is that human reason functioning in a climate with no stable system of beliefs, with no fundamental faith, soon became itself the object of faith; it became the omnipotent reason. It is this aspect in the evolution of human reason that can be called the myth of reason, and which forms a basic feature in the Communist pattern of individuation. We must be more explicit on this point.

The social and cultural climate in which the French men of letters of the mid eighteenth century lived can be taken as an illustrative example of the working of the myth of reason. Being socially and politically isolated, these men built up in their own minds the model of a new society. They all started from the presupposition that no real social progress was possible unless the complicated traditional customs which governed the society of their time were replaced by simple rules derived from reason. Thus they opposed to their society a product of reason.

It is obvious that the attitude of these men of letters was motivated by a series of beliefs regarding the character of human reason. First of all they believed that human nature was fundamentally rational, and that the most natural society was a rational one. They also believed that reason had the power of self-realization, and particularly the power to reform human society. What was rational was, in their eyes, socially feasible. Consequently they saw in the rational

**Op. cit.*, p. 192. Italics mine.

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principles of freedom, equality and fraternity the safest guide for human social action.

The beliefs mentioned above could not be justified by the progress made in the knowledge of human nature characteristic of that period. No such progress could demonstrate the rational character of human nature and human society. The real source of these beliefs is to be found in the deep change which occurred in man's emotional pattern. Step by step with the weakening of the faith in a pre-established order, supported by tradition and by transcendental reason, man placed his need for stability and security on to human reason. It is important to note that reason became omnipotent in the measure in which its functions were unconsciously impregnated with emotional factors. Therefore man's enslavement to the power of reason began when reason was called upon to satisfy the emotional expectations of the type of man who had lost his faith in the traditional order of his society, and in the divine order of his universe. In this case, the functions of reason were primarily to supply man with an area of security. The belief (the hypothesis) in the rational nature of man, of society and of the universe sprang up with the compulsive force of a deep anxiety. Since Nature, man, and society were rational, nothing could happen outside the limits of the knowable and the foreseeable. Historically speaking, this was the period of the 'great systems', the function of which was to strengthen man's need for security, by a rational organization of life. In all of them, one can see the idea of a strong machinelike State which can do with man 'what it pleases' (Bodeau). The model of government was Imperial China, the most bureaucratic society which ever existed. Economic planning and a communistic conception of social life were only extreme expressions of this strong need for rational organization. Morelly, in *Code de la Nature*, published in 1755, outlined the principles of common ownership, of uniformity in human dwelling, and even the necessity of having all children, after the age of five, taken from their parents, and brought up in common at the State's expense.

It has often been said that the ideologues of the French Revolution did not pay enough attention to the practical aspect of their ideas. This is true, but the real reason for this lies not in their ignorance of political life of their time. In fact, they took it for granted that their theories were applicable as they stood. Moreover, from the psychological analysis of their writings, one can deduce that their interest was as great in practical action as in their theoretical schemes. Their ideas were impregnated with an ardent urge for action, so that they can truly be called *Idées forces*. No wonder that they induced in the people of that age—and in many subsequent generations—an irre-

sistible impulse for action in the practical field of life. In this lies another aspect of the myth of reason which entered into the Communist pattern of individuation.

One usually says that reason is, according to the ideologues just mentioned, endowed with will power. Our interest in this matter is, however, less metaphysical and more psychological. In this respect it should be pointed out that the cultural climate of that period supported the belief that once the rational order of society is known, man is naturally attracted by it, and has the will to realize it. Moreover he cannot feel and will otherwise. In this belief is to be found the first image of a monolithic man, a man ready to give himself entirely to the requirements of any specific task derived from the rational order of his society. The Communist type of man is a late variation of this human type.

This is the right place to avoid a possible misunderstanding. We have made it clear, in a previous chapter, that we do not consider Rousseau as the forefather of the present totalitarian man. We think in the same way about other ideologues, and even men of action, of the French Revolution. Nor do we consider Hegel as a prefiguration of the totalitarian man. We have to confess, however, that our present interest lies in certain ways of thinking, feeling and acting, rather than in certain individual personalities. In this sense, it is obvious that Rousseau's, Saint-Just's, or Hegel's thought contains elements which later entered into the composition of the social and psychological climate in which the Communist type of personality and group originated. But in order to understand the origins of the present-day Communist man and society, one has to bear in mind the complexity of that climate. It is true, for instance, that one finds in the French revolutionaries, and even more explicitly in Hegel, the belief in the rational nature of man and society, as well as the belief in the power of reason to embody itself in super-individual structures of life, such as the people, the State, monarchic institutions, etc. But what differentiates the French revolutionaries and Hegel from the real fathers of the present-day Communist way of life is their conception of reason. Though they lost the faith in a divine order, the French revolutionaries conceived the reforms dictated by reason as carried out within the limits of moral conscience. They believed in the dignity of man, and in the ideals of freedom and fraternity. The atmosphere in which both the eighteenth-century ideologues and the Romantic idealists lived and worked conveys the feeling of human spontaneity in the realization of the order of reason. This cannot be said about the atmosphere in which the fathers of contemporary Communism lived. For though, on the one hand, their belief in the rational pattern of life was still strong, on the other

hand they could no longer believe that man, as individual or as a group, could conform to this pattern guided solely by the light of his own reason; they no longer believed in the dignity of man and in the guiding principles of human conscience. Karl Marx, an outstanding representative of this new cultural and psychological climate, while recognizing the rational laws governing human mind and society, mistrusts at the same time man's power to conform freely to these laws. He assigns to a special political party the task of compelling men to realize the laws of reason, that is, of compelling necessity to take place. Thus the pressure put upon men is so great that they cannot respect any moral value in their actions towards the realization of the schemes of reason. Reason is no longer 'moral', but 'mechanical', it has its end in itself, not in man. It is this compulsive and mechanical note that constitutes the most striking difference between the eighteenth-century idealistic rationalism and the mid-nineteenth-century materialistic rationalism. And it is this note that places Marx, Engels, Lenin, and their followers in a different psychological category from that of Rousseau and Hegel. This is the main reason why the former type of rationalism is a component of the cultural climate of democracy, while the latter, is a component of Communism.

There is no special need to discuss here in detail the sources of this compulsive trait. Since this has been the central problem of a series of foregoing chapters, we can confine ourselves to outlining its main aspects as follows:—

A. The disillusionment with the great ideals of the age of reason, which began to be felt towards the mid nineteenth century, led to a materialistic type of rationalism, and to the substitution of moral by physical necessity in the attainment of a rational order in life. B. The rise of the modern proletariat with its almost morbid urge for security. C. The crystallization of the mental trends found in both the intellectuals and the proletariat into the Communist Party. D. The specific intensity with which the Russian Intelligentsia was driven towards the making of a new society. E. The appearance in the cultural and political field of the nineteenth century of personalities such as Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, who, because of their inner conflicts, manifested compulsive tendencies for change and self-realization.

This is, in brief, the social and psychological constellation of the present-day Communist way of life. The fusion of all these traits has laid the foundation of a specific pattern of individuation, the product of which is the Communist type of personality. In what follows we shall describe the mental structure of this type as it is manifested by its latest and most accurate edition, the Bolshevik man.

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CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: THE NUCLEUS OF THE COMMUNIST TYPE OF PERSONALITY

As the term 'class consciousness' occupies a key position in Communist ideology, anyone studying the Communist type of personality has sooner or later to come to grips with it. In the present study its use is merely technical. It is the term used by Marxist ideologists and the Soviet psychologists for the mental structure characteristic of the individual members of a Communist society. In its broadest sense, it can be defined as the individual's self-awareness as a member of a group. In this sense, it can also be called social consciousness. The Soviet psychology emphasizes the elementary fact that the individual cannot live except in society, therefore his most adequate form of self-consciousness is as a member, or as a participant. Needless to say, the most natural form of society is that organized by the Communist Party, and therefore the highest form of self-awareness is as a Party member. In this sense, the partisan character of the human mind enters in the definition of the Communist personality.

For the definition of social class it is worth noting that the concept of human natural group is, for Marx, identical with that of social class, and the social class rather than the individual is the natural unit of human existence. Marx's approach to this problem is by no means psychological. The main difference between man and animal consists, according to him, in the fact that 'man creates his own history'. Or rather, he does so only to the extent to which he becomes an active factor in the process of production, that is, only to the extent to which he acts as a class.

The social class is an economic category, i.e., a decisive factor in production. It can, however, become a psychological one to the extent to which the individual identifies himself with his class and becomes by this an active factor in history. Marx frequently gives the impression that the social class is an 'incarnated' economic category and as such it behaves as a personality having its own ego and consciousness. Sometimes the bourgeoisie is depicted by him as a hero disguised as a Roman, and the proletariat as an invincible soldier marked with cicatrices. But despite all these suggestive images, Marx fails to define in clear terms what he means by class consciousness. In what follows we attempt to describe the structure and the functioning of class consciousness, basing our account on the analysis of the theoretical material found in various Communist ideologists, as well as on personal observation of various Communist personalities and groups.

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THE STRUCTURE OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Since the historical context in which the modern proletariat grew conscious of itself explains to a great extent the composition of class consciousness, we repeat here its main features: The modern proletariat became conscious of itself as a class during a period of social and economic crises. The main psychological effects of these crises on the proletariat are two: 1. A deep feeling of frustration and insecurity, and 2. Aggression towards the causes of frustration, the employers and their society. Thus the process of separation from, and conflict with a hostile world, lies at the basis of the self-consciousness of the modern proletariat.

The emotional experiences aroused by the historical conditions mentioned above form, by their intensity, a 'complex' in the members of the proletariat. This 'complex' has generated similar experiences in many generations of individuals belonging to the proletariat, from its early days to its subsequent development in the Communist parties and societies of to-day. Thus the traumatic experiences of the early days of the modern proletariat have emerged into a general frame of mind by which the Communist man perceives his world.

It is not easy to define the basic feature of class consciousness, namely, its collective character. One is inclined to believe that the collective traits of class consciousness are of primitive-irrational nature. The proletariat's solidarity is rooted in the emotional state of a group undergoing conditions of stress. The Communist's identification with his Party, and his unconditional surrender to the requirements of his society show little of a rational type of integration. But on the other hand, class consciousness is expressed also by the rational laws of dialectical materialism. It would therefore follow that the community between members of the proletariat is motivated by rational principles. And yet it is hard to believe that class consciousness is a rational structure. Responsible for this is its practical character.

'The question as to whether human thought is objectively true is a practical, not a theoretical, question', says Marx (*Theses on Feuerbach.*) Or rather, it is precisely the definition of *praxis* that discloses the irrational character of class consciousness. For in the last analysis, the criterion of *praxis* is to be found in a sort of instinct which guides the working class—organized by the Party—towards a dominant position in modern society. The laws of dialectical materialism are permanently controlled by a fundamental emotional situation, defined either as fear and suspicion, or as aggressive need for security. Everything is true and objective that satisfies this situation. Though Communists often speak the language of the universal laws

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of the human mind, one feels that class consciousness, that is, their consciousness, has no formal laws of organization. It has only a set of final goals. Logic, as a set of fixed rules regarding its own activity, has no meaning for it. In its activities, it takes various shapes, and it uses various standards; it might appear as its very opposite, as during the NEP period, or during the Soviet-German alliance of 1939. The only criterion of its activity consists in the final and total success of the Party and anything instrumental to this is true, real and primarily practical.

Class consciousness is not fully understood unless one distinguishes within its structure two sets of categories, a superficial set of rational categories, and a deep set of emotional categories.

The first set of categories of class consciousness consists in the main principles of dialectical materialism—the materiality of the world, the principle of the whole, the principle of contradiction or of the power of the negative, and the principle of transformation. According to the first principle, the individual with class consciousness cannot be satisfied in his knowledge until everything in his universe is reduced to palpable material causes. He cannot accept spiritual causes, or indeterminateness. The principle of the whole implies that the knowledge based on the structure of class consciousness is not adequate until each particular phenomenon becomes a function in the structure, or a momentum in the evolution of the universe as depicted by the Party's doctrine. This is the totalitarian principle of class consciousness formulated by Zhdanov in 1947 as the 'partisan' character of human knowledge. The third condition of truth is laid down by the principle of transformation. Class consciousness is not satisfied unless it is fully aware of the fundamental fact that everything is in process of radical change. The principle of contradiction, or of the power of the negative, constitutes the fourth condition of truth. This implies that the relationships between things are more adequately expressed in terms of their contradiction, than of their identity. The elements of the dialectical universe condition each other by mutual struggle.

The important fact should be noticed that these categories do not behave like formal laws of human consciousness, but like concrete categories of existence. This can be proved in two main ways.

A. The Communists hold the belief that the categories of class consciousness are external realities. Matter itself is constituted according to the principles of dialectical materialism, and class consciousness does nothing but mirror the dialectical articulation of the universe. Engels in *Anti-Dühring* and Lenin in *Empirio-Criticism* can, on this point, be classified as typical representatives of a naïve realism.

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B. As a consequence of this, the Communists conceive the categories of class consciousness as material forces working in the universe. One of the concrete forms of the category of matter is identified with the economic factor of human society. The category of the whole is materialized by the Party, 'that great whole', as Lenin called it; the category of transformation is materialized by the social evolution as described by historical materialism; the category of contradiction is rendered concrete in the class-struggle, in a class society, and in the struggle between the new and the old, in a classless society. If the Communists cannot see the world in the function of these material forces their theoretical and practical certitude is completely lost.

As stated before, class consciousness possesses a second set of categories, emotional categories. Considering their concrete character, we can call them existential categories, for their structure and functioning bear close similarity to those structural factors of human consciousness which Kierkegaard and his followers opposed to the formal laws of reason. Kierkegaard spoke of faith as the main existential category the function of which was to promote identification with the truth. Since faith is not peculiar to class consciousness, we shall pass on to a series of other emotional categories defining the structure of class consciousness.

1. The presence of an enemy is a condition of life for a Communist. This attitude can never be explained factually by the analysis of the empirical conditions of a given conflict. Hostile feeling is in fact a category of class consciousness. As such it is a condition of the Communist's perception of the world and a presupposition of its action, in precisely the same manner in which causal determination is a condition of the scientific perception of and action upon the material world.

The modes under which this emotional category works are of a great variety. The most general one can be described as a tension aroused by the permanent awareness of a danger or of an enemy. Aggression or ruthlessness are to a Communist simple techniques of dealing with situations in which the presence of bitter opposition is an *a priori*. Thus conciliation and compromise, if they ever occur, should be regarded as tactical steps and by no means as abrogation from the fundamental law of hostility.

Suspicion is another manifestation of this emotional category of class consciousness. The important fact should be pointed out that suspicion is a general attitude in a Communist society. For it is suspicion that defines the essence of the inter-individual contact in such a society. 'The other' is first of all a potential enemy. This attitude is shown not only to outsiders but also to the Party members.

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No one who ever joined a Communist Party could escape the feeling that, for a period of time, he was under heavy suspicion from his own 'comrades', and that the intensity of this attitude could in time diminish, but the attitude as such never disappeared. Because of this attitude, the new convert has always the feeling of expiation and quite often he becomes suspicious of himself.

The identification of the enemy is a condition of life in a Communist group. For the enemy certainly exists. It remains only to be identified and fought. This is one of the main tasks of the Communist leaders, of the secret police and of every Party member. This is the very source of Communist 'vigilance'. The internal enemy cannot be so easily identified as the external one, the class enemy. That is why, in a Communist group, special techniques have been developed for the discovery of the internal enemy. Special agents are entrusted with the task of engaging the Party members in discussion on various points concerning the 'line'. Needless to say these agents work on the assumption of the necessary existence of the internal enemy. Consequently their technique is that of a 'provocateur'. The result of this is seen in the periodical 'purges' taking place in every Communist organization.*

2. The anxiety for change can be considered as the second existential category of class consciousness. This cannot simply be reduced to the abstract category of evolution. Communists feel the need to be assured as often as possible that the conditions of their life are in permanent transformation. They experience day by day this dimension of life, and express it under countless forms such as increased production, better organization, growth of the Party . . . Life in their world has certainly acquired a new tempo which can be compared only with that of the early days of the Renaissance, or of the industrial revolution. But while in the former two cases the new tempo touched primarily, if not exclusively, town life, in Soviet Russia it includes country life as well. The tower clock striking every quarter, so characteristic of the Italian cities of the Renaissance,

*One can talk also about directions and mechanisms in the process of enemy identification. It is usual for a Communist organization to identify the enemy outside itself as a class enemy, as reactionary movements, or as the capitalist world in general. Consequently the fears, the suspicions, and the aggression existing at the basis of class consciousness are projected on to these various inimical objects. But the same suspicion and aggression can take quite an opposite direction by being projected on the organization itself. The outcome of this is the self-criticism which is one of the fundamental techniques of a Communist Party. In the light of what we have said so far with regard to the structure of class consciousness, self-criticism is undoubtedly another mode of manifestation of the emotional category of hostility. Psychologically it is a form of self-aggression which has been translated at the cultural level by Zhdanov as a fundamental principle of progress in Soviet society. (Zhdanov, *op. cit.*)

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has become in Soviet Russia one of the masters of the Kolkhoz life.

Change engenders an optimistic state of mind in Communists. This is because one of their inner tensions—the frustrated desire for change in the modern proletariat—is reduced. Consequently they are able to bear any strain and to work hard at any time if only they feel that the world is changing. No wonder that the word ‘progressive’ carries such a heavy meaning with them. Activity in a Communist organization has always something of a neurotic character as if it were motivated by unconscious conflicts. The Party members are almost permanently on the job, and often they collapse of exhaustion like soldiers after a hard battle. There is hardly a job finished and their conscience is worried about what is to be done. One of the greatest dangers in a Communist society is to ‘get drunk on victory’.

3. The need for unity is another existential category of class consciousness. Whoever has lived in a Communist society must have noticed that the mental capacity of the Party members rises to a higher level when working in a group. Dull, uneducated, impulsive and superficial people, when in ‘committee’, take decisions which reveal clear-sightedness and a power of understanding which can hardly be attributed to any of them separately. Reaction in group, united front, etc., seem to be forms of acting out the fear of aloneness and separatedness in modern proletariat. Stalin was successful with his early slogan ‘unity above all’ precisely because he appealed to a category of class consciousness. The ritualistic appeal to unity occurring in every Communist society—Malenkov made one at Stalin’s death—has one and the same source. It does not really mean the presence of an inner opposition and rebellion, as it is often believed, but is rather an outcome of a basic feature of class consciousness. In its negative aspect, the same feature of class consciousness explains the fear and idiosyncrasy manifested by Communists towards opposition and split. It also explains a great deal of the defendant’s reaction in a Communist trial. A disgraced Communist is prepared to do anything in order to regain the favour of the Party, be that favour only a motherly look before he dies.*

*‘Isolation’ is one of the main methods of punishment in a Communist organization. The isolated individual is, without being told beforehand, regarded as polluted; nobody would speak to or contact him. From our own observation of a series of cases of isolation in a group of Communist prisoners in Rumania (1943–4) we came to the conclusion that this method has an immediate and disastrous effect on the individual’s mind. In a matter of days of isolation the victims showed clear signs of powerful mental conflicts. Their moral collapse was a certainty. Sooner or later they were capable of doing anything to escape the situation; they ask to be put on trial, to be sentenced . . . Some of them attempted suicide. The emotional symptoms are on the whole those of an infant separated from his mother.

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As a general characterization of the existential categories of class consciousness, one can say that their most outstanding trait consists in their universality. For one can easily meet Communists whose activities show little or no use of the first set of categories, embodied in the doctrine of dialectical materialism, but it is almost impossible to meet one whose behaviour does not disclose in one way or another the working of the second set of categories. The origin of these categories lies in the historical complex which gave birth to the modern Communist movements. It was in that historical context that the enemy-anxiety, the deep sense of unity, and the impending desire for change took hold of the minds of many individuals and groups who, in time, detached themselves from the rest of society and laid the foundation of the modern Communist way of life.

The first set of categories forms a superficial layer in the structure of class consciousness; it can, in fact, be regarded as a reflection at the rational level of the existential categories. Thus, the category of contradiction and the power of the negative is a rationalization of the feeling of hostility; the category of transformation is the rationalization of the anxiety of change, and the category of the whole a rationalized need for unity.

THE COMMUNIST'S PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD

The manner in which the Communist type of personality perceives and organizes his world, social and physical, can, in principle, be understood as opposed to that of the democratic personality. Thus, class consciousness is totally impervious to the category of 'individuality', and incapable of critical activity, objectivity and contemplative attitude to life. In order to demonstrate this, we shall deal with the main points concerning the relationship between the individual and class consciousness.

Individuality

There are many features of class consciousness which testify to its incapacity to work with the category of individuality, or with the category of the 'personal'. Here are the most important of them.

1. As has been shown elsewhere, one of the main traits of conscious behaviour consists in the individual's capacity to suspend his drives and desires until he can take into account the multiplicity of conditions existing in the field of reaction. At the conscious level, the schemes of behaviour are flexible and refined so as to involve in the final solution as many conditions as possible.

This type of behaviour is not possible within the limits of class consciousness. The individual behaving on the basis of his class

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consciousness is always under the pressure of a fixed goal for his reaction. He finds it difficult to discriminate and compromise between various conditions presented by the situation. His mind grasps in the situation only two categories of actors, those identified with, and those opposed to, his goal. Between these two categories there is a vacuum, for the schemes of his mind fail to grasp the 'different', the relatively opposed, or the 'gradual'. Thus, a Communist cannot understand the others' point of view except under two forms: as absolutely identical, or as absolutely opposed to his own. In both cases the 'other' as an individual is annihilated. Human dialogue is non-existent in Communist society; the choice is between unison and breaking of relations.

2. Class consciousness works with global schemes, cognitive and emotional; it distinguishes classes, or categories of things, rather than things in themselves. This results in a sort of 'factorial analysis' of reality, in the sense that the whole variety of phenomena is organized in the function of a few fundamental concepts, such as class struggle, revolutionary and reactionary factors, the transition of quantity into quality, etc. Sometimes the whole Communist world is conceived in the function of two concepts, such as heavy versus light industry, Stalinism versus Trotskyism, etc. Anything existing as a 'nuance', or having an individuality of its own is absorbed in one of these categories.*

3. While in a democracy the dominant process is that of individualization, in Communist societies the dominant process is that of depersonalization. Living in a Communist group one is often under the vivid impression that human relations do not take place between one individual and another; the individuals are but 'means' of communication of the contents of class consciousness whose only bearer is the Party. Two Communists in conversation very seldom and very reluctantly put and answer 'personal' questions. Their language seems to have lost the capacity of expressing such questions. When an 'active' Communist happens to address one of his comrades with simple formulas such as 'How are you getting on?' or 'How is your wife?' it would be wrong to think that he is interested in whether his comrade or his comrade's wife feels 'fine', 'well', or

*The schemes of class consciousness are similar to the 'archetypes' of the unconscious, as described by Jung. It is the task of the Party to infuse the individual's mind with the archetypes according to which he organizes his own experiences. To ensure that scientific ideas, for example, correspond to class consciousness, Communists have introduced the system of collective elaboration of scientific knowledge, on the ground that group activity is nearer to class consciousness than individual activity. E. Tarlé, the well-known historian, has been surrounded by a group of conscientious Party men in order to keep him within the limits of class consciousness.

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'bored stiff'. The real meaning of his questions is: 'How are you getting on with your task as a Party member?' In other words, the interlocutor's interest is in the 'principle' of life as expressed by the Party, rather than in the way in which life is experienced by a particular individual.

Signs of depersonalization can be found also in the field of practical life. In the political field, for instance, Communists have no use for the individual as an agent of decision, or as a 'vote'. Unanimity, the undifferentiated group, forms the only basis of decision in Communist societies. If unanimous decision cannot be taken, the meeting is postponed until the conditions for unanimity are ripe. According to Ignazio Silone, Stalin postponed the meeting of the Comintern several times, and reshaped its composition so as to make possible the unanimous condemnation of Trotsky.*

An important aspect of depersonalization can be seen in the structure of language in Communist societies. A special section of the Party, the *Agitprop*, is entrusted with the coinage and dissemination of stereotyped expressions so as to enable individuals to formulate their experiences in a standardized manner. Those who fail to adjust their experiences to the meaning of these expressions may become liable to serious 'deviations'.

The evolution of the Russian language since 1917 shows some characteristic aspects of the process of depersonalization taking place in Soviet society. We refer in the first place to the inclination of this language to form abstract terms by the combination of the initial letters or syllables of two or more words. There have been coined over 3,000 such terms since the Revolution. Most important from our point of view is the fact that nearly all these compound words, or abbreviations, refer to various aspects of social life. It seems, therefore, that the driving force lying behind this linguistic phenomenon consists in a tendency to codify the main factors existing in the social field, such as *Sovdep*, *Komsomol*, *Agitprop*, *Fabzavmestkom*, etc. It is easy to see that in a social field so carefully organized round a series of impersonal factors, the individual, as an agent in the field, no longer counts. He is lost under the influence of one of these factors or classes, i.e., he is *Komsomol*, *Sovdep*, *NKVD*, etc. In such a culture-pattern the dynamics of social life is conceived as rational concatenations of super-individual factors rather than as a system of inter-individual relationships. For the understanding and the control of the social field the Communist works with his formulas in the same manner as the chemist does with his. More *Komsomol*, less *Sovdep*, and the structure of society changes accordingly.

**The God that Failed. Six Studies in Communism.* London 1950.

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Speech tonality can be mentioned as another symptom of de-personalization. In Communist society, speech tonality is usually even, with no rising and falling, perfectly monotonous as if a permanent censorship acts upon the individual's voice.

In conclusion, the whole structure of the language in a Communist society prevents the individual from appearing as 'himself'; he has to appear in an official mask in cliché expressions and in a depersonalized tone. Not to talk loudly, not to talk much, not to talk according to the colour of one's feelings, are by now important canons of behaviour in such a society.*

The Critical Mind

We have devoted a whole chapter to prove the dogmatic character of class consciousness. We could, therefore, easily draw a general conclusion by saying that class consciousness is diametrically opposed to critical activity. But this would not tally with the opinion held by Communists regarding the activity of class consciousness. For they make frequent use of words such as criticism and self-criticism. Moreover, criticism is a well-established practice of the Party. Its object may be the Party's attitude towards various problems—known as the criticism of the 'line'—the behaviour of the Party members, and the 'line' of another party. This makes it even more necessary for us to demonstrate that critical activity, in its usual meaning, cannot be considered as a function of class consciousness.

The European critical mind is rooted in the conviction which is opposed to dogmatism, that the human mind, though possessing the power of knowing the truth, can make errors. The chance of error can be reduced by a permanent control over the activity of mind. The very notion of control implies an attitude of doubt towards the ways and the results of our mental activity. Doubt, as a feature of the critical mind, is a negative attitude in that it rests on the consciousness of the possibility of error. But this is counter-balanced by a positive attitude manifested in a permanent measure of precaution with the object of avoiding an incomplete or wrong application of certain basic rules of mental activity. The criterion of certainty consists, for the critical mind, in the observation of the rules of its own activity, not in the results of this activity, that is, in ideas. When these rules are not kept, the ideas, whatever they may be, have to be changed.

Communist criticism rests on the idea of 'tactics', not on that of the critical mind. This means that Communist ideas and aims are fixed as guiding stars, and that only the way towards them can be changed. A controversial discussion with a Communist makes no

*For details regarding the language in Soviet society see: Z. Barbu: *Language in Democratic and Totalitarian Societies*, Orbis, June 1953.

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sense, since he can never resort to a real correction of his mind. His notion of error is purely tactical, the turnings in the 'Party line' mean nothing but a preparation for new attacks by the same idea. Here lies the root of his 'monotony', 'stubbornness' and 'strength'.

From the practical point of view, the critical mind leads to compromise. Marxists practise the method of compromise, but they hold a special view of it. Lenin made a compromise with liberal economy during N.E.P.; Rumanian Communists made a compromise with the Monarchy, from 1944 to 1947; French Communists made a compromise with the Catholic Church, etc. But all these were essentially tactical arrangements, and sooner or later the 'eternal Communism' swept away any trace of Russian liberal economy, Rumanian Monarchy, etc. One could never notice a substantial change of Communist ideas.

Sometimes the party speaks openly about its own mistakes, but only after working out a special system of explanation. The Party cannot bear the repercussions of an error, or the feeling of guilt, and as soon as an error is committed, the responsibility is thrown on somebody outside itself, on counter-revolutionaries, or unmasked traitors. The state of duality, so characteristic of the critical mind, is completely alien to a Communist's mind. The Party is not 'a goose with two wings', says Lenin.

'Self-criticism' is a term used when a Communist recognizes his deviation from the Party line. It cannot be called critical activity because it is not based on freedom. The conclusion is always given at the very beginning, in the sense that the Party is always right. What the accused has to do, is to 'qualify' his own attitude as dangerous to the Party. The idea should be stressed that a simple recognition of fault is not enough; the accused has to confess according to the Party requirements in connexion with the trial in question, whatever the personal meaning of his mistake may have been. In the first phase of his trial, Bukharin recognized his error of being too much of an independent thinker. But this was not the right attitude. He had to strain himself to see in his earlier thoughts and actions the picture of a counter-revolutionary Bukharin, or even of a German spy.

In conclusion, a Communist cannot be critical because he is obsessed by the end his mind has to attain. His failures do not make him doubtful or prudent. The only virtues he values are tenacity and shrewdness which lead him to his aims at any cost. This fundamental attitude makes his precautions at least partly superfluous. The Communist's frequent talk about criticism often reminds one of the complete title of Beaumarchais' comedy: *Le Barbier de Seville, ou, Sur la précaution inutile.*

Objectivity

The criterion of objectivity is, in the light of class consciousness, practical, not theoretical. This gives a specific meaning to what is objective for a Communist.

The definition of the concept of practice is not clearly formulated in Marxist writings. But since 1917, Soviet experience has made it clear that 'practice' is somehow synonymous with the material condition of the working-class development towards its historical goal, Communism. Hence, an idea, or an action are objective to the extent to which they are adjusted to the conditions of the working-class development. The main implication of this is that any action—class consciousness is primarily action—carried out in a group, is objective; any action corresponds to an objective order of things if it leads to the improvement of the life condition of the group. Further, any organization, any fragmentation, and finally any distortion of reality which facilitates the historical goal of the group corresponds to reality in itself, i.e., it is objective. For instance, if the working class, organized in a political party, decide that 5 million bourgeois should die, their decision corresponds to an objective order of history.

To brand this conception of objectivity as absurd does not take us very far towards its explanation. Yet there is not much else to be said about it. Perhaps it would be helpful to re-state at this point that this particular attitude towards objectivity is rooted in a 'paranoid' concept of reality, that is, a reality which should at any cost identify itself with one's ideas of and expectations from it.

Marx rejects the activity of individual consciousness on the ground that this type of mental structure is addicted to mystification, and it coins a series of ideas about reality, and, later on, believes in their objective existence. This is even more the case with class consciousness. We have shown in an earlier chapter that class consciousness represents reality in the function of a series of ends, and that these ends are in fact projections of the traumatic experiences of the proletariat and of Marx. Therefore, even if Marx's assumptions concerning the function of individual consciousness were true, we can hardly see the advantage of class consciousness from this particular point of view.

As a consequence of the difficulties involved in the practical criterion of objectivity, contemporary Communists reject the term 'objectivity' altogether. In their view, the recognition of an internal or external reality in its own right is a bourgeois weakness called 'objectivism', to which they oppose the partisan character of human knowledge. In his criticism of G. Alexandrov's book, *The History of Western Philosophy*, Zhdanov accuses the author of having become infected with the 'objectivist' spirit of bourgeois schools, and of

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having forgotten the Party outlook in his views of Western philosophy. Zhdanov condemns Alexandrov's admission of the progressive aspects of Hegelian philosophy on the ground that this weakens the class consciousness of Soviet youth, and undermines the party vigilance. Hence, class and party conditions force Alexandrov to admit that Marx found nothing progressive in the whole bourgeois philosophy, and that it was he who built up everything from the very beginning.

In conclusion one can say that the concept of objectivity, like many other concepts of Western civilization, has been melted in the concept of 'partisanship'. Objective is everything which fits into the party picture of the world.

The Sense of Leisure

The fact that class consciousness is primarily practical implies that the sense of leisure and the contemplative attitude are not among its attributes. There is a term very much in use in a Communist society which can be adduced as a proof of this, namely, 'task'. Every Communist should have a task, at any moment of his life. This means that he has always something to do for the Party and for his community. He never finds himself in the category of the 'personal', but always in that of 'functional', or 'instrumental'.

It was Trotsky who made the observation that the Bolshevik Party could never get rid of the militaristic habits acquired during the Revolution. This seems perfectly true. A Communist society lives in permanent mobilization with all its members on duty. The sense of duty is so deep in their minds that they seem unable to make adequate distinction between expressions such as 'holiday' and 'forced labour'.

If holiday implies the individual's temporary relief from his social tasks, this carries no meaning to Communists. 'Holiday' is for them just another way of performing their tasks in the community. The highest form of leisure consists, for them, in a form of purposive rest. This means that the individual has to take a rest in the interest of the community, and in the manner in which this is arranged by his community.

THE EMOTIONAL PATTERN OF THE COMMUNIST PERSONALITY

While in democratic societies the individual patterns his emotionality according to his personal relationships with things and persons, in Communist society his emotionality is modelled according to the reality of the Party which exists between him and things, and between him and persons. The Communist has little or no use for personal

feelings, as we defined these in the first part of the present study. He makes contacts with things and persons mainly in his capacity of a Party member, and forms his emotional attitudes accordingly.

At this stage of our study it would look less of a paradox to say that a Communist lives as a 'principle', not as a person. We hasten to say that this is not a conscious process, i.e., that he consciously injects himself with joy, enthusiasm or sorrow whenever the Party requires him to do so. On the contrary, a real Communist feels elation or sorrow 'naturally' at the Party success or defeat. The reason of this lies in the fact that the Communist does not relate himself to things and events as a person. When he does so—and this may happen in any Communist society—he is in fact an emotional 'deviationist'. The recent history of the Communist movements in south-east Europe shows many cases of this kind of deviationism. The main trait of the so-called nationalist Communists, of whom Tito is an example, consists in a displaced emotionality. They are emotionally fixated to their own ethnic group, and as such they have failed to pattern their emotionality according to the requirements of the Party. There is no object of love in Communist society except the Party and the objects it stands for. The fact that in the Soviet Union 'Russia' and 'Fatherland' have recently become objects of love should be understood in a special way. 'Russia' is an object of love only to the extent that the content of this concept has been completely remodelled by nearly forty years of Communist rule. Anyone who is acquainted with the work done by propaganda in order to re-create an image of historical Russia to fit into the Party life, or with the work of 're-interpretation' carried out by Soviet historians, will certainly understand this peculiar phenomenon. But apart from 'Russia' no other fatherland has yet become an object of love for Communists. One can say that 'Russia' has become the image of 'Fatherland' for all Communist movements in the world.

There is a series of other minor emotional deviations in a Communist society. Many marriages and friendships are broken because one of the partners is not a faithful member of the Party. Cases of wives denouncing their husbands for not being faithful to the Party, or children denouncing their own parents, are only too well known.

We have already mentioned the idea that the Communist emotional pattern is archetypically organized, and that this is one of the features of class consciousness. This means that the emotional behaviour of Communists on the whole is based on big and rigid schemes which are grouped round two poles: love for the Party leaders, and hatred of anything non-Communist. When we say archetypical we mean that the emotional pattern of a Communist

has no schemes for small private feelings. His world is devoid of simple enjoyments, of small and often inexplicable sorrows of private melancholies, of any kind of personal moods. These may exist, but his culture-pattern has no symbols for them. For Communists are utterly against lyrical moods which are rooted in the intimate contact of the individual with things and persons. These are called 'petty-bourgeois' feelings, and the Party irons them out from the minds of its members. They are emotional moods which by their personal quality are inappropriate to the emotional pattern of a Communist. Lyric poetry, which springs from the poet's intimate contact with the world—love for another person, love for things, love for Nature, etc.—is formally ignored or even forbidden. Only those emotions in the poet which are aroused by contact with things having a certain significance for the Party are worthy of the name of poetry. The struggle against personal feelings goes so far that in the recent Soviet novel, there is a general tendency to create 'collective heroes' such as a factory, a *kolkhoz*, and above all the Party.*

Friendship as an emotional attachment between two individuals *qua* individuals is not allowed in a Communist society. If two Party members appreciate each other for personal reasons and consequently build up an emotional tie between themselves, they are liable to emotional deviation. Communists have a special name for these forms of emotional behaviour. They call them 'small churches' and consider them as incipient splits in the Party.

One can say that friendship as a specific type of human relationship is almost non-existent in Communist society. Party members are dominated in their emotional relationship with each other by the category of partisanship. In their relations with non-members they manifest, if not hostility, a sort of detachment which precludes any emotional tie. Stalin himself used to meet people in his own house who were not directly concerned with the activities of the Party. His attitude towards these people can be considered as typical. At these meetings he always took the attitude of an onlooker; the others seemed to him actors rather than real people in real life. It is most probable that he had the feeling of reality only among his comrades.†

There is no other feeling more dominated by the category of partisanship than love. Plenty of illustrative examples can be found in Soviet literature. A young man, in the act of confessing his love to his sweetheart, stops suddenly and says: 'This is not the right

*Helen Rapp: 'The Post-War Novel in Russia', *The Listener*, April 1953, p. 725.

†References to Stalin's behaviour in circumstances described above are given by Ahmed Amba in *I was Stalin's Bodyguard*, London, Frederick Muller, 1953.

moment; I have to go to vote on the resolution taken by the factory committee'. A film shows a young couple meeting after five years of separation. His first words are: 'What a beautiful crop there is going to be this year.'* Orwell has grasped an important aspect of the feeling of love in Communist society in his novel '1984'. The protagonists feel guilty when they fall in love with each other, as if they have, by this very fact, broken a rule or neglected an important duty.

Two important facts are closely connected with the individual's emotional pattern in Communist society. The first consists in the little importance accorded to the family in the development of the individual. The second consists in the technique of 'deracination' or 'uprooting' practised by the Party with respect to all members of the community.

The emotionality of a member of a Communist society, as opposed to that of a member of a democratic society, is very little, if at all, patterned on the family system of interrelations. The emotionality of a child, naturally captivated by his parents, is, from a very early age, disturbed by, and finally displaced upon, far more powerful objects of love than the parents themselves, the Party leaders and the Party as such. The first effect of this is that emotionality grows from an early age round persons, things and situations in general with which he has no direct and intimate contact. In other words, his emotionality is patterned after symbols rather than after concrete human beings which surround him. He loves the Party leader because of what he 'represents' for the country. Moreover he loves the Party rather than any particular member of it. If he happens to love a particular member, this is certainly not because of his own relations with him, but because this member symbolizes the Party. The net of personal relationships is, in this way, from the very beginning, 'factorized', reduced to a series of super-individual symbols. The ultimate end of this process consists in the transference of the individual's emotional capacity outside the sphere of personal contacts.

The feeling of 'deracination' prevailing in Communist society is primarily the result of a well-known technique of the Party, by which its members are submitted to frequent changes in the place and the nature of their work. In this way, the only lasting bond in the life of a Communist is that existing between himself and the Party. The Communist is never allowed contacts with persons, places and things long and intimate enough to become 'personal'. The clothes he wears—normally a uniform—the desk he writes at, the glasses he drinks from are seldom long enough with, or near enough to him to become

*Examples given by Valeria Gerasimova in *Literaturnia Gazeta*, 28th June 1951.

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really 'his', and thus to make him indulge in personal feeling about them. For as a rule he does not live with things and persons; he uses them in the same way the Party uses him. This reveals a crucial feature of the mind of a Communist. He is not allowed to think and to feel about himself as a value, or as an end, but as a means in the structure of the Party. Consequently he suffers from an incapacity to regard his own connexion with things as having any intrinsic value whatsoever. The Party systematically destroys, by the technique of 'deracination', any emotional 'couche' and any nest of warm feelings which, at one moment or another, an individual may build up in his intimate contact with persons and things. Paraphrasing Rilke, quoted at the beginning of the chapter, we can say: The world of a Communist is invaded by empty and indifferent things. There a house, a fruit or vineyard have nothing in common with the house, fruit and vineyard which move the thoughts and feelings of Western man. In Communist society the drama of depersonalization reaches the point of perfection. It is not only an undesirable result of industrialization, as suggested by Rilke, but a systematic work done by a political organization. The final result of this work is the blockage of all personal feelings in the members of Communist society.

SUSPICION

The blockage of the personal feelings has important repercussions in the minds of the members of a Communist society. In this blockage lies perhaps the greatest source of frustration in the life of a Communist. The repressed desire to be oneself, to speak with one's own voice, and in the colour of one's own feelings, can be considered as the main cause of one of the most characteristic emotional attitudes in Communist society, that of suspicion. The individual acts out this deep desire by projection; he sees the desire to escape from the rigid impersonal rule of the Party in other persons, in practically everybody. Thus, suspicion dominates the pattern of inter-individual relations in Communist society. Everyone suspects everybody of not being 'orthodox', and of harbouring hostile attitudes towards the Party. Moreover, every Communist feels in one way or another that he is hated by others just because he is a better Communist than they are. His feeling of guilt for wishing to rid himself from the oppressing rule of the Party can be accepted by his consciousness only after this radical distortion.

TECHNOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Communists refer to Soviet man as to a new man, meaning by this a psychological mutation in the human species. Our knowledge

does not allow us to go as far as that. We can safely assume, however, that Communist civilization contains the basic conditions of a new type of personality whose behaviour is basically determined by his group-awareness. He can, therefore, be described as collective personality.

We have so far referred to the consciousness of this type of personality in terms of class consciousness. But, since the concept of class consciousness is closely connected with an historical context no longer actual, we propose, in this last section, to apply another name to the consciousness of the Communist personality. We call it technological consciousness. Its main traits are the following:—

A. The structure of technological consciousness is 'elementaristic'. It reflects the world in its broad lines, in black and white. In fact technological consciousness is not a cognitive structure; its prime concern is not with *what* and *how* the world is, but with how action upon the world is possible. Its cognitive activities are, therefore, limited to the requirements of immediate action. The man with technological consciousness is never satisfied with merely knowing things and events, for he is always under the urge of transforming the world; he suffers from action-anxiety.

B. The man with technological consciousness has an 'experimentalist' attitude towards life; he is pressed by the desire to master and shape the world, physical, social and psychological. As a ruler, he is a 'technocrat'; as any artist or writer he is an 'engineer of the human soul'; as a simple citizen, he is an 'expert'. This man is incapable of contemplating and enjoying things as they are; he can never let himself float freely in the stream of life. Even his art is 'a manual of life to man' (Chernyshevsky).

C. The man with technological consciousness has a particular taste for the 'artificial' and 'manufactured' in life which goes hand in hand with a certain detachment from nature. In this trait, there is something similar to Baudelaire's negative attitude towards nature. Baudelaire could not stand water unless safely imprisoned in pipes.

In Soviet Russia, anything manufactured is worthy of the name of 'culture'. A tractor is worth worshipping; an armoured car becomes a principal character—almost a national hero—in a novel. Electric lamps are far more beautiful than stars, as one of Azhaiev's heroes emphatically demonstrates.* Man's contact with nature is systematically blocked. He becomes more and more surrounded by and imprisoned in a universe of his own production.

It remains only to be said that many elements entering into the composition of technological consciousness can be found in every industrial civilization. In Communist society, however, these ele-

**Far from Moscow*, mentioned by Helen Rapp, *op. cit.*

ments form a lasting structure which dominates the mind of Communist man.

COMMUNIST, DEMOCRATIC AND FASCIST TYPES OF PERSONALITY

In this last chapter we have stressed the idea that Communist traits appeared in those historical periods, and in those individuals, in which the faith in a transcendental order of life had completely collapsed. This affected, in the first place, the system of human security. Individuals belonging to these periods and to this type of personality work out their system of security on a purely immanent plane of life. Their consciousness becomes overpowered by the purpose of establishing a certain order in their environment. The keenness and anxiety of these individuals to establish order in life by creating rigid systems of organization, ideological and social, are rooted in this basic condition of their personality. In this lies the main difference between the Communist and the democratic man. For the democratic personality is built up in a cultural climate in which faith in a transcendental order exists side by side with faith in an immanent order of life established by human reason. Thus the security system of this type of man is double, guaranteed by a transcendental and an immanent order, at the same time. The democratic man possesses the strongest system of security; faith in God and faith in man compensate for each other. Resting on this safe basis, the individual is ready to take the responsibility of life on himself, and thus the whole pattern of life becomes individualized.

The Fascist type of personality develops in those historical periods, and in those individuals, in which faith both in a transcendental and immanent reason is weak, or totally absent. The system of security rests entirely on the individual's, or group's, instinct and will to live. This is the type of man with the weakest system of security.

CHAPTER EIGHT

History and Personality

'Do you realize, Kallisthenes, how fortunate you are to have my deeds to record?'

'Do you realize, Alexander, how fortunate you are to have me to record them?'

THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL CIRCLE OF HISTORY

It has perhaps been noticed that we have shown some hesitation in dealing with the relationships existing between human personality and the process of history. We have, in fact, even avoided putting clearly the question of how far the personality of an outstanding individual is a creative factor in the development of the socio-cultural forms of his time. Though this attitude seems unbecoming to a psychologist, we have various reasons for it. Firstly, the psychologist has to start his search for the origins of historical forms at a point where the historian normally finishes. An historian often feels satisfied when he can answer a question such as: 'Who said it first?' The psychologist, instead, has to go into the mental field, sometimes completely unexplored, of a period and discover the feelings, attitudes and habits by which the foundation of a certain political or social form had been laid down. The ease with which some psychologists have derived all historical forms, political and spiritual, from the dominant personality traits of a few outstanding individuals—which traits are, in their view, often entirely determined by the 'infantile situation' of these individuals—should serve as a warning.

On the other hand, our approach to the problem of democracy and totalitarianism is an integralist one. We regard democracy and totalitarianism as 'ways of life' which develop conjointly in the culture-pattern of a community as well as in the minds of its individual members. Thus, we described in turn the social, economic, spiritual and psychological factors involved in the development of democratic and totalitarian ways of life, without being able to say what factors can be considered 'causes' and what 'effects', or when a specific factor is a cause and when an effect.

We feel, however, that if at this stage we try to organize into a

final conclusion all the references made in the body of this study to the part played by human personality in the development of human society and history, we may clarify our view on this point. It would be advisable to regard this problem in its simplest form, and to start by analysing firstly the part played by Hitler's personality in the rise of Nazism, and secondly, the part played by Marx's and Lenin's personalities in the rise of Communism.

1. Considering the relationships between Hitler's personality and Nazism, one always finds a chain of factors which form a closed circle. If, at a certain point, Hitler's personality acts upon the Nazi way of life as a cause, at a different point the same personality seems to be a product of a series of external constituent factors of the Nazi way of life. In what follows we give a few illustrations of this state of affairs.

We endeavoured to show that the Nazi way of life was an expression of a particular frame of mind existing in most individual members of the German group during the inter-war period. This frame of mind cannot be considered simply as a spontaneous factor; it is itself the reflection in the mind of the people of a series of historical conditions of German society. These conditions, expressed in a collective state of mind of insecurity, led to the formation of a certain type of personality based on a strong need for compensatory and substitute structures. The individuals possessing this type of personality show excessive aggression to make up for their basic insecurity, excessive need for social integration to make up for their lack of confidence in themselves and in others, and an excessive power of projection to make up for their incapacity to accept reality as it is. Hitler's behaviour showed that he was a *prototype* of this personality. From this point of view his personality was a representative product of a specific historical situation of German society. Thus, it cannot be considered as a creative factor in the historical process.

We hasten, however, to say that the concept of a prototype implies, in this case, a certain creative activity within the historical process. Hitler acted as a precipitating and cathartic factor upon the minds of many members of German society. Firstly, he synthesized in his personality their anxiety and aggression; secondly, he showed them through his behaviour, how to satisfy or to play out their basic feelings, how to escape the unpleasant reality, and finally how to build up a way of life congenial to their frame of mind. In this respect Hitler's personality was an active factor in the historical development of the German community. He was a 'leader', a model of behaviour and personality for that specific historical situation.

Hitler's personality became a decisive factor in the historical

process when he began to build up the Party. Yet the Party cannot simply be considered as the expression of his own personality. It was primarily the political embodiment of a series of deep mental trends diffusely existing in many sections of German society. Hitler's rôle was that of a 'realizer', in a political and social sense. Through the Party, he gave expression to latent needs of the German group which without him would have not been articulated at the political and social level. Through the Party, he created a way of life corresponding to certain basic needs of the German group. Thus, he shaped and speeded up the course of history.

There is another way of assessing the contribution made by Hitler's personality to the rise of the Nazi way of life. This refers to the psycho-pathological traits found in the Nazi society. One can consider Hitler's personality as the main source of a series of paranoid tendencies—compulsive aggression, persecution mania and others—manifested by the Nazi group. These psycho-pathological traits were ingrained in Hitler's personality as a result of his 'infantile situation'.

The difficulty arises, in this case, from the fact that 'the infantile situation', i.e., child-parent relationship in the first five years, is invested with the monopoly of personality formation. To us, it is obvious that the sources of the feeling of insecurity which determined the paranoid manifestations of Hitler's personality cannot be confined to his 'infantile situation'. His ill-health, his failure as an artist, the insecurity of the whole pattern of life in which he grew up can be mentioned in this respect as additional factors. And there is something else. In a sense, one can say that Hitler's personality could not become what it was, a paranoid leader of an aggressive self-centred group, except in the German society and culture-pattern of the inter-war period. For there existed in the German culture-pattern a paranoid mode of individuation, that is, a climate of insecurity that favoured a paranoid type of personality. German society as a whole manifested paranoid tendencies. In this sense again, Hitler's personality was a product of a wide historical process.

2. One can distinguish in Marx's personality a layer formed as a result of his Jewish origin, and of his 'infantile situation'. A series of later personal experiences contributed to the development of this layer. Already at an early age the main trait of Marx's personality became obvious. This was a high inner tension—compulsive and Messianic states—aroused by an incapacity for self-realization. Responsible for this are his Jewish origin, his multilateral interests and gifts, his lack of social talents, and even the spirit of the age.

Normally one would consider Marx's writings as the first and most important step in self-realization. But Marx's need for self-assertion could not be satisfied except in direct action political and social.

Thus, his writings had no meaning for the development of his personality unless and until they engendered successful political action.

Marx's identification with the proletariat can be considered as an important step towards self-realization. It constituted, in the first place, an advance in Marx's knowledge of himself; he recognized himself as one of the disinherited members of his society. In other words, he became aware of the basic condition of his life, or of the pattern of individuation which gave shape to his personality and to that of many members of the proletariat. Up to this point one cannot speak about a creative part played by Marx's personality in history. He simply integrates himself with the historical conditions of his time.

But the relationship between Marx's personality and the proletariat does not so easily lend itself to an analysis in clear-cut terms. It is very hard to know to what extent the proletariat with which Marx integrates himself is an historical reality, and to what extent his own creation. Throughout his writings Marx 'interprets' the historical position and the frame of mind of the proletariat. He would say that its discontent 'means' social injustice, that its revolt 'means' the need for social revolution, that its dreams of a happy end of its hardship 'means' the certainty of its final victory. Admittedly, discontent in the members of the proletariat was a reality. But since the way leading from a deep emotional state to its expression in a set of rational symbols is so winding and even discontinuous, it is hard to decide to what extent Marx's ideology is an 'interpretation' or a 'creation'.

One thing, however, is certain. Marx plays an active part in the rise of the contemporary Communist way of life through his rôle of an ideologue. He translates into rational symbols deep and diffuse states of mind characteristic of a specific type of personality and of a specific social group. This body of rational symbols has become an active factor in the development of contemporary history. It has constantly shaped the way of life of certain communities so as to correspond to the needs of the proletarian, and paradoxically enough, it has shaped the proletariat so as to correspond with the way of life expressed by these symbols. In a way, an ideology has become an autonomous factor in history.

One knows, however, how little satisfied Marx was with the rôle of a 'theoretical revolutionary'. In this sense one can say that Marx's personality was a failure. The man of action in him was frustrated. He identified himself with a type of proletariat—the revolutionary—which was not yet born; he joined political parties which were not of his creation and which he could not lead; he was hasty, premature, if not beside the point, in dealing with social and political events.

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In a word, he identified himself with an 'unripe' cause, consequently he was a failure as a 'realizer'.

Lenin succeeded where Marx had failed. The impact left by his personality in the course of history can be understood as complementary to that of Marx. One could even consider Marx and Lenin as the first prefiguration of that 'collective personality' which has become a main feature of the Communist way of life. Lenin selected the type of man and created the political organ necessary for the success of the revolution and for the building up of life expressed in Marx's writings and personality.

There still remains the important question: what, in the Communist way of life, is due to Lenin's personality, and what to a series of factors characteristic of the modern Russian way of life? The answer to this question takes us round the circle again. Lenin's personality was aggressive, authoritarian, and completely detached from the values of Western civilization. He built up the Party 'of a new type' out of people with similar qualities. Later, the Party became a medium of selection and promotion of this type of personality. Lenin was an agitator and an organizer at the same time. The Party he created became a school for agitation and a medium of political organization of all kinds of discontented members of the community.

But this is not a satisfactory answer to the question regarding the origins of present-day Communist society and type of personality. First of all many traits in Lenin's personality such as his singleness of purpose, his hostility towards the values of Western civilization, his organizing capacities, were to a great extent conditioned by factors existing in the social and cultural environment in which he lived, namely the Russian revolutionary movements. Moreover, the type of man needed for the building up of the Bolshevik Party already existed when he started his political career.

There is, however, something which makes Lenin's personality a decisive factor in the development of contemporary Communism. This is the fusion made in his personality between a wide range of empirical and practical conditions of social life and a specific body of social doctrine. No revolutionary ever had a more difficult task than Lenin, i.e., the task of focusing such a great variety of discontents existing in a big modern society within the narrow and rigid limits of a social ideology.

A word should be said about the origins of the psycho-pathological aspects of behaviour noticed in a Communist way of life such as suspicion, aggression, compulsive activities, and exaggerated needs for belongingness. The same traits are seen in Marx's personality. But, on the whole, they are characteristic of the type of personality

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developed under conditions of insecurity. Through its authoritarian rule, the Communist Parties maintain these conditions. One calls these traits pathological, for they are more frequently found in paranoid behaviour. In fact, in a Communist way of life they are normal forms of adjustment. Their abnormality is apparent only from a democratic point of view.

HISTORICAL STAGES OF THE PSYCHE

One of the main sources of difficulty in the study of the relationship between the psychological and socio-cultural factors in the development of history lies in a too personalistic approach to this problem. One is too often inclined to see historical forms related to actual personalities; one too often couples Communism with Marx's Messianic feelings, Nazism with Hitler's paranoia, and even history with Cleopatra's nose. There are in fact historical forms, political, social, economic or religious, which can be better understood from a psychological point of view, if their origins are related more to general and diffuse psychological factors than to specific personalities. In the present study we have distinguished three stages, or forms, under which the impact of the human mind on the process of history can be regarded.

(a) *Social Frame of Mind*

We describe a social frame of mind as the reflection in the mind of the people of the historical conditions characteristic of their own group. It consists of certain feelings, beliefs, attitudes and habits of thought. It has to be said that a frame of mind is not a 'mirror' of a certain historical situation. It is the final articulation in the human mind of a long historical process. Thus, a long period of social transformations in the Athenian and in some Western communities crystallized in the mind of the people as the feeling of change. The economic and spiritual prosperity of the same period crystallized in the feeling of security. Confidence in human reason and personality were produced in the same way, as shown in the first part of this study. The feelings of change and security, the confidence in human reason, and the belief in human personality formed basic features in the democratic frame of mind. In the same way the origins of the Nazi frame of mind can be traced, the basis of which is formed by the feeling of insecurity aroused in a group living under conditions of stress, in an historical period where rationalistic creeds were in decline.

A frame of mind expresses itself in certain institutions and ideologies. As such it becomes a contributing factor to the historical development of a community. An important thing should be noted

here. A frame of mind is the reflection at the psychological level of the historical conditions of a community. Consequently, it cannot form the hallmark of a specific personality. Some individuals, however, can become conscious of it to a higher degree than others; they can express it more adequately through their practical and theoretical activities. By this, they help the members of their community to create a way of life according to their frame of mind.

(b) Pattern of Individuation

The structure formed by the fundamental psychological and cultural traits existing in a community, at a given historical level, favours the formation of a specific type of personality. This property of a psycho-social climate is called the pattern of individuation.

A pattern of individuation can be seen as a psycho-social structure displaying a certain degree of functional autonomy, in the sense that a tendency towards the formation of a specific personality type persists even after the historical conditions in which it originated have ceased to exist. Thus even where and when the historical conditions giving birth to the modern proletariat have changed, the tendency towards the formation of a specific type of personality continues to operate. This is a personality with a strong insecurity feeling which is played out by an over-rationalization of life; a personality with a split social consciousness, who cannot assert himself save as a member of a sub-group antagonistically organized towards other sub-groups. If the objective conditions for such behaviour are minimal or non-existent, he magnifies or creates them.

A pattern of individuation presupposes some psychological 'constants' in the process of historical change. This is not difficult to understand if one takes into account the part played by some unconscious processes in the formation of personality. A parent whose personality structure is based on insecurity transmits unconsciously his insecurity to his children who in turn tend to form the same type of personality, though they may live in different historical conditions. This is one way in which one can speak about the persistence in some sections of contemporary societies of a pattern of individuation, the basis of which was laid down in the historical conditions of the rise of the proletariat. To this should be added that the basic features of this type of personality have been gradually 'objectified' in a specific ideology—Marxism-Leninism—and in a political organization—the Communist Party—which have helped the formation of the same type of personality.

(c) Personality

Personality constitutes another stage at which the relationship between psyche and history can be regarded. If a pattern of indivi-

duction is conceived as in interplay of psycho-cultural factors favouring a specific structuration of the human mind, then a personality is the final articulation of this into the mind of an individual. The character of uniqueness involved in the concept of personality can be understood at different levels. It may mean the specific mental organization of an individual, the specific way in which the pattern of life of a community is reflected in the mind of an individual, or the specific way an individual acts in the culture-pattern of his community.

Though an individual's personality bears the mark of uniqueness, it is not easy to detect his contribution to the development of a civilization. Considering, for instance, Hitler's or Marx's contribution to the civilization of our time, it would be useful to specify to what extent their personalities were but 'loudspeakers' of a general state of mind, to what extent they were prototypes of a particular mental group, and to what extent they left on history the impact of their specific personality. These distinctions are necessary in order to specify when a personality is a creative or a passive factor in history.

Since in democracy the pattern of individuation is flexible, the character of uniqueness is strongly emphasized; there the whole pattern of life favours the individual's tendency to be himself. On the other hand, in a totalitarian way of life, the pattern of individuation creates 'categories' rather than individual personalities; there everything leads to *Gleichschaltung*, to the stereotyping of the mind. The accent does not fall on 'to be oneself', but to be a 'prototype', a concentration of a set of mental traits existing in a diluted form in the members of one's own group. This determines the value as well as the political and social rôle of a personality. His actions rely on his identification with the masses; he himself becomes the embodiment of unity, order and authority in the group.

PARTY-LEADER-FOLLOWERS

The question: what makes one become a Nazi or a Communist has no simple answer. There is no doubt that many Germans joined the Nazi Party on economic grounds and many people joined the Communist Parties on sentimental humanitarian grounds, or on purely ideological ones. But these cases, though sometimes numerous, do not answer the question, what makes Communism or Nazism acceptable? For this type of Communist or Nazi remained at the periphery of their parties, and nearly always became the victims of periodical 'purgés'. In this study we have tried to show that the most important reasons for which someone becomes a Communist or a Nazi lie in the structure of his personality as a whole. Communism

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or Nazism becomes acceptable to him because his personality is shaped by a specific pattern of individuation. In a sense, he is a Communist or a Nazi before joining one of these Parties.

What has just been said shows what really happens with an individual after he becomes a member of a Communist or Nazi Party. Both Parties submit him to a process of rapid and 'radical' re-education through indoctrination. It ought to be said, however, that indoctrination by itself can seldom make one a good Nazi or a good Communist. On the contrary, intensive indoctrination has made many fresh members realize that they were not really Communists or Nazis. Thus, the process a Communist undergoes after joining the Party could more appropriately be called self-realization than indoctrination, i.e., the actualization of his own personality. This does not mean that a Communist does not learn anything in the Party. He learns how to satisfy the basic traits of his personality as a member of a rigidly organized group. This requires sometimes a great deal of flexibility. That is why Communists consider people after the age of forty lost from the re-education point of view.

One last thing should be said about the conditions that make Communism acceptable to the members of a constituted Communist society. This society builds up in the mind of its individual members such dispositions and trends as can be more readily satisfied in a Communist way of life. It is important to note that it is neither conscious fear, aroused by terrorist methods, nor indoctrination as an assimilation of the Communist doctrine, that are the principal reasons for which a Communist way of life is accepted by the members of Communist society. This act of acceptance takes place at a deep mental level, and is often unconscious. The personality of these individuals is formed in an atmosphere of tension and insecurity, and in a carefully prearranged environment so that their integration with a Communist way of life comes as an adequate adjustment. This is another way of saying that a Communist way of life creates its own type of personality. The whole process is, therefore, a circle of interactions within which neither personality nor party can be singled out as the only originator.

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
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