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INTRODUCTION.

The Protagoras of Plato is one of the few dialogues whose authenticity has never been called in question by any eminent scholar. None of the dialogues attributed to Plato is so full of fallacious reasoning; perhaps none contains an ethical theory so difficult to reconcile with ordinary Platonic teaching; but the extraordinary vivacity and power of the dramatic representation, as well as the charm of style, have furnished proofs of authenticity which even the most sceptical critics have been unable to resist.

§ 1. Analysis.

A brief analysis of the Protagoras will form a fitting introduction to the discussion of its scope and purpose.

Socrates narrates the dialogue to a friend (309 a—310 a).

Hippocrates had visited Socrates in great excitement at an early hour, in order to obtain from him a personal introduction to Protagoras, who had just arrived in Athens. In the interval before they set out, Socrates subjected his young friend to an interrogatory, which forced him to admit that he was
PREFACE.

THE present edition of the Protagoras is on the same lines as the Pitt Press editions of the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro.

The Editors venture to hope that the study of this delightful dialogue, for which much has already been done in English by Mr Wayte and more recently by Mr Turner, may be still further encouraged by the publication of this edition.

Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, has kindly read through the proofs, and contributed various criticisms and suggestions.

CAMBRIDGE,
July 26, 1893.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN this edition a few errors and misprints have been corrected, but we have not thought it necessary or desirable to introduce any further changes.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
September 28, 1905.
about to entrust his soul to a sophist, without knowing what a sophist really is. Such a course of action Socrates declared to be perilous in the extreme (310a—314c). Socrates and Protagoras presently proceeded to the house of Callias, where Protagoras was staying, and having with some difficulty obtained admittance, found themselves spectators of an animated scene, in which Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are the leading figures (314c—316a).

At this point the true business of the dialogue begins. After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter delivers a speech claiming for his profession a high antiquity. Poets, religious teachers, musicians and others who were in reality 'Sophists', have vainly tried to disguise themselves by other names: Protagoras has found it both more prudent and more honest to profess himself openly that which he is, a Sophist and Educator of men. Prodicus and Hippias with their respective adherents assemble to hear Protagoras publicly explain the advantages of his teaching (316a—317e).

Aided by a little Socratic questioning, Protagoras explains that his art consists in making men good citizens. Socrates professes to have thought that civic virtue could not be communicated by teaching, and that on two grounds: first, because the Athenians do not think it can, since they allow any man to advise them in matters connected with the state without requiring from him evidence that he has been taught, whereas they will only listen to an expert when they are deliberating on matters connected with the arts; and second, because as a matter of fact, great statesmen have not succeeded in transmitting
their civic virtue to their sons and wards (317 E—320 C).

The reply of Protagoras is in the form of a ἴδιος and falls into three sections.

In the first he endeavours to justify the Athenians for permitting any one to give counsel on politics, by relating a myth of pre-historic man, according to which no one is destitute of the foundations of civic virtue, Justice and Shame (320 C—323 A). That every man has part by nature in this virtue is, moreover, a universal belief, for he who publicly declares himself to be wicked is universally looked upon as mad (323 A—323 C).

Protagoras next endeavours to prove that the Athenians regard virtue as capable of being taught. In the first place, we hold men responsible for lacking that only which it was in their power to acquire, and we hold them responsible for their wrong-doing (323 C—324 A). Punishment, in the second place, is intended both by the Athenians and by all other men to be a means of teaching virtue (324 A—324 D).

Finally, Protagoras addresses himself to the question—why do not the sons of great statesmen possess the same virtue as their fathers? It is not from lack of teaching: for it would be absurd to suppose that statesmen teach their sons everything except the one thing needful for life as a citizen, and in point of fact, virtue is taught at every stage of human life—by parents, nurses, tutors, professional teachers for soul and body, and finally by the state herself, through the medium of the laws and the punishment which their violation entails. But children are often inferior to their parents in the capacity
for learning, and it is for this reason that they seem to fall short in civic virtue, although, compared with untutored savages, even the worst products of civilization might seem models of morality. Protagoras concludes by declaring himself a teacher of virtue and explaining his method of taking fees (324 D—328 D).

After thanking Hippocrates for bringing him to hear so fine a display, Socrates requests the Sophist to explain a matter which he had left obscure—Are the single virtues each of them parts of virtue, or only different names for one thing? They are parts of virtue, says Protagoras, in answer to the cross-examination of his rival, distinct from each other and the whole, as the parts of the face are different from the whole face and from one another. In number they are five—justice, temperance, holiness, courage, and wisdom, and wisdom is the greatest of them. We may possess one without possessing all the five. Each has its own peculiar efficacy and no one of them is like another (328 D—330 B).

Socrates endeavours in the first instance to make Protagoras admit that justice and holiness are identical, or nearly so. It is admitted that justice is just and holiness holy: but if justice and holiness do not resemble each other, justice will not be holy, but unholy, and holiness will not be just, but unjust—a conclusion which the Sophist rejects. Protagoras graciously concedes that there may be a considerable resemblance between justice and holiness, without however allowing that the two virtues are alike (330 B—332 A).

The next step in the argument seeks to establish the identity of temperance and wisdom. ἀφροσύνη,
Protagoras admits, is the opposite of σοφία, and nothing can have more than one thing which is opposed to it. ἀφροσύνη is however opposed to σωφροσύνη, as well as to σοφία; from which it follows that σοφία and σωφροσύνη are nothing but two names for one and the same thing (332 A—333 B).

If Socrates had also proved the identity of temperance and justice, four out of the five virtues would have been equated, but as he embarks upon his argument, Protagoras seizes the opportunity to plunge into a ἑτερία on the relativity of the notion 'good' or 'beneficial' (333 B—334 C).

Here ensues an interlude, in which Socrates protests against his rival's lengthy speeches, and threatens to depart. At last, in deference to the entreaties of Callias, backed up by some remarks from Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Socrates consents to stay, on condition that Protagoras shall first question him and afterwards submit to be questioned in his turn (334 C—338 E).

Protagoras proposes for criticism a poem of Simonides, remarking that the subject of the discussion will still be ἀρετή, though it is transferred from human conduct to the sphere of poetry. A good poem, Socrates admits, will not contradict itself: but Simonides, after asserting that it is hard to become good, proceeds in this poem to censure Prodicus for saying 'It is hard to be good'. That Simonides contradicts himself, Socrates denies, on the ground that 'to be good' is not the same as 'to become good': perhaps Simonides agreed with Hesiod in the view that it is hard to become, but easy to remain, good. Your cure is worse than the disease,
replies Protagoras: it would be the height of folly to call being good an easy thing. Socrates thereupon, with Prodicus' approval, at first suggests that 'hard' may mean not 'difficult', but 'evil', since the word 'hard'—so says Prodicus the Cean—means something evil in Ceos; but soon abandoning these sophistries he volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem (338 E—342 A).

Sparta and Crete are in reality the chief seats of philosophy in Greece, though they try to conceal the fact. The wise men of old knew this and in imitation of the Spartans compressed their wisdom into short and pithy sentences, one of which was the saying of Pittacus 'It is hard to be good'. Simonides wrote his poem to overthrow this maxim (342 A—343 C).

Socrates proceeds to support his theory of the poem by an exposition conceived (as will be afterwards shewn1) in the most sophistical spirit, but he correctly apprehends the central idea, viz. that in a world where it is not hard, but impossible to be good, we should not expect too much in the way of moral excellence (343 C—347 A).

The exposition of the poem being finished Socrates expresses himself disparagingly on the value of poetical criticism as a means of arriving at the truth, and the original question is resumed with Socrates for interrogator, as before. Conceding all that Socrates has hitherto been trying to prove, viz. that justice, holiness, wisdom and temperance are of the same kind, Protagoras takes his stand upon the sole remaining virtue and denies that courage bears any resemblance to the other four. By way of reply,

1 p. xxvii.
Socrates draws a distinction between \( \theta\alpha\rho\rho\oslash \) with knowledge, and \( \theta\alpha\rho\rho\oslash \) without knowledge, and endeavours to identify the former with courage. The proof which he offers is far from conclusive\(^1\), as Protagoras points out: it is therefore dropped and a subtler train of reasoning now begins (347 A—351 B).

To the proposal of Socrates, that pleasure should be identified with good, and pain with evil, Protagoras is unwilling to assent. He allows however that knowledge and wisdom, whenever they are present in a man, control his impulses and determine his conduct. But how is this to be reconciled with the common belief that a man having knowledge of that which is better, does the worse, because he is overcome by pleasure? In what sense are pleasures thus called evil? It is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they are followed by pain, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but pleasure in itself is good and pain in itself is evil. To be overcome by pleasure is therefore to be overcome by good: but as the phrase implies a censure, it is evident that the good which overcomes is unworthy to overcome the evil. Unworthy the good can only be because there is less of it: from which we infer that 'to be overcome by pleasure' is to choose less in place of greater good. Such a choice can only be the result of ignorance, so that it is incorrect to say that we ever knowingly choose the worse, and pleasure may still be identified with good, pain with evil (351 B—357 E).

Socrates now makes use of this identification to prove that knowledge and courage are the same. If pleasure is good, so likewise is every action which

\( ^1 \) See note on 349 E.
INTRODUCTION.

aims at pleasure: and as no one knowingly chooses evil rather than good, no one ever does that which he knows to be evil. Now fear is the expectation of evil, so that no one, neither the hero nor the coward, encounters that which he believes to be fearful. It follows that the coward who refuses to fight when he ought to fight, refuses by reason of his ignorance. In other words cowardice is ignorance, and therefore courage, its opposite, is knowledge (358A—360E).

It is pointed out in conclusion that whereas Protagoras had started by maintaining that virtue could be communicated by teaching, and Socrates by doubting whether it could, they have now changed places: since if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, but otherwise not. Socrates expresses a desire to resume the subject after he has discovered what virtue is in itself (360E—362A).

It appears from the preceding analysis that the Protagoras falls naturally into these sections:

I. Introduction to the narration of the dialogue (309A—310A).

II. Introduction to the dialogue itself (310A—317E).

III. Protagoras' description of his profession, followed by the objections of Socrates (317E—320C).

IV. A ὑγισ from Protagoras, containing both μὴθος and λόγος (320C—328D).

V. Cross-examination of Protagoras by Socrates, ending abruptly with a short ὑγισ by Protagoras (328D—334C).

VI. Interlude (334C—338E).
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VII. Cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, ending with a ῥῆσις by Socrates (338 E—347 A).

VIII. Conclusion of the cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, and final defeat of the Sophist (347 A—360 E).

IX. Epilogue (360 E—362 A).

§ 2. The General Scope and Purpose of the Protagoras.

In seeking to understand the scope and purpose of the Protagoras, we shall find it convenient, in the first instance, to view the form of the dialogue as far as possible apart from the matter.

Considered as to its form, the dialogue is an indictment primarily of Protagoras as an educator of young men. It is not however as an individual that Protagoras is attacked, but as the most distinguished representative of the Sophists: ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι, he says in 317 B, καὶ παιδεύειν ἄνθρωπον; and before Protagoras appears on the scene, Plato is careful to instruct us as to the nature of that which was called 'Sophist'. Prodicus and Hippias, as well as Protagoras, receive their share of ridicule, and may be supposed to suffer with him in so far as the aim and method of their teaching agreed with his, although they are not directly associated with him in his fall, which, as rivals in the profession, they doubtless viewed with something more than equa-

1 312 C ff., 316 D ff.
2 315 C ff., 337 A ff., 337 C ff., 347 A.
3 Socrates himself expressly separates them off in 359 A.
4 318 B, 340 B ff., 341 A ff.
nimity. It is part of the irony of the situation when Prodicus and Hippias fail to see that whereas in the actual discussion it is only Protagoras who is worsted, the attack is in reality directed against the professional Sophist in general—the ἐμπυρός τις ἦ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἄφ’ ὕν ψυχῇ τρέφεται.

Pitted against Protagoras, as the representative of the Sophists, we find, as usual, Socrates. Whether in this case we are to regard Socrates as speaking for Plato or for himself, we shall presently inquire: in the meantime, it is well to notice one particular aspect in which the contrast presents itself. Protagoras represents the principle of μακρολογία, Socrates that of βραχυλογία: the former excels in continuous discourse, the latter in the method of investigation by question and answer. In the only section of the dialogue where Socrates deserts his usual method, in order to deliver a harangue upon the poem of Simonides, he expressly asserts that the method of Protagoras is futile, and it must be admitted that he is himself, whether intentionally or not, altogether unsuccessful in applying it.

In its formal aspect, therefore, the Protagoras may be regarded as an attempt to shew the superiority of

1 In 341 A ff. Prodicus furnishes Socrates with weapons against his rival: and in 358 A—359 A they lend their assent to the train of reasoning by which Protagoras is finally overthrown. Bonitz (Platonische Studien p. 260) is surely wrong in regarding their assent to Socrates’ counter-reasoning as a proof that they too are refuted: what is refuted is the statement that courage is different from the other virtues—a statement to which they never assented.

3 313 c.

Socrates to Protagoras—of dialectic to continuous discourse. But the dialogue is not merely a "philosophical prize-fight": the subject-matter of the dispute between the rival interlocutors is one of great importance for the theory of education. It is first expressly raised in 319A: Can virtue be communicated by teaching? If not, education, as it was understood by Socrates no less than by Protagoras, is impossible. The doubts expressed by Socrates upon the subject nowhere throughout the dialogue amount to a denial of what every self-respecting teacher must hold to be true: that the Athenians do not think virtue teachable proves nothing, as they may be mistaken: that Athenian statesmen do not teach it to their sons may prove only that it cannot be taught by Athenian statesmen. But the reasons adduced by Socrates against the view that virtue can be taught are judiciously chosen in order to drive Protagoras into a defence of his position. Protagoras was not only professionally a teacher of virtue, and therefore bound to hold that virtue could be taught, but as the representative of the Sophists, he was bound to maintain that the beliefs and practice of the Arch-Sophist of them all, the Athenian Demus, were in harmony with his own. Accordingly he meets Socrates with a flat denial—the Athenians do hold virtue to be teachable and teach it in a multitude of ways. It is possible to hold this view and still believe that the elements of virtue are present by nature in every man, as Protagoras also asserts: and such was no doubt in reality the belief of the Athenians, as it is perhaps of the ordinary practical man in all ages.

1 319A—320B.
2 See Rep. vi 492 A ff.
Plato's own view of education as the development of the faculties innate in soul may itself be regarded as the psychological counterpart of this ethical creed. But there still remains the question, what must we suppose virtue to be, in order that it may be taught? It is here that Socrates differs from the Athenians and Protagoras. Virtue, according to Socrates, can only be communicated by the teacher if it is identical with knowledge, and to prove this identity the whole of the dialogue from 329c, with the partial exception of the section on the poem and of the interlude in 333b—338e, is devoted. The conclusion to be drawn is that Virtue can indeed be taught, but not by the Sophists, any more than by the educational system, public opinion, and laws of the Athenians, because in them there is no knowledge.

In connexion with this conclusion, we naturally ask: If virtue is not taught by the Sophists, how is it to be taught? To this question the dialogue itself furnishes an implicit answer. Inasmuch as virtue is knowledge, it must be taught by dialectic, the only means by which knowledge can be communicated. The method of Socrates, which it is the object of the formal side of the dialogue to represent as triumphant over the Sophistic μακρολογία, is to be understood as the method which will succeed where Sophistic has been shewn to fail. It is thus that form and matter are reunited and the dialogue attains its unity as a work of art.
§ 3. On the myth of Protagoras.

So much it was needful to say about the central theme of the dialogue, but there remain three episodes which call for special discussion, partly from their connexion with the subject of the whole, and partly on account of their substantive philosophic value.

The first of these is the myth of Protagoras. The place of this episode in the argument is to shew that the Athenians do right in permitting all and sundry to advise them on political questions. It is not unlikely that the introduction of the mythical form as a vehicle of exposition was due to Protagoras\(^1\). There can at all events be no doubt that it was rapidly coming into favour in the literary circles of the day, and that it was sometimes employed not only by the so-called Sophists\(^2\), but by the other Socratic schools\(^3\) as well as the Academy. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that the myth with which we are concerned was written by Protagoras himself. The style shows many marked peculiarities of the kind which we should suppose that Protagoras affected\(^4\), and although this might be set down to Plato's skill as an imitator, it is difficult to see why Plato should have taken such pains to imitate where he manifestly did

\(^1\) Dümmler's Akademika p. 236.
\(^2\) See note on ch. xi. ad init.
\(^3\) As for example the Cynics; see Dümmler l.c. p. 1 foll.
\(^4\) See on 320 E.
not intend to caricature. Zeller has recently lent the weight of his authority to the view which we are advocating, and an Italian scholar has made it seem probable that the work from which this fable is taken had among other motives the polemical one of maintaining against the theories of Hippias and his followers the superiority of νόμος to φύσις. In the catalogue of Protagoras’ works preserved by Diogenes Laertius, two books are mentioned, in either of which the fable may have occurred, περὶ πολιτείας and περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως: most probably it formed part of the latter.

We have commented in detail in the notes upon the subject-matter of the myth; but its general bearings and literary connexions require to be noticed here.

We may say broadly that two views of early society were current in antiquity. On the one hand the laudator temporis acti loved to represent the past as a golden age, from whose glories we have fallen away:

1 Grote (II p. 47) perhaps states the case too strongly when he says that the fable is “fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—in my judgment it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato”: but hardly any one will now deny that the episode is one of the most valuable and interesting parts of the dialogue. It should be borne in mind that the fable differs in style from what Protagoras says in the rest of the dialogue (except at 334 A, where see note) as much as it differs from the myths of Plato. If Plato could insert in one of his works a speech by Lysias (Phaedrus 230 E foll.) I see no reason to suppose that he might not have made Protagoras deliver a speech of his own making.

2 In the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie v 2 p. 175 ff.
3 Chiapelli ibid. 111 p. 15 and p. 256 foll.
4 IX 55.
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PLATONIS PROTAGORAS

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES

BY

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AND

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while others again saw in the far-distant past little but savagery and woe, out of which humanity has by slow degrees climbed upward\(^1\). Not a few—and this is perhaps the original view, whereof the others are fragments—maintained that the reigns of good and evil succeed each other in ever-recurrent cycles, as we find in the myth of the Politicus\(^2\). The fable of Protagoras represents mankind as having risen. It is in effect a novel version of the story of Prometheus superinduced upon a cosmological theory. So far as concerns the creation of man out of the four elements, and the assumption of a period of time during which there were no men upon the earth, we can find

1 See Dümmler's Akademika p. 216 ff. (Die Anfänge des Menschengeschlechts). There is an excellent and learned collection of passages bearing on the Golden Age by Graf in Leipziger Studien \textit{viii} pp. 1—80, and another by Eichhoff in Fleckeisen's \textit{Jahrbücher} Vol. 120 (1879) pp. 581—601.

2 269 c foll. When Eichhoff (i.c. p. 596) asserts that there is no hint of a golden age awaiting mankind in the future in Greek profane writings, he ignores the evidence of Hesiod. In the Works and Days 174—175 we read: \textit{μυκέτ' ἐπετ' ὀφειλον ἑγὼ πέμπτοις μετεῖναι ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἤ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἐπειτα γενέσθαι}, and ibid. 180—181 \textit{Zeüs δ' ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων, εντ' ἃν γείνυμενοι πολιοκράταφοι τελέθωσιν}. It has been pointed out elsewhere (The Nuptial Number of Plato, p. 60) that the sign of the recommencement of the golden age is when children are born with grey hairs (cf. Polit. 273 \textit{E}): an interesting parallel is afforded by the Testament cited by Mr James in his account of the Revelation of Peter p. 57, where it is stated that one of the signs of the end shall be \textit{“children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired”}. There are traces of a similar tradition in Greek mythology: the three Graeae, for example, had grey hairs from their birth.
parallel views in Plato, and to a certain extent in Empedocles; but there seems to be nothing in contemporary or previous literature to account for the peculiarities of the Prometheus legend as it meets us here. According to Hesiod, mankind originally possessed fire, but lost it through the impious cunning of Prometheus. When Prometheus steals it back again for the use of man, both he and humanity are severely punished, he by the eagle preying on his vitals, humanity by the creation of woman. In Aeschylus, Prometheus appears in like manner as the befriender of man against the gods, but we hear nothing of Pandora, nor does it appear that man had ever possessed the use of fire till Prometheus came and stole it. On the other hand, Aeschylus greatly amplifies the services of Prometheus to mankind, assigning to him the invention of astronomy, number, writing, medicine, and divination, as well as the elements of material happiness and comfort. Although it is not expressly stated by Aeschylus that we owe the political or social art to Prometheus, the poet can hardly have intended expressly to exclude it from the list of his benefactions, since the arts which are attributed to Prometheus presuppose that man has already become in some measure a πολιτικόν ζωήν. It was reserved for Protagoras to represent πολιτική as a later gift, not from Prometheus, but from Zeus himself, in direct and perhaps conscious antagonism to Hesiod, according to whom the age in which we are now living knows

1 See the notes on 320 D foll.
2 Theogony 521—616: Works and Days 47 ff.
3 Prom. 445—506.
4 Prom. 506 πᾶσαι τέχναι βρατοίσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως.
neither Justice nor Shame. But the great and fruitful innovation introduced into the legend by Protagoras, whether on his own responsibility, or in accordance with his authorities, consists in making Prometheus and Epimetheus assist the gods in the making of mortal things. The work of the gods ended when they had moulded man and the lower animals: it was Prometheus and his brother who were charged to furnish them with such accidentals as size, strength, hoofs, hair and hide, not to speak of food and procreative power. Protagoras' version of the legend, in which Prometheus already takes part in the creation of man, proved the germ of the later representation of the hero as the artificer of mankind out of clay. In this form the story was transmitted by the poets of the New Comedy to Rome, and appears in quaint and interesting reliefs upon Roman Sarcophagi.

§ 4. On Socrates' criticism of Simonides' poem.

The second episode which it is needful to discuss is the criticism given by Socrates of the poem of Simonides.

As we have endeavoured to shew, the aim of the Protagoras is to prove that virtue cannot be communicated by teaching, unless knowledge and virtue are

1 Works and Days 192 δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδώς οὐκ ἔσται.
3 See Baumeister's Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums P. 1413.
4 On the restoration of the poem see Appendix.
identical. Now Poetry, in the days of Plato, was regarded as perhaps the most powerful means of teaching virtue, and Protagoras had already maintained its educative value in his speech. It was therefore necessary to inquire whether the claims of the Muses were well founded. It became all the more necessary when the Sophists—or some of them—in this as in many other respects went with the stream, and developed the practice of poetical criticism into an art\(^1\). Socrates' exposition of the poem is intended to shew by a practical demonstration that poetry does not teach virtue because in poetry there is no knowledge. There cannot be knowledge in the written words of poets οὐς οὐτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷον τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὅν λέγωναί, ἔπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οὐ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐ μὲν ταῦτα φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οὐ δ' ἐτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι οὐ ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελεγξαι (347 E): for knowledge implies the power to ask and answer questions—which its method is, in short, dialectic. Browning and other societies would have received short shrift from Socrates, unless the members communicated with the poet to find out what he meant: and even then the poet would himself require to be cross-examined—an ordeal from which he would not be likely to emerge successfully, being in fact but a Sophist himself\(^2\). Plato's objection to poetry in the Protagoras is not yet based upon ethical and metaphysical grounds as it was when he wrote the Republic, but rather reminds us of his condemnation in the Phaedrus\(^3\) of written books in general as a means of

\(^1\) See note on 338 E.

\(^2\) See 316 D and note in loc.

\(^3\) 275 D.
INTRODUCTION.

education. The poet is a θεῖος ἀνήρ, who says what he does not know: even when alive he cannot explain his meaning: how much less shall another when he is dead! Socrates might have been content to prove his point without doing so much violence to Simonides' meaning. His exposition of the poem is admittedly sophistical. To begin with, there is nothing in the poem itself to indicate that Simonides' primary intention was to overthrow the maxim of Pittacus, as Socrates avers: Pittacus is censured for saying not what is untrue, but what is less than the whole truth. The real subject of the poem is the impossibility of continued perfection among mankind: the mention of Pittacus is but an episode, which might have been omitted without injuring the argument as a whole. But it is in the explanation of details that Socrates runs riot most. His comments upon μέν, upon ἀλήθως, upon κακῶς δ' εἰ κακῶς, are obviously and intentionally absurd, while in dealing with εὖ πράξεως and ἐκών he contrives by the most perverse sophistry to wrest the plain meaning of Simonides into his own favourite theories of the identity between knowledge and virtue and the impossibility of voluntary sin. But the exaggerated perversity of his exposition is doubtless intended as a satire on the epideictic displays in vogue among some of the Sophists: Plato would fain make it plain that he can beat a Sophist on his own ground.

1 342 A—343 C: 344 B et al. Schleiermacher's reference to the fragment of Simonides (in Schneidewin's Delectus fr. 2 of Simonides=Bergk fr. 57) proves nothing for this particular poem.

2 343 D. 3 343 D. 4 345 A.

5 345 A. 6 345 D.
INTRODUCTION.

At the outset, he borrows some features from the speech of Protagoras in 316 c: and the remark of Hippias, when the episode is ended, ἐν μὲν μοι δοκεῖσ—περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι may be taking as indicating that Hippias at least accepted the picture as a fair representation of his method. We have not sufficient data to say for certain whether the picture is a caricature or not: probably it is just as much and as little of a caricature as the representation of the Sophists in the Euthydemus. At all events, if the sketch is even approximately true to nature, no one will deny that the Sophists had better have "put the poets on their shelves" if they desired to reach the truth of things.

If the view which we have taken is correct, it will be vain to look for reasoned ethical teaching in the episode. The opinion of Dümmler, that Plato is here attacking Antisthenes for regarding virtue as ἀναποθλητος, receives no support from the dialogue, even if we allowed that the truly virtuous man could ever have seemed to Plato or even to Socrates capable of losing his virtue.

1 From this point of view, the whole episode should be compared with the speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus 237 b—241 D.
2 348 A, where Socrates virtually confesses that his exposition is naught.
3 Akademika p. 50.
4 Diog. Laert. vi 105.
§ 5. On the identification of the Pleasant and the Good.

The last episode which requires to be discussed in connexion with the argument of the dialogue is the identification by Socrates of the good and the pleasant. This identity is the hypothesis from which the final refutation of Protagoras is deduced: it is not a substantive result of the dialogue, but only a means to an end.

We remark at the outset, that Protagoras is at first unwilling to accept the identification: still more noteworthy is it that Socrates in reality offers no proof, beyond the εὖ ἡδυ fallacy\(^1\), which begs the question by equating εὖ with ηδέως. The long discussion on the meaning of the common phrase 'to be overcome by pleasure' does indeed remove one obstacle in the way of the identification, but beyond this it does not go. Even here there are fallacies, as when Socrates infers that knowledge always determines the conduct of its possessor because it is her nature to rule\(^2\), and in the subtle reasoning of 355 \(\delta\)\(^3\), which, in point of fact, presupposes the theory that might is right. The only convincing proof, from the Socratic point of view, of the identity of the good and the pleasant, would be to demonstrate their essential unity by an analysis of the connotation of the two names: but of this there is no hint in the Protagoras. The meaning of 'Good' and of 'Pleasant' is supposed to be already known.

\(^1\) 351 \(\beta\).
\(^2\) 352 \(\beta\). The fallacy lies in a confusion of the ideal and the real: knowledge may be λογυρίν, ἡγεμονικά and ἀρχίκαν, and yet not λογυρίν, ἡγεμονεδιώκα, or ἀρχεώ in each individual case.
\(^3\) See note in loc.
INTRODUCTION.

The teaching of the Protagoras on the relation between Pleasure and Good, as is well known, differs toto caelo from that of nearly every other dialogue of Plato. Not to mention the Philebus\(^1\), and the Republic\(^2\), where the point is rather that Pleasure is not the i.e. the Chief Good, in the Gorgias\(^3\) and the Phaedo\(^4\) we have the most explicit assertion of the distinction between the two notions. Contrast the following passages:

\begin{verbatim}
oûκ ἄρα τὸ χαλέπιν ἐστὶν εἰς πράσσειν ὤδῇ τὸ ἀνιάσθαι κακῶς, ὡστε ἐτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἥδυ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (Gorg. 497 Α).
oὐ ταῦτα γίγνεται, ὡ φίλε, τάγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν ὄδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαρῶς (Gorg. 497 Β).
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
ὡ μακάριε Συμμίλα, μὴ γὰρ ὦνχ αὐτὴ ἡ ὅρθη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἥδονας πρὸς ἥδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι καὶ μείξις πρὸς ἐλάττωω ωσπερ νομίσματα κτλ. (Phaedo 69 Α).
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
λέγεις δὲ τινας, ἐφην, ὥ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἥδην, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; 'Ἐφη. 'Ἀρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρωπος ἀν εἰς ἥδην, εἰ ἀνωμένος τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ἥδης; Οὐκ ἐφη. Τὸ δ', εἰ ἥδεως βιώσει τὸν βίον τελευτήσειν, οὐκ εἰ δέν οὐκ ὁσιάζεισθαι; 'Εμούγ', ἐφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἥδεως ἥδην ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώς κακῶν (Prot. 351 Β).
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῆς, τα μείξω αἰε καὶ πλεῖω λυπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρά πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλλεται ὅπο τῶν ἡδῶν, εὰν τα ἐγγύς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐὰν τα τῶρρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταῦτα τὴν τὴν πράξει πρακτεῖν ἐν ἂν ταὐτ' ἐνή· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα υπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα (Prot. 356 Β).
\end{verbatim}

\(^{1}\) 53 Β foll.

\(^{2}\) VI 509 Α οὐ γὰρ δῆπον σὺ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ (i.e. τὸ ἀγαθὸν) λέγεις. Ἐνδοδὴμει· ἤν δ' ἐγὼ.

\(^{3}\) 495 Α foll.

\(^{4}\) 64 D, 68 E foll.
Such passages, which might be multiplied at will, shew that, if there is any meaning in words, the antithesis is a real one. Nor does the contrast lurk merely in isolated passages, for the whole tone and argument of the Gorgias and the Phaedo are opposed to any communion between pleasure and good.

Various explanations of the difficulty have been offered.

Those who (like Grote) hold that the dialogues of Plato "are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose," find of course no difficulty to explain: the Protagoras is perhaps the strongest bulwark in their argument. The most thorough-going adherents of the opposite school deny that Plato is serious, Plato's object being merely to prove that whatever we take to be the Chief Good, virtue can only be identified with the knowledge thereof. Between these two extreme views comes the theory that the identification of Pleasure and Good is seriously meant, either as the view of Plato himself when he wrote the Protagoras, or as a faithful historical picture of the teaching of his master upon this subject. It seems clear to us that Plato is serious, but we do not find sufficient evidence to justify us in holding that the view which he advocates—whether he believed it formerly or not—was at this time held by the philosopher himself. To the opposite theory, it seems a fatal objection that in none of the minor dialogues which are universally admitted to be earlier

1 Plato and the companions of Socrates ii p. 89.
than the Protagoras does there seem to be any hint of hedonism. On the contrary, the analogues to the Measuring or Calculating art which meet us in the Charmides¹ and Laches² are concerned not with the weighing of pleasure, but with the determination of what is good³.

The most probable view is that which regards the episode in question as intended to represent the views of the historical Socrates. It is true that even in the Memorabilia Socrates never in so many words declares that Pleasure is Good⁴, but he frequently inculcates the practice of the virtues on account of the pleasures which they bring⁵. Moreover, if Socrates actually did sometimes call pleasure good, it is easier to understand how the Cyrenaics could have fathered their Hedonism upon him. It is of course quite possible that the formulating of the doctrine is due to Plato, and that the historical truth of the picture suffered by the introduction of greater brevity and precision: we may even suppose that Plato, for dramatic or other reasons, was not careful to represent his Master in all respects as he was. But to stigmatise the doctrine as “utterly un-Socratic,” as Schleiermacher

¹ 174 A foll. ² 199 c.
³ The nearest approach to a unification of pleasure and good elsewhere in Plato seems to be in Laws II 663 A ff. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἢδυ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ’, εἰ μηδὲν ἐτερον, πρὸς τὸ τινα ἐθέλειν ἃν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βλοῦν κτλ.: where, however, Plato is merely insisting on the practical importance of the identification for the welfare of a state.
⁴ He identifies ὡφελίμων with good in Mem. IV 6. 8 ff.
⁵ e.g. II 1. 19: IV 5. 9: see Zeller Philosophie der Griechen³ II 1 p. 126.
does\(^1\), seems to involve a misconception of its moral worth. There is nothing degrading in the theory as it is worked out by Socrates, since it is not the balance of pleasure in each individual species of pleasure which we are recommended to choose, but the balance of pleasure generally and in the long run: it would be quite open to Socrates to maintain that the lower pleasures are never to be chosen, because they are always followed by more pain, or even that they are not even pleasant\(^2\).

If we accept this explanation, the identification of pleasure and good will be in harmony with the general realistic tone of the dialogue, and we shall be justified in holding that in the Protagoras we see the ethical no less than the educational theories of Socrates and Protagoras brought face to face\(^3\).

§ 6. Date of Composition.

Of external evidence as to the date when the Protagoras was written, there is none.

The internal evidence, so far as it goes, is in favour of an early date. It rests upon indications furnished by (1) the language and style, (2) the doctrine, (3) references and allusions in the dialogue itself.

1 Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95.
2 Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173\(^b\) 20 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἀν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦθ' ἡδέα. The historical Socrates would have stopped short of this assertion, if we may judge from such evidence as Xen. Mem. I 4. 12.
3 See Dr Jackson’s article on the Sophists in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
On linguistic grounds, Ritter holds that the dialogue was composed before 399 B.C. But the evidence upon which he relies is chiefly derived from the relative frequency of certain particles and formulae throughout the dialogue, and (as usual with evidence of this kind) it is by no means clear that Plato's choice of particles and the like is not a result of the character of the composition rather than an index to its date. It is also unlikely on many grounds that any of Plato's dialogues are anterior to the death of Socrates. The proofs derived from the exuberant vivacity, the boisterous juvenility and dramatic fire of the dialogue are surer, if more intangible, and all point to a comparatively early date.

In two points of doctrine the Protagoras shews its affinity with the earlier and purely Socratic dialogues. Holiness, as in the Laches, is reckoned as a virtue and placed by the side of δικαίωσίνη, whereas in the Republic and Phaedo ὀυιότης is excluded, and it is only the four cardinal virtues that are recognised as such. Too much stress ought not to be laid upon this argument, but at least, if we may trust Xenophon, the recognition of ὀυιότης as a distinct virtue had the sanction of Socrates. The second point is of more importance. Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that

1 Untersuchungen über Plato, p. 127.
2 This subject is well handled by Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 70 foll.
3 Prot. 329 c et al., Lach. 199 D, Rep. IV. 428 A, Phaedo 69 C. The doctrine of the Meno and Gorgias resembles that of the Protagoras in this point: Meno 78 D, Gorg. 507 B.
4 Mem. IV 6. 4.
'demotic virtue'\(^1\) of which Plato made so much, no allusion to it is made\(^2\). It is perhaps a natural conclusion that Plato had not yet elaborated the distinction—unknown to Socrates—between scientific and unscientific virtue: but it should at the same time be remembered that Plato may have deliberately refrained from adverting to this subject in order to make his picture of Socrates more true to nature. However this may be, the distinction in question is only an ethical deduction from the metaphysical distinction between knowledge and true opinion: its absence from the Protagoras is therefore in harmony with the purely Socratic tone of the dialogue, where we look in vain for the metaphysical speculations or presuppositions of Plato's mature age.

\(^1\) It is in the Meno that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down. See on the whole subject Archer-Hind's Phaedo, Appendix I.

\(^2\) The nearest approach to a recognition of two virtues, one scientific and the other unscientific, is in the speech of Protagoras 320c foll. The elements of \(\pi\omicron\upsilon\lambda\iota\omicron\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\acute{\eta}\ \dot{a}r\eta\acute{\epsilon}\tilde{h}\) implanted in mankind at the beginning and transmitted by father to son are in their essence distinct from scientific virtue, and so far resemble the \(\delta\acute{\mu}\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \dot{a}r\eta\acute{\epsilon}\tilde{h}\) of Platonic teaching: but this part of Protagoras's speech is not taken up by Socrates, who will not even allow that the (so-called) virtue which the sophists and public opinion try to teach is virtue in any sense of the word, since it is not knowledge. Schöne (Über Platon's Protagoras, p. 51) thinks that the Platonic Socrates \textit{does} recognise the distinction between true and demotic virtue when he expresses (319\(\alpha\)) a doubt whether virtue can be taught, since he afterwards proves himself that it can. No doubt Socrates' change of position in the course of the dialogue finds its justification in this distinction between true and spurious virtue (as it is found in the Meno), but so far as we can see, there is nothing in the Protagoras which shews that Plato had as yet made the distinction explicit to himself.
From the allusion in the dialogue to the art of the Peltasts¹, Teichmüller² has endeavoured to fix the date of composition more precisely. It is known that there were Peltasts in Thrace before the time of Iphicrates³, but there is no proof that they formed a regular corps of the Athenian army till the military reforms of 391, which are associated with his name. Teichmüller points out that Plato speaks of Peltasts in such a way as to imply that they are no longer unfamiliar or foreign to his readers⁴, and assigns the dialogue to 393 or 392 B.C., when Iphicrates probably began to organise the new arm.

On all these grounds we cannot go far astray in assigning the dialogue to the second half of the first decade of the fourth century B.C.

§ 7. Date of the Action.

The majority of critics are agreed in supposing the dialogue to be conceived as taking place before the war, in 433 or 432 B.C.

It is in harmony with this that Pericles and his sons are represented as still alive⁵, that Socrates is still young⁶, and that Alcibiades⁷ is but a youth and

¹ 350 A τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἤ οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοὶ: cf. Theaet. 165 D πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ.
² Literarische Fehden, p. 20.
³ Thucydides IV 111. 1: cf. (with Teichmüller) id. II 29.
⁴ Eurip. Alcest. 498 Θρηκλας πέλτης ἀναξ et al.
⁵ Contrast Xenophon Mem. III 9. 2, where peltasts are similarly cited in illustration, but called Θρᾷκες ἐν πέλταις.
⁶ 315 A et al. They died in 429.
⁷ 314 B et al. In 432 he would be 36.
⁸ 309 B. He was born in 451.
Agathon a lad\(^1\). Other indications of minor importance point in the same direction. But in patent contradiction to this date come the facts—authenticated by Athenaeus\(^2\)—that the ‘Wild Men’ of Pherecrates, which Plato alludes to as represented last year (\(\pi\epsilon\rho\nu\sigma\iota\))\(^3\), was produced in \(420\) B.C., and that Hipponicus, the father of Callias, is apparently supposed to be dead, whereas he was alive till nearly \(421\) B.C. Athenaeus is not always an unprejudiced witness when Plato is concerned, but we have no reason to reject his evidence here. Plato frequently introduces anachronisms in matters not essential to the action of his dialogues\(^4\).

\(^1\) 315 D. He was born about 448.
\(^2\) Athen. v 218 B and XI 505 F.
\(^3\) 327 D.
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

[Α' ΣΟΦΙΣΤΑΙ: ΕΝΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

Στ. I

1. Πόθεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνεις; ἢ δῆλα δῆ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδον ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρὸς ὑδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μὲν- τοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦμιν εἰρήσθαι, καὶ πόγωνος ἦδη ὑποτιμπλάμενος.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τί τούτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὄμηρον ἐπαινέτης εἰ, ὅσ ἐφ' χαριεστάτην ἦβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἢν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνεις; καὶ ἵππος πρὸς σὲ ὧ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἐμοιγε ἐδοξεῖν, οὐχ ἡκίστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ἐπε, βοηθῶν

Α. Ρ.
ἐμοὶ. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἀτοποῦν
15 μέντοι τί σοι ἑθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου,
οὔτε προσείχω τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελαυθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ
θαμά.

ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἀν γεγονὸς εἳη περὶ σὲ κάκεινον C
tοσοῦτον πράγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήποτε τίνι καλλίων
evετυχεσ ἀλλῳ ἐν γε τῇς τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.
ΕΤ. Τί φῆς; ἀστῳ ἦ ξένῳ;
ΣΩ. Ξένῳ.
ΕΤ. Ποδαπῷ;

25 ΣΩ. Ἀβδηρίτῃ.
ΕΤ. Καὶ οὔτω καλός τις ὁ ξένος ἑδοξέν σοι εἶναι,
ὡςτε τοῦ Κλεινίου νιέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;
ΣΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ μέλλει, ὁ μακάριε, τὸ σοφότατον
κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

30 ΕΤ. Ἀλλ’ ἦ σοφῷ τινὶ ήμῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες,
evετυχῶν πάρει;

ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήποτε τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ D
stoi δοκεῖ σοφότατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.
ΕΤ. Ωμ τὶ λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

35 ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ήδη ἡμέραν.
ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἀρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονῶς ἥκεις;
ΣΩ. Πάνω γε | πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. 31
ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὖν διηγήσω ήμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ

μὴ σὲ τὶ κωλύει, καθιζόμενος εὐταυθῇ, ἑξαναστήσας

40 τὸν παίδα τουτοῦ;

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν
ἀκούητε.
ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι, ἐὰν λέγησ.
ΣΩ. Διπλῇ ἄν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἀκούετε.
II. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδόρων νῦός, Φάσωνος δὲ ἄδελφός, τὴν θύραν Β τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνω σφόδρα ἐκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδῆ αὐτῷ ἀνέφεξε τις, εὐθὺς εἰσώ ἤε ἐπευγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων Ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεῦ- δεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τῇ φωνῇ γνῶς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἐφην, οὕτος. μὴ τι νεῶτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἢ δ' ὦς, εἰ μὴ ἄγαθά γε. Ἐν ἄν λέγοις, ιὸ ἢν δ' ἔγω· ἐστὶ δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἐφη, ἥκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοὶ. Πρώην, ἐφην ἔγω· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέτυσαι; Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, ὑ ἐστέρας γε. καὶ ἀμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ 15 εἶπεν· Ἐστέρας δήτα, μάλα γε ὅψε ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Ὀἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δήτα μέλλων σοι φράξειν, ὅτι δωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὕπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην· ἐπειδῆ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δε- δειπνηκότες ἤμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε 20 μου ἄδελφος λέγει, ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἐτί μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἱέναι, ἐπειτά μοι λίαν D πόρρω ἐδοξέ τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδῆ δὲ τάχιστα με ἐκ τοῦ κόπτου ὁ ὑπνός ἀνήκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὖτω δεύρῳ ἐπορεύμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τῇ 25 ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τι οὖν σοί, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τούτο; μὼν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὃς γελάσας, Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἐφην ἔγω, ἄν αὐτῷ δεδόξαργύριον καὶ πείδης 30 ἐκείνου, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφὸν. Εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὦς, ὁ
Τέσσαρες θεοί, εὖ τούτῳ εἶη· ὡς οὔτε ἀν τῶν ἐμῶν Ε ἐπιλύπομεν οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὕτα ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἢκώ παρά σε, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλέξῃς αὐτῷ. 35 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερος εἰμι, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὔτ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἐτί γὰρ πάις ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἀνδρὰ ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ φασὶ σοφῶτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τι οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐνδοὺ | καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἦκουσα, παρὰ Καλλία τὸ 'Ἰππούικον' ἀλλ' ἱώμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐἵπον. Μήτη, ἁγαθέ, ἐκείσε ἱώμεν, πρὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δεύρο ἐξαναστώμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλῆν, καὶ περιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἐωσ ἄν φῶς γένη- 45 ται· εἴτα ἱώμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἐνδοὺ διατρίβει, ὡστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐνδοῦν.

III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλῆν περιήμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ 'Ἰπποκράτους τῆς ρώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτῶν καὶ ἱρώτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὁ 'Ἰππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἴεναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκεῖνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὡστερ ἄν εἰ ἐπε- νόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτὸν ῥμόνυμον ἐλθὼν 'Ἰπποκράτη 5 τὸν Κῦθον, τὸν τῶν 'Ασκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελείων ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκεῖνῷ, εἰ τίς σε ἱρέτο, Εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὁ 'Ἰππόκρατες, 'Ἰπποκράτει 10 μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνως; Εἰπὼν ἄν, εφη̣, ὦτι ὡς ἰατρῷ. 'Ὡς τίς γενησόμενος; 'Ὡς ἰατρός, 15 ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν 'Ἀργείου ἦ
Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναίον ἐπενόεις αὐτικόμενος μισθὸν ἕπερ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἰ τίς σε ἱρετο· τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἁργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδία; τί ἂν ἄπεκρίνω; Εἴποιν ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. Ὑς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτὸς; 20 Δήλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. Εἰςεν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἔγω τε καὶ σὺ ἁργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἐτομοὶ ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ἕπερ σοῦ, ἀν μὲν ἐξικνήται τὰ ἥμετερα χρήματα καὶ τούτως πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων 25 προσαναλίσκοντες· εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· εἴπέ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππóκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι·

Ε μεθα· τί οὖνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου 30 ἄκοιμομεν; ὡσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιόν καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητῆς, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἄκοιμομεν; Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι ὁνομάζουσί γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἀνδρα εἶναι, ἐφη. Ὑς σοφιστὴν ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα· Μάλιστα. Εἰ 35 οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τίς σε προσέρειτο· αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς 312 τίς γεγονόμενος ἐρχεῖ παρὰ | τὸν Ἐπταγόραν; καὶ ὡς εἴπεν ἐρυθριάτασ—hdη γὰρ ὑπέφαινεν τι ἡμέρας, ὡστε καταφανῇ αὐτῶν γενέσθαι—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γεγονόμενος. 40 Σὺ δὲ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Ὡς τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρῆ λέγειν. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ὁ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἐσεσθαι, 45 Ἀλλ’ οἶαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ
κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ έκάστην ὁὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἐμαθεῖς, ὥς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.

50 Πάνω μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοιαύτῃ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

IV. Οίσθα οὖν ὁ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λαυθάνει; ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; "Ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχήν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρα- σχεῖν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρὶ, ὡς φής, σοφιστῇ; ὅ τι δὲ ποτε ὁ σοφιστὴς ἔστιν, θαυμάζομαι ἂν εἰ οἴσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ’ ἀγροεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἴσθα, οὔτ’ εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ’ εἰ κακὸν πράγματι. Οἶμαι γ’, ἐφη, εἰδέναι. Λέγε δή, τί ἤγει εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν; 'Εγὼ μὲν, ἢ δ’ ἂν, ὁσπερ τούνομα λέγει, τούτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τούτο μὲν ἐξεστὶ λέγειν καὶ περὶ ξωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὔτοι εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες. ἂλλ’ εἰ τις ὁ ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ξωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες.

15 μονες, εὑμοιμεν ἂν που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. εἰ δὲ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφιστής τῶν τί σοφῶν ἔστιν, τί ἂν ἀποκρινοῦμεθα αὐτῷ; ποῖας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εὑμοιμεν αὐτὸν εἰναι, ὁ Σώκρατες;

20 ἐπιστᾶτὴν τοῦ ποίησαι δεινὸν λέγειν; "Ισως ἂν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀλλήλη λέγομεν, οὐ μὲντοι ἰκανῶς γε’ ἐρωτησεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῶν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτον ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν. ὁσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δεινὸν δῆτον ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὕτε καὶ Ε’ 25 ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως—ἡ γάρ; Ναι. Εἰεν’ ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;
V. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον | μετὰ τούτῳ· Τί οὖν; οἰσθαί εἰς οἶον των κύνδυνων ἔρχει ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ, διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρὸν, πολλὰ ἄν περιεσκέψω, εἰτ’ ἐπιτρέπτευν εἰτε οὐ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τοὺς τε φίλους ἄν παρεκάλεις καί τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενοι ἤμερας συχνῶς· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἤγεί, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ὧ πάντ’ ἔστι τὰ σὰ ἢ ἐν ἢ κακῶς 10 πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ ἑγομένου, περὶ ὧν τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἅδελφῳ ἐπεκοινώσωσον οὔτε ἴμοιν τῶν ἑταίρων οὔδενί, εἰτ’ ἐπιτρέπτευν εἰτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ἐξερχαί τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ’ ἐστέρας ἄκουσας, ὡς φήσι, ὅρθριος ἤκων περὶ 15 μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὔδε συμβουλὴν ποιεί, εἴτε χρῇ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἐτοιμὸς δ’ εἰ ἀναλίσκειν τὰ τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκός, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέοι Πρωταγόρα, ὅν οὔτε γυμνώσκεις, ὡς φήσι, οὔτε διείλεξαι οὔδεπώ· 20 Ποτε, σοφιστήν δ’ οἰνομάξεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστήν, τὸ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, φαίνει ἄγνωσθι, δ’ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν καὶ ὃς ἄκουσας, Ἐοίκευν, ἐφ’ ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ὃν σὺ λέγεις. Ἀρ’ οὖν, ὧ Ἰππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὃν ἐμπορός τις ἢ κάτηλος τῶν ἀγωνιῶν, ἀφ’ 25 ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιούτος τις. Τρέφεται δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίν; Μαθήμασιν

Hippocrates therefore will greatly endanger the welfare of his soul, by feeding it with unknown food bought of an unknown species of mankind.
δήποτε, ήν δ' εγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μη, ὦ ἑταίρε, ὦ σοφιστής ἐπαινῶν ἂ πωλεῖ εξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ 30 οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἐμπορός τε καὶ δ' κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὐτοὶ ποὺ ἄν γούσιν ἀγωγίμων οὐτε αὐτοὶ ἵσασιν ὃ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρόν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπεινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὄνωμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τόχη γυμναστικὸς ἢ 35 ἵατρὸς ὄν. οὖτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ κατηλεύοντες τὸ ἄει ἑπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ὅ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα ὃ ἄν τινες, ὃ ἀριστε, καὶ τοῦτων ἄγνωσθεν ὃν πωλοῦσιν ὃ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν 40 ψυχήν· ὅς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ ὄνωμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, Ε' ἐάν μή τις τόχη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἄν ἱατρικὸς ὄν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τοῦτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὀνειδοθαί μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄντος· εἰ 45 δὲ μή, ὦρα, ὃ μακάριε, μή περὶ τοὺς φιλτάτους κυβεύσε τε καὶ κινδυνεύσε. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὁμὴ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πράμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις 50 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πίοντα ἡ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἰκαδε ἔξεστιν συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἔπαιντα, ὃ τι τε ἐδεστεόν ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὃ τι μή, καὶ ὀπόσον καὶ ὀπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὡμή οὗ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος· μαθή- 55 ματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγεκείν, ἀλλ' Β' ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμήν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθώντα ἀπίεναι ἡ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὀφελημένου. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν.
VI. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταύτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὡς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὀδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν’ οὖν μὴ ἄτελῆς γένοιτο, ἄλλα διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἔσιομεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἐως συνυπολογήσαμεν ἄλληλοις· δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχος οὗ τις, κατήκουν ἡμῶν. κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἀχθεσθαί τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ὑδῶν ιὸ ἡμᾶς, Ἔι, ἐφῃ, σοφισταὶ τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῶ· καὶ ἀμηφοῖ τῶν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὥς οἶος τ’ ἢν ἐπήραξε. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούσαμεν, καὶ ὡς ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, Ὁ ἀνθρωποι, ἐφῃ, οὐκ ἄκηκοατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· 15 Ἀλλ’ ωγαθέ, ἐφῃν ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν Ε οὔτε σοφισταὶ ἐσμεν· ἄλλα θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γὰρ τοι δεόμενοι ἱδεῖν ἡλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν. μόνις οὐν ποτε ἡμῖν ἀνθρωπος ἀνέφξε τὴν θύραν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ 20 προστάφῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ’ αὐτῷ συμπεριπέτουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου 315 καὶ ὁ ἄδελφος αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ἢ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
25 ἔπι θάτερα ὁ ἔτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, οὕσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνη μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστής ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἱ ὄπισθεν ἥκολοῦθον ἔπαγωγοί τῶν 30 λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὕς ἄγει ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι’ ὅν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὁ ὅσπερ Ὁρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκηλημένοι: ἢσαν δὲ θύειας καὶ τῶν ἐπιχαιριῶν ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τούτων τὸν 35 χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγοψε ἤδων ἡσθην, ὡς καλῶς ἡλιαν-βούντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περισσάξιοντο οὕτοι οἱ ἐπήκουσι· ἔνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ 40 περιόντες ἀεὶ ἐς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

VII. Τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενόησα, ἐφη’ Ὀμηρος, Ἰπ-πίαν τὸν Ἡλείουν, καθῆμενον ἐν τῷ κατ’ Κ ἀντικρυ προστώφων ἐν θρόνων· περὶ αὐτῶν δ’ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἀκον-5 μενοῦ καὶ Φαώδρος ὁ Μυρρινοῦσιος καὶ Ἀνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολιτιαί τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλοι τινες. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεως τοῖς καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικά ἄττα διερωτῶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, ὁ δ’ ἐν θρόνῳ καθῆμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ 10 διεξήςε τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσείδον· ἐπὶδημεῖ γὰρ ἀρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματι τυίν, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμείῳ ἐχρήτι Ἰππώνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν κατα- 

15 λυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο,


VIII. Καὶ ἥμεις μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθήθηκεμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισήλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε οἱ καλὸς, ὡς φῆς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχροον. ἥμεις οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἐτί σμίκρ᾽ ἄττα διατριψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεσασάμενοι, προσήβημεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ ἐίπον Ὄ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σὲ τοι ἡλθομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὕτος. Πότερον, ἐφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθήμαι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ἦμιν μὲν, ἢν 10 δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὗδὲν διαφέρει ἀκούσας δὲ οὐ ἐνεκα ἡλθομεν αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τι οὖν δὴ ἐστιν, ἐφη, οὐ ἐνεκα ἥκετε; Ἰπποκράτης οἴδε ἐστίν μὲν τῶν ἑπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδόρου νῦσ, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμυλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἦλι- 15 κιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλογίμοις γενέσθαι.
ἐν τῇ πόλει, τούτο δὲ οἴεται οἱ μάλιστ’ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ
σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ’ οὐν ἦδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον
περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἰεὶ δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους,
20 ἡ μετ’ ἄλλων. Ἑρμός, ἐφη, προμηθεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες,
ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ιόντα εἰς πόλεις
μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς
βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας,
καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ἄθυείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεω-
25 τέρων, ἐαντὸν συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εἰλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα
πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε
γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.
ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι πα-
30 λαίαν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν
ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν,
οἶον Ὡμηρὸν τε καὶ Ὅσιόδον καὶ Σιμώνιδην, τοὺς
dὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμοδίας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε
35 Ὄρφεα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίοις δὲ τινας ὑσθῆμαι καὶ
γυμναστικῆς, οἶον Ἰκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν
ἔτι ὡν, οὐδεῖς ἦττων σοφιστῆς, Ὁρδίκος ὁ Σηλυμ-Ε
βριανός, τὸ δὲ ἄρχαιον Μεγαρεύς· μούσικὴν δὲ
Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὡμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο,
40 μέγας ὡν σοφιστῆς, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κέιος καὶ
ἅλλοι πολλοὶ. οὕτωσι πάντεσ, ὡσπερ λέγω, φοβη-
θέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσ-
μασιν ἔχρησαντο· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἄπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο
45 διαπράξασθαι ὁ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν
ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν,
ὡνπερ ἕνεκα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οὐ γε
ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΩΣ ΕΠΙΤΟΙ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΝΤΑΙ, ΆΛΛ' ΆΤΤ' ΑΝ ΟΥΤΟΙ ΔΙΑΓΓΕΛΛΩΣΙ, ΤΑΥΤΑ ΥΜΝΟΥΣΙΝ. ΤΟ ΟΥΝ ΆΠΟ-ΔΙΔΡΑΣΚΟΝΤΑ ΜΗ ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ ΆΠΟΔΡΑΝΑΙ, ΆΛΛΑ ΚΑΤΑ-50

Β ΦΑΥΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΠΟΛΛΗ ΜΩΡΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΥ ΔΥΣΜΕΝΕΣΤΕΡΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ΑΝΑΓΚΗ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ· ΉΓΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΤΟΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΆΛΛΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΝΟΥΡΓΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΕΓΩ ΟΥΝ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑΝ ΆΠΑΣΑΝ ΟΔΩΝ ΕΛΗΞΗΒΑ, ΚΑΙ ΟΜΟΛΟΓΟ ΤΕ 55 ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΙΔΕΥΕΙΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ, ΚΑΙ ΕΥ-ΛΑΒΕΙΑΝ ΤΑΥΤΗΝ ΟΙΜΑΙ ΒΕΛΤΙΩ ΕΚΕΙΝΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΤΟ ΟΜΟ-ΛΟΓΕΙΝ ΜΆΛΛΟΝ ή ΕΞΑΡΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ· ΚΑΙ ΆΛΛΑΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΥΤΗ ΕΣΚΕΜΜΑΙ, ΩΣΤΕ, ΣΩΝ ΘΕΩ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ, ΜΗΔΕΝ ΔΕΙΝΟΝ

C ΠΛΑΠΧΕΙΝ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΟΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΚΑΙΤΟΙ 60 ΠΟΛΛΆ ΓΕ ΕΤΗ ΗΔΗ ΕΙΜΙ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ· ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΞΥΜΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΆ ΜΟΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ· ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ ΟΤΟΝ ΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΑΝ ΥΜΩΝ ΚΑΘ' ΗΛΙΚΙΑΝ ΠΑΤΗΡ ΕΙΗΝ· ΩΣΤΕ ΠΟΛΥ ΜΟΙ ΉΔΙΣΤΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ΕΙ ΤΙ ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΕ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ, άΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΝΟΩΝ ΌΝΤΩΝ ΤΟΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ. ΚΑΙ 65 ΕΓΩ—ΥΠΩΠΤΕΥΣΑ ΓΑΡ ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΤΩ ΤΕ ΠΡΟ-ΔΙΚΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩ ΙΠΠΙΑ ΕΝΔΕΙΞΑΣΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΛΛΟΠΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ ΌΤΙ ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΑΦΙΓΓΕΝΟΙ ΕΙΜΕΝ—ΤΙ ΟΥΝ, ΕΦΗΝ

D ΕΓΩ, ΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΥ ΚΑΙ 'ΙΠΠΙΑΝ ΕΚΑΛΕΣΑΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΕΤ' ΑΥΤΟΥΝ, ΊΝΑ ΕΠΑΚΟΥΙΩΝ ΆΜΩΝ; ΠΑΝΤΙ ΜΕΝ 70 ΟΥΝ, ΕΦΗ Ο ΠΡΟΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ. ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΕ ΟΥΝ, Ο ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ ΕΦΗ, ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΟΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΩΜΕΝ, ΊΝΑ ΚΑΘΕΞΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΔΙΑ-ΛΕΥΘΗΣΕΙ; 'ΕΔΟΚΕΙ ΧΡΗΜΑΙ· ΆΣΜΕΝΟΙ ΔΕ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ΗΜΕΙΣ, ΩΣ ΑΚΟΥΣΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ ΣΟΦΟΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΙ ΑΝΤΙΛΑ-ΒΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΒΑΘΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΛΙΝΩΝ ΚΑΤΕΣΚΕΥΑ-75 ΖΟΜΕΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΩ 'ΙΠΠΙΑ· ΈΚΕΙ ΉΑΡ ΠΡΟΫΨΗΡΧΕ ΤΑ

Ε ΒΑΘΡΑ· ΕΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΩ ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ 'ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ ΉΚΕΤΗΝ ΆΓΟΥΣΤΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΥ, ΑΝΑΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΚΛΙΝΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΥ.
IX. Ἐπει δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεξόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἂν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἵδε πάρεισιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποτοῦ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ότι Ἦ αὐτὴ μοι ἁρχὴ | ἔστω, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, 318 ἀρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ ὁδὲ τυγχάνει ἐν ἑπιθυμίᾳ ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας; ὃ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, εάνς σοι συνῆ, ἰδέως ἂν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἴμετερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν: Ὡ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοῖνυν σοι, ἐάν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ὴμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπίέναι οὐκαδὲ βελτίων γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταύτα ταύτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἂει ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον: Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σὺ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὧν καὶ ὦτω σοφός, εἰ τίς σε διδάξειν ὁ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἑπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. 20 ἀλλὰ μὴ ὦτως, ἀλλὰ ωσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλῶν τὴν ἑπιθυμίαν Ἰπποκράτης ὤδε ἑπιθυμομήσεις τῆς συνουσίας τοῦτο τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ ὑννοεστὶ ἑπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ηρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ’ αὐτὸν, ωσπερ παρὰ σε νῦν, ἀκούσειν αὐτοῦ ταύτα ταύτα, ἀπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης Σ ἡμέρας ξυνών, αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἑπιδώσει· εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο· τι δὴ φής βελτίων ἑσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὲ ἑπιδώσειν; εἴποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζευξίππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικὴν· κἂν εἰ Ὄρθαγόρα τῷ Ὀμβαίῳ συγ- 30 γενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταύτα ταύτα, ἀπερ σοῦ; ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὁ τὶ βελτίων καθ’ ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγεγυμόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἴποι ἂν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλησι
οὔτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ύπέρ τοῦ τούτου ἐρωτώντι, Ἰπποκράτης οδε Πρωταγόρα συγ-
γενόμενος, ἦ ἃν αὐτῷ ἡμέρα συγγέννηται, βελτίων 35 ἀπείς γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκά-
στης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἠκούσας, Σὺ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶς, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἰππο-
πο- 40 κράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἄφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται, ἀπερ ἀν ἐπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενοι τῶν σοφιστῶν.
Εἰ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λοββόνται τοὺς νέους: τὰ θὰρ 
tέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἀκοντας πάλιν αὐ ἀγοντες
ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμοὺς τε καὶ ἀστρο-
νομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἃμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ
ἄφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περί ἄλλου τοῦ ἡ περὶ ὀπτ ἤκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημα ἑστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν
οἰκείων, ὅπως ἄν ἀρίστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διαικοῖ, 50
καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς | πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνα-
tῶτατος ἄν εἰη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἀρα, ἐφην
ἔγω, ἐπομαι σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν
πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχυεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας
ἀγαθοὺς πολλας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὐν τοῦτο ἑστιν, ἐφη, 55
ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὁ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.
Χ. Ἡ καλῶν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτη-
σαι, εἰπερ κέκτησαι: οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἄλλῳ
πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἀπερ νοώ. ἔγω
γὰρ τοῦτο, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ἤμην
Β διδακτῶν εἶναι, σοι δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως 5
ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτῶν εἶναι
μη' ὡς ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστῶν ἀνθρώπων, δί-
καί ὡς εἴμι εἴπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοις, ὦσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἐλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγόμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέ θράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπτομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τῶν ναυπηγοὺς, καὶ τάλα πάντα οὕτως, ὡσα ἤγονται μαθητά C 15 τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρή αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημουργον εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλοῦσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσι, ἔως ἂν ἦ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ 20 ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καθαροφυβηθεῖς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσι, ἢ ἐξαιρωνται κελεύοντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὃν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως D διοικήσεως δέ θεούς συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς 25 αὐστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεύς, σκυτοτόμος, ἐμπορός, ναύκληρος, πλούσιος, πένης, γενναῖος, ἄγεννης, καὶ τούτως οὐδὲς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὦσπερ τοὺς πρότερον, ὦτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν οὐδὲ οὕτως διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ 30 ἐπείτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεί· δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἤγονται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἦμῖν οἱ σοφῶτατοι Ε καὶ ἀριστοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ταῦτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἶοι τε ἄλλοις παραδίδοναι· ἐπεὶ Περι- 35 κλῆς, ὁ τουτων τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἄ μεν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὧ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφὸς ἦστιν, οὕτε αὐτὸς | παίδευει οὔτε τῷ 320 ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ περιόντες νέμονται
οσπερ ἄφετοι εάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδον 40 τοιούτι νεώτερον ἅδελφον, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὖ-
τος ἀνήρ Περικλῆς, δεδώς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφαρῆ
ἥ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδον, ἀποστάσας ἀπὸ τούτοις, κατα-
θέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἑπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν εὖ μήνας
Β γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ο禁忌 χρήσαιτο 45
αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἱ
αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι οὔτε οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν
οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλοτρίων. ἔγὼ οὖν, ὥ
Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἤγομαι
διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σου ἁκοῦσ καὶ ἀντα 50
λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἴμαι τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ
ἥγεϊσθαι σε πολλῶν μὲν ἐμπειροῦν γεγονέναι, πολλὰ
dὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἤξηνρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν
C ἐχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπίδειξαι, ὡς διδακτὸν ἔστιν
ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον. Ἀλλ', ὥ 55
Σωκράτες, ἐφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ἡμῖν, ὡς
πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπίδειξον ἡ λόγῳ
dιεξελθὼν; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθ-
ημένων, ὀποτέρως βούλοιτο, οὕτως διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ
τοῖνυν μοι, ἐφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μύθον ἡμῖν λέγειν. 60
XI. Ἡν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος, οτε θει μὲν ἤσαν,
D θυντα δε γενὴ όυκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ
tοῦτοις χρόνον ἤλθεν εἰμαρμένοις γενέ-
σεως, τυπούσιν αὐτὰ θεός γῆς ἐνδον, ἐκ
γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξατες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ 5
κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἐμελλον,
προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμήσαι τε
cαι νείμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὑς πρέπει. Προμηθέα
dε παρατεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νείμαι, νεῖμαντος δε
A. P.
μου, ἡφή, ἐπίσκεψαι καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων
de τοῖς μὲν ἵσχυν ἀνευ τάχοις προσήπτευν, τὰ δ’ Ε
ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει. τὰ δὲ ἀπλιζε, τοῖς δ’
ἀσπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν’ αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανάτο
dύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἄ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι

ημπισχεὶν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἰκησιν ἐνεμευν’
ἀ δὲ ηὐξε μεγέθει, τὸδε ἢ αὐτῷ ἐσωζεν’ καὶ τάλλα
ούτως ἐπανισῶν ἐνεμευν. ταύτα δὲ ἐμηχανάτο εὐλά-
βειαν ἔχων μὴ τι γένος αἰστωθεί’ ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς
ἀλληλοφθορίων διαφυγας ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ

Διὸς ὥρας εὐμαρίαν ἐμηχανάτο ἀμφιεννύς αὐτὰ
πυκναὶς τε θρίξιν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἵκανοις μὲν
ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς
ἐυνᾶς ιοὺσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα στρωμὴ
οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστῳ καὶ ύποδῶν τὰ

μὲν ὅπλαίς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. Β
tοιντεύθεν τροφᾶς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἔξεπορίζευν, τοῖς
μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρποῦς,
tοῖς δὲ ρίζας. ἐστι δ’ οἶς ἐδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ξώα
ἀλλων βοράν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὄλγογονίαν προσήπης,
τοῖς δ’ ἀναλισκομένοις ύπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν,
σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ι ἀπεὶ δὴ οὖν οὐ πάντι τι
σοφὸς ὃν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαβεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας C
tὰς δυνάμεις. λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἐτὶ αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ
ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἥπορει ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο. ἀπο-

ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος
τῇ νυμῆν, καὶ ὅρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ξὰ εἰμελὼς πάντων
ἐχοντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ
ἀστρωτον καὶ ἄσπλον. ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα
παρῆν, ἐν ἦ ἐδει καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς
φός. ἀπορία οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς, ἦντινα
σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὖ ροί, κλέπτει Ἦφαιστον
καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἐνεχυνοι σοφίαν οὐν πυρὶ—ἀμή-
χανοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτὴν κτητὴν τῷ ἀρχηγίῳ γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖαι ἀνθρώπῳ.
τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίου σοφίαν ἀνθρώπος ταύτῃ 45
ἐσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικήν οὐκ εἴχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ
Διί· τῷ δὲ Προμηθεί εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ
Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ
Ε αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
καὶ Ἦφαιστου οἰκήμα τὸ κοινὸν, ἐν ὃ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτιν, 50
λαθῶν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέφας τὴν τε ἐμπυρῳν τέχνην
tὴν τοῦ Ἦφαιστου καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
dιδὼσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀν-
θρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεά δὲ | δ' Ἐπιμηθεά
ὑπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.

ΧΙΙ. 'Επειδή δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας,
πρώτον μὲν ᾔθων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν,
καὶ ἑπεχεῖρε θεοῖς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ
ἀγάλματα θεῶν ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνό-
ματα ταχὺ διηθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ
οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθήτας καὶ ὑπόδεσις καὶ
στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἡμέτερο.
οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευαζόμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀν-
θρūποι φύκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπόλ-
λυτον οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχύ αὐτῶν 10
ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς
πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἴκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τῶν τῶν
θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδείη· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὕτω
εἰχον, ὡς μέρος πολεμικῆς. ἐξῆτου δὴ ἄθροιζοσθαι
καὶ φίλησθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἄθροισθεῖν, 15

† Post πρώτον μὲν addunt codices διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν.
ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχουτες τήν πολιτικήν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδασμόνει διεφθειροντο. Ζεύς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιπο τὰν, Ο Ἐρμῆν πέμπτει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδώ τε καὶ 20 δίκην, ὑν εἰεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτά οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδώ ἀνθρώποις πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενεμηται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενεμηται δὲ ὅδε· εἰς ἔχων ἱατρικὴν πόλλοις ἴκανος ἱδιώταις, καὶ 25 οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδώ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἡ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, Ὅ ἐφη ὁ Ζεύς, καὶ πάντες μετέχοντων· οὐ γὰρ ἀν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχουεν ὡσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θῆς παρ’ ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον 30 αἴδοις καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

οὕτω δὴ, Ὅ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταύτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἅθηναιοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετείναι συμβουλής, καὶ εὰν τις ἐκτὸς ἢν τῶν ὀλίγων 35 συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φής· εἰκότως, Ἐ ὡς ἐγὼ φήμι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ᾧ ἱσχὶν, ἢν δὲ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πάσαν ἰέναι 323 καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἀπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσήκου ταύτης ἡ μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, 40 ἢ μὴ εἰναι πόλεις. αὕτη, Ὅ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία. ἦν δὲ μὴ οὐχ ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἠγούνται πάντες ἀνθρώποι πάντα ἀνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς τόδε αὕ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὡσπερ 45 σὺ λέγεις, ἐὰν τις φή ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς εἴναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινόν τέχνην, ἢν μὴ ἐστὶν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ Β
χαλεπαίνουσι, καὶ οὶ οίκειοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μανιμένου· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἄρετῇ, εάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἀδικῶς ἔστιν, εὰν ὦτος αὐτοῦ καθ' αὐτοῦ τάληθη λέγῃ 50 ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὅ εἰκεὶ σωφροσύνην ἤγονυτο εἶναι, τάληθη λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας δειν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, εάν τε ὦσιν εάν τε μή, ἡ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην, ὡς ἀναγκαῖοι οὐδέναι ὁντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν 55 αὐτῆς, ἡ μή εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἀνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἄρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἤγείσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἤγονυται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ εἶ ἐπιμελείας παραγιγνεσθαι ὡς ἀν παραγίγνηται, τούτῳ σοι μετὰ τούτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαί. ὅσα γὰρ ἤγονυται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώποι φύσει ἡ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταύτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἶον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἄσθενεῖς τῆς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὡστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταύτα μὲν γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἵσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντια τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, εάν τις ταύτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τάναντια τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ τούτοις ποι' τ' θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὅν ἐστίν ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ 23 324 ἀσέβεια καὶ συλληβδην πᾶν τὸ | ἐναντίον τῆς πολι-
τικῆς ἄρετῆς· ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὃς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὐσίας. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, 25 ὥ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἄδικοντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει, ὅτι ὃι ὅ τε ἄνθρωποι ἠγούνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἄρετὴν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἄδικοντας πρὸς τούτῳ τῶν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τοῦτον ἔνεκα, Β ὅτι ἡδίκησεν, ὡστις μὴ ὡσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως
30 τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληθεύτος ἔνεκα ἄδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἀν τὸ γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θεία—ἄλλα τὸν μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὐθίς ἄδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς ὁτὸς μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἴδων κολασθέντα· καὶ
35 τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παϊδευτὴν εἶναι ἄρετῆν· ἀποτροπῆς γοὺς ἔνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχονσιν, ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ Σ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἳ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὖς ἀν οἴωνται ἄδικεϊν, καὶ οὐχ
40 ἡκιστα 'Αθηναίοι, οἳ σοὶ πολίται· ὡστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ 'Αθηναίοι εἰσὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστῶν εἶναι καὶ διδακτῶν ἄρετην. ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἳ σοὶ πολίται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτωτόμων συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
45 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἠγούνται ἄρετῆν, ἀποδεικταί σοι, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἔμοι φαίνεται. D

ΧΙΓ. Ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστὶν, ὡ ἀπορεῖς

and, in point of fact, virtue, which is the product of the political art, is taught to all,
πέρι, ὡς Σωκράτες, οὐκέτι μῦθον σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὥστε γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι ἐν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, Ε οὐ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἢ ἱο ἁπορία, ἦν σὺ ἀπορεῖς, ἢ ἀλλοθι οὖδαμον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τούτο ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη | καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὀσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν· εἰ τούτ' ἔστιν, οὐ 15 δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, εάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὔτω πράττειν, ἀνεν δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μή μετέχονται καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ παίδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναίκα, ἐωσπερ ἃν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, 20 ὅς δ' ἂν μὴ υπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος.

Β ὡς ἀνίατον οὔτα τούτον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν· εἰ οὔτω μὲν ἔχει, οὔτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότοι οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ διδάσκονται τους νεῖς, τούτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμάσιοι 25 γίγνονται οἱ ἁγαθοὶ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδάκτον αὐτὸ ἤγονται καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία, ἀπεδείξαμεν· διδάκτον δὲ οὖν καὶ θεραπευτὸν τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἄρα τους νεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ξημία εἰὼν μὴ ἐπιστῶται, ἐφ' ὅν δὲ ἢ τε ξημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς 30 Ψ παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἁρετὴν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ως ἔτος εἰπεῖν ξυλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἴεσθαι γε χρή, ὡς Σωκράτες. — 35

XV. Ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὕτως ἀν ἰδοί, καὶ διδάσκοντες καὶ νουθετοῦσιν.
έπειδάν θάττον συνιή τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφός καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγός καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατήρ περὶ τοῦτον διαμάχονται, ὡπως Δ βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τὸδε μὲν καλὸν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον,
10 καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει· καὶ εὰν μὲν ἐκῶν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μῆ, ὡσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαίς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελείσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παιδῶν ἡ
15 γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι Ε τοῦτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὐ γράμματα μᾶθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὡσ- περ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκεις ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα
20 καὶ ἐκμαθήναις ἀναγκαζοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νοο- θετήσεις | ἐνεισιν, πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἐπαινοὶ καὶ 326 ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ξηλῶν μιμήται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οὐ τ' αὐ κιθαρισταί ἐτερα τοιαύτα σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦν-
25 ται καὶ ὅπως ἃν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποι- ητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκοντες μελοποιοῦν, εἰς Β τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαζοῦσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς
30 τῶν παιδῶν, ἵνα ἡμερῶτεροι τε ὡσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ωσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώ- που εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοῖνυν
πρὸς τοὺτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπτοις, ἵνα τὰ σῶματα βελτίως ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. 35

C χρηστῇ ὤσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδεικνύαν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς πράξεσιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιότατοι· καὶ οἱ τούτων νεῖς, προϊαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτῶν, ὑφιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγοῦσιν, η ἀπὸ τῶν τε νόμων ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν.

D καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζηῇ, 1 ἵνα μὴ αὐτὸλ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῇ πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνώς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράφαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι οὖτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδάσκων καὶ ἀναγκάζοντι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὅπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμων ὑπογράφασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους 50 ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαί· ὅς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάξει, καὶ ὅνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ. E καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἀλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐθύναι. τοσαῦτας οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας υόσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱδία καὶ δημοσία, θαυμάζεις, ὅ 55 Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτοῦν ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς; ἀλλ' οὐ χρή θαυμάζεις, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτοῦν. XVI. Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ νεῖς φαίλοι γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὐ ἐμδὲ· οὔδεν γὰρ θαυμαστῶν, εἴπερ ἄληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει 327 πόλις εἶναι, ὁ οὔδενα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγων οὔτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ

† Post ἂν add. codd. κατὰ παράδειγμα.
μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμηθεὶς ἄλλο τῶν ἐπι-
τηδευμάτων ὡτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ
10 μὴ οἶνον τῇ ἑδύουν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ
ημὲν, ὅποιὸς τις ἐδύνατο ἐκαστὸς, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἴδια
καὶ δημοσία πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἑπέπληττε
τοῦ μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου,
ὡσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς
15 φθονεὶ οὐδ᾽ ἀποκρύπτεται ὡσπερ τῶν ἀλλών τεχνῆς-
Β μάτων· λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἢμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ τάντα πᾶς παντὶ προ-
θύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
νόμιμα· εἰ ὅν ὦτῳ καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυ-
20 μίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἰχόμεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἷς
ἀν τὶ, ἐφή, μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν
ἀγαθούς αὐλητὰς τοὺς νικεῖς γύρωσθαι ἢ τῶν
φαύλων; οἶμαι μὲν οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἑτυχεὶ ὁ νῖος εὐφυέστατος
γενόμενος εἰς αὐλήσιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγυμος θυξῆθη,
25 ὅτου δὲ ἀφυῆς, ἀκληῆς· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ
αὐλητῶν φαύλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ᾽ ἂν φαύλου
ἀγαθός· ἀλλ᾽ οὖν αὐλητάς γ᾽ ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἰκανοὶ
ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαίνεται.
οὕτως οἶου καὶ νῦν, ὡστὶς σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται
30 ἀνθρώπος τῶν ἐν νόμωις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων,
δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῦτο τοῦ
πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους,
οἷς μῆτε παίδεια ἑστὶν μῆτε δικαστήρια μῆτε νόμοι
μῆτε ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἄναγκαζοῦσα ἀρετής
35 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰεν ἀγριῶ τινες, οἰοὶ περ ὅνς
πέρυσιν Φερεκράτησ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Δηναῖώ.
ἡ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος,
ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπητὰς
ἀν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδα, καὶ ἀνολο-
Ε φύραι ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν. 40

νῶν δὲ τρυφῆς, ὁ Σῶκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοι

εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὁσον δύνανται ἔκαστος, καὶ οὐδεὶς

σοι φαίνεται εἰναι. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ξητοῖς τὶς διδάσκαλος
tου ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φανείη, οὐδὲ γ' ἂν, οἴμαι,
eἰ ξητοῖς τὸς ἡμῶν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν 45

υίες αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ

πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὁσον οἶός τ' ἦν ὁ πατήρ
καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὀμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτη
tις ἂν διδάξειεν,—οὐ ράδιον οἴμαι εἰναι, ὁ Σῶκρατες,
tούτων διδάσκαλον φανήμαι, τῶν δὲ ἀπειρῶν παντά-50

πασι ράδιον, οὔτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων·

ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν

Β προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετῆν, ἀγαπητόν. ὥν δὴ ἐγὼ οἴμαι

εἰς εἰναί, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων

οὐήσαι τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ 55

ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὅν πράττομαι, καὶ ἐτι πλείωνος,

ὡςτε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταύτα καὶ

tὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιούτου πε-

ποίμαι: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν

βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον. 60

C ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθῶν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας ὅσον ἂν φῆ ἀξιά

eῖναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

tοιούτων σοι, ἤφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ

λόγον εἰρήκα, ὡς διδακτῶν ἀρετῆ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως

ἵγονται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν 65

πατέρων φαύλους νεῖες γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων

ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου νεῖες, Παράλου

καὶ Ἐαυθίππου τοῦδε ἥλικιώτατον, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν

πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν.· τῶνδε

D δὲ οὕτω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἐτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς 70

eἰσὶν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γὰρ.
XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσάντα καὶ τοιαύτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τὸν λόγον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένοις ἐτί πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐβλεπον ὡς ἐρωτοῦτα τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ήσθομην ὅτι τῶ ὄντι πεπαιμένοις εἴη, μόγις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἰπποκράτη. Ὡ παῖ Ἀπολλοδόρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προὔτρεψας με ὅδε ἀφικέσθαι 10 πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἃ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου ἐν γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἡ ἀγαθοὶ ὁ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἔμποδῶν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπείδη καὶ τὰ πολλά ταύτα ἐξεδίδαξεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο ὁτιὸν τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχι ἂν καὶ 15 τοιούτως λόγους ἀκούσειν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἰκανῶν εἰπεῖν. εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροτο τινά τι, ὡσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλὰ εἶναι τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερστήσῃ τι τῶν ῥήθεντον, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἥχει καὶ ἀποτείνει εἶναι μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὔτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες 20 δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ θεὶ δέ ἰκανὸς μὲν μακρὸς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδεξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἢ δλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα 25 μένα. νῦν οὖν, ὥ Πρωταγόρα, σμικρὸν τινὸς ἐυδεις εἰμι πάντες ἔχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίασμο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδακτόν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώ-
C πων πειθομήν ἂν, καὶ σοι πείθομαι· ὃ δ’ ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τούτο μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπληρώσων. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ο Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδώ 35 πέμψειν τοὺς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτοῦ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα ταύτα ὡς ἐν τὶ εἰς συνθήβην, ἀρετή· ταύτ’ οὖν αὐτὰ διέλθε μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μέν τὶ ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς 40 ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, ἡ

D ταύτ’ ἐστιν ἣ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὄνοματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος· τούτ’ ἐστιν ὃ ἐτὶ ἐπιποθῶ.

XVIII. Ἀλλὰ βάδιον τοῦτό γ’, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες ὁ ποιητὴς, ὡς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια ἐστιν ἢ ἔρωτάς. Πότερον, ἐφη, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόρια ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ρίς καὶ ὀφθαλμὸι καὶ ὡτα, ἡ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἑτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ’ ἡ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; Ἑκείνος

Ε μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλου πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, ῥῆν θ’ ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἡ ἀνάγκη, ἐναπτῇ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἀπαντῆ ἐξειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐστιν, ἀδικοὶ δὲ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐτοὶ σοφοὶ δὲ οὐ. Ἑστίν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταύτα μόρια τῆς 15 330 ἀρετῆς, ἐφῆν ἐγώ, ὃ σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δῆπον, ἐφη· καὶ μέγιστον γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἑκαστοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἢν θ’ ἐγὼ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναι. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἔκαστον ἰδίαιν ἔχει; ὡσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἐστιν 20
όφθαλμός οὖν τὰ ὁτα, οὖδ’ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή: οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὖδέν ἐστιν οἴον τὸ ἑτέρον οὕτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα. ἂρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἐστιν τὸ ἑτέρον οἴον.

25 τὸ ἑτέρου, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἡ δὴ λαμά δῇ ὧτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματι γε ἐοικεν; Ἄλλ’ οὕτως, ἐφη, ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἴον ἐπιστήμη, οὖδ’ οἴον δικαιοσύνη, οὖδ’ οἴον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ’ 30 οἶον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ’ οἴον ὀσιότης. Οὐκ ἐφη. Φέρε δῇ, ἐφην ἐγώ, κοινὴ σκεψόμεθα ποίον τί αὐτῶν ἐστίν ἐκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα C τί ἐστίν ἡ οὐδέν πράγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοι; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; [ei tis érotos] ἐμε τε 35 καὶ σέ· ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπετο δῇ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα, ὁ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἄν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν’ ἄν ψήφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἐφη.

40 Ἐστίν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἴον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἐγὼγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἑρωτώντι· οὐκοῦν D καὶ σὺ; Ναὶ, ἐφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἑρωτοῦ οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητα τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώμαι. Ναὶ, ἡ δ’ ὅσ. Οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο 45 πράγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν· ἡ οὖ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἴον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἡ οἴον ὅσιον; ἀγανακτήσαμεν ἂν ἐγὼγε’, ἐφην, τῷ ἑρωτήματι, καὶ εἶπομεν ἂν· εὐφήμει, ὁ ἀνθρωπε’ σχολὴ μενταν τῇ E 50 ἄλλο ὅσιον εἶη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὀσιότης ὅσιον ἐσται. τί δὲ σὺ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
XIX. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτ', εἴποι, ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· πῶς οὖν ὅλγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἀρ' οὖκ ὁρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατε μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὖν εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἔτερον· εἴποιμ' ἂν ἐγὼ γινώς ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁρθῶς ἦκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οὐεὶ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρῆ-κουσας. Πρωταγόρας | γὰρ οἴδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὥ τι Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς οὖν εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνατο; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ὁμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογῆσαντες, ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐπανερήται· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀσιότης οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὔτε δικαιοσύνη οἶον ὀσιον, ἀλλ' οἰον μὴ ὀσιον· ἃ δ' ὀσιότης οἰον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἕκαστον; τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίνῃ ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην 20 ὀσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δὲ, εἰ μὲ ἐφής, ταῦτα ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοῦμην· ὅτι ἢτοι ταῦτον γ' ἐστὶν δικαιότης ὀσιότητι ἢ τι ὁμοίο-τατον καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἰον ὀσιότης καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης οἰον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὃς, 25 εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ σοί οὕτως. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὦ Σῶκρατε, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὡστε συγχωρήσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην ὀσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο δια- 30 φέρει; ἐφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαίο-
σύνη ὀσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἃν δ’ ἐγὼ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ’ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ

35 τοῦτο λέγω, οἴομενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστον ἀν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἰ τις τὸ εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὃς τὰ προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὠτρών ἁμὴ γέ πη προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλαν ἐστιν ὅτι προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ

40 μαλακῶ, καὶ τάλλα ὁ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἐφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον οἶον τὸ ἐτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἁμὴ γέ πη προσέοικεν καὶ ἐστιν τὸ ἐτερον οἶον τὸ ἐτερον· ὡστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα

45 ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὃς ἀπαντά ἐστιν ὁμοία ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοίων τι ἔχοντα ὁμοία δίκαιον καλεῖν οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιον τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὁμοίον. καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάζας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτὸν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ

50 τὸ ὁσιον πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔχει, ὡστε ὁμοίων τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ἀν | ὃς σὺ μοι δοκεῖς οἴσεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφην ἐγώ, 33: ἐπειδῆ δυσχέρας δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τούτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἑάσομεν, τὸδε δὲ ἀλλο οὕν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψόμεθα.

XX. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἐφη. Τοῦτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πάν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἀνθρώποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὡφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἦ τοῦναντίον; Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; B

† ἦν τοῦναντίον ἐπραττόν; codd.
Ἀνάγκη. Όυκοῦν οἱ µὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὐτὸ πράττοντες; Συνδοκεῖ µοι, ἔφη. Τούναντίον ἀρα ἔστιν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἐφη. Όυκοῦν τὰ µὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη; Ὡμολογεῖ. Όυκοῦν εἰ τι ἵσχὺ πράττεται, ἵσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἰ τι ἀσθενεία, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει. Καὶ εἰ τι µετὰ 15 τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἰ τι µετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως;

смерть. Καὶ εἰ τι δὴ ὁσαυτῶς πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἰ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλὸν; Συνεχώρει. Τούτω ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν 20 τὸ αἰσχρόν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τι δὲ; ἔστιν τι ἁγαθὸν; Ἐστιν. Τούτω ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακὸν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τι δὲ; ἔστιν τι ὅξυ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τούτω µὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρὺ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Όυκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν 25 ἐναντίων ἐν µόνον ἔστιν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλὰ; Συνωμολογεῖ. Ἡθο δὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἤµιν. ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ µόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλεῖω δὲ µὴ; Ὡμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; 30 Ἐφη. Ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι δ' ἄν ἀφρόνως πράττεται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ; Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; 

Συνεχώρει. Όυκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ 35 ἐναντίου πράττοντ' ἂν; Ναὶ. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ µέν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναὶ. Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Όυκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὀντῶν;

Α. Ρ.
Ναί. Ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη; 40 Φαίνεται. Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὠμολογηται ἥμιν ἀφροσύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι; Συνωμολογεῖ. "Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημ. Πότερον οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; 333 45 ἐτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἁρετής, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἑτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώ- που μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἁμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται οὐ γὰρ 50 συνάδουσιν οὔδε συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνάδοιεν, εἴπτερ γε ἀνάγκη ἐν μὲν ἐν μόνων 55 λόγησεν καὶ μᾶλ' ἀκόντως. οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν εἶνη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐθ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὀσίωτις σχεδόν τι ταῦτον ὄν. ἦθι δὴ, ἦν δ ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμω- μεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψόμεθα. ἂρα τίς 60 σοὶ δοκεῖ ἄδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἄδικεῖ; Λίσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο Σ ὀμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοῦ γε φασιν τῶν ἄνθρωπων. Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνος τὸν λόγον πουήσομαι, ἐφη, ἦ πρὸς σὲ; Εἴ βούλει, ἐφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶ- 65 τον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. Ἀλλ' ὁυδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐάν μόνον σὺ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἰτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἴτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἵσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἑρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρίνομεν ἐξετάζεσθαι.
Το μὲν οὖν πρώτον ἐκαλλωπήζετο ἧμιν ὁ Πρωταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἦτιατο δυσχερή εἶναι· ἐπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Ἐπεὶ δὴ, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχής μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσι τινὲς σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικούντες· Ἐστω, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὐ φρονεῖν; Ἐφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὐ βουλεύσεθαι, ὅτι ἀδικούσιν; Ἐστω, ἐφη. Πότερον, ᾧν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὐ πράττουσιν ἀδικούντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἀττα εἶναι; Λέγω. Αρ' οὖν, ᾧν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, ἃ ἐστὶν ὑφελίμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἐφη, κἂν ἐ μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑφελίμα ἃ, ἐγώγη καλῶ ἀγαθά. καὶ μοι ἐδόκει οὗ Πρωταγόρας ὡδὴ τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἄγωνιάν καὶ παρατετάθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ὡδὴ εὐπειδῆ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὔτως ἔχουτα, εὐλαβούμενοι ἧρεμα ἡρόμην. Πότερον, ᾧν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὁ | Πρωταγόρα, ᾧ μηδεν ἀνθρώπων ὑφελίμα ἐστὶν, ἃ ἂ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὑφελίμα· καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Ὀὐδαμῶς, ἐφη· ἀλλ' ἐγώγη πολλὰ οἴδ' ᾧ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστὶ, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ωφελίμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ὕπποις δὲ· τὰ δὲ βουσών μόνοι, τὰ δὲ κυσίν· τὰ δὲ γε τούτων μὲν οὔδενι, δένδροις δὲ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθά, 25 Β ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις ποιημα, οἶνοι καὶ ἥ κόπρος, πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλώνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἀπασάν ἐστὶν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς 30 θρίξιν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς

when Protagoras launches out into a long and irrelevant ha-rangue.
ον \ àνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τού \ àνθρώπου \ ἄρωγον καὶ \ τῷ \ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὖτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ \ ἀγαθόν καὶ \ παντοδαπόν, ὡστε καὶ \ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος \ ἀγαθόν \ ἐστιν τῷ \ àνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δὲ \ ἐντὸς \ ταύτου \ τοῦτο \ κάκιστον. καὶ \ διὰ \ τούτοι \ οἱ \ ίατροὶ \ πάντες \ ἀπαγορεύουσιν \ τοῖς \ ἀσθενοῦσι \ μὴ \ χρῆσθαι \ ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ' \ ἢ \ τὸ \ σμικροτάτῳ \ ἐν \ τούτους \ οῖς \ μέλλει \ ἔδεσθαι, ὡσπερ \ μόνον \ τὴν \ δυσχέρειαν \ κατασβέσαι \ τὴν \ ἐπὶ \ ταῖς \ αἰσθήσεις \ ταῖς \ διὰ \ τῶν \ μιν \ γιγνομένην \ ἐν \ τοῖς \ σιτίοις \ τε \ καὶ \ ὀψίοις.

**XXII.** Εἰπόντος οὖν ταύτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες \ ἀνεθορύπησαν \ ὡς \ εὗ \ λέγοι· καὶ \ ἐγὼ \ εἶπον. \ "Ω \ Πρωταγόρα, \ ἐγὼ \ τυγχάνω \ ἐπιλήσμων \ τις \ ὧν \ ἀνθρώπος, \ καὶ \ εάν \ τίς \ μοι \ μακρὰ \ λέγῃ, \ ἐπιλανθάνομαι \ περὶ \ δ' \ οὖ \ ἢ \ ὁ \ λόγος. \ ὡσπερ \ οὖν, \ εἰ \ ἐτύγχανον \ ὑπόκωφος \ ὦν, \ ὧν \ ἂν \ χρῆναι, \ εἰπερ \ ἐμελλέσαι \ μοι \ διαλέξεσθαι, \ μείζον \ φθέγγεσθαι \ ἢ \ πρὸς \ τοὺς \ ἄλλους, \ οὖτω καὶ \ νῦν, \ ἔπειθη \ ἐπιλήσμου \ ἐνέτυχες, \ σύντευμε \ μοι \ τὰς \ ἀποκρίσεις \ καὶ \ βραχυτέρας \ πολεῖ, \ εἰ \ μέλλω \ σοι \ ἐπέσθαι. \ Πῶς \ οὖν \ κελεύεις \ με \ βραχέα \ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; \ ἢ \ βραχύτερά \ σοι, \ ἐφη, \ ἀποκρίνωμαι \ ἢ \ δεῖ; \ Μηδαμίως, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ 'Αλλ' \ ὅσα \ δεῖ; \ ἐφη. \ Ναι, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ Πότερα \ οὖν \ εἰ \ ἐπιλήσμου \ ἐνέτυχες, \ σύντευμε \ μοι \ τὰς \ ἀποκρίσεις \ καὶ \ βραχυτέρας \ πολεῖ, \ εἰ \ μέλλω \ σοι \ ἐπέσθαι. \ Πῶς \ οὖν \ κελεύεις \ με \ βραχέα \ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; \ ἢ \ βραχύτερά \ σοι, \ ἐφη, \ ἀποκρίνωμαι \ ἢ \ δεῖ; \ Μηδαμίως, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ 'Αλλ' \ ὅσα \ δεῖ; \ ἐφη. \ Ναι, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ Πότερα \ οὖν \ εἰ \ ἐπιλήσμου \ ἐνέτυχες, \ σύντευμε \ μοι \ τὰς \ ἀποκρίσεις \ καὶ \ βραχυτέρας \ πολεῖ, \ εἰ \ μέλλω \ σοι \ ἐπέσθαι. \ Πῶς \ οὖν \ κελεύεις \ με \ βραχέα \ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; \ ἢ \ βραχύτερά \ σοι, \ ἐφη, \ ἀποκρίνωμαι \ ἢ \ δεῖ; \ Μηδαμίως, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ 'Αλλ' \ ὅσα \ δεῖ; \ ἐφη. \ Ναι, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ Πότερα \ οὖν \ εἰ \ ἐπιλήσμου \ ἐνέτυχες, \ σύντευμε \ μοι \ τὰς \ ἀποκρίσεις \ καὶ \ βραχυτέρας \ πολεῖ, \ εἰ \ μέλλω \ σοι \ ἐπέσθαι. \ Πῶς \ οὖν \ κελεύεις \ με \ βραχέα \ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; \ ἢ \ βραχύτερά \ σοι, \ ἐφη, \ ἀποκρίνωμαι \ ἢ \ δεῖ; \ Μηδαμίως, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ 'Αλλ' \ ὅσα \ δεῖ; \ ἐφη. \ Ναι, \ ἢν \ δ' \ ἐγώ. \ Πότερα \ οὖν
μὲ, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. ὩΣ Σωκράτες, ἐφη, ἐγὼ πολλοὶς ἤδη εἰς ἀγώνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν δὲ σὺ κελεύεις, ὥς ὁ αὐτιλέγων ἐκέλευν με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὔδεν δὲ βελτίων 25 ἐφαινόμην οὔδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ — ἐγών γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἐμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι
Β οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἐκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι — ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν 30 ταῖς συνουσίαις, Ὅλλα τοι, ἐφην, ὅ Πρωταγόρα, οὔδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γέγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐπεσθαί, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γὰρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φής δὲ 35 καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ
C οἴος τ' εἰ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γὰρ εἰ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἄδυνατος, ἔπει ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἴος τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρὴν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ 40 οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοὶ τις ἅσχολία ἐστίν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἴος τ' εἴην σοι παραμείναι ἀποτείνοντε μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ποί με δεὶ—εἴμι· ἔπει καὶ ταύτ' ἂν ἑςως οὐκ ἀγδῶς σου ἥκουν. καὶ ἀμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπι· 45
D λαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τούτου, καὶ εἰπεῖν. Οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὅ Σωκράτες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἐσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμείναι ἡμῖν· ὅσ ἐγὼ οὖδ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίουν 50 ἀκούσαμι ἡ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων· ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἰποῦν—�新 de
άνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιόν—Ω παί Ἰππονίκου, αἱ τε μὲν ἐγωγεῖ σοι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαί, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν 55 ἑπαίνῳ καὶ φιλῷ, ὡστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαι ἐσοι, εἴ μοι δυνατὰ δέοι: νῦν δ’ ἐστὶν ὑστερ ἂν εἰ δέοι μοι Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραῖῳ δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι ἐπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἡ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθείν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαι, εἴποιμι ἂν σοι ὅτι | πολὺ σοῦ 336

60 μᾶλλον ἔγῳ ἐμαυτοῦ δἐομαι θέουσιν τούτως ἀκολουθεῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ’ εἰτ δεῖ θεᾶσθαι εὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμὲ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέοι συγκαθεῖναι· ἔγῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὔτος δὲ δύναται βραδεῖως. εἰ οὖν ἐπι-65 θυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέοι, ὡστε τὸ πρῶτὸν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὔτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ Β ἐγώ’ φύμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγο-70 μένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. Ἀλλ’ ὀρᾶς, ἕφη, ὡ Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεὶ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἄξιον αὐτῷ τε ἔξειναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὐ σὺ βούλῃ.

XXIII. 'Τπολαβῶν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὃ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὁδὲ ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετείναι ὅι μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἶός τ’ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ-C στασθαί λόγοιν τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζομι’ ἂν εἰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳν παραχωρεῖ, εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθήναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, 10 διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ’
XXIII 337 B

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ.

39

ἐκάστη ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τόσο λόγους καὶ ὅπις ἑθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ'

ἀπομηκύνων ἐως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅσον τὸ ἐρωτημα ἢν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκούόντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη

γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυόμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παλέξη 15 καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγνωμαί, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπτών· Ὡ

Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα 20 ἐ πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἂεὶ φιλο-

νικός ἔστι πρὸς ὧν ὀρμήσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινὴ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι

τὴν ἔννοιαν. | εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταύτα, ὁ Πρό-25 δίκος, Καλῶς μοι, ἥφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὁ Κριτία·

χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιούτῳ λόγοις παραγιγυγομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τῶν διαιλεγομένων ἀκροα-

τάς, ἵσους δὲ μὴ. ἔστιν γὰρ ὅτι ταύτων· κοινὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσαι δεὶ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἵσον δὲ νεῖμαι 30 ἐκατέρφο, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφοτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἐλαττόν. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὁ Πρω-

ταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὡμᾶς συγχωρεῖν

Β καὶ ἄλληλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζεσι δὲ μὴ· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὕνοιαν 35 οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διάφοροι τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἄλληλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἀν καλλιστῆ ἡμῖν ἢ συνονομα γίγνοιτο· ύμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοίσθε· εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῖς 40 ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκούόντων ἀνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι
δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς
τ' αὐτὰ χρήσηντες μᾶλιστ' ἢν ούτως εὐφραίνοιμεθα, ὡ
ἡ διανοία, ἡ δευτεραὶ δὲ ἐσθίουτά τι ἢ ἀλλο ἢδυ πάσχοντα
ἀυτῷ τῷ σῶματι.

XXIV. Ταύτα ὦν εἰπὼν τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ
πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ
dὲ τοῦ Προδίκου Ἰσπίας ὁ σοφὸς εἰπεν,
"Ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, ἐφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι
5 ἠγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας
ἀπαντᾶς εἴναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ
ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενεῖς ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννοις
δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται.

10 εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἐλλήνων, καὶ
κατ' αὐτὸ τούτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἐλλάδος
eis αὐτὸ τὸ πρωτανείον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς
πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὁλβιώτατον οἴκον τόνδε,
μηδὲν τούτοι τοῦ ἄξιοματος ἄξιον ἀποφήμασθαι,

15 ἀλλ' ὡςπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων δια-
φέρεσθαι ἄλληλοι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ
συμβουλεύω, ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμ-
βήμα γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὡςπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβα-
ζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, | καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβές τούτο}

20 εἴδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ
μὴ ἢδυ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς
ἡμίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχη-

μονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαινόνται, μὴτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν
πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, ἐφύγειν εἰς

25 τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ
μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὦς οὖν ποιήσατε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ύμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μήκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου.

XXV. Ταῦτα ἠρέσε τοῖς παρούσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν, καὶ ἐμὲ γε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἐφῆ ἀφίσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέωντο ἐπιστάτην. εἰπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἰη βραβευτὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἰτε γὰρ χεῖρον ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθεῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιώνον ἐπιστατεῖν, εἰτε ὁμοίος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὁμοίος ἡμῖν ὁμοία καὶ ποιήσει, ὡστε C ἐκ περιττοῦ ἱρίσθεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίωνα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεθε. τῇ μὲν ἄλθεία, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀδύνατον ἴο ἡμῖν, ὡστε Πρωταγόρο τοῦδε σοφότερον τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φίςετε δὲ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τίδε γίγνεται, ὡσπερ φαῦλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρείσθαι, ἐπεὶ τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὕτωσι ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὁ προ-15 θυμεΐσθη συνονσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωσται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὔτος μὲν ἔρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἀμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρινῶμαι ὑπόσ' 20 ἄν οὕτος βούληται ἔρωτάν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμὸι λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτῶμεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἴμεις κοινῇ δησόμεδα αὐτοῦ ἀπερ ἴμεις ἐμοῖ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνονσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτον 25 ἔνεκα ἐνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὐτω ποιητέον εἶναι·
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἦθελεν, ὀμοι δὲ ἡναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἰκα-30 νῶς ἐρωτήση, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXVI. Ὅρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὔτωσι πῶς. ᾿Ηγοῦ-μαι, ἐφή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγω ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι. ἔστιν | δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιη- 339
tῶν λεγόμενα οἶον τ’ εἶναι συνιέναι ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μῆ, καὶ ἐπὶ-
ντασθαί διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον
λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν, περὶ οὗπερ ἥγω τε καὶ σὺ νῦν
dιαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετεννυγμένον δ’ εἰς
ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που
Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος νῦν τοῦ
Θεταλοῦ, ὁτι
ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι β
χαλεπὸν,
χερσίν τε καὶ τοσὶ καὶ νῦν τετρά-
γωνον, ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.
τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἥ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ
ἡγὸ εἰπὼν ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίστασαι τε γάρ, καὶ πᾶν
20 μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἂσματος. Ἐν, ἐφή,
λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποίησθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἥ οὐ; Πᾶνυ, ἐφην ἥγω, καλῶς τε καὶ
ὁρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δὲ σοι καλῶς πεποίησθαι, εἰ ἐναντία
λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής; Οὐ καλῶς, ἥν ὁ
25 ἥγω. Ὅρα δὴ, ἐφὴ, βέλτιον. Ὁλλ’, ῥΥγαθέ, ἐσκεμμαί c
ἰκανῶς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἐφη, ὅτι προϊόντος τοῦ ἂσματος
λέγει που
οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένου· ἀλεπόν φάτ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι. 30 ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ούτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἐμπρόσθεν; Ὅδη, ἢν δὲ ἑγώ. Δοκεὶ οὖν σοι, ἐφι, ταύτα ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογεῖσθαι; Φαίνεται ἐμοιγε. καὶ ἀμα μέντοι ἐφοβοῦμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι. Ἀτάρ, ἐφην δ ἑγώ, σοι οὖν φαίνεται; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν φαίνοιτο ὀμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τὸν αὐτὸς ἐνείμαι καὶ ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀληθεία, ὀλύγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρὸσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταύτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι ἀλεπόν ἐσθλὸν 40 ἐμμεναι, τούτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φήσων ὑποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὅπότε τὸν ταύτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὅστε ἥτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ύστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταύτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον 45 Ε παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγώ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πῦκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλλογίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταύτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑπιθυρβησάντων· ἐπειτα, ὅσ γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τάληθη, ἦνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται 50 τῇ σκέψῃ τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητὴς, τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτὸν, Ὀ Πρόδικε, ἐφην ἑγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἰ βοηθείων 340 τῷ ἀνδρί. | δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σὲ—ὡσπερ ἐφή Ὁμήρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ 55 τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμώεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα φίλε κασίμητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροι περ σχῶμεν,
άταρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μή ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας
tὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ
ύπερ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἥ τὸ
tε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαίρεσις ὡς ὦν ταύτῳ Β
όν, καὶ ἄ νῦν δὴ ἔπεις πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν
σκόπει, εἰ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὁπερ ἐμοί. οὔ γὰρ φαίνεται
65 ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γὰρ, ὁ
Πρόδικε, προαπόφημαι τὴν σὴν γυνώμην. ταύτων
σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;
"Αλλο νῦν Δί", ἐφι ο Πρόδικος. Οὐκοίν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἐν
μὲν τοῖς πρὸτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γυνώ-
70 μην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἄγαθον ἀληθεία γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν εἰς; Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφῆ ο Πρόδικος. Τὸν C
dὲ γε Πιττακόν, ἡν δ’ ἐγὼ, μέμφεται, οὐχ, ὡς οἴεται
Πρωταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο.
οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ Πιττάκος ἐλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι
75 ἐσθλὸν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμμεναι· ἐστὶν
dὲ οὐ ταύτων, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησιν Πρόδικος
δὲ, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν
tὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅσος ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὁδὲ καὶ
80 ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ’ Ἡσίόδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἄγαθον D
χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἄρετῆς ἐμπροσθεὶν τοὺς
θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θείναι· ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρον
ἐκτείνῃ, ἡδίδειν δὴπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπῆν περ
ἐσοῦσαν, ἐκτήσθαι.

XXVII. Ὅ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα
ἐπῆνεσέν με· ο δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπαν-
ὁρθωμά σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, μείζον
ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῦς. καὶ ἐγὼ
ἐπον, Κακὸν ἀρα μοι εἰργασται, ὡς

and, after some playful sophistry, offers finally to
give his own ex-
planation of the

poem.
Ε'οικεν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμὶ τις γελοῖος ιατρὸς· ιῶμενοι μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Ἄλλο οὖτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Πῶς δὴ; ὃν δ' ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἰν τὸν ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὖτω φαῦλον τῷ φήσιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετῆν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὦ ἐστίν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς οὐ ἀπασίων δοκεῖ ἀνθρώπως. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Ἡ τοῦ Δία, εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὤδε. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, 341 ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ῥητοῖ ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἡ καὶ ἐτὶ παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἵνα ἀλλῶν πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ἄν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνει, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τοιοῦτο· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἵσως οὐχ οὖτως Σιμωνίδης υπελάμβανεν, ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, 20 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικος μὲ οὔτοςι νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγώ ἢ σὲ ἡ ἀλλὸν βιτινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ, ἑρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθα δεινὰ καλῶν— τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φήσιν, κακὸν ἐστίν· οὔδεις γοῦν λέγει 25 ἐκάστοτε, δεινοῦ πλοῦτον οὔδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὔδὲ δεινῆς ύγιείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὥς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος— ἵσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐὶ οἱ Κείοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἡ κακὸν υπολαμβάνουσιν ἡ ἀλλὸ τί δ' σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις. 30 ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνῆ ποιῶν ἐρωτᾶν· τί ἔλεγεν, ὁ Πρόδικε, τὸ C χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακὸν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταύτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἵνα δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πυττακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ 35 ἦκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν
ἐμμεναι. Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἐφη, λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἤ τούτο, καὶ ὅνειδίζειν τῷ Πιττακῷ, ὅτι τὰ ὅνωματα οὐκ ἡπίστατο ὅρθῶς διαυρέιν ἄτε 40 Δέσβιος ὅν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένοι; Ἀκούεις δή, ἐφην ἔγω, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωτα-νὰς, Πολλοῦ γε δεὶ, ἐφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς Πρόδικος ἄλλ' ἔγω εὗ οἴδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν 45 ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἄλλ' ὁ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον ᾗ, ἄλλα διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνεται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔγω οἴμαι, ἐφην, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικον γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἄλλα παίξειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποτειράσθαι, εἰ οἶος τ' 50 ἔσει τῷ σαυτῷ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἔπει ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριον ἐστίν Εὐθύς τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ ρῆμα. λέγει γὰρ ὅτι θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ᾽ ἔχων γέρας. οὐ δήπου τοῦτο γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθελὸν ἐμμεναι, εἶτα 55 τὸν θεὸν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γάρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κείων. ἂλλ' ἂ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει | λαβεῖν μοι πείραν ὅπως 342 60 ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπών· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι. ὃ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταὐτα λέγοντος, Ἕι σὺ βούλει, ἐφη, ὡς Σώ-κρατες· ὃ δὲ Πρόδικος τε καὶ ὃ Ἰππίας ἐκελεύητην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

XXVIII. Ἑγὼ τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ἃ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελ-θεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιστάτη τε καὶ
πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Δακε-Β δαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταί πλείστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματι-ζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὤσιν ὅτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περείσων, ὥσπερ οὔς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστὰς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσι τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ περιέναι, ἡγοῦ-10 μενοί, εἰ γνωσθεῖν ὃ περείσων, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκή-σειν, τὴν σοφίαν. γὰρ δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὧτα τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ C ἵμαντας περιελήπτονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ 15 βραχείας ἀναβολάς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρα-τοῦνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἑπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς, καὶ ἦδη ἀχθοῦνται λάθρα ἕξυγγυρύμενοι, ἔξηλπασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε 20 λακωνίζοντων τοῦτοι καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ἵνων ὅν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγύγυρυνται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἔδωσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς D ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξείναι, ὥσπερ οὗδ' Κρήτης, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομανθάνωσιν ὃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν 25 ταῦταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναίκες. γνοίτε δ' ἂν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταύτα ἄληθή λέγω καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἀριστα πεπαίδευνται, ὡδ' εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Δακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ 30 E συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει αὐτοῦ φαύλον τίνα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένου ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής,
35 ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίων. τούτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ κατανεούσαι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὡς τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὃτι τοιαύτα οὖν τ᾽ εἶναι ρήματα φθέγγεσθαι
40 τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. | τούτων ἦν 343 καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεύς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἠμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἐβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Δακεδαίμωνιος Χίλων. οὕτωι
45 πάντες ξηλωταί καὶ ἔρασται καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Δακεδαίμωνίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἃν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὕσαν, ρήματα βραχέα ἁξιο-
μημόνευτα ἕκαστῳ εἰρήμενα· οὕτωι καὶ κοινὴ ξυνελ-
θόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι Β
50 εἰς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα, ἢ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνώθι σαιτὼν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν.
	τοῦ δὲ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὃτι οὕτως ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Δακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἱδία περιεφέρετο
55 τούτῳ τὸ ρήμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλέπτων ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι. ὃ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἀτε Σ φιλότιμος ὃν ἔπει σοφία, ἑγνὼ ὅτι, εἰ καθέλω τούτῳ τῷ ρήμα ὡσπέρ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητήν καὶ περιγένειοι αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε
60 ἀνθρώποις· εἰς τούτῳ οὖν τὸ ρήμα καὶ τούτῳ ἔνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολούσαι αὐτὸ ἄπαν τὸ ἁμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

XXIX. Ἡ Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὕτω κοινῇ ἄπαντες, εἰ ἀρα ἔγω ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὖθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἁματος μανικὸν ἂν φανεῖ, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, D
οτι ανδρα áγαθον γενέσθαι xαλεπον, ἐπειτα ἐνέβαλε
to mév. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔδε πρῶς ἐνα λόγον
φαίνεται ἐμβεβλήσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τις ὑπο-
λάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ
ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην—λέγοντος τοῦ Πιτ-
tακοῦ ὦτι Χαλεπτὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα
εὑπεὶν ὦτι Ὡ NUnit, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπτὸν ἀνδρὰ io
ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ, ὥς ἀλήθως,—οὐκ ἀληθεία
Ε ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖτο λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα
ὅντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀλήθως ἄγαθων, τῶν δὲ
ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλήθως· εὑρίθες γὰρ τοῦτο
γε φανεῖν ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεὶ 15
θείναι ἐν τῷ ἔσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὔτωσι πῶς ὑπει-
πόντα τό τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ θείμεν αὐτὸν
λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον,
eἰπόντα "Ω ἀνθρωποι, χαλεπῶν ἐσθλῶν ἐμμεναι, τὸν
344 δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὦτ" Ω Πιττακέ, | οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· 20
οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἔστιν ἄνδρα ἄγαθον
χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῷρ τετράγωνων, ἀνευ ψόγου
tετυγμένον, χαλεπῶν ἀλαθέως. οὔτω φαίνεται πρὸς
λόγον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς
ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τοῦτο 25
μαρτυρεῖ, ὦτι οὔτως εὐρίται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ
περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔσματι εἰρημένων ἀπο-
B δεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται· πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ
μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἰη αὐτὸ οὕτω
dιελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν 30
καὶ τῆν βούλησιν, ὦτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξεγχός ἔστιν
tοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

XXX. Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὅλιγα διελθῶν, ὡς
ἀν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὦτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἄγαθον
A. P.
χαλεπῶν ἀλαθέως, οὖν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά·
γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑξει
καὶ εἶναι ἁνδρα ἁγαθῶν, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, ὥς C
Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὖκ ἁνθρώπειον,
ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἀν μόνος τούτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,
ἀνδρα δ' οὖκ ἔστι μή οὐ λακόν ἐμμεναί,
ὅν ἂν ἁμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

τίνα οὖν ἁμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίῳ ἄρχη; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἴδιωτὴν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιωτης
ἀεὶ καθήρται· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενον τις ἂν
καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτα ποτὲ καταβάλοι
ἀν τις, ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ,
οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὅντα ποτὲ ἁμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἂεὶ ἁμήχανον ὅντα οὐ·
καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμών ἐπιπεσῶν ἁμή-
χανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπῆ ὡρα ἐπελ-
θοῦσα ἁμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ιατρὸν ταῦτα ταῦτα.

τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ
καὶ παρ' ἄλλον ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντως
αὐτάρ ἁνήρ ἁγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακὸς, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.

τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὖκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἂλλ' ἂεὶ εἶναι E

ἀνάγκη· ὅστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ
ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἁμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη, οὐκ ἔστι
μή οὐ λακόν ἐμμεναί· σὺ δὲ φής, ᾧ Πιττακέ, χαλεπῶν
ἐσθλῶν ἐμμεναί· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπῶν
(δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλῶν, ἐμμεναί δὲ ἀδύνατον·

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἁνήρ ἁγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.

τὶς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἁγαθῇ πράξις ἐστιν, καὶ | τὶς 345
ἀνδρα ἁγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
tούτων μάθησις. τὶς δὲ εὐπραγία ἁγαθὸν ιατρὸν
ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμάντων τῆς θεραπείας 35
μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς
γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ὦ πρῶτον μὲν ὕπάρχει ἰατρῶ
ὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς
γένοιτο· ἥμεις δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἱδιόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε
γενοῖμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες 40
Β οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὡστὶ δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν
γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρὸς.
οὔτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἁγαθὸς ἁνήρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ
κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ
ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὐτὴ γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ
45
πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι· ὥστε καὶ τοῖς τού ἄσματος πρὸς τούτο τείνει, ὅτι
C εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν οὖχ οἶνον τε, διατελοῦντα 50
ἀγαθὸν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἁγαθὸν οἶνον τε, καὶ κακὸν γε
τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον· ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοι
eἰσίν οὕς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

XXXI. Ταύτα τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν
εἰρηταί, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος
ἐτὶ μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γὰρ·
τούνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ
γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
dιζήμενος κενεάν ἐς ἄπρακτον
ἐλπίδα μοίραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὖρυδοὺς ὦσον
carpōν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
ἐπὶ θ' ύμιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω,
φησίν· οὕτω σφῶδρα καὶ δι' ὦλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξ-
ἐρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι.
πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἕκών ὀστὶς ἔρδη

15 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοί μά-χονται.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὐτὸς ἀπαίδευτος ἢν Σιμωνίδης, ὡστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἕκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιή, ὡς ὑπὸ τινῶν οὐκ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδὸν τι οἴμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδές τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἤγειται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ εὖ ἔσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες

25 ἀκούτες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιή ἕκὼν, τούτων φησίν ἐπαινεῖτος εἰναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ εαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἐκὼν. ἤγειτο γὰρ ἀνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγ-κάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινεῖτην, οἴον 346

30 ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκο-τον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηροὺς, ὅταν τοιούτον τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆ, ὡστερ ἁσμένους ὤραν καὶ ψέγοντας ἑπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἡ πατρίδος, ἦν καὶ ἀντίς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ μηδέ ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὡστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς Β ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ' ἄγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπ-τεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι 35 ὁργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἡ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθείσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ

† Post ἐπαινεῖτην add. codd. φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.
επαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ, οἴμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ τύραννον ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἐκών, ἀλλ' 45 ἀναγγακαζόμενοι. ταύτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὦτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε ψέγω· ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόφωγος, ἐπεὶ ἐμοίγ' ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακῶς ἢ μηδ' ἀγαν ἀπάλαμμος· εἰδῶς γ' ὄνησιπολίν δίκαν ὑγίης ἀνήρ· οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ μωρήσομαι (οὐ γὰρ εἰμὶ φιλόμωμος). τῶν γὰρ ἥλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα· ὥστ' εἰ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθεὶς ἂν ἐκείνους μεμφόμενοι.

πάντα τοι ταλά, τοίσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται. 55

ὁ οὔ τούτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, 60 οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοίον γὰρ ἂν εἰή πολλαχὴ· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὡστε μὴ ψέγειν· καὶ οὐ ξητῶ, ἑφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὡσοὶ καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς, ἔπὶ θ' ύμῖν εὐρών ἀπαγγελέω· ὡστε τούτου γ' ἕνεκα 65 οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἢ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Ε. Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκών (ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν το τῷ ἔκων διαλαβεῖν λέγουν) ὥστις ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἀκών δ' ἐστιν οὔς ἐγὼ ἐπαίνω καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἐλεγες ἐπιεικὴ καὶ ἀλῆθη, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐψεγον. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γαρ
75 καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενοι δοκεῖς ἄληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτα σε ἑγὼ ψέγω.

XXXII. Ταυτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὡ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἢν ὦ ἑγὼ, Σιμωνίδης διανοοῦμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ἁσμα. καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὡς Σῶκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἁσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἐστὶ μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμὸς λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ύμῖν ἐπι-Β δείξω, ἀν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναῖ, ἔφη, ὡ Ἰππία, εἰσαύθις γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιον ἔστων, ἀ ὁμο- 
10 λογισάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἠτερον. καὶ ἔγω εἰτὸν Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρα ὅπότερον αὐτῷ ἱδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἀσμάτων τε καὶ Κ ἐπὶν ἔασωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὅν τὸ πρῶτον ἑγὼ σε ἡρω-τησα, ὡ Πρωταγόρα, ἱδέως ἀν ἐπὶ τέλος ἐλθομι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμπο- 
15 σίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίοις ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὐτοί, διὰ τὸ μη δύνασθαι ἀλλήλους δι’ ἐαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας Θ ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοὺς μισθούμενοι ἄλλο- 
20 τριάν φωνῆν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλους σύνεισιν· ὅποιον δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἀν ἱδοις οὔτε αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἄλλα αὐτούς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὑντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν 30 λύρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς,
λέγοντας τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει εὐαυτῶν κοσμίως,
Ε καὶ πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὖτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοι-
αίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωντα ἀνδρῶν, οἰότερ
ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας
φωνῆς οὔδὲ ποιητὰν, οὐς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν 35
περὶ ὅλων λέγουσιν ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ
eν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασίν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν,
οἱ δὲ ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὁ ἀδυνα-
tοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαί· ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας
348 ἐσώσιν χαῖρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐαυτοὶς σύνεσιν δι' ἐαυτῶν, 40
ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν λόγοις πείραν ἄλληλων λαμβάνοντες
καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλ-
λον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ· καταθεμένους τόὺς
ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους τοὺς
λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν 45
πείραν λαμβάνοντας· κἀν μὲν βούλῃ ἐτὶ ἐρωτᾶν,
ἐτοιμὸς εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ
βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμὸν παράσχει, περὶ ὅλων ἐπανεῖ-
β μεθα διεξόντες, τοῦτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. λέγοντος
οὖν ἐμοὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ 50
Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσει. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκι-
βιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, "Ω Καλλία, δοκεῖ
σοι, ἐφή, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ
ἐθέλων εἶτε δώσει λόγον εἶτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ
οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἦτοι διαλέγεσθοι ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ
55 έθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἢν τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν,
Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέγεται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἄν
C βούληται ἄλλως· καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθεῖς, ὡς
γέ μοι ἔδοξε, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος
καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν τι ὁ
τῶν παρόντων, μόνης προυπάπτετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι
καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀποκρινούμενος.
XXXIII. Εἰπὼν δὴ ἐγώ, Ω Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι μὲ σοι ἀλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἢ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἥγοιμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὄμηρον τὸ σύν τε δῦ έρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ δ’ οὗ τού εὐνόησεν· εὐποροῦτεροι γὰρ πως ἀπαντήσεις ἐσμέν οἱ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς ἄπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον 10 καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δ’ εἴπερ τε νοήση, αὐτίκα περιών ζητεῖ ὅτι ἐπιδιέξεται καὶ μεθ’ ὅτου βεβαιώσεται, ἐως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὦςπερ καὶ ἐγώ ἑνεκα τοῦτον σοι ἢδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ, ἥγοιμενός σε βέλτιστ’ ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 15 περὶ ὁν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ε περὶ ἄρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἂ σὲ; ὃς γε ὦ μόνον αὐτὸς οἰεί καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὦςπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσίν, ἄλλοις δὲ ὦ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄγαθος εἰ καὶ ἄλλοις οἴος τ’ εἰ 20 ποιεῖν ἄγαθούς. καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σὺ γ’ ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ἡ ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας 30 τοὺς Ἐλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπεφήνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἄρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος 25 τοῦτον μισθὸν ἄξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρὴν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτους σκέψιν καὶ ἔρωτάν καὶ ἄνακοινοῦσθαι; ὦκ δῆποθ’ ὅπως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἐκεῖνα, ἀπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἥρωτον περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἢ ἀρχής τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ 30 σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἴν δὲ, ὃς ἐγώμαι, Β τὸ ἑρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σοφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε
οντα ονόματα, ἐπὶ εἰν πράγματι ἔστιν, ἥ ἐκάστῳ τῶν οὐνόματων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἵδιος οὐσία καὶ πράγμα ἔχον ἕαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἐκαστον, οὐκ ὃν ὅνον 35 τὸ ἐτερων αὐτῶν τὸ ἐτερων; ἐφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ οὔνόματα ἐπὶ εἰν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἐκαστον ἰδίω πράγματι

C τῶν οὐνόματων τούτων ἐπικείσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὃς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοία ἐστιν ἀλλήλους καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόρια ἐστιν, 40 ἀλλ᾽ ὃς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόρια ἐστιν καὶ ἄλληλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδιὰν ἐκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὦσπερ τότε, φάθι: εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τούτο διώρισαι, ὡς ἔγνωκε οὖν οἴ τοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πή ἄλλη 45 νῦν φήσῃς: οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώ-

D μενὸς μου ταῦτα ἐλεγεῖς.

XXXIV. 'Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἔστιν ἀρε-

τῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέταρτα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικὸς παραπλήσια ἄλληλοις ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ ἀν-

δρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρουν πάντων τού-

των. ὡς δὲ γνῶσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω: εὐρήσεις γὰρ πόλλους τῶν ἀνθρώ-

πων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιω-

τάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθε-

τάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.

Ἔ'Εχε δῆ, ἐφην ἐγὼ· ἀξιον γὰρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὁ λέγεις. πότερον τους ἀνδρείους χαραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ήτας γ', ἔφη, ἔφ' ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ φο-

βούνται ἴέναι. Φέρε δῆ, τὴν ἅρετὴν καλὸν τι φής εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλὸν ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον 15 σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ
μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ' έγώ, τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ τι καλὸν, ἢ οἶλον καλὸν; "Ολον ποιον καλὸν ὡς οἶδον τε μάλιστα. Οἶσθα οὖν τίνες
20 εἰς τὰ φρέατα | κολυμβώσιν θαρραλέως; 'Εγώγε, ὅτι 350 οἱ κολυμβηταῖ. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δ' ἄλλο τί; "Οτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἁφιπποί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; 25 οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μῆ; Οἱ πελταστικοὶ. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ξητεῖς, ἐφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μῆ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροι εἰσίν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. "Ἡδη δὲ Β
τίνας ἐώρακας, ἐφη, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας
30 ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἐκαστα τούτων; "Εγώγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλεόι οὕτω καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσίν; Αἰσχρὸν μεντάν, ἐφη, εἰ ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε μανώμενοι εἰσίν.
Πῶς οὖν, ἐφην έγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς
35 θαρράλεους εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω, καὶ ἢν δ' έγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἄλλα μανώμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐ οἱ σοφότατοι ὄντο καὶ θαρραλεώτατοι εἰσίν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρείοτατοι; καὶ κατὰ τούτων τὸν λόγον ἡ
40 σοφία ἀν ἀνδρεία εἶ; Οὐ καλῶς, ἐφη, μημονεύεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃ ἐλεγόν τε καὶ ἄπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ῥμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλεόι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τότε ἦρου, ἐπιπον ἀν ὁτι οὐ
45 πάντες· τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλεόι εἰσίν, τὸ δ έμον ῥμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὁρθώς ῥμολόγησα. ἐπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἐαυ-
τῶν θαρραλεωτέροις ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπι-
σταμένοιν ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἷς τὴν ἀνδρείαν
καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταύτων εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ 50
μεταίναι καὶ τὴν ἱσχὺν οὐθενός ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ ούτω μεταίνει ἐριστὶ με εἰ οἱ
Ε ἱσχυρὸι δυνατοὶ εἰσιν, φαίνῃ ἂν· ἐπείτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπι-
στάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατότεροι εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπιστα-
μένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθοσιν, 55
ἡ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίνῃ ἂν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῖ ὁμολογή-
σαντος ἐξείη ἂν σοι, χρωμένω τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίως
tοῦτοι, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία
ἐστὶν ἱσχύς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ
τους δυνατοὺς ἱσχυροὺς εἶναι, τους μέντοι ἱσχυροὺς 60
351 δυνατοὺς· οὐ γὰρ | ταύτων εἶναι δύναμιν τε καὶ ἱσχύν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν
dύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας τε καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, ἱσχύν
dὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων, οὕτω
dὲ κάκει οὐ ταύτων εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· 65
ὡστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι,
μὴ μέντοι τοὺς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας·
θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνδρότοπος
Β καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὡσπερ ἡ δύναμις,
ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν ἐφι
γίγνεται.

XXXV. Λέγεις δὲ τινας, ἔφη, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐ ἰη, τοὺς δὲ κακοῖς;
'Εφη. 'Αρ' οὖν δοκεὶ σοι ἀνθρώπος ἄν
εὐ ἰη, εἰ ἀνώμενός τε καὶ ὁδυνώμενος
ἰη; Οὔκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἦδεως βιοῦς
τῶν βίων τελευτήσειν, οὔκ εὖ ἄν σοι
δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη.

Socrates begins afresh. "Is not pleasure the same as good? And
when men say that they eschew the good because they are over-
come by pleasure, is not this inac-
curate?"
Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἦδεως ξην ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ’ ἀγδὸς κακόν. 
Εἴσπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ’, ἔφη, ξο’ ἴδομενος. Τῇ δή, 
ο Ἡρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σὺ, ὁσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἤδε 
ἀττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθᾶ; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, 
καθ’ ὃ ἦδεα ἔστιν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθᾶ, μὴ 
ei τι ἀτ’ αὐτῶν ἀποβῆσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὐθίς αὐ 
τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὁσαύτως οὗτως οὐ καθ’ ὅσον ἀνιαρὰ, 
κακά; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, 
ὡς σὺ ἔρωτας, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἔστιν, ὡς τὰ ἦδεα 
τὲ ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακὰ. ἀλλὰ 
μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ 
ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς 
πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βλον τὸν ἐμὸν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἄ 
tῶν ἦδεων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἔστι δ’ αὖ καὶ ἄ 
tῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακὰ, ἔστι δ’ ἄ ἔστιν, καὶ τρίτων 
οὐδέτερα, οὕτε κακὰ οὔτ’ ἀγαθᾶ. Ἡ ἦδεα δὲ καλεῖς, 
ἠν δ’ ἔγω, οὐ τὰ ἦδους μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἦδο- 
νῆς; Πάνω γ’, ἔφη. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν λέγω, καθ’ ὅσον 
ἂν ἦδεα ἔστιν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, τὴν ἦδουν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν 
ei οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν. “Ωσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάσ- 
tοτε, ὃ Σώκρατες, σκοπῶμεθα αὐτὸ, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς 
λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαινηται 
τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, συγχρηστόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε 
ἔδει ἀμφισβητήσωμεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, σὺ 
βούλει ἢγεμονεῦειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἔγω ἡγόμαι; 
Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἢγεῖςθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις 
tοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, τῇ δε πη καταφανές | 
ἀν ἦμιν γένοιτο; ὁσπερ εἰ τις ἀνθρωπόν σκοπῶν 352 
ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν 
tοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἢδον τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς 
χείρας ἄκρας εἴποι· ἢ δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ
στῆθι καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἑπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγὼ τοιούτων τι ποθό πρὸς τὴν 40 σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φής, δέομαι τοιούτον τι εἰπεῖν· ὥθη δὴ μοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀπο-
B καλυφτον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ
tοῦτὸ σοι δοκεῖ ὥστε ποτὲ πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ 45 ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμην τοι-
οῦτον τι, οὐκ ἴσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν
eῖναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτοιν αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦται,
ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμην οὐ τὴν
evπην ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἀρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτε μὲν 50
θυμόν, τοτε δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτε δὲ λύπην, ἑνίοτε δὲ
ἐρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι
C περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελ-
kομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἢρ' οὖν καὶ σοι
toιοῦτον τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλὸν τε εἶναι ἢ 55 ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἀρχεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπουν, καὶ εάνπερ
γυγώσκη τις τάγαθα καὶ τὰ κακὰ, μὴ ἂν κρατηθήναι
ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὡστε ἄλλα ἀττα πράττειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἢ
ἐπιστήμη κελεύη, ἄλλ' ἵκαιν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν
βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ 60
λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀμα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αὐσχρόν
D ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων
κράτιστον φάγαι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων πραγμάτων.
Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἔγω, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οὐσθα
ουν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ 65
οὐ πείθονται, ἄλλα πολλοὺς φασὶ γυγώσκοντας τὰ
βέλτιστα οὐκ ἔθελεν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἄλλα
ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἔγω ἡρόμην ὦ τί ποτε
αιτίον ἐστι τοῦτον, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἠττωμένους
70 ἡ λύπης ἡ ὄν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον ὑπὸ τινὸς τούτων Εκρατουμένους τάντα ποιεῖν τους ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. "Θιδὴ μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχειρήσον πείθειν τοὺς ἄνθρωπος καὶ διδάσκειν ὦ ἔστιν
75 αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὁ φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν ᾦδονῶν 353 ἠπτάσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γυγνῶσκεν γε αὐτὰ. ἦσος γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὁρθῶς λέγετε, ὁ ἄνθρωποι, ἄλλα ψεύδεσθε, ἔρωτι ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὁ Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ
80 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἠδονῆς ἠπτάσθαι, ἄλλα τί ποτε ἔστιν, καὶ τί ὡμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε ἐίναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν. Τί δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, δεὶ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἄνθρωπων, οὗ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Οἶμαι, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, Β
85 εἰναὶ τι ἡμῶν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τάλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτὲ ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἐδοξεῖν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγησασθαι, ἂν ὅμαι ἂν ἐγωγε κάλλιστα φανερῶν γενέσθαι, ἐποῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλουν, ἐῶ 90 χαίρειν. 'Ἀλλ', ἐφη, ὁρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὡσπερ ἦρξο.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τοινυν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, εἰ ἔρωιντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο είναι, ὦ ἡμεῖς Κ
ηττω εἶναι τῶν ἠδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἰποιρί
ἀν ἐγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁδί· ἀκούει δὴ· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρω-
tαγόρας φράσαι. ἀλλο τι γὰρ, ὁ ἂν-
thρωποι, φατε ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν
tοίσδε—οἶνον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ
ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἦδεων ὄντων, γυγνῶσκουσ
οτί ποιηρά ἐστιν, ὡμος αὐτὰ πράττειν; Φαίεν ἀν. Ἰο
Οὐκοῦν ἐρῷμεθ᾽ ἄν αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν.

Δ ποιηρά δὲ αὐτὰ τῇ φατε εἶναι; πότερον ὁτί τή
ἠδονῆς ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ὡδύ
ἐστίν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν, ἢ ὁτί εἰς τὸν ὑστερον χρόνον
νόσους τε ποιεὶ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ 15
παρασκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἰ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὑστερον
μηδέν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεὶ, ὡμος
δ' ἄν κακά ἢν, ὁ τι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ

Ἐ ἄλλα διὰ τὰ ὑστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ
tάλλα. Ἑγὼ μὲν οἴμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς
πολλοὺς ἄν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. Οὐκοῦν νόσους
ποιόντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας 25
354 ποιεῖ; ὁμολογοῦει ἄν, ἃς ἐγόμαι. Συνέφη ὁ Πρω-
ταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὡς ἀνθρωποὶ, ὡμῖν, ὡς
φαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὔδεν ἄλλο ταῦτα
κακά ὑστα, ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτα καὶ ἄλλων
ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ; ὁμολογοῦει ἄν; Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν 30
ἀμφότερον. Οὖκοῦν πάλιν ἄν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐρῶ-
μεθα· ὡς ἀνθρωποὶ οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ
eἰναι, ἄρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἴκον τὰ τε γυμνᾶς
καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας
τὰς διὰ καύσεων τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακεῖων καὶ 35
ἀμοκτονῶν γιγνομένας, ὦτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἐστιν,
Β ἀνιαρὰ δὲ· φαίεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει. Πότερον οὖν κατὰ
tόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὥτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα
ὁδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὁτι
εἰς τὸν ὑστερον χρόνον ὑγείαι τε ἀπε αὐτῶν γίγνονται 40
καὶ εὐεξία τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαν καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαί καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαίνειν οὖν, ὡς ἐγγύμαι. Συνεδόκει. Ταύτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι’ ἄλλο τι, ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονάς ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὁ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἄλλ’ ἢ ἡδονάς εἰς καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἄν φαίειν, ὡς ἐγγύμαι. Οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκούν τὴν μὲν ἡδονήν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθόν ὅν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς 50 κακόν; Συνεδόκει. Τούτ’ ἄρα ἤγεισθ’ εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἔπει καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακόν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερή ἢ ὅσα αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μειζοὺς παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἔπει εἰ κατ’ ἄλλο 55 τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἄν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἐφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Ἄλλο τι οὐν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ 60 λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονάς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἔπει εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς Ἐ ο ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔξετε. 65 Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, εἰ με ἀνέροισθε, ὁ ἀνθρωποί, τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆ; συγγυγνώσκετε μοι, φαίνην ἄν ἐγώγη. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ βάδιον ἀποδείξαι, τι ἐστὶν ποτὲ τούτο, ὃ ὡμεῖς 70 καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἄλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι
355 ἔξεστιν, εἰ η ἔχετε ἀλλο τι φάναι | εἰναι τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἀλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ήδεως καταβιώναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μη ἔχετε μηδὲν ἀλλο 75 φάναι εἰναι ἁγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, ο μη εἰς ταῦτα τελευταί, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε, ὅτι πολλάκις γυνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἀνθρωπος, ὅτι κακὰ ἑστιν, ὁμοις πράττει αυτὰ, ἐξὸν μη πράττειν, 80 Β ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἁγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος. καὶ αὕθις αὐ λέγετε, ὅτι γυνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρήμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος.

XXXVII. ᾽Ως δὲ ταῦτα γελοία ἑστιν, κατάδηλου ἑσται, εὰν μη πολλοὶς ὄνομασι χρώμεθα ἁμα, ἥδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῳ καὶ ἁγαθῳ καὶ κακω, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφανή ταῦτα, δυ- σίν καὶ ὄνομασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρώτον μὲν ἁγαθω καὶ κακω, ἑπείτα αὕθις ἥδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῳ. θέμενοι δὴ C οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι γυνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρω- πος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἑστιν, ὁμοις αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. εὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τί, ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκείνοις ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονής οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰσεῖν· ἀλλ’ γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονής τὸ ἁγαθόν· ἐκεῖνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινόμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἡττώμενος—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει τοῦ ἁγαθου, φήσομεν νη Δία. ἀν οὖν τύχη ο ἔρόμενος 15 ἡμᾶς υβριστής ὡν, γελάσεται καὶ ἑρεῖ· ἤ γελοίου D λέγετε πράγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακὰ, γυνώσκων ὅτι κακὰ ἑστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ

A. P.
τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἀρα, φίσει, οὐκ ἄξιων ὄντων υικᾶν ἐν
20 ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἄξιων; φίσομεν δὴλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὃτι οὐκ ἄξιων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἠττω ἐϊναι τῶν ἱδονῶν. κατὰ τί δὲ, φίσει ὅσως, ἀνάξια ἐστὶν τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο τι ἢ οταν τὰ μὲν μείξω,
25 τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἢ; οὐχ Ε ἐξομεν εἰπέιν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δὴλον ἀρα, φίσει, ὅτι τὸ ἠττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείξω κακᾶ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν ὅν ὄντω. μεταλάβομεν δὴ τὰ ὄνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἤδυ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς
30 αὐτοὶς τούτοις, καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνθρωπος πράττει, τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γυγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστίν, ἡττομενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἱδέων, δὴλον ὅτι ἢ ἀναξίων ὄντων υικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἀλλή 35 ἀναξία ἱδονῇ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὑπερβολή ἀλ-
35 λήλων καὶ ἑλλειψις; ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ μείξω τε καὶ σμι-
kρότερα γυγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἠττον. εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρήμα ἢδυ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὑστερον χρόνου καὶ ἱδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ, μῶν ἀλλώ τω,
40 φαίην ἄν ἐγωγη, ἢ ἱδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἑσθ’ ὅτι
ἀλλη. ἀλλ’ ὀστερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἀνθρωπος, συνθεῖς B
τὰ ἱδέα καὶ συνθεῖς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγύς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ξυγγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἱδέα πρὸς ἱδέα ἰστῆς, τὰ μείξω αἰεὶ καὶ
45 πλείω λυπτέα· ἐαν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάτ-
tω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐαν δὲ ἱδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐαν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἱδέων, ἐαν τε τὰ ἐγγύς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐαν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέου ἐν ἢ ἀν ταῦτ’ C
XXXVII 357 A ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ. 67

ἐνὶ. ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, ὦ πρακτέα: 50 μὴ πῃ ἅλλη ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἀνθρωποί; οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἅλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ εἰκεῖνω. Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ὅμω τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζων, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττων. ή οὐ; Φήσουσι. 55 Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ οὐσάντως; καὶ οἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἂν ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι;

D Φαίεν ἂν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἂν τὸ εὗ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, 60 τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἀρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἂν τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἠμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἂνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ 65 σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο

Ε τὸ φαίνομαι, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἄλθες ἑσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλθει καὶ ἐσωσέν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἀνθρωποί πρὸς ταῦτα ἠμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σοφεῖν ἂν τέχνην, 70 ἂν ἁλλήν; Τὴν μετρητικήν, ὁμολογεῖ. Τί δ', εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἂν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὡστε τὸ πλέον ὁρθῶς ἑδεῖ ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὡστε τὸ ἐλαττον, ἃ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐαυτὸ ἂν τὸ ἐτερον πρὸς τὸ ἐτερον, εὗτ' ἐγγύς εὗτε πόρρῳ εὕη, τί ἂν 75 ἐσώζειν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἂρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἂρ' ἂν οὗ μετρητικὴ τις, ἑπειδὴ τοις ὑπερβολῖς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἑστὶν ἂν τέχνη; ἑπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῖ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἃρα ἁλλή τις ἂν ἁριθμητική; ὁμολογοῦεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, ἂν οὔ; Ὑδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρω-80

5—2
ταγώρα ὁμολογεῖν. Ἐϊεν, ὦ ἀνθρώπωι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡ ἡδονὴς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρων B 85 καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἀρα πρῶτον μὲν ὢν μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολὴς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἱσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψεις; Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ, ἀνάγκη δὴ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν. "Ητις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν αὐτή, 90 εἰσαύθησι σκεφτόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀποδείξειν, ἢν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δὲ, εἰ δὲ μέμνησθε, ἦν ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, 95 ὅπου ἂν ἐν, καὶ ἡδονὴς καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἐφάτε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· οὐ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τούτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἢ· 100 τᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε D εἶναι; εἴπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἶπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε ἢν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἄν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελᾶσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὁμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ἐξαμαρ- 105 τάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτι ὁμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ὡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανόμενη πράξεις ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμα- Ε 110 δία πράττεται. ὡστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἦττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη· ὡς Πρωταγόρας οδὲ φησίν ιατρὸς
Τοῦτο μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀποκεκριμένων ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἕρωτα, ὁ Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε—κοινῶς γὰρ δὴ ἐστώ ὡμίν ὁ λόγος—πότερον δοκῶν ὡμίν ἄληθῆ λέγειν ἡ ψεύδεσθαι. Τερπνοὺς ἔδοκεί ἀπασίν ἄληθῆ εἰναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὅμολογεῖτε ἁρα, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν ἥδυ ἀγαθὸν εἰναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακὸν. Τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαιρέσων τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ β ἥδυ εἴτε τερπνῶν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτὸν, εἴτε ὅποθεν καὶ ὁ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαύτα ὀνομάζων, ὁ βελτιστε Πρό- δικε, τοῦτο μοι πρὸς ὁ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι. Γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνυμμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τι δὲ δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, τὸ τοιόντε; αἵ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἀπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλῶπως ζην καὶ ἥδεως, ἃρ' οὐ 15 καλαίτ; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔρημον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ ὡφέλιμον; Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἂρα, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, τὸ ἥδυ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδῶς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἀλλὰ βελτίω εἰναι, ἢ ᾧ C ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἐπείτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἑξὸν τὰ βελτίω- ὀνδὲ τὸ ἢττῳ εἰναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμαθία, 20 οὖδὲ κρεῖττω εαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἡ σοφία. Συνεδόκει πᾶσιν. Τι δὲ δὴ; ἀμαθίαν ἂρα τὸ τοιόντε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψευδοῦσαν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλῶν ἄξιῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσιν συνεδόκει. " hwnd
25 τι οὖν, ἐφην ἑγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὔδεις ἐκὼν ἔρχεται
οὔδ' ἐπὶ ᾧ οἶται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐοι-
κεν, εὖ ἀνθρώπων φύσει, ἐπὶ ᾧ οἶται κακὰ εἶναι θ'
ἐθέλειν ἴναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ
δυνῶν κακοῖν τὸ ἐτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὔδεις τὸ μεῖξον
30 αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον. Ἀπαντα ταῦτα συνεδό-
κει ἀπασίων ἡμῖν. Τι οὖν; ἐφην ἑγώ, καλεῖτε τι δέος
καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἑγώ; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ἃ
Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαιν τινα λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἰτε
φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. 'Εδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν
35 καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Πρόδικῳ δὲ Ἔ
δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ. Ἀλλ' οὔδεν, ἐφην ἑγώ, ὁ Πρόδικε,
diaφέρει, ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῇ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν ἑστιν,
ἀρὰ τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθέλησει ἐπὶ ταύτα ἴναι ᾧ δέοι-
κεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἡ μή; ἡ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων;
40 ᾧ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὀμολογηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ᾧ
dὲ ἡγεῖται κακὰ, οὐδένα οὔτε ἴναι ἐπὶ ταύτα οὔτε
λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. 'Εδόκει καὶ ταῦτα | πᾶσιν.

XXIX. Οὗτω δὴ τοῦτων ὑποκειμένων, ἵν' δ' ἑγώ,
ὁ Πρόδικε τε καὶ Ἰππία, ἀπολογείσθω
ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὁδε, ᾧ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπε-
κρινατο, πῶς ὁρθῶς ἔχει, μη ᾧ τὸ πρῶτον
παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὁντων
μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἐφη εἶναι τὸ
ἐτέρον οἴον τὸ ἐτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ
ἐκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὗ ταύτα
λέγω, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ὑστερον εἴπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὑστερον ἐφη
10 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλῆσια ἀλλῆλοις εἶναι,
tὸ δὲ ἐν πάνιν πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἀλλῶν, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, Β
γνώσεσθαι δὲ μ' ἐφη τεκμηρίῳ τιδ' εὐρίσεις γάρ,
ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὁντας καὶ
άδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκόλαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ· ὃ γυνώσει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀν- 15 δρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἔγω εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἑθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδή ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξήλθοιν. ἦρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον, εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὃ δέ, καὶ C ἢτας γ', ἐφη. Μέμησαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα 20 ἀποκρινόμενοι; Ὅμολογεί. Ἰθι δή, ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τὶ λέγεις ἢτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ ἐφ' ἀπερ οἱ δειλοί; Οὐκ ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐτερα; Ναί, ἢ δ' ὡς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; Δέγεται δή, ὃ 25 Σώκρατες, οὔτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἄληθῆ, ἐφην ὃ ἐγὼ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἔρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τὶ φίλης ἢτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἣγουμε- νοὺς δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆ; Ἄλλα τοῦτο γ', ἐφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοὺς λόγους ἀπεδείχθη ἀρτί ὅτι ἀδύ- 30 νατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἄληθής λέγεις· ὅστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἂ δεινὰ ἤγείται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδή τὸ ἠπτω εἶναι ἐαυτοῦ ἡπέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα. Ὅμολογεί. Ἄλλα μὴν ἐπὶ ὁ γε θαρροῦσιν πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄνδρειοι, 35 καὶ ταύτῃ γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ ἕ ό ἀνδρεῖοι. Ἄλλα μέντοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάν γε τοῦναυτίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ὁ οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἢναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἐφην ἐγώ, καλὸν 40 ὃν ἢναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλὸν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν- τάς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἁγαθὰς ὁμολογή- σαμεν. Ἄληθὴ λέγεις, καὶ ᾧ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
45 ὁρθὸς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ | ποτέρους φης εἰς τῶν 360 πόλεμον οὐκ ἔθελειν ἴεναι, καλὸν ὃν καὶ ἀγαθὸν; Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἢ δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἶπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἤδυ; 'Ὡμολογηταί γοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀρ' οὖν γυγυώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἔθελοσιν ἴεναι 50 ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἀμεινον καὶ ἤδιον; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο εὰν ὀμολογῆμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἐµ- προσθεν ὀμολογίας. Τι δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἀμεινον καὶ ἤδιον ἐρχεται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὀμολογεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐκ αἰσ- 55 χροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ, ἀρ' οὗ καλά; 'Ὡμολογεῖ. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μανιμόμενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται 60 καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ὀμολογεῖ. Θαρροῦ- σιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαι καὶ ἀμαθίαιν; Οὔτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τι οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὁ δὲ δειλοὶ εἰσιν οἱ δειλοὶ, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; Δειλίαν ἐγών', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν 65 ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ἄντεσ; Πάνω γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτην ἀρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσιν; 'Ὡμολογεῖ. Δι' ὁ δὲ δειλοὶ εἰσιν, δειλία ὀμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἄν εἰη; Ἐπένευσεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐναντίον 70 ἀνδρεία δειλία. Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ δ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἑστίν; Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐτὶ ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; Πάνω μόνης ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία ἀρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἑστίν, ἐναντία 75 οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπι-
νέσαι ἠθέλησεν ἑσύγα τε· καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπον· Τί δή, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φής ἂ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὑ- Ε τός, ἡφι, πέρανον. "Εν γ', ἡφην ἐγὼ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἐτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὀσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτι δοκοῦσιν εἰιαί τινες ἀνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνδρειότατοι δὲ. Σο Φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἡφι, δοκείς, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἰναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὐν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀδύνατον μοι δοκεῖ εἰναι.

XL. Οὔτοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτοις 361 φανεροῖ | γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατά- δηλον γένοιτο ἑκείνο,περὶ οὐ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτόν ἀρέτη, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρτί ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὀσπερ ἀνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελάν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, 10 εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ἄτοποι γ' ἐστε, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστίν ἀρετή ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τᾶναντία σπεύ- βδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὃς πάντα χρήματα ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ 15 ἀνδρεία, ὃ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτόν φανεί ἡ ἀρετή: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἢν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὀσπερ Πρω- ταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἢν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μή διδακτόν ὄν. Πρω- 20 ταγόρας δ' αὐ διδακτὸν τὸτε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τούναντίον C ἐςοικεν σπεύδοντι, ὅλιγον πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆμαι αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὔτως ἂν ἥκιστα εἳ διδακτόν. ἐγὼ

Conclusion. Socrates and Protagoras have both veered round to the opposite of that from which they started.
οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορὼν ἂνω κἀτω
25 ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ
αὐτὰ γενέσθαι. καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας
ήμας ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρετὴν ὁ τι ἔστι, καὶ πάλιν
ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰτε διδακτὸν εἰτε μὴ
didaktòn, μὴ πολλάκις ἦμας ὁ Ἑπιμηθεῦς εἰκείνος καὶ
30 ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὦσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
διανομῇ ἡμέλησεν ἠμῶν, ὡς φῆς σὺ. ἦρεσεν οὖν μοι
καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεύς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἑπιμηθέως·
ὁ χρώμενος ἔγω καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου
τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ
35 εἰ σὺ ἑθέλοις, ὦσπερ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἠλέγουν, μετὰ σοῦ
ἀν ἡδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποῖν. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Ἀκρατατεῖς, ἐπαῖνο διὰ τὴν προθυ-
μίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτε τάλλα Ε
οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἀνθρωπος, φθονερὸς τε ἡκίστ’ ἀν-
40 θράπτων, ἐπεῖ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηκα,
ὅτι δὲν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν
τηλικοῦτων καὶ πάνω καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἀν θαυ-
μάζομε, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοις ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφία.
καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαύθες, ὅταν βούλῃς, διεξεῖς.
45 νῦν δ’ ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι | τρέπεσθαι. Ἀλλ’, ἦν 362
δ’ ἔγω, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ
οὕσπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλία τῷ καλῷ
χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.
tαῦτ’ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.
NOTES.

Πρωταγόρας ἡ σοφισταλ ἐνδεικτικός. This is how the title appears in B, except that ἐνδεικτικός (which is absent in T) is apparently from a later hand. Plato probably called the dialogue Πρωταγόρας (compare the titles Crito, Euthyphro, etc.—the majority of the dialogues are named after an interlocutor): the words ἡ σοφισταλ and ἐνδεικτικός were added by Thrasylus, whose date is about the Christian era. The Protagoras is the sole example of an 'endeictic' dialogue: it is so called because it was thought to be an arraignment (ἐνδειξις) of the Sophists. That this is the meaning of ἐνδεικτικός, and not 'probative', can be inferred from the fact that Albinus used ἐλεγκτικός in its place (ἐλασχωγή εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους Ch. v. Cobet takes the right view: see his edition of Diog. Laert. III 51). The arrangement of the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies is also probably due to Thrasylus. The Protagoras is the second dialogue of the sixth tetralogy, the others being (1) Euthydemus, (3) Gorgias, (4) Meno. See Grote's Plato, Vol. I p. 158 foll.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates meets a friend, who asks him to describe his interview with Protagoras.

1. πόθεν—ὡραν. The opening words of Cicero's translation of the Protagoras are preserved by Priscian (vi 63): "quid tu? unde tandem appares, o Socrate? an id quidem dubium non est, quin ab

1 B denotes the Bodleian MS = Bekker's Β: T a manuscript in the library of St Mark's at Venice (append. class. 4 cod. 1) = Bekker's τ. The former is the best representative of the MSS of the first class: the latter is supposed by Schanz to be the source of all the MSS of the second class.
Alcibiade?” ἦ = Latin an? introduces a second question intended to forestall Socrates’ answer to the first: compare Apol. 26 B πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, οὗ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἦ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κτλ.;

2. κυψειστοῦ—ώραν. For the metaphor in κυψειστοῦ Sauppe quotes Soph. 222 D τῇ τῶν ἐρωτῶν θήρᾳ τῶν νοῶν, ὡς έσικας, οὖπω προσέσχεις and Χεν. Mem. I 2. 24 ‘Αλκιβιάδης—διὰ μὲν κάλλος—θηρώμενον κτλ. τοῦ περὶ τὴν ‘Αλκιβιάδου ὁράν (=τοῦ ὥραιον ‘Αλκιβιάδην, cf. βλὶ Ἡρακλείη for βλαυος Ἡρακλῆς) is a slight παρὰ προσδοκίαν as in the English: ‘From hunting, no doubt—after the young and blooming Alcibiades’. It was part of Socrates’ habitual irony to pretend to be in love with young men of ability (cf. the words of Alcibiades in Symp. 216 D Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ δεὶ περὶ τούτων ἔστι καὶ ἐκπέπληκται and 216 E: see also infra, note on 310 A line 38).

3. καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ. καὶ μὴν is merely ‘well’ as in Phaedo 84 D καὶ μὴν—τάληθη σοι ἐρώ. The second καὶ goes with πρόφυν: ‘well, it was only the other day that I saw him etc.’ In the next line καλὸς ἀνήρ is in the predicate: the readings of Bekker (ἀνήρ) and Athenaeus (ὁ ἀνήρ) are less good. ἀνήρ μὲντοι is ‘but yet a man’ (παῖς. At the age of 18 an Athenian εἶς ἀνδρας ἐνεγράφετο.

5. ὡς γ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν—ὑποτιμπλάμενος. αὐτοῖς = μόνοις is emphatic as in the usual αὐτοῦ γάρ ἔσμεν and therefore precedes ἡμῖν. ὡς γ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι apologises for ἀνήρ μὲντοι: for this use of ὡς γε cf. Euthyd. 307 A ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθη εἰρήσθαι and infra 339 E: καὶ in καὶ πῶς ὄνος is ‘and’ not ‘even’. ὑπο— in ὑποτιμπλάμενος is diminutive, like sub- in Latin. So in 312 A ἥδη γάρ ὑπὲ φαινέν τι ἡμέρας.

7. οὐ σὺ μέντοι. “In interrogationibus haec particula” (μέντοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingeni speciem” (Hoefer, de particularis Platonicis, p. 34). The idiom is very frequent in Plato, e.g. Rep. I 339 B, Crat. 439 A, Theaet. 163 E. Translate ‘You don’t mean to say that you disapprove of Homer’.

309 B 8. δὲ ἔφη χαριστάτην ἡβην κτλ. Homer II. xxiv 348 and Od. X 279 πρῶτον ὑπηνήτῃ τοῦπερ χαριστάτη ἡβη. To insert τὴν (with Hirschig) before ἡβην would make the reference to Homer less precise. The line in Homer refers to Hermes, and Sauppe quotes Clement to shew that sculptors modelled their busts of Hermes after Alcibiades,
12. εὖ ἐμοιγε ἐδοξέν, sc. διακεῖσθαι. Socrates replies to his friend's second question (καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;) first, and to his first question (ἡ παρ’ ἐκείνου φαίνει;) second, in the words καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρι ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι, where οὖν marks the regression to the earlier inquiry. Both B and T read ἔρχομαι by mistake for ἔρχομαι: ἔρχομαι is found in a Vienna codex (suppl. phil. gr. 7) which Kral and Wohlrab place along with B in the first class of MSS.

16. οὕτε προσεῖχον—ἐπελαμβανόμην τε. τε following οὕτε throws emphasis on the second clause: e.g. Apol. 26 ε παντάπασι με φῆς οὕτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδάσκειν. The idiom is very common in Plato (e.g. infra 347 E, 360 D, 361 E) and corresponds to neque—que or (more frequently) neque—et in Latin. For the interchange of pronouns ἐκείνον—aὐτοῦ see on 310 D.

21. καὶ πολὺ γε, i.e. καλλίον ἐνέτυχον.

25. Ἀβδηρίτη. Abdera, on the coast of Thrace, was the birthplace of Democritus and of Protagoras. The reputation of the city for heaviness and stupidity seems not to be earlier than the age of Demosthenes: see pseudo-Dem. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον 23 ὡσπερ ἐν Ἀβδηρίταις ἦ Μαρανείταις ἄλλον ὑπὲρ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις πολιτευόμενοι and Cic. ad Atticum vii 7. 4.

27. νιέοις. Schanz writes νίεσ in conformity with the general usage of inscriptions about Plato's time, but MSS upon the whole favour νιέοις: see the Editor's note on Crito 45 c.

28. τὸ σοφῶτατον. So the MSS: Schanz and others read σοφῶτερον, apparently the reading of Ficinus, who translates the word by sapientius. Socrates however is thinking of Protagoras, who is not σοφός, but σοφῶτατος (line 32): the effect of the neuter τὸ σοφῶτατον is to generalise the statement into a kind of adage. σοφῶτερον would introduce a somewhat frigid comparison between Alcibiades and Protagoras in respect of wisdom; and it should also be noted that the MSS reading σοφῶτατον was more likely to be changed to σοφῶτερον by mistake than vice versa. There may be an allusion to some proverbial form of speech resembling that in Theognis 255 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίωτατον· λύστον δ’ ύμιαλτεν κτλ.: cf. also the Scholium referred to in Gorg. 451 ε. The sentiment is an interesting anticipation of the Stoic paradoxes as to the beauty of the wise man.

30. ἄλλ’ ἦ expresses surprise and interest: 'What! have you just left etc.' So in Gorg. 447 Ά ἄλλ’ ἦ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν
33. σοφότατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. The interest is sustained by reserving the name of Protagoras to the end.

37. πάνυ γε πολλά καὶ εἴπών κτλ. Sauppe places a comma after πάνυ γε, but it suits the rapid movement of the dialogue better to take πάνυ with πολλά.

38. τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω. Literally 'why didn't you relate', i.e. 'tell us at once'. So in 317 D τί οὖν—οὐ καὶ Πρώδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν; This construction of τί οὖ and τί οὖν οὐ is common in animated conversational style, especially with the second person: e.g. Gorg. 503 B τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτῶν ἑφρασας τίς ἔστιν;—ὑπάρχον ὅτι τάχιστα—οὖν ἃν φθάνωσι φράζων as Thompson remarks.

39. ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τούτον. The slave was doubtless in attendance on the Friend.

42. ἄκουστε. From this, as well as from ἥμεις and ἄκουστε, it appears that the Friend was not the only listener.


CHAPTER II.

Socrates begins his story. Hippocrates called on him at an early hour and entreated him to apply to Protagoras on his behalf.

1. ἔτι βαθέως ὀμβρου. ὀμβρος βαθὸς is the period just before daybreak; ὀμβρος is the morning twilight, and βαθὸς implies that it was more dark than light: Crito 43 A. A similar use of βαθὸς is seen in the expressions βαθεία νῦς and βαθεία ἐσπέρα.

2. Ἰπποκράτης—Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφὸς. Hippocrates is known only from this dialogue. δὲ without preceding μὲν is regular in such twofold descriptions of a person: Sauppe refers to Aesch. Pers. 151 μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασιλεια δ’ ἐμῆ and Hdt. vii 10 πατρὶ τῷ σῷ,
πλάτων Πρωταγόρας.

5. ἢς εἶπενομνος. So BT: neither in the 3rd singular of such forms nor elsewhere do Plato’s mss always avoid hiatus. Schanz (Vol. xii p. xv) would insert the ν εφελκυστικὸν in such forms before a vowel, unless a pause follows.

9. Ἰπποκράτης, ἤφην, οὔτος. We have followed Heindorf in printing a full stop after οὔτος. Heindorf (following Ficinus) correctly takes the words as an aside; Socrates recognises Hippocrates by his voice. The neuter comparative of νέος regularly implies that the new is worse than the old: see on Euthyphr. 2 a.

10. εἶ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. Compare Ar. Knights 186 μῶν ἐκ καλῶν εἶ κάγαθῶν; μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, εἶ μὴ ’κ ποιηρῶν γε and Blaydes in loc. The idiom originally meant ‘unless by νεότερα you mean ἀγαθά’, which would be a contradiction in terms, since νεότερον is κακόν. Preceded by οἶδεν it has come to mean little more than ‘except good’.

12. πρόθνη: see 309 D τρίτην γε ἡδὴ ἡμέραν.

14. ἐσπεράς γε: χρής is unnecessary, as the Athenians counted the interval between two sunsets as one day (Kroschel, referring to Varro ap. Gall. Noct. Att. III 2. 4).

ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος. The σκίμπον was a low stool or bed. According to a Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 254 the word means properly a ‘lame stool’ (χολῶν κρατότατον) and is connected with σκιμπάζειν = χολάινειν. ἐπιψηλαφῶ is followed by the accusative where it does not (as here) contain the idea of search for, e.g. in Rep. II 360 Α (ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τόν δακτύλιον).

17. Οἰνώνης. Oenoe (probably = the Wine-country) was a δήμος in the φυλή Ἰπποδοκώντις, near Eleutherai, on the road to Thebes. The slave had endeavoured to escape across the frontier into Boeotia. There was another δήμος of the same name near Marathon, belonging to the φυλή Αλαντις.

19. ἐπειδή δὲ ἠθλον... For this sense of ἐρχομαι (‘come back’) Heindorf quotes Lysias ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου § 4 ἀλλ’ ἠθλομεν πρὶν τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυλῆς εἰς τὸν Πειραιὰ κατελθεῖν προτέρον πένθ’ ἡμέραις.

21. ἀδελφός. So (not ἀδελφός) the mss. The article is not rarely omitted with names denoting relation, as we usually omit it with ‘father’ and ‘mother’. See Kühner’s Griechische Grammatik II p. 522. The force of ἐρι is ‘late though it was’. δὲ is commonly omitted after ἐπειτά and εἶτα: so infra 350 D πρώτον.
μὲν γὰρ—ἐπείτα: Symp. 211 A πρῶτον μὲν ἄει ὧν—ἐπείτα οὐ τῆ μὲν καλῶν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρῶν.


24. ὁ ὑπνὸς ἀνήκεν is modelled on Homer (e.g. II. 71 ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὑπνὸς ἀνήκεν), but Plato gives a different turn to ἀνήκεν by adding ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, where ἐκ is ‘from’, not ‘after’ (as Stallbaum thinks). Note presently that οὗτοι to introduce the apodosis after participles is especially common in Plato: cf. infra 314 C, 326 D.

26. ἀνδρείαν. ἀνδρείας occurs in much the same sense in Meno 81 D οὐδέν κυλήει—τάλλα πᾶντα αὐτῶν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρείας ἡ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάλυψεν ζητῶν. οὐλ is emphatic and should therefore be accented, like σὲ in line 31.

27. ἀδικεῖ. ἀδικεῖν is often used of a past injury because the injury is regarded as continuing till atonement is made: see on Crito 50 c.

30. ἄν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἁγύριον καὶ πείθης ἐκεῖνον. For the variation of pronouns cf. Euthyphr. 14 D ἄλλα μοι λέξον τίς αὐτῇ ἢ υπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αὐτεῖν τε φης αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι κεκέλνυς; supra 309 B and infra 318 C. The change is most frequent where the second pronoun is different in case from the first: compare Classen on Thuc. I 132. 5. Cobet ejects the words καὶ πείθης ἐκεῖνον, but they are supported by the parallel expression of 311 D ἄν μὲν ἐξικνήσητα τὰ ἡμετέρα χρήματα καὶ τούτους πείθωμεν αὐτῶν.

31. ὢ Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ: i.e. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ. The exclamation is common: see Blaydes on Ar. Plutus 1.


310E 33. οὗτε τῶν φίλων. The English idiom would lead us to expect οὗτε τῶν τῶν φίλων; but in Greek the double article is avoided by substituting ‘my friends’ for ‘my friends’ property’. Analogous is the usage known as comparatio compendiaria, e.g. κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὀμοία (II. xvii 51), where ‘the Graces’ is put for ‘the Graces’ hair’.

ἄλλ' αὐτά ταῦτα. See on Apol. 23 B. ταῦτα = διὰ ταῦτα is frequent in Plato and Aristophanes.

37. οὗτο τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεσήμανεν. Probably about 445 B.C., if
the date of action of the dialogue is 433—432. (See Introd. p. xxxvi.) Protagoras went to Thurii in 443 B.C. being charged by Pericles to draw up a code of laws for the new colony.

41. Καλλιάς τῷ Ἰππονίκου. Callias, son of Hipponicus, belonged to one of the richest families in Athens (infra 337 D αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως—τοῦ μέγατον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον ὀίκου τῶνδε). His devotion to the ‘Sophists’ in general is remarked upon in Apol. 20 A ἀνδρὶ ὑπετέλεκε χρήματα σοφίσταις πλεῖον ἢ ἐξμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλιάς τῷ Ἰππονίκου (cf. Crat. 391 B) but he seems to have been particularly attached to the doctrines of Protagoras: see Theaet. 164 ε ὁ γὰρ ἑγὼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλιάς ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου (i.e. Πρωταγόρου λόγων) ἐπίτροπος. One of his two sons (Apol. 20 A), Protarchus, appears as an interlocutor in the Philebus. In 393—392 Callias was associated with Iphicrates in the command of the Athenian forces at Corinth, and as late as 371 we find him acting as ambassador to Sparta (Xen. Hell. vi 4). It appears that he spent all his money and died in actual want (Athenaeus xii 52).

42. μὴπῶ, ὑγαθε. The mss have μῆπω ἀγαθέ: probably the archetype had μηπωγαθε, by a natural mistake. Cobet rejects ἐκείσε ἄμεν, reading μῆπω γε, on the ground that with μῆπω γε the Greek idiom does not repeat the verb: but there is no proof that the verb could not be expressed with μήπω (without γε).

43. δεύρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν. Herwerden needlessly suggests that ἐξαναστάντες should be read, or εἰς τὴν αὐλήν rejected: εἰς τὴν αὐλήν goes with ἐξαναστῶμεν: cf. ἐμὲ δὲ δεὶ ποι ἐξαναστήναι in Theages 129 B. δεύρο we should translate by ‘here’: ‘let us rise and go out into the court here’. Classic Greek does not admit of τῆς in such a case: see Cobet’s Novae Lectiones p. 91.

CHAPTER III.

Socrates cross-examines Hippocrates as to his purpose in putting himself under Protagoras, and elicits from him that his object is liberal education.

1. ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν. For ἀναστάντες after ἐξαναστῶμεν cf. infra 314 C where ἐπιστάντες is followed by στάντες, 328 ε ἐπεκαθάλαξεν—ἐξειδίδαξεν: 335 C ἐξεξελβότας—ἐξελθεῖν: Phaedo 104 D ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἱδέα ἐκείνη τῇ ὑπό σφυ, ἢ ἃν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐλθοῖ—ἐλγάζετο δὲ γε ἢ περιτῆ; Euthyd. 281 C οὐκ ἐλάττων πράττων ἐλάττων ἢν ἐξαμαρτάνοι,
2. ἀποπειρώμενος—διεσκόπουν. ῥώμη of strength of will and resolution (cf. ἀνδρεία above 310 D) as in Polit. 259 C πρὸς τὴν τῆς γυνῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην. γυνῆς, the suggestion of Hoenebeek, would be much less forcible and exact.

8. ὀσπερ ἄν eι κτλ. ἄν goes with ἀπεκρίνω in line 13. The application of the similes follows in D, and each illustration contains two subordinate protases, viz. (in B) (1) eἰ ἐπενδεῖς—ἐκεῖνω, (2) eἰ τίς σε ἦρετο, and (in C) (1) eἰ δὲ—ἐκεῖνοι, (2) eἰ τίς σε ἦρετο. With this multiplication of protases Heindorf compares Meno 74 B μανθάνεις γάρ ποι ὁ ὀσπερ ἄν ἐλεγξεν περὶ παντὸς· eἰ τίς σε ἦρετο τούτο ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγξον, τί ἔστι σχῆμα, ὡς Μένων; eἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, eἰ σοι εἶπεν ἀπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ὡς στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμα τι; εἰπές δὴ ποι ἄν ὁ ὀσπερ ἄν. The reasoning from analogy is quite in Socrates' style: see for example Gorg. 448 B foll.

9. Ἰπποκράτη—τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. It is unnecessary (with Naber) to bracket Ἰπποκράτη. Hippocrates, the founder of medical science, born about 460 B.C. in Cos, was at the height of his renown about the year 400. He is referred to also in Phaedrus 270 C (eἰ μὲν οὖν Ἰπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πειθεσθαι) as holding the view that the human body could not be understood apart from ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις. The expression τῶν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν constituted a sort of medical degree, since it marked a man as one of the 'sons of Asclepius'—a recognised school of medicine in Cos and Cnidus. See Blümner Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 354.

15. Πολύκλειτον—Φειδίαν. As Hippocrates was the leading doctor, so Polyclitus and Phidias were the foremost sculptors of the fifth century B.C. in Greece. Polyclitus is not elsewhere mentioned in Plato (except infra 328 C): according to Pliny (Nat. Hist. xxxiv 55) he was born at Sicyon, but Argos was the centre of his school. Phidias is referred to in Meno 91 D οἶδα γάρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείον χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὡς οὖν περίφασι καλα ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καί ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν and in Hipp. Maior 290 A—D.

21. εἶλεν—παρά δὲ δή. εἶλεν is explained by Timaeus in his Lexicon Vocum Platonicaeum as expressing οὐγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. According to the testimony of ancient grammarians the particle was pronounced εἶλεν with inter-
vocalic aspiration as in ταδε. See note on Apol. 18 E. The rough breathing may possibly be due to popular etymology from ἐρα ἐν, ἐν being used as in ἐν μὲν τῶν ἢν τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589. In the best MS of the Republic (Paris A) εὶὲν is regularly written, and the same orthography is found in B, e.g. Gorg. 466 c. δὲ δὴ is used to introduce the application as in 312 E. See also note on 357 A infra.


27. εἰπέ μοι, ὡ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες. ἄγε, φέρε, ἰδὲ, εἰπέ are not rarely used in addressing subjects in the plural. Compare Ar. Peace 383 εἰπέ μοι τι πάσχετ' ὠδρεῖς: Pl. Enthyl. 283 B εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὡ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι. The exhortation or command is in general primarily addressed to one man: contrast however infra 330 B and Lach. 186 E σὺ δ', ὡ Λάχης καὶ Νείκια, εἰπέτον ἥμαν ἐκάτερος.

30. ἄλλο γε, i.e. other than the name 'Protagoras'. It is more in accordance with Plato's usage to make the first question end with the first ἀκόουμεν, and regard the ὁσπερ clause as introducing the second question τι τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκόουμεν; This second question is rejected by Cobet as spurious, but the punctuation which we have adopted seems to remove the difficulty. The ὁσπερ clause defines in advance the meaning of τοιοῦτον: for this and for the asyndeton compare Sophist. 258 B—C πότερον ὁδὲ—δὲι χαρακτεῖ ἢδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ δὲν βεβαιωσ ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτῷ φύσιν ἔχουν; ὁσπερ τὸ μέγα ἢν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν, οὔτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅποι, ἀνάβηκαν τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἴδος ἐν; Crat. 394 A—B: Theaet. 172 D with Heindorf's note. See also 330 A ὁσπερ τά τοῦ προσώπου, where the same punctuation should be adopted. In line 33 the MSS read ἥκοουμεν by mistake for ἀκόουμεν.

33. σοφιστὴν—εἶναι. On σοφιστὴς see infra, note on 312 C. γε implies that Protagoras may be a sophist only in name. εἶναι is frequently used with verbs of naming: compare Lach. 192 A δ ἐν
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πάσιν ὄνομάζεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι. Cobet's suggestion to read εἶνεν, ἔφη, ὃς for εἰναι, ἔφη. ὃς is ingenious but needless.

36. αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ—παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν, sc. τι ἄν ἀποκρίνατο;

38. ὑπεφαίνειν τι ἡμέρας. ὑποφαίνει ἡμέρα is used, as Heindorf says, de die illucescente. Here τι ἡμέρας = 'something of day', 'some daylight'.

39. εἰ μὲν τι—ἔοικεν. Heindorf remarks that Stephanus' conjecture τοῦτο ἔοικεν is needless, the vague indefinite subject being frequently omitted. Comp. Crat. 387 D εἶπερ τι τῶν ἐμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογόμενον εἶναι. Phaedo 99 E ἠσω μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον τῶν οὕκ ἔοικεν.

41. εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας σαυτόν. εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας goes with παρέχων: cf. Symp. 179 B ἵκανη μαρτυριῶν παρέχεται—εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. Young men of fashion were fond of looking to Greek, as opposed to Athenian, public opinion. The MSS have αὐτῶν, but the use of the third personal reflexive pronoun for the first and second in the singular number does not seem to be certain in Plato: and it is simplest to suppose that σ fell out after Ἑλλήνας: Scharz Vol. vii p. xii.

44. ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὦ τοιαύτην. ὦ goes closely with τοιαύτην, and μὴ is virtually 'perhaps' (originally 'lest' as in ὅρα μὴ Θεατ. 145 B): 'but perhaps after all (ἄρα) this is not the kind of learning which etc.' Compare Euthyd. 290 E ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὦ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' ἐπών and Apol. 25 A ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὦ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους. Meno 89 C μὴ τοῦτο οὖ καλῶς ὁμολογήσαμεν. In all of these passages it is better to take μὴ in this way than as equivalent to Latin nim. From this use of μὴ grew up the use of μητοτε = 'perhaps', frequent in Aristotle and later, e.g. Eth. Nic. x 2 1173a 22 μὴ ποτ' οὖ λέγονσιν τὸ αἰτιον.

46. οὕταπερ ἢ παρά is the reading of Τ: B has οὐα περιλ. The γραμματισταὶ of Athens were Schoolmasters, who besides teaching reading and writing (cf. infra 326 D) translated (ἐρμηνεύειν) Homer and interpreted his γλῶτται. They were distinct from the γραμματικὸν or κριτικὸν who pursued more scientific literary and grammatical studies. The κιθαριστής and γραμματιστής between them taught μουσική, and the παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική; and μουσική and γυμναστική were the two parts of παιδεία or liberal education: Rep. i 376 E.

48. ἐπὶ τέχνη—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία: cf. 315 A ἐπὶ τέχνη μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. The distinction between professional and liberal (ὡς τὸν ἴδιοντην καὶ τὸν ἐλευθερον πρέπει) education is fre-
quently emphasized by Plato (see especially Laws i 643 D): his word for the latter is always παιδεία, cf. Gorg. 485 A, Rep. vi 492 c. The ‘arts’ are throughout the Republic looked on as βάναυσιν, and unfit for men whose souls are free.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates continues his cross-examination, and reduces Hippocrates to ἀπορία.

3. παρασχεῖν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρὶ σοφιστῇ. The word παρέχω is often used of putting oneself in the hands of a doctor: compare Gorg. 456 ὁ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ὀλαρφ. ἀνήρ is regularly used (mostly in a complimentary sense, real or feigned) with words which denote one’s profession, standing or the like, e.g. ἀνήρ μάντις, ἀνήρ νομεὺς, ἀνήρ δικασταί; compare Euthyphr. 15 D. For παρασχεῖν Cobet reads παρέχειν, but if MSS can be trusted, Plato used the aorist infinitive with μέλλω tolerably often: see Schanz Preface to Symposium p. vii.

7. οὐτ' εἴ ἀγαθῷ οὐτ' εἴ κακῷ πράγματι. So in Gorgias 520 οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι (their pupils) δ' αὐτὸν παιδεύουσιν. Here Socrates uses the most general form of expression because ex hypothesi nothing is yet known as to the sophist: cf. infra 330 η δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τὸ ἐστὶ η ὁδὴν πράγμα; Cases like Crito 53 D οὐκ ὦτε ἄσχημον ἢν φανεύσατο τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; are somewhat different and contain a slight admixture of contempt: see the Editor’s note in loc.

8. οἶμαι γ' εἶδέναι. Hippocrates oieteai eideʰnai μὴ εἰδός: he is thus, according to Socrates, in the worst of all states: compare Apol. ch. vi foll. Socrates now proceeds to convict him of ignorance.

10. ὥσπερ τούνομα λέγει—τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμων. Hippocrates derives σοφιστής from σοφὸς and (ἐπι)λατ(αμαι) “quasi sit ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἱστής” (Heindorf, comparing the derivation of Ἰφαίστος in Crat. 407 c from Φάισος ἱστήρ). The correct derivation is perhaps given by Suidas s.v.: σοφιστῆς καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος ὡς σοφίζω (cf. σωφρονίζω = make σωφρόν), but -ίζω is very elastic in meaning, and σοφίζω may very well mean ‘play the σοφός’.

14. τῶν τὶ σοφῶν. τῶν πρὸς τὶ σοφῶν would be more precise, 312D but the accusative of reference is preferred for brevity. For the construction Kroschel compares Theages 125 c τῶν τὶ σοφῶν
συνουσία φήσι σοφώς εἶναι τοῦ τυράννου; where however σοφῶς is masculine. The neuter of σοφός is not here used ironically as in Theaet. 157 ἐπαρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

17. ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τι σοφῶν ἔστιν. Heusde suggested ἐπιστήμων after ἔστιν, but the sense can be supplied out of the -ιστής of σοφιστής, according to the derivation of the word just given: the full sense is as it were ὁ δὲ σοφιστής τῶν τι σοφῶν ἔστιν (σοφίστης).

18. τί ἄν ἀποκρινομέθα αὐτῷ. There is no need to change the verb to ἀποκρινομέθα, as was done by Bekker to suit ἔροις: compare infra 354 Α ἐί ἔροιμεθα—φαίεν ἄν and Phaedr. 259 Α ἐί οὖν ἵδοιεν—δικαίως ἄν καταγελέμεν.

πολας ἔργασιας ἐπιστάτης. These words are not of course part of the imaginary questioner’s interrogation, but are spoken by Socrates to help out Hippocrates’ answer. Socrates suggests that Hippocrates should say that the sophist is ἐπιστάτης of some sort of ἔργασία, but in order that the answer should come from Hippocrates himself, he substitutes for the desired answer: ‘(The sophist is) ἐπιστάτης—of what kind of ἔργασία?’ Hippocrates then replies by explaining the ἔργασία, viz. τὸ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. The full grammatical construction would be πολας ἔργασιας ἐπιστάτης (ὅτι ἔστιν ἀποκρινομέθα ἄν αὐτῷ); If we take this view, it is not necessary to insert ἔστιν after ἐπιστάτης (with Hirschig).

Note that ἐπιστάτης is substituted here for ἐπιστήμων: it is clear from Crito 47 Β that Plato connected the two words—probably because both contain the syllable -ιστ- as in ἠστωρ: he frequently plays on the similarity of form between ἐπισταμαί ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστατεῖν: see the Editor’s note on ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπιστρητῆ in the Crito l.c.

19. τί ἄν εἴπομεν—ὡ Σωκράτες; Hippocrates is on the verge of ἀπορία, and merely throws out his suggestion ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν for what it is worth. The words ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν are strictly speaking a reply to the question of Socrates πολας ἔργασιας ἐπιστάτης; for τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν answers πολας ἔργασιας, and but for the intervening clause (τί ἄν εἴπομεν αὐτῶν εἶναι;) the word ἐπιστάτην would have been in the nominative.

Thus explained, the mss reading need not be changed. The next best view is to read (with Schanz) τί ἄν <ei> εἴπομεν αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡ Σωκράτες, ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;
23. ὡστερ ὁ κιθαρίστης κτλ. Compare Gorg. 449 E and 451 A foll., where much the same reasoning is employed to discover τι ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν δύναν, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἶσιν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορική χρήται (Gorg. 451 D). Rhetoric and Sophistic were regarded by Plato as sisters: cf. Gorg. 464 B foll. The clause ὡστερ ὁ κιθαρίστης κτλ. is logically the protasis to ἐλευτέρως δὲ δὴ σοφιστής κτλ.: see on 311 E above.

25. ἐλευτέρως δὲ δὴ σοφιστής. For ἐλευτέρως and δὲ δὴ see on 311 C 312 E above.

27. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι. Stahl’s emendation (ἐπιστάσθαι for ἐπισταται), which had occurred to us independently, seems to be certain. Most editions read ἦ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐπισταται; inserting ἦ before δῆλον (with Heindorf) and giving the words to Socrates, but it is surely more natural to regard them as giving Hippocrates’ reply to Socrates’ question, in which case δῆλον ὅτι is right. The MS reading ἐπισταται gives a non sequitur; for the harpist makes one δεινὸς λέγειν περὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐπιστήμων οἱ οἱ περὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι, not περὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐπιστήμων-ἐστιν indeed. The next sentence τί δὴ ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστιν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ (sc. ἐπιστάσθαι); in no way invalidates the reading ἐπισταται: it is everywhere assumed in the Platonic writings that he who makes others know has knowledge himself; see for example Alcib. I 111 B οὗκ ὁ σοφὸς ὅτι χρητὸς καὶ ἐκλείποντας διδάσκειν ὁμοίων αὐτῶν πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἦ οὗ; πῶς γὰρ οὗ; and ibid. 113 C, 118 C.

30. οὐκέτι. See below on οὐκέτι in 321 D.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates points out that Hippocrates is running a grave risk in submitting himself to one of the ‘Sophists’ without knowing what ‘Sophist’ means.

3. ἦ η ἐλ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κτλ. For ἦ compare Crito 50 E ἦ πρῶς 313 A μὲν ἁρὰ σοι τὸν πατέρα—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἁρὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐσται σοι; and for the general form of the sentence Apol. 28 E εἰ ὦτι μὲν—τὸτε μὲν—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος—ἐνταῦθα δὲ, Meno 94 C—D, Gorg. 512 A: see the Editor’s note on Apol. l.c.

5. πολλὰ ἀν ἐπιρεσκέψω: but ἔδει in line 4 and παρεκάλεσιν in 8. The effect is to represent the process of reflection by oneself as prior to consultation with friends. Heindorf on Gorg. 514 D quotes a
parallel from the Theaetetus (144 E): ἀτὰρ εἰ, νῦν ἐχθντου ἐκατέρων λύραν, ἐφη αὐτάς ἡμύσθατι ὅμως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἄν ἐπιστεῦομεν ἡ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα ἄν (i.e. should have inquired first) εἰ μονοκὸς ὡν λέγοι;

9. τὴν ψυχήν. Compare (with Heindorf) Rep. IX 583 E δ μεταξὺ ἀρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡς ψυχίαν, τούτο ποτε ἀμφότερα ἑσται. ἐν ὃ presently is like ἐν τούτῳ in 310 D where see note: Heindorf cites Eur. Iph. T. 1057 καὶ τάμι ἄν ὑ μὲν ἐστιν ἡ καλὸς εὐχεῖν ἡ μηδὲν εἶναι. For καὶ ἐν ὃ we should at first sight expect καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ: for the Greek idiom is Relative+Anaphoric pronoun, not Relative+Relative when the two pronouns have the same antecedent and are connected by a conjunction: e.g. Gorg. 452 D τί ἐστι τούτῳ δ ὕψος ὑν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτῷ: see the Editor’s note on Apol. 40 A. Here however the fact that the relative precedes its antecedent (δ δὲ περὶ πλεονος—περὶ δὲ τοῦ του) makes the rule inoperative; and there are other exceptions: e.g. Rep. II 374 B καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ωσάυτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς δ’ περὶ τίς ἐκάστος καὶ ἐφ’ ὃ ἐμμελε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βλοῦ αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος—καλὸς ἀπεργάζεσθαι, and Theaet. 192 B καὶ δ’ οἴδεν καὶ δ’ αἰσθάνεται (where however Bonitz rejects the second δ, perhaps rightly).

14. τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ἥξειν. Heindorf’s suggestion τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ τῷ ἥξειν would convey a somewhat different meaning, viz. ‘this arrival, the foreigner’. The presence of ἀφικομένῳ renders the article after τούτῳ unnecessary: cf. infra 337 E τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος. There is some contempt in τούτῳ=ίστι (see note on Apol. 45 A), and much scorn in τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, repeated slowly at the end of the clause.

15. ὅρθριος: the mss have ὅρθριον by mistake. The adjectival construction of this word is found in Laws XII 961 B δεῖν δὲ ὅρθριον εἶναι τὸν σύλλογον.

20. γιγνώσκεις. The present is regularly used of being acquainted with a person: e.g. Phaedo 60 A Ξανθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ: Theaet. 144 C ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτὸν. γιγνώσκω. In Plato the perfect is generally used of knowing things: e.g. Apol. 23 B ὁστὶς—ἔγνωκεν ὧτι κτλ., Euthyphr. 2 C τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἔγνωκέναι.

οὔτε διελεξαί οὐδεπώποτε, sc. αὐτῷ: cf. on 313 A line 9 above.

22. ὃ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν is wrongly rejected by Cobet.
The words are to be taken closely with τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὁ τί ποῦ ἐστὶν φαίνει ἀγνοεῖν: that Hippocrates should entrust himself to that of which he knows nothing is the climax of Socrates’ rebuke.

23. έστιν προταγόρας. sc. είναι, i.e. be true (not ἐμὲ ἁγνοεῖν, which is doubtful Greek for ἔστιν ἁγνοεῖν). The subject is simply ‘it’, as in Rep. 1 333 C where έστιν is similarly for έστιν είναι.

25. τυχαίον ὁν—ψυχὴ τρέφεται. τυχαίον ὁν is virtually equivalent to ‘really is’: cf. Gorg. 468 D οἷόμενος ἀμενον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυχαίον ὁν δὲ ὁν κάκιον, and note on Euthyphr. 4 E. The έμπορὸς is a travelling merchant who trades on a larger scale than the retail dealer or κατηγορ: see Rep. II 371 D ὁ οὐ κατηγοροι καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὁνὴν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακοῦντας ἑδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορῇ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τάς πόλεις έμπόροις; The same account of the Sophist as έμπορός τοις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα (Soph. 231 E) is given in Soph. 223 C—224 E.

26. φαίνεται γὰρ ἐστὶν τοιοῦτος τὸς. We follow Schleiermacher in giving these words to Socrates. Turner judiciously points out that γε in ἐστὶν is only appropriate if Socrates speaks the words, and that Hippocrates could hardly assent till he knew what τροφὴ ψυχῆς meant.

28. έποιεὶς γε μὴ—ποιαοῖν αὐτῷ έκατατηρήσει. ποιεῖν is ‘to have on sale’: ‘to sell’ is ἀποδίδοσθαι. Cobet, Novae Lectiones p. 159. For ἐκατατηρήσει the MSS have ἐκατατηρήσῃ, but the 1st aor. conj. is very doubtful in Plato after ἐποιεῖς μὴ (see on the whole question Kühner’s Griechische Grammatik II p. 899), and final -η and -ει are frequently confused in the MSS.

30. ὁ έμπορός τε καὶ κατηγορ. έμπορός τε καὶ κατηγορ together 313 D is a plural, and according to strict logic would require a plural when ὁ is written by attraction instead of the grammatically won gen. Compare Symp. 186 C ὁ διαγεινόμενοι—τὸν καλὸν public bu. ἐρωτα: infra 355 E τὰ ὄνοματα—τὸ ἥν τε καὶ which were under great stress c (ὁρθότης ὄνομα ἐπιστήμων. τυχάνεις has sunk to a mere 313 E Charm. 163 D, necessary to insert ὁν after ἐπιστήμων, although only taught in Plato’s Socrates had only ὁ τοῦ τυχάνει ἀναζήσει καὶ pupil of Prodicus, e.g. ίνεὶ ἥμων ἐκαστὸς οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ Prodicus wrote eulogies of ν τυχάνει τὸ γράψαι εὐαντῶν: ibid. substance, if not the actual In these cases (as here in the
Protagoras) it is easy to suppose that the participle has fallen out from ‘lipography’: but in Hipp. Maior (perhaps pseudo-Platonic) 300 Λ and in Laws XI 918 c and Timaeus 61 c the participle cannot be so easily supplied: and that the construction without the participle was used in every-day speech appears from Ar. Eccl. 1141 καὶ τῶν θεατῶν εἰ τις εὐνοὺς τυγχάνει. See Rutherford’s New Phrynichus p. 342.

45. περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. τὰ φιλτάτα is used here of the soul’s health as in Gorg. 513 Α σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἴρεσις ἢ μᾶς ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει.

46. κυβεύσῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύης. Cobet rejects τε καὶ κινδυνεύη, but Plato often puts metaphor and interpretation side by side. Compare infra 314 B ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα (where Deuschle wrongly rejected καὶ μαθόντα): 334 δ’ συντεμένε μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ. Euthyd. 297 c πολὺ γάρ ποῦ εἰμὶ φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέως, ὅσ οὐχ ὅσ τε ἦν τῇ τε ὑδρᾷ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφοτρα οὐδε καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφιάν ἀνιελήθη, εἰ μιᾶν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμήθη καὶ βάρος καὶ ἀνάκων κτλ.: Lach. 194 c χειμαζόμενοι ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν: Theaet. 174 c εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πάσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων. See also note on τῶν τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστασις διαφθείροντας in Euthyphr. 3 c.

49. παρὰ τοῦ κατηλοῦν καὶ ἐμπόρον: so B. The κατηλοῦς is put in the foreground as the most usual seller of σίτια and ποτά: the article is expressed only once, because the κατηλοῦς and ἐμπόρος both belong to the same genus ‘merchants’: cf. Hdt. IV 71 τῶν οἰνοχῶν καὶ μάγευρον καὶ ἱπποκόμον καὶ δηκομον καὶ ἀγγελητῆς κτλ. There is no sufficient ground for bracketing the wjectival τοῦ κατηλοῦν καὶ ἐμπόρον as is done by Schanz, nor for τοῦ (with T) and omitting κατηλοῦν καὶ ἐμπόρον, as He:

ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις: i.e. other than our own bοροf being ac-
ti οἴνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταιφόρον ἀκούστη, γινω- be implied that the body is itself an ἀγγείον (τε is αὐτῶν. γιγ. the notion is not unplatonic, and kindred erof knowing things: later philosophy, e.g. Marcus Aurel. x 38 athyrph. 2 c τοσοῦτον καὶ τὰ ὀργάνα ταύτα τὰ περιπεπέλασμένα 1

56. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα κρ.: cf. on 313 A line 9 eis) as in Rep. VII 517 a εἰ πῶς ἐν τῷ 243 c ταύτων τούτω πάθος εἰληφός is wrongly rejected by Cobet.
which is explanatory of ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα, see note on κυβεὺς τε καὶ κυνδυνεύῃς.

59. νέοι ὦστε τοσοῦτον. Heindorf quotes Eur. Andr. 80 γέρων ἐκεῖνος ὦστε σ’ ωφελεῖν παρὰν, and points out that whereas νεώτεροι ἦ ὦστε would deny altogether ἢ τοῦ διελέσθαι δύναμις: the words νέοι ὦστε are less strong "nobis nonnisi iuvenilis quaedam facultas suppetit ad tantam rem diiudicandam". The best mss of Plato read ταύτων, τοιοῦτον, τοσοῦτον, etc. in the great majority of cases rather than ταύτο etc. Schanz (Preface to Laws, p. vi) thinks it probable that Plato always used the forms in -ν. In inscriptions of Plato’s time τὸ αὐτό and τὸ αὐτὸν occur side by side, but apparently only τοιοῦτον, τοσοῦτον. See Meisterhans Grammatik der Griechischen Inschriften 2 p. 122.

63. Ἰππίας. Hippias of Elis was one of the most accomplished and—if we may trust the Platonic writings—ostentatious of the Sophists. According to the Hippias Maior (285 B foll.) he claimed to be at home in all the learning of the day—in Astronomy, Geometry, Arithmetic, Philology, Music, Mythology, History and Archaeology. See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen 1 p. 956 foll.

64. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον. Contrast Crat. 402 B 314 C οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσιόδος. Either construction is admissible. Prodicus of Ceos is repeatedly mentioned in the Platonic writings. A fellow-citizen of the poet Simonides (infra 339 E), he professed like Gorgias and Hippias to educate young men (Apol. 19 E, Theages 127 E, Rep. x 600 C) and received very large sums in return for his instruction together with the gratitude of his pupils. On one occasion, when in charge of a political mission from Ceos, he is said to have won great reputation in the βουλή at Athens for his conduct of public business, and to have given at the same time private lectures, which were popular and well paid (Hipp. Maior 282 C). He laid great stress on the importance of using words in their correct sense (ὑπόθεσις ὄνομάτων): see infra 337 A, 358 A, and Euthyd. 277 E, Charm. 163 D, Lach. 197 D; cf. also Phaedr. 267 B; but this was only taught (we are told) in his 50 drachma lecture; the impecunious Socrates had only paid one drachma and was not quite master of this subject (Crat. 384 B). Socrates is fond of professing himself a pupil of Prodicus, e.g. infra 341 A, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D. Prodicus wrote eulogies of Heracles and others (Symp. 177 B): the substance, if not the actual words, of his Apologue of Heracles at
the cross-roads is given by Xenophon Mem. II 1. 21. A scholiast on Rep. x 600 c says the Athenians put him to death by hemlock for corrupting the youth, but there is no other authority for this unlikely story. Compare Zeller 1\textsuperscript{4} p. 952 foll.

CHAPTER VI.

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed together to Callias' house.

1. δόξαν ἶμιν ταῦτα. This idiom seems not to occur elsewhere in Plato. We can hardly supply ποιεῖν: rather δόξαν ταῦτα is like δόξαντα ταῦτα, an accusative absolute, the singular verb being kept as in ἐδοξῶ ταῦτα. See Goodwin’s Moods and Tenses (new Edition) p. 339 § 854.

2. προθύρῳ. The rooms of a Greek house opened on the cloisters surrounding the αὐλή or court: from the αὐλή a passage (θυρωπεῖον, so called because the porter’s lodge was situated in it) led into the πρόθυρον or space in front of the main door (ἀυλείον θύρα or αὐλεία without θύρα). Blümner, Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 147 ff.

ἐπιστάντες διελεγόμεθα. The situation recalls Symp. 175 A foll., where Socrates, on his way to Agathon’s house, is discovered standing wrapt in thought in front of a neighbouring house.

5. οὖτως ἐσιόμεν. οὖτως with the apodosis after participles is extremely common in Plato: see above on 310 D.

6. στάντες. For the dropping of the preposition after ἐπιστάντες see on 311 A. The Bodleian has ἑστάντες, but T στάντες: Schanz reads ἐπιστάντες, Cobet ἑστάντες. Tr. ‘we came to a stand and conversed’.

7. δοκεῖ ὁμιλ. Compare Phaedo 108 D ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς—τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου ὁ ὤκ ἔξαρκει: the construction is fairly common in Plato: see on Crito 43 D. To have a eunuch for porter was rare, and a mark of wealth: they were supposed to be more trustworthy than others and fetched a higher price in the East (Hdt. VIII 105).

8. κινδυνεύει—ἀχθεοθαλ. Present, because the dialogue is narrated just after it took place (see 309 b), and as Protagoras is still with Callias, the stream of visitors probably continues. It is not quite clear why the number of the sophists should have made the porter annoyed with the visitors: unless the visitors themselves were sophists. Probably therefore τοῖς φοιτῶσιν means τοῖς φοιτῶσιν
σοφισταῖς: in the porter's judgment the house was already too full of sophists. φοιτῶν implies frequent visitation: cf. Lach. 181 C χρήν μὲν ὄνων καὶ πρότερον σὲ φοιτῶν αὐτὸν παρύματος καὶ οἰκεῖος ἥγεσθαι.

10. ἐκρούσαμεν τῇν θύραν. There was a metal knocker (βότ-τρων, κόραξ, ἐπισπαστρον) on the αὐθεῖος θύρα. Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 149.

11. οὐ σχολή αὐτῷ. For αὐτῷ 'the master' cf. infra 315 B, Rep. I 327 B ἱρήμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη, and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἐφα 'ipse dixit'.

12. ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν. So B: T has ταίν for τοῖν. Cobet has shewn that the dual feminine of the article is the same as the dual masculine: Variae Lectiones p. 70.

13. ἐκροούμεν, but ἐκρούσαμεν in line 10. Socrates pretends to be somewhat staggered by the rebuff.


15. ἀνθρωπος. According to Ast, the Greeks sometimes used 314 E ἄνηρ and ἀνθρωπος without the article of a definite person "sed ut vel contemplationem vel reprehensionem aliquam simul indicarent". But in the cases quoted in support of this usage the word is in an oblique case, the meaning is quite general like the English 'a man', e.g. Rep. X 595 C δεινὸν τινὰ λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἄνδρα: Phaedo 98 B ὅρω ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Soph. Phil. 1228 ἀπάταισιν αἰσχραί ἄνδρα καὶ δόλως ἐλών: Theaet. 155 D ἐὰν σοι ἄνδρος, μᾶλλον δὲ ἄνδρῶν ὄνομαστῶν τῆς διανολὰς τὴν ἄλθειαν—συνεξερευνήσωμαι: it is therefore safer to suppose (with Schanz and most Platonic scholars) that where ἄνηρ and ἀνθρωπος of the mss can only be translated by 'the man', the rough breathing should be restored: e.g. infra 315 E and Phaedr. 267 A, 268 C: Rep. I 331 E.

21. προστῷ. The αὐθή was surrounded by cloisters. This προστῷον is doubtless that on which the passage from the πρόθυρον opened.

23. Πάραλος—Ἀντίμοιρος. The mother ofXanthippus and Paralus had once been the wife of Hipponicus, to whom she bare Callias: Plut. Pericel. XXIV 9. In 320 A as well as in Meno 94 B Plato remarks that Pericles was unable to teach the art of statesmanship to either of his two sons: cf. Alc. I 118 E τῶ—Περικλέους νῦν ἡμιθιω ἐγενέσθην. They both died of the plague. One of
the most interesting fragments of Protagoras describes the fortitude of Pericles when his sons died: see Appendix II. p. 203, Frag. 3. Charmides, son of the elder Glaucon, was Plato’s maternal uncle: the dialogue Charmides is named after him. He was φιλόσοφος τε καὶ πάνυ ποιητικὸς (Charm. 155 A), and as remarkable for σωφροσύνη as for personal beauty (ibid. 157 D). He was afterwards one of the Ten, and fell along with Critias at the battle of Munychia in 404 B.C. (Xen. Hell. II 4. 19). Of Philippides and his father Philomelus and Antimoerus of Mende (on the west coast of the peninsula Pallene) nothing further is known.

29. τούτων—ἐφαίνοντο. B and T omit ὁ, which was inserted by Stephanus: Heindorf prefers to insert ὄν after λεγομένων. The MSS reading could only be defended if ἐφαίνοντο could be regarded as parenthetical=ὡς ἐφαίνοντο, like δοκεῖ μοι=ὡς δοκεῖ μοι (see on 314 C above), but there seems to be no authority for such a use of φαίνομαι. It is hardly to be supposed that in ἐπακοὼντες and ἐπῆκου (in B below) there is an allusion to an outer circle of Protagorean students, deemed unworthy of the subtlest teaching of the master, in spite of Theaet. 152 C, where Socrates is hardly serious.

31. ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων. The plural is used as in Theaet. 157 C παρατηθημὶ ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεφασθαί and Rep. X 601 Λ χρώματι ἀττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν.

315 B 34. Χοροῦ. The tragic chorus consisted of 15 χορευταλ, arranged in 3 rows (στοιχοι) of 5 each, the leader (κορυφαῖος) being in the middle of the first. So here Protagoras occupies the middle of a row of 7. With the metaphor cf. Theaet. 173 B τοῦς—τοῦ ἡμέτερου χοροῦ and ibid. C λέγωμεν δη—περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων: Phaedr. 246 E foll.

35. ηὐλαβόντο. The MSS have ἐνυλαβόντο, but in the classic period ἐν- (and εἰ-) were always augmented in the past tenses, while after 300 B.C. ἡ- does not appear on inscriptions. See Meisterhans Gr. der Att. Inschr.2 p. 136.

CHAPTER VII.

The scene in the house of Callias is further described.

1. τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενήσα, ἔφη Ὁμήρος. Homer Od. xi 601 τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενήσα βιν ό Πρακλητίν. The reference is not to be pressed beyond the words quoted: for there is no special likeness
between Homer’s Heracles (δεινόν παπταίνων, αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἐςικώς 608) and Plato’s Hippias, whose situation as here described is more like that of Minos in Homer ibid. 569 foll. χρύσεων σκῆπτρον ἔχουσα θεματεύοντα νέκυσιν, ἢμενον· οἱ δὲ μὲν ἄμφι δίκαι εἴροντο ἀνακτα ἢμενοι ἑστάτης τε κατ’ εὐρυπολές Ἀἰδὸς δό. With ἔφη Ὀμηρος (‘as Homer said’) cf. Meno 76 D σώνες δ’ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος.

3. ἐν θρόνῳ—ἐπὶ βάθρων. Hippias is depicted as a school- master among his pupils.

4. Ἐρυξίμαχος τε—Ἀνδρών ὁ Ἀνδροτέλων. Eryximachus and his father Acumenus were doctors. The former delivers one of the speeches in the Symposium, defining his art as ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονήν καὶ κένωσιν (Symp. 186 c). Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, of the deme of Μυρψαιοῦς in the tribe Πανδιόνιος, also appears in the Symposium, and gives his name to the dialogue Phaedrus. Andron, son of Androtion (so T here, and both B and T in Gorg. 487 c—the Ἀριστίωνος of B is therefore a mistake) is in the Gorgias described as one of those who shared the view of Callicles, that too much φιλοσοφία ruined men. His son is believed to have been the orator Androtion.

7. περὶ φύσεως. The primary substance which early Greek philosophy sought to discover was called by them φύσις: see Aristotle Met. IV 4 p. 1014b 32 foll. τούτων γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν φύσεω ἐντων τὰ στοιχεῖα φασιν εἶναι φύσιν, οἴ μὲν πῦρ, οἴ δὲ γῆ, οἴ δ’ ἀέρα, οἴ δ’ ὕδωρ, οἴ δ’ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον λέγοντες, οἴ δ’ ἐνια τούτων, οἴ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα. Thus (among others) Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles called their books περὶ φύσεως, i.e. on the substance which gives birth (φυεί) to all else. By Plato’s time the word had acquired a wider meaning equivalent to ‘de rerum natura’, our ‘Nature’, and it is in this sense that the word is here used.

8. ἀστρονομικά ἀττα. Schanz brackets ἀστρονομικά, but the word is meant to be taken rather with μετεώρων than with φύσεως. On Hippias’ skill in astronomy compare Hipp. Minor 367 E ἦ (sc. ἀστρονομικῆς) ἀδ σὺ τέχνης ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἰεί εἶναι ἣ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

10. Τάνταλον γε. Od. XI 582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσείδον κρατέρ’ ἀλγε’ ἔχοντα. Prodicus is compared to Tantalus because of his physical wretchedness: see Crat. 395 E καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἰκεν ὡσπερ ἄν εἶ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον ὄνομάσαι, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὄνομάσει καὶ εἴποι ἀντ’ ἐκείνου Τάνταλον· τοιοῦτον τι καὶ τοῦτῳ τὸ ὄνομα οἰκεν ἐκπορίσαι ἢ τύχῃ τῆς φήμης.
II. ἐπιδημεῖν γὰρ ἄρα. Heindorf's correction ἐπιδημεῖν for ἐπι-
δήμειν seems to be necessary, as Prodicus is still in Athens. Just so the presentational tenses are used in 314 D κυνδυνεῖι δὲ—ἀχθεσθαί and infra line 15 κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. If the clause is taken as a parenthetical clause of explanation, there is nothing harsh in the construction: ἢν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματὶ τω ἄρα naturally enough follows on εἰσειδον. For γὰρ ἄρα (a somewhat rare combination) Heindorf quotes Rep. IV 438 λάπαιν γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, Symp. 205 A ἀφελὼντες γὰρ ἄρα (so T: B has only γάρ) τοῦ ἐρωτός τι εἴδος ὀνομάζομεν, Laws III 698 D συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγη-
νεύσασιν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑρετρικὴν. γὰρ ἄρα always introduces something supposed to be known to the person addressed: see 314 B οἴμαι δὲ καλ Ἱπόδικον τῶν Κείον.

18. Παυσανίας is known from the Symposium 180 c foll. The deme Κεραιῆς was in the tribe Ακαμάντις. ὑμεῖς ἐγὼμαι is to be taken closely with καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν.

20. τὴν δ' οὖν ἱδεῖν πάνυ καλὸς. Compare Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλῶν (i.e. Ἀγάθωνα) ἦν. There is no reading for finding καλῶν for καλός with Stephanus: cf. Lach. 180 Ε τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε—διαλεγόμενοι.

22. Ἀγάθωνα. It is at the poet Agathon's house that the scene of the Symposium is laid. From his speech in that dialogue 194 D foll. we should infer that he had studied under Prodicus to some purpose. Born about 447 B.C., Agathon was first successful on the tragic stage at an early age: cf. Symp. 175 E ἢ δὲ σῇ (sc. Ἀγάθωνος σοφία) λαμπρά τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχοσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος ὀνύν σφόδρα ἐξελαμψε καὶ ἐκφανὴς ἐγένετο πρώην ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρλοῖς. He visited the court of Archelaus about 407 B.C. and died probably about 400. That he was held in esteem by the Athenians appears from Ar. Frogs 83 foll. Ἀγάθων δὲ ποῦ 'σθ' ὑμῖν ἀγάθως ποιήσῃ καὶ ποθευόσ τοῖς φίλοις. For παιδικά Παυσανίου compare Symp. 193 B.

23. τοῦτ' ἢν τὸ μειράκιον. So BT: the idiom is like our 'There was this young man'. The nearest parallels seem to be Phaedo 59 B ἢν δὲ καὶ Κτίστιππος ὁ Παυσανίου and Rep. Χ 615 D ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ιδιωταί τινες. τοῦτο τε δὴ (Ast), τοῦτο τ' οὖν (Heindorf), τοῦτ' ἐνδον ἦν (Schirlitz), have been suggested, while Kroschel rejects the words, but the text is probably sound.

τὸ Ἀδειμάντων. Adimantus son of Cepis is not elsewhere
named. The son of Leucolophidas was afterwards στρατηγός under Alcibiades, whose policy he supported (Xen. Hell. 14. 21): he was taken prisoner at the battle of Aegospotami, but spared by the Spartans. He was afterwards put on his trial by Conon on the charge, not improbably a true one, of having betrayed the Athenian fleet at this battle: see Kock on Ar. Frogs 1512.

27. πάσοσσοφος—άνήρ—καλ θείος. For άνήρ BT read άνήρ, but see on 314 E above. πάσοσσοφος is often ironical: e.g. Euthyd. 271 C ὅ δὲ σὺ ἔρωτας τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῶν, θαυμασία, ὥς Κρίτων: πάσοσσοφοι ἄτεχνος τῶ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅ τι ἔλεν οἱ παγκρατιασταῖ. For the meaning of θείος cf. Meno 99 C οὐκοῦν—ἀξίων τούτοις θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἀνδρας, οὔτως νοῶν μὴ ἔχουσε πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσι τῶν πράττονσι καὶ λέγουσι; θείος (in the form σείος) was the favourite Spartan word of praise and was much affected by the Socratic circle in Athens.

CHAPTER VIII.

After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter enlarges upon the antiquity of his profession. At the suggestion of Socrates a circle is formed to hear the Sophists discourse.

4. Κρίτιας the foremost of the Thirty so-called tyrants was related to Plato on the mother’s side: Perictione Plato’s mother being granddaughter of the elder Critias, who was father of Callaerchus. He is one of the dramatis personae in the Charmides and Timaeus, and the dialogue Critias is named after him. A Scholiast on the Timaeus 20 A (quoted by Stallbaum) describes him as γενναίας καὶ άθρας φύσεως, ἡπτετο ὑπ' καὶ φιλοσόφων συννοικίων, καὶ ἕκαλείτο ἴδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος ὑπ' ἴδιώτας. For the fragments of his poems see Bergk’s Poetae Lyrici Graeci 411 p. 279 foll.

5. ἐτὶ σμικρ’ ἀττα—διαθεσάμενοι. σμικρ’ ἀττα is the plural of σμικρὸν τι, and as ἐτὶ σμικρὸν τι διατρήφαντες would mean ‘after a little further delay’, so ἐτὶ σμικρ’ ἀττα διατρήφαντες means after ‘some little further delays’. The reference in ἐτὶ is to 314 C. ταύτα in καὶ ταύτα refers to the causes of the delays, which were, as usual, some topics of discourse: its antecedent is involved in διατρήφαντες.

8. πρὸς σέ τοι ἥλθομεν. Here, as in 314 E, both B and T have τι for τοι: but τι is impossible here, and this use of τοι is very frequent in address: Heindorf refers (inter alia) to Ar. Plut. 1100 σέ τοι σέ τοι λέγω, Καρίων, ἀνάμενον.
17. οἴεται οἱ μᾶλιστα, αὐν γενέσθαι. B and T read μᾶλιστα without αὐν: see on Crito 51 Ε. It is more likely that αὐν should have dropped out after μᾶλιστα here than that Plato’s usage should have varied with οἴομαι and the aorist infinitive referring to the future: cf. infra 353 B ἣ οἴμαι αὐν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, where αὐν is in all the mss.

19. μόνος οἱε δεῖν—πρὸς μόνους. οἱε δεῖν is virtually like one verb, δεῖος or the like: it therefore takes the nom. (not the acc.) with inf.; cf. Demosth. Fals. Λ. 235 εὐθὺς ἡγούμην ἐν τούτοις—αὐτὸς περείων δεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλοφυχότερος φανερῶς, quoted by Stallbaum on Crito 50 Ε. Note that Protagoras here uses the more precise μόνος πρὸς μόνους, but above only μόνῳ (316 Β)—unless (with Cobet and Schanz) we insert μόνοι before μόνῳ.

21. ξένον γὰρ ἀνδρα καλ ὄντα κτλ. For καὶ ὄντα Τ reads in the margin κατόντα: Liebhold suggests καταλόντα. ὄντα however is parallel to ξένον and to πείθουντα ‘a man who is a stranger and goes—and tries to persuade etc.’ The whole passage recalls Apol. 19 Ε—20 Α τούτων (viz. Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias) γὰρ ἑκαστός—οὗς τ’ ἐστιν ἵνα εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους οἰς ἐξετάτων ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προκέειν ἵνα βούλωσιν—τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἑκέλευθον ἑξουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφισιν ἑυνεῖν χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσείδοναι. Notice throughout the longwinded character of Protagoras’ speeches: cf. Philostrat. Vit. Soph. 1 494 (quoted by Kroschel on 320 c), γνώσις δὲ τῶν Πρωταγόραν ὁ Πλάτων σεμνῶς μὲν ἐρμηνεύοντα, υπτιάζοντα δὲ τῇ σεμνότητι καὶ τοῦ καὶ μακρολογώτερον τοῦ συμμέτρου τὴν ἱδέαν αὐτοῦ μόνῳ μακρῷ ἐχαρακτήρῳ.

316 C 31. τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς αὐτῆς. ἐπαχθεῖς like φορτικόν means what hearers will resent (think a burden or αἴθος) as in bad-taste because presumptuous: cf. Demosth. de Pace 4 τὸ λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶς εἰπέ τις καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ—οὕτως ἡγούμαι φορτικὸν καὶ ἐπαχθεῖς ὄστε κτλ.

32. τοὺς μὲν ποιῆσαι. σοφός and its derivatives are often used especially in early writers in connexion with poetry, e.g. Theognis 19—20 Κύριε σοφιζόμενῳ μὲν ἔμοι σφηγής ἐπικείαθα τοῖσοδ’ ἔπεισαν, Pindar Isthm. 4. 29—30 μελετάν δὲ σοφιστάς Διὸς ἔκατε πρόσβαλον σεβιζόμενοι.

34. τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὥρφεα καὶ Μουσαίον = ‘Orpheus and Musaeus and their schools’. The Editors quote Ar. Frogs 1032 foll. Ὅρφεις μὲν γὰρ τελετᾶς θ’ ἦμων κατέδειξε φῶνων τ’ ἀπέχεσθαι, Μουσαίος δ’
36. Ἦκκος—Ἡρόδικος. Iccus is mentioned in Laws viii 839 ε foll. as a model of temperance. According to Pausanias, he was won in the pentathlon at the Olympic games and afterwards set up as a trainer (γυμναστής). Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace combined the professions of the γυμναστής and λατρός (μίξας γυμναστικήν λατρικήν). He is described in Rep. i 406 ε as the inventor of the παιδαγωγική τῶν νοσημάτων λατρική—by means of which he tortured first himself (by prolonging his own dying) and afterwards others: δυσθανατών—υπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο (ibid. B).

οὐ νῦν ἔτι ὃν—σοφιστής. Heindorf reads ἦττον in place of ἦττων, but νῦν ἔτι ὃν is ‘still living’, and οὔδεν ήττων σοφιστῆς is a descriptive qualification.

39. Ἀγαθοκλῆς—Πυθοκλείδης. Agathocles is mentioned in 316 ε Lach. 180 δ as teacher of Damon: according to the Alc. i 118 ε Pythochiles also taught Pericles. A Scholiast on the Alc. i (I. c.) remarks: Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδασκάλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὗ μαθητής Ἀγαθοκλῆς, οὗ Λαμπροκλῆς (Δάμπρος, van Prinsterer), οὗ Δάμων. With the sentiment compare the imitation in Plut. Pericl. 4. 2 ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὧν σοφιστῆς καταδύσεθα μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὑνομα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δευτέρα.

42. ταῖς τέχναις ταῦταις παραπετασμασίν ἔχρησαντο. Compare Plut. Pericl. 1. c. οὗ μὴν ἔλαβεν ὁ Δάμων τὴν λύρα παρακαλὸμενοὶ τιμαί χρώμενοι.

43. κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι. εἶναι is tautological as in Isaeus peri τοῦ 317 Α Μενεκλέους κλήρου 32 ἡμεῖς ὄμοσαμεν εὐ ποιεῖν ἄλληλους—κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, and in the common ἐκῶν εἶναι: but no other instance of the precise phrase κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι is quoted.

47. οὐ γε πολλοὶ—οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται. Compare Gorg. 474 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἐνα ἐπιυψηλῶν ἐπίσταμαι, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. For ὃς ἐπος εἰπεύν (to be taken with οὐδὲν) see on Apol. 17 Α. The phrase is used to qualify the comprehension of a word or phrase, generally οὐδεὶς or πάντες.

49. τὸ οὖν—ἐπιχαρήματος. B and T read τὸν for τὸ, by a natural error. Heindorf compares Theaet. 144 Α τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ δινα
NOTES ON VIII 317 A

—πρᾶυν αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως—ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁμοίως γενέσθαι κτλ. and Rep. I 331 B τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἀκούτα τινα ἐξαπατήσαι—μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως συμβάλλεται. Here καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρή-

54. τοῦτων τῇ ἐναντίαν ἀπασαν ὅδον. “h. e. τὴν ὄδον ἢ ἀπασά ἐστιν ἐναντία τοῦτων. πρὸ τοῦτων εαμὲν εις γενεατίαν καὶ ἐραθομένας ἀνθρώπους. The σοφιστής σοφίζει, i.e. παίδευει: see note on 312 C above. Thenæt. 167 C (where Socrates is speaking for Protagoras) ὁ σοφιστής τοὺς παιδευμένους ὤντων δινάμενοι παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν.

59. σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν. “Crebra modestiae formula, bene explicat Steph., quod ita dico, ut in eo opem divinitam agnoscam”. Heindorf on Theæt. 151 B καὶ σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνω ἰκὼν τοπάζω ὅσι ὃν συγγενήμερον ὄντω στρέφειν διοίκησιν.

317 C 61. πολλά γε ἡτὶ ἦδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. Meno 91 E οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (i.e. Ἰωσαφάραν) ἀποθανεῖν ἑγώσι καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἡτὶ γεγο-

62. οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὔ. For the ἀσυνδέτων Heindorf compares Hom. Od. xiv 96 ἢ γὰρ οἱ ἵω ἢ ἦν ἀσπετοῖς οὖ τιν τὸσον ἀνδρῶν ἡμῶν. The nearest parallel to πάντων (which Cobet rejects) after οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ seems to be in Dem. Adv. Lept. § 3 οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ότου τούτῳ οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων (quoted by Heindorf).

64. ἀπάντων goes with τῶν ἐνδον δυντῶν. It seems better to take περὶ τοῦτων with βούλεσθε than with τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι: otherwise it is hardly possible to separate τοῦτων from ἀπάντων.
67. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι—ὅτι ἑρασταί. ὁτι depends rather on ἐνδείξασθαι than on καλλωπίσασθαι: compare infra 327 Α ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέτρεπτε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, and ibid. B τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὖν ἂν ἄποκρύπτεται ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων, Phaedo 94 D τὰ μὲν ἄπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νοθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. See also notes on 327 Α and 335 Ε below.

68. εἴμεν. BT read εἶήμεν, but in Plato's time the short form of the optative plural is regular: see on Apol. 22 E.

τὶ οὖν—οὐ—ἐκαλέσαμεν. See above on 310 Α; and for ἐπακούσωσιν note on 315 Α.

72. καθεξόμενοι. So T: B has καθιζόμενοι, but presently in 317 D 317 Ε both MSS read συνεκαθεξόμενα.

74. καὶ αὐτὸλ ἀντιλαβόμενοι. This passage is difficult and different views are possible as to the construction and meaning. The MSS read καὶ αὐτὸλ τε. If the MSS reading is retained, τε must be regarded as answering to δὲ in ἐν δὲ τοῦτῳ (cf. Euthyphr. 3 E), and καὶ αὐτὸλ = etiam ipsi, i.e. even without waiting for servants—a harsh explanation both for καὶ and αὐτὸλ. If τε is left out (with most of the editors, following Heindorf), καὶ αὐτὸλ means ‘ourselves also’ as opposed to Callias and Alcibiades in ἐν δὲ τοῦτῳ Καλλιάσ τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης. There is still a slight difficulty in contrasting αὐτὸλ with these two, because they also would seem to be included in αὐτὸλ (πάντες ἡμεῖς—καὶ αὐτὸλ), but such slight inaccuracies of expression are common in actual dialogue, which Plato’s style is intended to imitate.

77. Καλλιάς. Hermann read Κριλας in order to escape the slight difficulty remarked on in the preceding note: “sed hospitis erat Prodicum ut accederet invitare”. Kroschel.

78. ἀναστήσαντες: but ἄγοντε just before. Euthyd. 273 B offers an exact parallel (if we follow the reading of the Bodleian MS) Ιδόντες δὲ αὐτόν ὃ τε Διονυσίδωρος καὶ ὁ Ευθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντες διελεγέσθην ἄλληλον, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς: cf. ibid. 273 Α εἰςεδόθηνες—παρεπατήτων and D ἐγελασάτην γοῦν ἀμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἄλληλους. The dual in Plato as in Greek generally is apt to sink into the plural.
Protagoras explains his profession. It is to teach civil virtue and make men good citizens.

8. γάρ used like Latin enim to introduce a speech (introduction γάρ): see on Apol. 20 ε.

9. ó τί—ἀποβῆσεται—πυθέσθαι. For the situation compare Gorg. 455 C—D where Socrates says ἵσως γάρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τίνας σχεδὸν καὶ συνχοῦσαι αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἵσως αἰσχύνοντ' ἂν σε ἀνεφέσθαι· ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισαν καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· τι ἡμῖν, ὥ Γοργία, ἔσται, εάν σοι συννάμεν; ἐπεὶ τίνων τῇ τὸλει συμβουλεῖν οἶοι τε ἐσόμεθα;

14. ἐν τῇ ὑστεραλὰ ταύτα ταύτα: sc. ἐσται σοι. ἐν (bracketed by Schanz after Hirschig) before τῇ ὑστεραλὰ means ‘during’: cf. (with Kroschel) Thuc. 1 44. 1 τῇ μὲν προτέρα οὐχ ἤσοσιν—ἀπεδεξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραλὰ μετέγνωσαν κτλ. and add infra 321 C ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆ, ἐν ἢ ἔδει καὶ ἀνθρωπὸν ἔξεναι ἐκ γῆς.

19. ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος. τυγχάνοις (suggested by Bekker) would be the usual periodic structure: but the indicative is looser and more direct: Kroschel compares Gorg. 464 D el δέοι—diagwvìζεσθαι—πότερος ἐπάλει. Notice the usual Socratic implication that virtue is knowledge.

20. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως. Cf. Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως and infra 331 C. So μὴ γάρ, μὴ σὺ γε, μὴ τοι γε and the like are often used without a verb expressed. ὡσπερ ἂν belongs to εἴποι ἂν in lines 28 and 32: it is answered by οὕτω δὴ in line 33. αὐτίκα here does not mean ‘for example’ but goes with μάλα (which intensifies it): ‘as if Hippocrates were to change his desire on the spot and conceive a desire (ἐπιθυμήσειν) for etc.’ αὐτίκα μάλα is idiomatic, cf. Gorg. 469 D αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάιν, Crat. 384 B αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι.

22. νῦν νεωστί: nunc nuper as in Meno 90 A. The more general word is followed by the more specific exactly as in Theaet. 161 C βατράχου γυρίνω where γυρῖνος according to a Scholiast is τὸ ἐκ τοῦ βατράχου παιδιόν.

23. Ζευξίππου. An obscure sculptor (not painter) of this name is mentioned in Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 1229 (quoted by Overbeck, Die Antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste.
bei den Griechen p. 300). The Zeuxippus here mentioned is supposed to be the same as the famous painter Zeuxis of Heraclea (the Greek colony in Italy, most probably) who is mentioned by Plato in Gorg. 453 c, and several times by Xenophon (Mem. 1 4. 3, Occon. 10. 1, Symp. 4. 63 τὸν Ἡράκλεωτην ξένον): see Overbeck, l.c. p. 311 foll. Zeuxis began to rise into fame probably about 424 B.C.: he would therefore be still a young man about the date when this dialogue is supposed to take place: see Introd. p. xxxvi. Brunn would read Zeuxidos for Zeuxιπποι here, but according to Fick (quoted by Sauppe) Zeuxις is nothing but a familiar diminutive of Zeuxιπποι: for other similar examples see Fick, Die Griechischen Personennamen p. xxviii foll. -ιπποι in proper names was aristocratic (Ar. Clouds 62 foll.) and could upon occasion be omitted or added without prejudice to personal identity: compare Clouds 929 οὐχὶ διδάξεις τοῦτον Κρόνος ὃν with ibid. 1071 σὺ δὲ κρόνιπποι, where -ιπποι adds mock dignity to κρόνος.

29. 'Ορθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ. Orthogoras is said by Athenaeus 318 C (IV 184 E) on the authority of Aristoxenus to have taught Epaminondas how to play the flute.

31. αὐτὸν but εκείνου in 30 and εκείνῳ in 32: see on 310 D. εἰς ὑ τι βελτίων is here used rather than ὑ τι or τι βελτίων (as in line 27) to prepare for εἰς αὐλησν where the preposition could hardly be dispensed with.

33. οὖτω δή. Heindorf would write οὖτω δέ, which is frequent after ὁσσερ, e.g. 328 B: see his note on Phaedo 72 C.

34. Πρωταγόρα συγγενόμενος: "gravius hoc quam σοι συγγενό- 318 D μενος" Kroschel. See also note on 335 A.

43. λωβωνται is here rather κακῶς ποιεῖν than κακῶν ποιεῖν, 318 E although (like κακουργεῖν, λαμαλομαι and the like) it unites both meanings: cf. Rep. 1 335 B foll., and see on Euthyphr. 3 A κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. With the words of Protagoras compare those of Anytus in Meno 91 c 'Ηράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὡ Σωκρατες, μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν, μήτε οἰκεῖων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστόν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτῃ μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθήναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοι γε φανερά ἐστι λ洿θη τε καὶ διαφορὰ τῶν συγγεγομένων.

τὰς γὰρ τέχνας—ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας. τεχναί is used of Arithmetic, Geometry, Solid Geometry and Harmonics in Rep. vii 532 C: elsewhere in Plato αἱ τέχναι generally means the mechanical arts, e.g. Rep. vi 495 D and vii 522 B. Here τεχναί can only mean the subjects taught in schools (γραμματική, λογιστική, κιθαριστική) as
Sauppe remarks, but there seems to be no precise parallel to such a use of the word.

47. *eis ton Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν*; see on 314 B.

49. *εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκελὼν*. The editors quote Meno 91 Α oὐτὸς γὰρ—πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με ὅτι ἐπίθυμε ταῦτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἄρετῆς ὡς οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τάς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦνται, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολιτάς καὶ ξένους ὑποδέχονται τε καὶ ἀποτέμνεται ἐξίσους ἄνδρος ἁγαθοῦ: Euthyd. 273 Ο ἄρετῆς—ὡ Σώκρατες, οἶμέθα οἷον τ' εἶναι παραδοθναι κάλλιοτ' ἄνθρω- πων καὶ τάχιστα.

319 A 54. ἄνδρας ἁγαθοὺς πολιτάς forms a single expression: ‘good citizens’ are the ἔργον of πολιτική τέχνη. So Ar. Knights 1304 ἄνδρα μαχητρόν πολιτήν.

56. ἐπαγγελμα δ ἐπαγγέλλομαι. ἐπαγγέλλομαι and its derivatives are often used of sophistic ‘professions’.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates professes to disbelieve that ἄρετῆ can be communicated by teaching. His arguments are twofold: (1) while in matters connected with the arts of building, ship-carpentry, and the like, the Athenians will listen only to the professional man, in politics they give ear to any and every one: (2) Athenian statesmen have not been able to communicate their political virtue to their sons.

2. *εἶπερ κέκτησαί*. Cobet’s rule (Mnemos. XI p. 168) “ubi praecededit vocalis, semper (Plato) κέκτημαι ponit, ubi consonans, promiscue κέκτησαί et κέκτησαι” represents the usage of the best MSS, but Schanz now writes κέκτησαι universally after consonants. See also Mnem. VIII 336. κέκτησαι is in reality an old Ionic form: it is used by Aeschylus Prom. 795 κοινῷ ὅμμι εὐκτῆμέναι.

319 B 5. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. The MSS reading ὅπως ἄν ἀπιστῶ was corrected by Heindorf, ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive being only used in final clauses. The subjunctive is deliberative: cf. Euthyphr. II B οὐκ ἔχω ἔγνω ὅπως σου εἰπῶ ὅ νοῦ.

6. οὐ διδάκτον—μηδὲ. οὐ negatives διδάκτον only, μηδὲ the whole of its clause: a similar case is Eur. Andr. 586 δράν εὖ, κακῶς δ’ οὖ, μηδ’ ἀποκτεῖνει βλά. μη after verbs of thinking and saying is tolerably common in Plato. See on Euthyphr. 6 B ὅμολογούμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι.
8. ὦσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες, sc. φασι. Compare 337 D where Hippias calls Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτῷ τὸ πρωτανείον τῆς σοφίας: a somewhat less favourable judgment is given in Laws 1 6.1 E τῆν πόλιν ἀπαντεῖ ἡμῶν Ἑλληνες ὑπολαμβάνοντες ὡς φιλόλογοι τε ἐστι καὶ πολυλογος, Λακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογαν, τὴν δὲ πολυλογίαν μᾶλλον ἡ πολυλογίαν ἀσκούσαν.

12. μετατεμπομένους is probably middle: Plato does not seem to use μεταπέμπειν in the sense of ‘send for’ (like Thucydides e.g. 1 112. 3’ Ἀμυρταίου μετατέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως: VI 52. 1 et al.). The subject is τοὺς πολίτας to be supplied from τὴν πόλιν. Compare Gorg. 455 B foll. ὅταν περὶ λατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἤ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἤ περὶ ναυτηγῆν ἤ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημοουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τί τότε ὁ ἰθιορκὸς συμβουλεύει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικότατον δεῖ αἰρεσθαι and Alc. I 107 A—C. Kroschel well remarks that the words περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων (which Hirschig wrongly rejects) are added to shew that it is only about the actual buildings that the builders are consulted, “non de necessitate, utilitate, magnitudine”, as to which the orators advise: compare Gorg. 455 D.

17. κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἤ κτλ. Imitated in Alc. I 107 B and C: 319 C εὰν τε γε σμικρός ἤ μέγας ἤ; εάν τε καλὸς ἢ αλοχρός, ἐτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής, πώς γὰρ οὐ;—ἀλλ’ ἂν τε πένης ἂν τε πλούσιος ἤ; ὁ παραινώ, οὔδεν διοίκει Ἀθηναίοις, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύνται, πώς ἂν ὑγιαλύνει, ἀλλὰ ἃτοκεῖαι λατρῶν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

20. οἱ τοξόται. The τοξόται (bowmen) or Σκύθαι (so called from their nationality) or Πευσίνοι (from one Πευσίς who according to the Schol. on Ar. Ach. 54 had the chief hand in establishing them) were the police. ἐλκω was regularly used of removing an offending orator: e.g. Ar. Knights 665 καθ’ εἶλκων αὐτῶν οἱ πρωτάνεις χοὶ τοξόται.

21. ἐξαιρωται. So T (B has ἐξέρωται): the present is perhaps due to tense-assimilation to κελεύοντων. The active αἴρεω is used in the same connexion by Ar. Eccl. 261 ἡμεῖς δὲ γ’ ἐν αἴρω’ (sc. οἱ τοξόται), ἐὰν κελεύσομεν, but no exact parallel for the use of the middle has yet been found—the nearest seems to be Eur. I. T. 1201 οὗ γὰρ ποτ’ ἂν νῦν ἡράμην βάθρων ἀπο: cf. Ar. Ach. 1140 τὴν ἀσπίδ’ αἴρου καὶ βάδις’ ὧ παῖ λαβὼν: ibid. 953.

23. περὶ τῶν τῆς πέλεως διοικήσεως. So B and T, but in both 319 D the copyist had doubts as to the text. It is usual to drop either τῶν
or διοικήσεως: Kroschel transposes τῶν and περὶ. Sauppe retains the mss reading, making περὶ govern διοικήσεως—but this is very harsh. τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως is a periphrasis for ἡ πόλεως διοικήσεις (for the omission of the article with πόλεως cf. Polit. 296 ε’ τούτων δει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινῶτατον ὅρθος πόλεως διοικήσεως, διὸ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων): ‘the city’s administration’ being contrasted with τῶν ἐν τέχνῃ διοικήσεις. The whole phrase περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως corresponds to 318 ε’ καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατῶτατος ἐν εἶ ὧν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.


29. μαθῶν. Heindorf quotes many cases of the transition from plural to singular in Plato (e.g. infra 324 Β): the change is justified here because in each case the reproach would be addressed to a single person.

31. μὴ τοῦν ὅτι—ἀλλὰ ἱδία. See on Apol. 40 Δ οἶμαι ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἱδιώτην τινα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα κτλ.

319 Ε 34. οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι. Plato comments on the inability of statesmen to teach their sons political sagacity in Meno 93 Β foll., citing Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides as cases in point. Compare Alc. I 118 Ε foll.

35. ἀ μὲν διδασκάλων εἰχετο. The phrase is used by Plato in the other passages where he deals with this topic: cf. infra 324 Δ, Meno 93 Δ and 94 Α.

320 Α 38. νεμονταῖ τῶσειν ἄφετοι. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze’, and ἄφετος is said de grege numini alicui consecrato (Heindorf): cf. Critias 119 Δ ἄφετων δντων ταῦρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδώνος λερῷ. The same expression occurs in Rep. VI 498 Β ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ στρατεύμων ἐκτὸς γλύφεται, τότε ἤδη ἄφετος νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν. Here the object of νέμεσθαι is virtually the clause εὰν ποι—τῇ ἁρέτῃ ‘going to and fro by themselves they graze like creatures set apart upon whatever excellence etc.’: cf. (for the use of εὰν) Rep. VII 528 Α φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ’ ἄν ἄλλοι εἰ τίς τι δύνατο ἄπ’ αὐτῶν διασθαί.

39. εὰν ποι αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἁρέτῃ. αὐτόματος (used as in Theaet. 180 Ε, Polit. 271 Δ δ’ ἤρον περὶ τοῦ πάντα αὐτόματα γλύφεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) agreeing with ἁρέτῃ would make the expression more pointed, and avoid the slight contradiction involved.
in the expression αὐτῶματοι περιτύχωσιν (since one cannot spontaneously fall in with a thing), but αὐτῶματος is not to be pressed, and should be understood as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου (cf. 323 c).

40. Κλεινίαν. The author of the First Alcibiades makes Alcibiades himself speak of his younger brother as μανάθμενος ἀνθρώπως (118 E).

42. μὴ διαφθαρῇ δῆ. δῆ adds a touch of irony to spare the feelings of Alcibiades.

43. καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀριφρόνος. According to Plutarch (Alcib. ch. 1) Ariphron shared with Pericles the guardianship of Alcibiades. Ariphron was Pericles' brother.

45. ἀπεδωκε τοὺς, i.e. Pericles to Alcibiades. Pericles is 320 B humourously represented as restoring his ward in despair to the very man who was suspected of corrupting him: and Alcibiades is again appeased.

48. οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. See Gorg. 515 C foll., where it is argued that Pericles, Cimon and Miltiades made none of their fellow-citizens better.

51. καµµπτοµαι. Stallbaum quotes Thuc. III 58. ι καλτοι ἄξιοµαι γε—καµφόθναι υµᾶς καὶ µεταγνώαι.

52. πολλῶν µὲν—τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐξηµηρκέναι. It is implied that Protagoras' originality is not equal to his industry. The mss have ἐξηµηρκέναι, but in the perfect as in past tenses generally initial εὐ became ηὐ: see on 315 B above.

55. ἀλλ' ἐπιδειξόν. See below on ἐπιδειξάµενος in 328 D. 320 C

56. ὡς προσβύτερος νεωτέροις. Gorg. 527 Α τάξα δ' οὖν ταῦτα µυθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ σπερ γραῦς.

57. ἡ λόγῳ διεξέλθων. So BT: Cobet requires ἡ λόγῳ διεξέλθω, but λόγῳ διεξελθῶν contrasts with µυθόν λέγων, not with ἐπιδειξ_CUDA](), which belongs to both participial clauses. For the aorist participle (where we should expect the present) compare with Sauppe Theact. 167 D ἀµφισβήτηει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξέλθων.

CHAPTER XI.

Protagoras' reply falls into three sections: viz. (1) 320 C—323 C, (2) 323 C—324 D, (3) 324 E—328 D: compare Introduction, p. xi. In the first he is concerned to justify the Athenians for allowing everyone to address them on political questions: this he does in the first instance by relating a myth of pre-historic man.
It is probable that this myth comes from Protagoras’ treatise περὶ τῆς ἑν ἀρχῆς καταστάσεως, mentioned in Diog. Laert. IX 55. It does not resemble the other myths of Plato in point of style, and if not actually written by Protagoras, it is at least carefully modelled on his way of writing: compare the similar imitations of the style of Agathon in Symp. 194 D foll. and of Prodicus infra 337 A foll. See Introd. p. xxi. That the ‘Sophists’ taught by means of parables we can see from Prodicus’ Apologue of Heracles in Xen. Mem. II 1. 21 foll. The other passages in Plato treating of the primitive constitution of man are Polit. 269 C foll., Tim. 42 E foll. and Symp. 189 C foll. In Rep. III 414 C foll. there are also some points of resemblance to the present story.

1. ἦν γὰρ ποτέ χρόνος. γὰρ introduces the story: see on Apol. 20 E Χαριφθῶντα γὰρ ἦστε ποι. ἦν χρόνος was usual in beginning a tale: the editors quote Theocr. 8. i ἦν χρόνος ἀνικ’ ἐγών κτλ.

2. θυντά δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. In the Timaeus 42 E foll. the creation of men takes place after that of gods. The lower animals in the Timaeus arise from the degeneration of the souls of men in later births, every soul being first born as man: cf. Tim. 41 E with 90 E foll. Here the lower animals are created simultaneously with man, for θυντα γένη is of course not limited to the human race.

3. χρόνος ἡλθεν εἰμαρμένοι γενέσεως. The omission of the article, as well as the whole turn of expression (ἡλθεν αὐτοῖς χρόνος), is somewhat poetic.

4. θεοὶ γῆς ἐνδόν: so in Tim. 42 E it is the created gods, not the ὅμοιοργός, who make men. There however it is not said that human creatures were made within the earth: but compare the γενναιον ψεύδος of Rep. III. 414 C ἦσαν δὲ (i.e. the citizens of Plato’s state) τότε τῆ ἀληθεία ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλατύμενοι. The wide-spread tradition of autochthonous races among the Greeks no doubt helped to produce such anthropological theories, with which compare Empedocles (ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. p. 143) ὦντους μὲν πρῶτα τοῖς χρόνοις ἐξανετέλλον: Symp. 191 C ἐγέννων καὶ ἐτικτων (sc. primitive men) οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ’ εἰς γῆν ὡσπερ οἱ τέττιγες: and Polit. 272 A ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεμισόκοτο πάντες. It is to be noticed that Plato regularly uses ἐντὸς (not ἐνδόν) as a preposition: ἐνδόν (so used) is the more poetic word.

έκ γῆς—κεράννυται. Compare Tim. 42 E (of the creation of man) μμούμενοι (i.e. the created gods) τῶν σφέτερον δημοιργόν, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὀδατός τε καὶ ἄερος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δανειξόμενοι μόρια
πάλιν εἰς ταύταν τὰ λαμβανόμενα ξύνεκδελλον. For 'air and water' is substituted here τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ kerάννυται. Fire is the rarest and earth the densest of the four elements: Protagoras' theory is that air and water are produced by mixing these in different proportions, for kerάννυται cannot mean merely that the elements interchange. Compare the theory attributed by Aristotle to Parmenides: Met. I 5. 986b 33 δύο τάσ αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχάς πάλιν τίθεσι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οὐν πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. It is noteworthy that Plato himself regards all four elements as differentiated, although imperfectly, before the creation of the κόσμος by the δημιουργός: compare Tim. 53 A foll. The chiasmus in γῆ καὶ πυρὸς followed by πυρὶ καὶ γῆ is part of Protagoras' art.


7. Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ. In Gorg. 523 D Prometheus again appears as the servant of Zeus, commissioned to put a stop to man's foreknowledge of his day of death: in Polit. 274 C he is mentioned as the giver of fire to mortals. The Hesiodic and Aeschylean form of the legend, in which Prometheus steals the fire, does not appear in Plato, except at 321 D, nor is there any hint in his works of the story in Hesiod about the gift of Pandora—the source of human ills—to Epimetheus (Works and Days 50 foll.), though it is worth noting that Plato like Hesiod makes the creation of woman posterior to that of man (Tim. 42 B).

9. παραιτεῖται—αὐτὸς νεῖμαι. The object clause, as usual with verbs like παραιτεῖσθαι (deprecari) depends on the positive part of the verb (here αἰτεῖσθαι): see on Apol. 31 B. αὐτὸς is 'by himself', without Prometheus' aid. We follow Cron and Turner in retaining the mss νείμαντος δὲ μου as against Bekker's δ' ἐμοῦ: the antithesis, as Cron remarks, is between the actions—νείμαντος and ἐπισκέψαι. The point to be noticed is that Afterthought invites Forethought to exchange offices with him: it is Afterthought whose duty it is to inspect (ἐπισκέψασθαι: cf. Gorg. 526 C ὃ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν καθηταί).

11. τὰ δ' ἀνθρέπνεστερα—τὰ δὲ. B and T have τῶς δ' ἀσθενε-320 E στέρους—τῶς δὲ, a natural mistake, which can hardly be due to Plato.

NOTES ON XI 320 E

The whole passage is full of rare and often poetic rhythms, words, constructions, and turns of expression: e.g. ἀυτὸν φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἡμιπάχειν, πτηνὸν φυγήν, τῷδε αὐτῷ (for αὐτῷ τοῦτο), ἀϊστωθεὶς, ἀλληλοφθοροῦν διαφυγάς ἐπήρκεσε, εὐμαρίαν (as against εὐμάρειαν), and many more: note also the effort after balance and variety in ἰκανὸς μὲν ἀμύνα χειμῶνα, ὄντας δὲ καὶ καῦματα (321 A), τοῖς μὲν εἰς γῆς—全能 δὲ—τοῖς δὲ—ἐστι δ' οἷς. “Summum opinor,” says Heindorf, “in his imitatantis philosophi appareret artificium, si quid de propria Protagorae dictione superesset”. See Introd. p. xxii.

14. σμικρότητι ἡμιπάχειν. The usual construction would require σμικρότητα: the change is perhaps due to the desire for balance with ἀ δὲ ἡπεί μεγέθει, but the same construction occurs infra in line 21 with ἀμφιενόν.


20. εὐμαρίαν. So Schanz with BT: the editors generally read εὐμάρειαν. The older form is intentionally used here: see above on line 13.

24. ὑποδῶν is Cobet’s correction for ὑπὸ ποδῶν of B and T. See infra on 321 C γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον κτλ.

321 B 25. τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀνάλαυσις. After τὰ δὲ the MSS read θριξὶν καὶ. The words seem to have been wrongly introduced from line 21. This (the suggestion of Ast, adopted by Schanz and others) seems better than to read for θριξὶν καὶ the words ὄνυξιν καὶ. 

31. οὐ πάνυ τι—non satis: cf. note on Euthyphr. 2 B οἶδ’ αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γεγυῖσκω. οὐ πάνυ is the English ‘not quite’, sometimes equivalent to ‘not at all’ by meiosis: the addition of τι makes the phrase a little less emphatic. πάνυ οὐ is quite a different phrase and means ‘altogether not’.

321 C 32. καταναλόσας τὰς δυνάμεις. After τὰς δυνάμεις, the words εἰς τὰ ἀλογα are found in T, but not in B.

36. ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα: like ἰκανὸς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα in Theaet. 194 D and the genitive after καλὸς ἔχειν and the like.

37. γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἀστρωτον καὶ ἀσπλον. Compare the description of Ἐρως in Symp. 203 C: ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ὀοῖκος, χαμαιπτῆς ἄει ὦν καὶ ἀστρωτος. ἀνυπόδητον contrasts with
XI 321 E  PLATO’S PROTAGORAS.  III

υποδῶν in 321 B (line 24), and justifies Cobet’s emendation for υπὸ ποδῶν. Aristotle (περὶ ᾿ξῖων μορίων IV 10, p. 687a 23) alludes to this passage of the Protagoras: ἀλλ’ οἱ λέγουσες ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ χειρίστα τῶν ᾿ξῖων (ἀνυπόδητον τε γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι φασί καὶ γυμνὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὀπλοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἀλκήν), οὐκ ὅρθως λέγουσι.

39. ἐν ᾧ. See above on ἐν τῇ ύστεραλα 318 A. All the ὀνητὰ γένη then according to Protagoras issued forth on the same day. Plato thought otherwise: see on 320 D line 2.

40. ἐχόμενος: so T: “σχόμενος B, sed in marg. vitii nota” Schanz. σχόμενος is occasionally found in this passive sense, especially in compounds (Sauppe quotes Soph. 250 D συνεχόμεθα and Isocr. xix 11 φθηγ σχόμενον), but the present participle is at least equally well attested here and suits the meaning better: cf. (with Kroschel) Laws vi 780 B ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἔχομενοι.

42. τὴν ἑντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ. Aesch. Prom. 252—254 321 D πρὸς τοῖςδε μέντοι πῦρ ἔγω σφιν ὀπτασα. καὶ νῦν φλογωτῶν πῦρ ἔχουσ’ ἐφήμεροι, ἀφ’ οὗ γε πολλὰς ἐκμαθήσουσι τέχνας—which is the usual form of the story. In Polit. 274 c Plato attributes fire to Prometheus, and the arts to Hephaestus and Athena. σὺν denotes a much closer connexion than μετά: it is seldom used by Plato except in a few adverbial phrases, or in religious uses (like ἔιν τις Χάριος καὶ Μοῦσαι Laws iii 682 Λ), or in semi-poetic passages like the present: see on οὐδὲν ἔπειν νῦ in Crito 48 c.

46. ἐσχεν is ‘obtained’: see on ἔσχετε in Apol. 19 Λ. ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δίῳ reminds one of Sophocles’ Δίκη ἐξυνέδρος Ζηνός Ο. C. 1382.

48. οὔκετι means that Prometheus had to draw the line there; he had been able to steal the fire, but farther he could not go—no doubt because time pressed. The same idiomatic use of οὔκετι (ἡδη occurs above in 312 E μὰ Δί’, ἐφη, οὔκετι ἔχω σοι λέγειν: it is extremely common in Plato and in Greek generally: see note on Euthyphr. 3 E and Cope on Arist. Rhet. A 1. 1354b 7 referred to there.

49. Δίὸς φυλακαλ are no doubt Κράτος and Βία, as in the 321 E Prometheus. Compare Hesiod Theog. 385 foll. (quoted by Heindorf) καὶ Κράτος ἤδη Βίην ἀριδελκετα γείνατο τέκνα (sc. Στύες) τῶν οὐκ ἐστ’ ἀπάνευθε Δίος ὀδόμος οὐδὲ τις ἔδρη οὐδ’ ὀδὸς ὀππη μὴ κελνος θεὸς ἤρεμουτενεί: ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ πάρ Ζηνι βαρυκτύπῳ ἐδριῶντας.

εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς κτλ. Protagoras reverts to the story of
the theft. Similarly in 346 D below Socrates reverts to a part of the poem which he has quoted some time before in 345 C.

51. ἐμπυρον τέχνη is τέχνη which works by πῦρ, as ἐντεχνος σοφία in line 42 is σοφία working by τέχνη.

322 A 54. τοῦ βλου—δι’ Ἐπιμηθέα. βλου is ‘means of living’ as in line 45. The words δι’ Ἐπιμηθέα mean ‘thanks to Epimetheus’:
cf. Ar. Clouds 12—14 ἀλλ’ οῦ δύναμαι δειλαῖος εὐδεῖν δακνύμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ τῆς φάτνης καὶ τῶν χρεῶν, διὰ τούτοι τὸν υἱόν, and in Rep. I 354 A οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι, δι’ ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ σέ. The words are rejected by Schanz (after Sauppe), but without reason: the jingle (Προ-μηθέα δὲ δι’ Ἐπι-μηθέα) is quite in Protagoras’ style.

55. ἢπερ λέγεται. Aeschylus relates the punishment but not the trial: cf. Prom. 7—9 τὸ σῶν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας, θυντοίσι κλέψας ὁπασεν’ τοιάδοε τοι ἀμαρτίας σφε δεὶ θεοὶ δόναι δίκην.

CHAPTER XII.

The myth is continued (322 A—322 D) and used to justify the Athenians for listening to promiscuous political advisers, since according to it all men are endowed with πολιτικὴ ἀρετή—as indeed all men believe, otherwise they would not (as they do) regard as insane the man who does not at least pretend to possess justice and πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ generally.

1. θείας μετέσχε μολᾶς: μοῖρα is ‘dispensation’, and refers to the ἐντεχνος σοφία, which is θεία because derived from Hephaestus and Athena.

2. [διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν]. These words are open to objection on two grounds. The singular τοῦ θεοῦ is inaccurate—no single god has been mentioned as akin to man: nor can τοῦ θεοῦ well be taken as God in the monotheistic sense, or as generic for τῶν θεῶν—both usages are alien to the whole tone of the myth. These difficulties might perhaps be got over by reading τοῦ θεοῦ = τῶν θεῶν, but another difficulty remains. The reference in τὴν συγγένειαν can only be to 320 D τυποῦσων αὐτὰ τερι, the creatures being regarded as children of their creators as in Tim. 42 E νούσαντες οἳ πάϊδες (the created gods) τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διάταξιν, but there it is not only man but all θυγτὰ γένη that are in this sense ‘akin to gods’—why then should not the lower animals also have built themselves fanes? As the phrase is at best a bad case of loose thinking
and inaccurate writing in an otherwise careful and elaborate piece of composition, I have followed Kral and Schanz in rejecting the whole phrase. The words were perhaps an (inaccurate) gloss on *thelas* in *thelas molpas*. For the sentiment which they express see the Editor’s Introduction to the Euthyphro p. xvi.

μόνον: man alone *thelas* μετέσχε μολπας: see note in loc. Cobet’s μονος would be more grammatical, but the attraction of ἕφικτι is too strong.


4. ἐπειτα. πρῶτον μὲν and ἐπειτα refer to logical sequence rather than temporal: Protagoras follows the maxim ἐκ Διὸς ἄρχω-μεσθα.

7. ηὔπετο. MSS εὑρετο, but see on 315 B above.


14. ἦ̣ς μέρος πολεμικῆ. πολεμικῆ is recognised as a part of πολιτικῆ in Rep. II 273 D foll.

15. σφάξεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις. The insufficiency of the individual for his own wants is assigned as the cause of city life in Rep. II 369 B γίγνεται πόλει—πόλις, ὥς ἐγώμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἑκατοστὸν οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδειχς: ἦ τιν’ οἰὲι ἄρχην ἀλλήν πόλιν οἰκίζειν; οὐδεμιᾶν, ἦ δ’ ὄς.

19. ἀιδῶ τε καὶ δίκην. The editors cite Hesiod (Works and Days 192) δίκη δ’ ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἑσταὶ (of the γένος σιδηρεων, where man is corrupt). αἰδῶς is a part of δεός (Euthyphr. 12 C): it keeps men together by making them fear the censure of their fellows (Laws I 647 A—B); compare Homer Iliad xv 561 foll. ὁ φίλοι, ἀνέρες εἴστε, καὶ αἰδῶθε θέαθ’ ενι θυμῶ, ἀλλήλους τ’ αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας. αἰδομένων δ’ ἄνδρων πλέονες σοι ἣ πέραντα: φευγόντων δ’ οὔτ’ ἀρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή. δίκη is here the abstract principle ‘law’ like Latin ius: for the original meaning of the word see Verrall on Eur. Med. 411.

20. πόλεων κόσμοι—συναγωγι. The phraseology no less than the rhythm is highly poetical.

21. τίνα οὖν τρόπον. For οὖν retained in the indirect the editors cite Symp. 219 D ὥστε οὖθ’ ὑπως οὖν ὄργιζόμην εἶχον οὖθ’ ὅτι A. P.

24. εἰς ἔχων ιατρικὴν—ιδιώταις. This division of labour takes place as soon as men begin to unite in cities: compare Rep. II 369 E foll.

322 D 30. κτείνειν ώς νόσον πόλεως. κτείνειν is poetical for the ἀπο- κτείνειν of prose.

32. Ἀθηναῖοι: without the article as in 319 B and 324 C.

322 E 35. οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φής: 319 C οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται. The antithesis between οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὡς σὺ φής and εἰκότως ὡς ἔγω φήμι is a poor one, since οὐκ ἀνέχονται has to be repeated with εἰκότως. We should expect some word like ἀλόγως before ὡς σὺ φής, or perhaps οὐκ εἰκότως has dropped out after φής.

323 A 37. ἢν δεὶ διὰ δικαιοσύνης—λέναι. The antecedent to ἢν is συμβολὴν not ἄρετὴς: cf. Laws i 632 C (quoted by Heindorf) κατιδών δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ἀπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν (sc. φύλακας) διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἱστασ. The phrase διὰ δικαιοσύνης λέναι is equivalent to δικαίαν εἶναι as διὰ φιλίας λέναι to φιλὸν εἶναι.

38. ἀπαντῶσ. Schanz reads παντὸς on account of παντὶ following: but Plato frequently interchanges ἀπας and πᾶς; see on Euthyphr. 9 E. It is natural that the more emphatic form ἀπαντῶσ should come first.

40. ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. ἢ = alioquin is regular with δεὶ, προσήκει, and the like, in the preceding clause: compare infra 323 C ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις and 325 A.

αὐτὴ—τούτου αἰτία: asyndeton as in 318 A τοσοῦτος δ ὡς ἠμέτερος λόγος.

41. ὡς τῷ δότι ἡγοῦνται. The presence of τῷ δότι, as Sauppe remarks, shews that ὡς depends on τεκμήριον in line 44: compare infra 324 C ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—ἀποδέδεικταί σοι.

323 B 54. προσπολούμενον δικαίοςύνην: elsewhere in Plato προσποιεῖσθαι takes the infinitive. Thuc. i 37. 7 has ἢν ψευδῶς προσποιοῦσατο.
CHAPTER XIII.

Protagoras now passes to the second part of his reply (323 c—324 d), in which he seeks to prove by two arguments that men believe that virtue can be taught: (1) as we hold men responsible for ἀδίκια, it is clear that we conceive of it as capable of being acquired (323 c—324 A); (2) punishment is in point of fact intended to teach well-doing (324 A—324 D).

4. οὐ φῦσει ἴγοονται εἶναι—ἀλλὰ διδακτὸν. Sauppe (on 322 c) remarks that the giving of δίκη and αἰδῶς to all is inconsistent with the theory that πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ can be acquired by teaching. What Protagoras no doubt means is that while all men have a part in δικαιοσύνη (323 A), because they possess δίκη and αἰδῶς, they may be improved by teaching, but it must be allowed that his words are hardly consistent with themselves. See Introduction, p. xix.

15. τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντια τοῦτοις. This, the MSS reading, 323 D retained by Heindorf, and recently by Kral, is, we think, right. ταῦτα in line 14 does not have its antecedent in the previous sentence, but is explained by τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντια τοῦτοις. Protagoras in fact divides ‘goods’ into two classes, viz. (1) goods φύσει, (2) goods ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς, and calls the former καλὰ, the implied examples being personal beauty, stature and health. Schanz’s rejection of τὰ καλὰ is therefore needless.

The editors mostly read τὰ κακά, but (in spite of Ficinus’ haec mala etrumque contraria) this would seem to be precluded by the μὲν and δὲ in ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ δοσα δὲ—ἀγαθά: the contrast requires that one class of goods shall be set over against another, and is much weakened if we put ‘evils’ in the foreground by reading τὰ κακά. Further, ταῦτα is too remote to be easily taken with τὰ κακὰ in the sense of ‘these evils’, whereas if we take the pronoun merely as anticipating τὰ κακὰ, then the statement becomes too wide: for not all κακά, not all ἀγαθά (τάναντια τοῦτοις, on this view) come to men φύσει, as indeed the next clause states.

21. συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον—ἀρετῆς. We have here the first hint of the unity of the different vices and (by implication) virtues: compare infra 329 C.
NOTES ON XIII 324 A

24. ei γὰρ έθέλεις—διδάξει. Cf. infra 342 D.
25. αὐτό σε διδάξει: 'fact will shew you': Theaet. 200 E ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος—ἐφή ἄρα δελέξειν αὐτῷ: the idiom is a frequent one.
27. οὐδές γὰρ κολάξει κτλ. Plato's own theory of punishment so far agrees with this, but goes deeper: see Gorgias 525 A foll. προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὕπ’ ἄλλου ὥρθως τιμωρομένως, ἢ βελτίως γλύνεσθαι καὶ ὄνυνασθαι ἢ παραδελγαται τοῖς ἄλλοις γλύνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὄρωντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἄν πάσχῃ φοβοῦμεν Βελτίως γλύνωνται. Vice (being ignorance) is disease of soul, as νόσος is of body: it is the business of the judge to cure the one as of the physician to cure the other: cf. Rep. IX 591 A—Β and Gorg. 478 D σωφρονίζει γὰρ ποι δικαιωτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρική γλύνεται πωνηρία ἢ δίκη: hence (ibid. 480 Β foll.) the sinner should go before the judge as readily as the patient to a doctor, and should even accuse his friends. In the ideal city the judges are to put to death incurable sinners just as the doctors will allow incurable patients to die: III 409 E foll. τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μη, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιούτου, ἀποθνῄσκουσα ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιᾶτος αὐτὸλ ἀποκτενοῦσιν. The same holds good of punishment after death: for Ardiaeus and the others in Rep. X 616 A, whose punishment is everlasting (οὐχ ἦκει—οὔτ' ἃν ἤξει δεύρο), are incurable—ἀτεχνῶς παραδελγατα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεί ἐν ἄδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφεκνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα—the majority are punished to purge them of the guilt contracted upon earth and teach them to choose more wisely their lot of life next time. The remedial view of punishment is embedded in the genius of the Greek language, as is shewn by the punitive sense of σωφρονίζειν, δικαιόν, εὐθύνειν. The older and sterner view (δράσαντι παθεῖν) appears more rarely in Plato's time.

324 B 29. ἡδίκησεν. See above on 319 D.
30. τιμωρεῖται. The editors quote Aristotle Rhet. I 10. 1369b 12 διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρίᾳ καὶ κόλασις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐνεκα ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ. The distinction is not invariably observed in Plato, although he generally uses τιμωρεῖσθαι in passages where the gravity of the sin is more insisted upon.
31. οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος—ἀγένητον θεί. Turner (on 324 B) quotes Laws XI 934 A οὐχ ἐνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι διδοὺς τὴν δίκην, οὐ
The phrase yap τὸ γεγονός ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτε κτλ. represents a common proverbial saying: cf. Simonides Frag. 69 τὸ γὰρ γεγενημένον οὐκέτ’ ἄρεκτον ἔσται (Sauppe) with Bergk’s note, and the impressive application of the saying in Aesch. Ag. 1019—1021 του ἔπι γὰν ἀπαξ πεσὼν βανάσιμον προσάροι’ ἀνδρός μέλαν αἴμα τίς ἄν πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαι’ ἐπαείδων;

38. κολάζονται: the middle (in the present) is rare: Heindorf quotes Ar. Wasps 405 νῦν ἐκεῖνο νῦν ἐκεῖνο τοιξύθυμον ὃ κολαξόμεσθα κέντρον ἐντέτατ’ ὤζ.

CHAPTER XIV.

Here begins the third part of Protagoras’ reply: 324 E—328 D. In this chapter he begins to shew that virtue is in point of fact taught to all by shewing that it would be absurd to suppose that it is not.

1. λοιπῇ ἀπορίᾳ. For the omission of the article before a relative clause (Heindorf suggested the insertion of ἤ after λοιπῇ) Sauppe quotes Rep. III 413 εφίλαξ αὐτοῦ ὤν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μονοκίθης ἦς ἐμάνθανεν. The ἀπορίᾳ was raised by Socrates in 319 D foll.

4. διδάσκοντων. Contrast infra 325 B τα μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς and ibid. τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, said of the parents as διδάσκοντων (in the usual sense of διδάσκονται) is said here and in Meno 94 B. Similarly in Prot. 320 άπαθεία is used where we should expect ἑπαθείατο: cf. ἑπαθείατο in Meno 93 D.

α διδασκάλων ἔχεται. See note on 319 E supra.


13. δικαιοσύνη—τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι. Thus for the first time 325 A Protagoras definitely speaks of the virtues in language implying their unity: cf. 323 E.


16. μετά τοῦτου: not μεθ’ ὦ, see on 313 A καὶ ἐν ὑ. For the use of μετά cf. Phaed. 69 Α ff. (ἡ) ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμωμα ὀρθῶν,
19. *kai paída kai ándra kai γυναίκα*: nearly equivalent to 'not only child but etc.': *paída* is put first as the natural object of *κολάζων*—"et nos ergo manum manum ferulae subduximus" (Juv. I 15).

21. *ὑπακούῃ* is more than obey: the word means 'to hear and answer' (cf. Crito 43 A): tr. 'respond', sc. by becoming better (as explained in line 20).

22. *ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα—ἀποκτένειν*: Rep. III 410 A τοὺς—κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεὶς καὶ ἀνίατους αὐτοῖς ἀποκτένεισι. In the next line αὐτοῦ in αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος is still this 'one thing', viz. ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ.

25. *ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίγνονται*. The MSS have ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται which could only mean 'in what a strange way are produced'—a meaning irrelevant here. The point is that it is θαυμαστῶν if 'good men'—virtue having been proved to be teachable—teach their sons everything except virtue. θαυμάσιοι (with Kroschel and other editors) seems the simplest of the many emendations proposed: cf. Euthyd. 305 B θαυμάσιοι εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. The mistake may have arisen from the influence of the common θαυμασίως ὡς. Next best is Hirschig's θαυμασίως γίγνονται ἄγαθοι οἱ ἄγαθοι (cf. 328 ε οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἡ ἄγαθοι οἱ ἄγαθοι γίγνονται) or θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄγαθοι: cf. Meno 89 B οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄγαθοι γίγνονται and Heindorf's emendation on 326 C below. As to γίγνονται "Saepius a Platone id quod argumentatione colligitur, γίγνεσθαι dicitur, ut p. 355 A φημὶ ὡμίν τοῦτον ὄντως ἔχοντο γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι ὅταν λέγητε κτλ., Euthyd. p. 298 ε οὐκοίν ὁ κύων πατήρ ὁν σός ἑστιν, ὡστε σός πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων". Kroschel. The same use of γίγνεσθαι is common in Aristotle.

28. *τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἀρα*. For the form of the sentence and for ἀρα here and in line 34 compare note on Crito 50 E ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἀρα.

29. *διδάσκονται* (but not of course ἀρα) is interrogative: so οὐ διδάσκονται in line 34.

30. *ἐφ’ ὄν*. So BT: Heindorf's ἐφ’ ὃς is adopted by Kral. ἐφ’ ὃς (i.e. ἐπὶ τοῦτων ἄ) κτλ. is 'in the case of subjects which if they have not learnt' (μὴ μαθῶσι), the latent ἄ depending on μαθῶσι: whereas ἐφ’ ὃς—ἐπιστονται in the previous line is ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ὃς (i.e. ἐφ’ ὃς, according to the usual idiom)—ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιστονται αὐτά. This use of ἐπὶ with the genitive is common in Plato, e.g. Rep. VII 524 E ὡςπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν. The variety of expression is not
unnatural in view of the dative τοῖς παισὶ following. For the misplacement of τε in ἦ τε ἦμια see note on 316 D above.

33. ὡς ἔτος ἐπείν is to be taken with ξυλλῆβδην, which goes 325 C with the verbal noun ἀνατροπαί: ‘almost wholesale subversion of their house’. ξυλλῆβδην means not κατὰ σμικρῶν, but so as to embrace everything: cf. Rep. I 344 A—B τυραννίς ἦ οὗ κατὰ σμικρῶν τὰλλάτρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται—ἄλλα ξυλλῆβδην, and Theognis 147 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλῆβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή νι. For ὡς ἔτος ἐπείν see on 317 A.

35. οἰσθαί γε χρή: a way of answering one's own question: Crito 53 D, 54 B.

CHAPTER XV.

In this chapter Protagoras shews that the whole scheme of Athenian education is intended to teach ἀρετή.

1. μέχρι οὗπερ ἀν ζῷω, i.e. οἱ παιδευόμενοι: in 326 D foll. it is shewn that education does not end when school is left, but goes on through life.

3. ἐπειδὰν βάπτον seems not to occur elsewhere in the Platonic writings: in Alcib. I 105 A is ἔαν βάπτον. τάχιστα is more usual after such conjunctions. Kroschel quotes an imitation of this passage from De Rep. Laced. 2. 1 ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς τὰ λεγόμενα τευκτίσαν, εὖθύς μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς παιδαγωγοὺς θεράποντας ἐφιστάσιν, εὖθύς δὲ πέμποντοι εἰς διδασκάλους μαθησομένους καὶ γράμματα καὶ μονοικὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν παλαιστρῃ.

5. ὅπως βελτιστός: so BT: there is no reason for inserting ὡς 325 D after ὅπως with Kroschel and Turner: βελτιστός does not mean better than all others, but very good.


10. τὸ μὲν πολεί, τὰ δὲ μὴ πολεῖ: τὰ μὲν is not δίκαιον, καλὸν, ὅσιον, but quite general: 'this do, that do not'. The τάδε μὲν—τάδε δὲ of T is unnecessary; cf. τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ in line 8. The symmetry of the sentence is worth noting (a, b, b, a): first τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ, next τὸδε μὲν—τὸδε δὲ twice, last τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ, the end recalling the beginning. Compare note on καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν in Crito 49 B.

ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθηται: without apodosis: see Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses (1889) p. 179. This idiom occurs more than once in Homer: it is perhaps a remnant of the days when the conditional particles introduced a main sentence: certainly the Greeks were not conscious of any such ellipse as εὖ ἔξει.

11. ὡςπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον. ξύλον is ‘a piece of wood’, not necessarily a dead log, as appears from Hdt. III 47 εἰπροισὶ ἀπὸ ξύλον (of the cotton tree) and other exx. in L. and S. The growing child is compared to a tree growing up and becoming crooked (note the present διαστρεφόμενον—καρπτόμενον). Plato frequently applies the metaphors ‘crooked’, ‘warped’ and the like to victims of vice and vicious education: compare Gorg. 525 Λ πάντα σκολία ὑπὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀλαζονέας. Theaet. 173 Α σμικρὸ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς.

12. εὐθύνουσιν—πληγαῖς. Cf. Arist. Ἀθην. πολιτ. Ch. 8 τούς ἀμαρτάνοντας η ὅθων εἰς κυρία οὖσα τοῦ ξημίον καὶ κολάζεων (of the Areopagitic council). For εὐθύνεων (here passing into the meaning of ‘chastise’) see note on 324 Α οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει. To illustrate πληγαῖς Sauppe quotes the well-known line of Menander ὁ μὴ δαρεὶς ἀνθρώποις οὐ παιδεύεται.

13. εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες. It appears from 326 Ε that there was no regular age for going to school; the parents decided in each case. Plato ordains (Laws VII 809 Ε) that children shall learn γράμματα (i.e. reading and writing, ibid. 810 Β) from 10 to 13, and the lyre from 13 to 16.

πολὺ μᾶλλον—εὐκοσμίας. Protagoras’ description of the aim of Athenian education agrees with the account of the Δίκαιος λόγος in the Clouds 961 ο. 325 Ε 17. ὡςπερ τότε: supra 325 Ε ἐπειδὰν θάττων συνή ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα.

18. ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων: i.e. as they sit on the benches: cf. above 315 Ε. παρατιθέασιν represents the works of the poets as intellectual food: cf. Theaet. 157 Ε παρατιθημί έκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀγογεύσασθαί.

19. ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν: Homer especially, and also Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Compare Laws VII 810 Ε, from which passage it also appears that extracts were frequently made for committing to memory (ἐκμαθάλαβειν).

21. διέξοδοι means finished narratives or descriptions (cf. λόγος διεξελθόν and διεξέναι in 320 C). It is to be noted that so far we have not got beyond ποίησις ψιλή (i.e. unaccompanied by music): lyric poetry begins to be studied when the lyre has been learnt (line 26).

24. ἔτερα τοιαύτα: for the phrase see on Apol. 26 A. The accusative (internal) depends on ἐπιμελοῦντας as in 325 C ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν and Laws vii 812 εν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ παϊδευτὴς ἐπιμελείσθω: the whole phrase is equivalent to ἔτεραν τοιαύτην σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦνται. Verbs taking the external object in the genitive or dative are not precluded from taking the internal object in the accusative.

28. εἰς τὰ κιθάρισματα ἐντείνοντες. ἐντείνειν εἰς is to stretch into, i.e. to ‘put into’: whence ἐντείνειν ἐς κύκλον χωρίον τρίγωνον ‘to describe a triangle in a circle’ (Meno 87 A); περὶ γὰρ τοῦ τῶν ποιημάτων ὑπὸ πεποίηκας ἐντείνειν τούς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους of adapting to metre (Phaed. 60 D); and here of accompanying poems on the lyre: the boys learn the poems and tunes (made by the poet) together, while the Citharist plays the lyre. Plato in the Laws vii 812 d foll. requires the κιθάρισματα to be identical with the tune to which the poem is sung: δεὶ—τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς ὕλας προσχρημαθαί—τῶν τὰ κιθαριστὴν καὶ τῶν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι τῇ δ’ ἐτεροφυλλίαν καὶ ποικίλιαν τῆς ὕλας, ἀλλὰ μὲν μὲλὴ τῶν χορδῶν ίεσών, ἀλλὰ δὲ τοῦ τῆς μελωδίαι ξυνθέντος πινητοῦ—πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ.

ῥυθμοὺς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας. ῥυθμοῖ times or rhythms (cf. Rep. iii 399 e foll.), ἁρμονίαι scales (ibid. 398 d foll.). ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία between them make up μοισκῆ in the narrower sense: see Symp. 187 a foll., where music is defined as περὶ ἁρμονίαι καὶ ῥυθμών ἔρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη—περὶ ἁρμονίαι since it reconcileς ὀξύ and βαρύ, περὶ ῥυθμῶν since it reconciles ταχύ and βαρύ.


30. εὐρυμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι. See Rep. III 400 c foll., where, after it is shewn that τὸ εὐρυθμον and τὸ εὐάρμοστον imply εὐολογία, Plato continues (400 d) εὐολογία ἃρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὕτων ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλούμεν ὡς εὐθείειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλός τὸ ἥδος κατεσκευασμένη διάνοιαν.
34. ἐς παιδοτρίβου: Protagoras passes to γυμναστικὴ, the second great division of Greek education: Rep. II 376 E.

35. ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. Plato asserts that the true object of γυμναστικὴ is not to cultivate the body, but to educate the soul to the proper mean between hardness and softness: Rep. III 410 C foll. On the soul as the mistress of the body see Phaedo ch. 43.

326 C 39. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι. The first μάλιστα is due to Heindorf: it is necessary to the meaning. Most of the editors insert the word μάλιστα not after ποιοῦσιν but after δυνάμενοι, explaining its loss by the presence of μάλιστα following: but it comes (we think) more naturally after ποιοῦσιν.

42. ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγόσι: ἐκ is rejected by Cobet (cf. Gorg. 514 C ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν): but the phrase is just as stereotyped as ἐς διδασκάλων, to which (in line 40) it forms an appropriate contrast—in neither of the two cases were the Greeks (in all probability) conscious in common parlance of an ellipse. Sauppe quotes a fragment of Ar. Banqueters 42 οὐκ εἰθὸς ἀπεδιδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλον, Plutus 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἔρχομαι, and other parallels.

43. ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν: hardly to be taken literally, but only in the sense that ignorance was no excuse for breaking the laws.

44. κατὰ τούτους ζῆν. After ζῆν occur in the mss the words κατὰ παράδειγμα. “Facile succurrat cuivis κατὰ τούτους ζῆν καθάπερ παράδειγμα—quamquam taliis notanda potius quam statim corrigenda,” says Heindorf. Most recent editors bracket or reject the words, which are open to objection on several grounds, that the laws are not an example but a rule of life, and Plato does not use παράδειγμα precisely in this way, as well as from the harsh omission of ὄς. The suggestion of Sauppe that the words are a gloss on κατὰ τούτουs by a scribe referring to the illustration which follows—‘as for example’—has much probability.

326 D 45. γράμματιστοι: see on γραμματιστοῖ 312 B.

46. ὑπογράφαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμαί) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμαί as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; “ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere iubentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt,” Kroschel. Such a view is however inconsistent with
the meaning of ὑπογράφειν and of ὑψήγησις, and (in view of Plato’s statements as to the nature of Law) renders the simile inexact. ὑπογράφειν in Plato regularly refers to an outline drawing (as υποτυπωθαι to moulding in outline Tim. 76 E) and is opposed to ἀπεργάσασθαι and (in Aristotle) to ἀναγράφειν, e.g. Rep. viii 548 c—D oύκοιν—αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὖστι γεγονοῦσα καὶ τοιαύτη ἂν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἔξαρκεὶν μὲν ἰδεῖ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαίωταν καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, and Theaet. 172 E, where a litigant’s αὐτωμοσία is called ὑπογραφή—a sort of outline drawing ὡς ἐκτὸς οὖ ῥητῶν, but which his speech must simply ἀπεργάσασθαι. ὑψηγεῖσθαι is similarly used, only with the added idea of guiding: e.g. Rep. iii 403 d—e oύκοιν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἰκανῶς ἑρμηνεύσαντες παραδόμεν· αὕτη τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑψηγήσαμεθα—ὁρθῶς ἂν ποιοῦμεν; and Laws x 890 c δεὶ ταῦτα οὖτω πράττεν διανοούμενοι ὅππερ ἄν ὑμοθέτης ὑψηγῆσαι ταῖς γράφων. The point of the simile is this. As the child draws his pen between the outlines of the lines forming letters (making e.g. ( ) into ( ), so we must keep our actions between certain outlines, which are the laws. Plato invariably regards νόμοι as only τύποι, within which our actions should fall: cf. Rep. ii 383 c παντάπασιν—ἔγγυε τοὺς τύπους τοὺς συγχώρω, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώμων (whence νόμους ὑπογράφειν here and in Laws v 734 e): see also Polit. 294 a foll. τὸ δ’ ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἱσχύειν, ἀλλὰ ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν—ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ δύνατο τὸ τέ άριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον ἀκριβῶς πάσιν ἀμα περιλαβήν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττειν. αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων—οὐδὲν ἑώραν ἀπλοῦν ἐν οὔδεν περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὔδ’ ἠρτυοῦν—for which reason in the Republic (vi 497 d) there must always be a power above the laws. The explanation which we have given does not disagree with the account of Seneca in his Epistles xv 2. 51 “Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digiti illorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducentur”: it is supported by Quintilian i 1. 27 “cum vero iam ductus sequi coeperit, non inutilis erit eas (sc. literas) tabellae quam optime insculpi, ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus”. It is probable that both these authors had the present passage in view.

It should be noted that γράφειν νόμους was a regular phrase: compare the image in Rep. vi 501 a.
NOTES ON XV 326 D

49. ὃς δὲ καὶ. ὃς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose; Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. VII 530 ὅσος ἀπρονομίᾳ ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὃς πρὸς ἴναρμύσιον φοράν ὅτα παγίναι. For δὲ see above on 318 C.

54. εἰθὺναι regularly denotes the 'putting straight' or examination of a magistrate when his office expired. It is not clear whether Protagoras' philological zeal does not cause him to stretch a point in giving to the word a wider signification: but see on εἰθὺνουσιν in 325 D.

CHAPTER XVI

Protagoras at last comes to the difficulty raised by Socrates in 319 E. Virtue having been proved to be teachable, it is only from a lack of natural aptitude that good men's sons sometimes turn out badly: compared with men who have never been taught virtue, even they are good. Protagoras concludes with a manifest bid for pupils.

4. ἐμπροσθεν: viz. at 324 E.

6. οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν: equivalent to πάντας δεῖ εἶναι δημούργους: no one must be a layman in ἀρετή.

12. ἐδιδάσκει καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα. As ἐδιδασκε is the important word, ἐπέπληττε has no effect on the construction, but is in effect enclitic: see on 317 C ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλωπίσασθαι.

19. εἰ οὐν οὕτω. οὐν marks the reversion to the original protasis, viz. εἰ μὴ οὖν τῷ ἦν—καὶ τοῦτο κτλ., from λυτελεῖ to νῆμμα being parenthetical: it therefore seems better to print a colon rather than a full stop after νῆμμα.


27. ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληθαὶ γ' ἂν: γ' ἂν for γοῦν was Shilleto's conjecture, which can hardly fail to be right. ἀλλ' οὖν—γε is an emphatic 'but at all events': cf. Gorg. 496 D μανθάνω: ἀλλ' οὖν τό. γε πεινὴν αὐτὸ ἀνισρόν.

29. οὐτῶς οἴοι καὶ νῦν. Sauppe's φοι καὶ νῦν seems to be quite needless: the conclusion is naturally put as a command—'so in the present case, you are to think'.

30. τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποι. So BT. ἀνθρώποι in this emphatic sense is a little awkward with ἀνθρώποι two lines below.
and ἄνθρωπος said seven lines below of savages (though the word is qualified in both cases), but the text is probably right: cf. 323 C ἀναγκαίον οὐδένα δυντ' οὐχὶ ἁμός γέ πως μετέχεις αὐτής (sc. τῆς δικαιοσύνης), η μη εἶναι ἐν ἄνθρωποις. Of the suggested emendations the most reasonable is perhaps Sauppe's ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐννόμοις ἄνθρωποι—which he has now given up in favour of the MSS reading.

31. αὐτὸν is not emphatic: to be δικαίος is to be a δημοφύς δικαιοσύνης, cf. 326 E τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὐδένα δεὶ ἰδιωτεῦειν.

32. μήτε—μήτε—μήτε—μηδέ. μηδέ introduces the climax: see 327 D note on οὗτε—οὔδε γε in Apol. 19 D and Cope on Arist. Rhet. 14. 4. Presently ἄλλ' εἶνεν is used rather than ἄλλ' εἰσὶ (in spite of ἐστίν in line 33) because the hypothetical nature of the case is becoming more prominent. For the passage of a relative clause into a main clause (οὐ is not to be repeated after ἄλλα) see on 313 A.

33. ἄλλ' εἶνεν ἄγριοι τίνες. It appears not only from Athenaeus (v 218 D), but from Suidas and others that the play in question was called Ἀγριοῖ. The few fragments of it which remain (see Kock's Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta 1 pp. 146—150) give us no indication of the plot or treatment. The probability is that the Ἀγριοῖ formed the chorus (compare the names Νεφέλαι, Βάτραχοι etc.), "ad quos"—as we should infer from the words of Plato—"Athenienses quidam, pauci sine dubio, vitae civilis in sua urbe pertaesī (μισάνθρωποι) sicut Pithetaerus et Euelpides, accedebant imprudenter sperantes se inter homines inmanes meliores iuistioremque quam in civitate sua vitam inventuros esse" (Kock). Plato was perhaps thinking of the same play again in Rep. vi 496 D ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσόν, οὗτε εὐναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὗτε ἱκανὸς ὦν εἰς πᾶσιν ἄγριοις ἀντέχειν.

οἷον περ οὓς τέρπειν: so BT, and there is no sufficient reason for altering: the text to οὓς τέρπειν (with Sauppe, after Athenaeus v 218 D) or οὓς περ τέρπειν with Schanz. Plato does not always avail himself of the liberty of attraction: a parallel is quoted from Crat. 432 E ἦνα κομιδή γῇ τοιοῦτον οἶνον περ οὖν θνομά ἐστὶν.

36. τέρπειν. Athenaeus v 218 D ἐδιδάχθησαν δὲ οἱ Ἀγριοὶ ἐπ' Ἀριστίλονος ἄρχοντος, i.e. Ol. 89 4 = 421/420 B.C. For the bearing of the date of the Ἀγριοῖ on the question when the dialogue of the Protagoras is assumed to have taken place see Introd. p. xxxvii.

Φερεκράτης. The fragments of Pherecrates—a poet of the old comedy who gained his first victory in 438 B.C.—are given in Kock's Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta 1 pp. 145—209.
THE APROVAI (also called ΛΗΛΑΙ and τεμενος του Διονυσου) was an enclosure sacred to Dionysus on the south-east slope of the Acropolis. Compare Photius s.v. ΛΗΛΑIOV: περιβόλος μέγας 'Αθήνησιν, εν ὧν τοὺς ἀγώνιας ἦν, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ θέατρον οἰκοδομηθῆναι, ὄνομάζοντες εἰπὶ ΛΗΛΑΙ. The phrase ‘at Lenaecum’ seems to have survived even after all plays were given in the Dionysiac theatre, as by this time they were, and to have been understood as equivalent to ‘at the Lenaean festival’ (cf. Ar. Ach. 504 οὐπὶ ΛΗΛΑΙ ὑ’ ἀγών), for which the expressions εν ΛΗΛΑΙΟΙς and (εἰδίάξθη) εἰς ΛΗΛΑΙΑ are more usual in the didascaliae (see Müller’s Bühnenalterthümer p. 316 note 3). The Lenaea took place in the month Gemelion.

38. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἕκεινῳ τῷ χορῷ, sc. γενόμενοι. γίγνεσθαι ἐν is ‘to come to be in or among’, ‘to fall among’. ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἑγενν-μεθα of 314 C is the same idiom.

ΜΥΣΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ. So the mss. The various suggested emendations (ημιάνθρωποι Heinrich, μιξάνθρωποι Jacobs, μεσάνθρωποι Lehrs) proceed on the supposition that the word is an epithet of the ἄγριον, which is most improbable: ‘αλλὶ sunt ἄγριοι, αλλὶ μυσάνθρωποι, neque in illa sermonis iunctura’ (sc. if we regard the ὥσπερ clause as explaining τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς) ‘scribendum ὥσπερ sed οἷον περ σχιτ’ (Heindorf).

39. ΕΥΡΥΒΑΤΩ καὶ ΦΡΥΝΩΝΔΑ. Two proverbial scoundrels of real life: see Suidas s. vν. Εὐρύβατος πονηρός, ἀπὸ τοῦ περιφέντοις ὑπὸ Κροῖσον ἐπὶ ξενολογιαν μετὰ χρημάτων, ὡς φησιν 'Εφορος, εἶτα μεταβαλομένου πρὸς Κύρον· ἵν ὤδ 'Εφέσίων κτλ. Φρυνώνδας τῶν ἐπὶ πονηρία διαβεβημένων, ὡς ξένοι ὧν κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ διέτριβεν 'Αθήνησι—ἐκ τοῦτο τοὺς πονηροὺς Φρυνώνδας καλοῦσι. They are frequently mentioned in Greek literature: see Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 861. Blaydes remarks that -ώνδας is a Boeotian termination: cf. Εσπαμευώνδας, Χαρώνδας and the like.

327 E 42. οὐδές σοι φαίνεται εἶναι. εἶναι is Heindorf’s emendation for εἶδ’ of the Bodleian. For the asyndeton with ὥσπερ see above on 311 E.

43. τὸς διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἀθηνίζειν. The same illustration occurs in Alc. I 111 Α.

328 A 48. τοῦτος επὶ τὸς ἄν διδάξει τὸν χειροτεχνόν υἱὲς: and οὐ μέδοις οἷμαι εἶναι—τοῦτω διδάσκαλον φανήσαι is a variety on οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς φανείτ’, which the οὐδέ γ’ ἄν of line 44 might lead us to expect would be repeated—but the sentence is a
slight anacoluthon. This is better than to take ἄν of οὐδὲ γ' ἄν in line 44 with εἶναι of line 49.

51. οὔτω δὲ ἀρετῆς. On οὔτω δὲ see above rare in Plato, e.g. Meno 72 C κἂν εἰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ἀπασαι ἔχουσιν: it is extremely common in Aristotle. The ἄν shews that the idiom must have arisen from cases where the apodosis contained a verb with which ἄν could go, e.g. κἂν εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι, εὐ ἔχοι. Such cases as Symp. 185 Α κἂν εἰ τις — ἐξαπατηθεῖν, καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη, where the verb after εἰ is in the optative, preserve traces of the origin of the construction.

52. κἂν εἰ: κἂν = καὶ εἰ is somewhat rare in Plato, e.g. Μeno 72 C κᾱν εἰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ἀπασαι ἔχουσιν: it is extremely common in Aristotle. The ἄν shews that the idiom must have arisen from cases where the apodosis contained a verb with which ἄν could go, e.g. κἂν εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι, εὐ ἔχοι. Such cases as Symp. 185 Α κἂν εἰ τις — ἐξαπατηθεῖν, καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη, where the verb after εἰ is in the optative, preserve traces of the origin of the construction.

53. οὖν ἄλλα τινα πρὸς. οὖν ἄλλα is Dobree’s correction for νοήσαι: 328 B cf. Rep. X 601 D εἴπερ οἶδος τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετῆν οὖν ἄλλαν ἀνθρώπων.

54. τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ. Aristotle Eth. Nic. IX 2. 1164 a 24 ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν ὅτε γὰρ διδάξεις ἀδήπτοτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθήτα ἐκέλευν ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπιστασθαι καὶ ἐλάβανε τοσοῦτον. This is more than Plato says: see next note.

55. ἀποδέδωκεν: but κατέθηκεν (gnomic aorist) two lines lower down. It is not necessary to reject ἀποδέδωκεν (with Sauppe and Schanz) or to read ἀπέδωκεν (with Kroschel and Kral). ἀποδέδωκεν is hardly to be explained as a gnomic perfect (Goodwin), certain examples of which are rare, if not unknown, but is to be taken in its natural sense: ‘if he prefers, he has already paid... if not etc.’: this is also Heindorf’s view. Unless the pupil had paid in advance, Protagoras left the fee to his own conscience and (according to his own account, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθῶτι) generally fared better, even though (if Diogenes Laertius IX 52 may be trusted) his fee was 100 minae. If Protagoras made no bad debts, he escapes the censure of Plato in Gorgias 519 C, where it is said that, if teachers of δικαίωσύνη do not receive their fees, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and deserve no fees.


62. τῶνδε. Protagoras is more encouraging than Socrates in 319 E.
CHAPTER XVII.

Here begins Socrates' criticism of Protagoras' speech. The question is first raised—Is Virtue one, or many? The connexion between this question and the speech of Protagoras is that if Virtue has a unity in knowledge, it is teachable, otherwise not: see Introd. p. xx.

328 D 2. ἐπιδειξάμενος. ἐπιδεικνυόμενον and ἐπιδειξὴς are regularly used of a Sophistic display: e.g. Gorg. 447 Α πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Ποργίλιος ἡμῶν ὀλγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο, Crat. 384 Β τὴν πεντηκοντάραξιον ἐπιδείξην. ἐπιδεικνύμενος is also sometimes used in the same way, e.g. Euthyd. 274 D and infra 347 B: in 320 C above ἀλλὰ ἐπιδείξου is intended to suggest this meaning, which comes out more clearly in ἐπιδείξῳ two lines below.

3. ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνων goes with ἐβλέπων and ἐτὶ with κεκηλη-μένος.


9. ὁδε in the sense of δεόρο is noted as a Platonic idiom by the lexicographers. The usage is found in tragedy, but no other example is quoted from Plato.


15. ἐπεκδίδαξε—ἐξειδίδαξεν: see on 311 Α.

329 A 17. τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιοῦτος λόγους: καλ goes with τοιοῦτος—'even such', 'just such': τοῦτο should not be inserted (with Sauppe, Schanz, Kral) before τοιοῦτος.

20. ὀσπερ βιβλία. Hermann wished to read οὐχ ὀσπερ βιβλία, since the orators do make a speech when spoken to: but the point is that like books they do not answer the questions asked, or put questions themselves, as the true dialectician does: cf. Phaedr. 275 Ν δεινῶν γάρ ποιοῦ—τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφῆ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ᾿Ισογραφή, καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκεῖνης ἑκγονὰ ἑστηκε μὲν ὡς ἐστάτα, εἰτ' ἀνέργα τι, σεμνῶς πάνω συγά. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι: δόξαις μὲν ἀν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοῦς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τὶ ἐρή τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενοι μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μὸνον ταῦτα ἂν: infra 347 E and Hipp. Min. 365 Τ τῶν μὲν ὁμορο—ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδή καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι, τί ποτε νοών ταῦτα ἐποίησε τὰ ἐπη. A similar objection applies to laws: see Polit. 294 Α (quoted above on 326 D).

22. ὀσπερ τὰ χαλκία. The mss have χαλκεῖα, but (as Kro-
schel points out) in Crat. 430 A εἰ τι χαλκίον κινήσει κρούσας. χαλκεῖα would mean ‘smithies’.

23. μακρὸν ήξει καὶ ἀποτελεῖ: ἀποτελεῖ is used absolutely as in Gorg. 458 B καὶ νῦν Ἰωάν πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν. Compare Euthyd. 300 B ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρα, οὐ συγνώσαι λέγεις; οὐκ οἷς ἡ ἐγώ, ἐφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις (mss. χαλκίοις), ἀλλὰ φυσιγγήμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τα σιδηρα λέγει.

25. δόλιχον κατατελοῦσι τοῦ λόγου. δόλιχον is the reading of B and T, but (1) the adjective δόλιχός seems to be exclusively poetic, the word surviving in Plato’s time only in the form δόλιχος δρόμος (cf. for the change of accent κάκη by κακή, Ψαῦδρος by ψαῦδρος and the like): (2) δόλιχός τοῦ λόγου would be a rare construction, though not without parallels, e.g. πολλὴν τῆς χώρας in Xen. Cyrop. ΙΙΙ 2. 2 and τῆς μαρκής συχνῆν in Ar. Ach. 350: ἀμήχανον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας of Apol. 41 c is different: (3) after the expressive simile which we have had, ‘a long speech’ sounds very weak. On the other hand δόλιχος τοῦ λόγου, the suggestion of Stephanus, is strongly supported by 335 εὐχετε Socrates compares Protagoras, because he plays the ἄρτωρ and not the dialectician, to a δολιχόδρομος: νῦν δ' ἐστιν ὦσπερ ἐν εἰ δεόν μοι Κράσων τῷ Ἰμεραλῷ δρομεῖ ακμάζοντι ἐπεσθαίν ἦ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἦ τῶν ἦμεροδρόμων διαθέν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαίν, and the editors quote a number of parallels to the metaphor, such as Plut. Phoc. 23. 3 καλὸς ἐφη πρὸς τὸ στάδιον, τῶν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι; Epicrates in Kock’s Com. Att. Frag. Vol. II p. 283 ἐπεί δὲ δολίχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἥδη τρέχειν, Ar. Clouds 430 τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι με λέγειν ἔκατον στάδιον ἀριστον and Frogs 91 πλεῖν ἦ στάδιον λαλατέρα, Eupolis (Kock l. c. I p. 281) (of Pericles) ὅποτε παράλθει δ' ὦσπερ ἀγαθόν δρομῆς ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ἢρει λέγων τοὺς ἰθηρας. Dropping the sporting metaphor we may say ‘spin out a league of verbiage against you’. The δόλιχος was 24 στάδια, the στάδιον being covered 12 times both ways: cf. Pind. Ol. ΙΙΙ 33.

27. ὃς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ. The mss read αὐτά, which most recent 329 B editors change to αὐτό with Stephanus, regarding the idiom as analogous to that in 324 Α αὐτό σε διδάξει, but in this idiomatic use of αὐτό the verb is generally, if not always, in the future. αὐτό ποὺ λέγει in Ar. Eq. 204 and the cases quoted by Blaydes in loc. are different, since in each case αὐτό has a definite antecedent expressed. ὃς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ is simply as ‘things themselves’ i.e. ‘as facts shew’: the reference is to the speech which Protagoras has just delivered.

A. P.
Compare Arist. Pol. IV 12. 1331a 21 δῆλον ὃς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται κτλ., and (with Heindorf) Xen. Cyr. VI 1. 7 οὐκ οἶδα μὲν ἐγώγε, εἶ τι δεῖ λόγων, ὅπου αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα δείκνυε τῷ κράτιστον.

31. εἰ μοι ἀποκρίνατο τόδε. The optative follows σμικρόν τινὸς ἐνδεχὸν εἰμὶ πάντ' ἐχειν as virtually equivalent to πάντ' ἀν ἔχωμι (Hein-dorf).

32. εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοῦμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. The fulness of expression is no doubt intentional: Socrates politely dwells upon his compliment. The objections to the syntax are two-fold: (1) ἀν with the optative in protasis; (2) εἴπερ (in clauses of this kind) with its verb expressed. Cases of the potential optative in the protasis are given by Goodwin MT. p. 192 (e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 3 εἴ γε μηδὲ δούλων ἄκρατη δεξαμεθ' ἀν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτῶν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιούτων γενόσθαι;) for εἴπερ with verb expressed Heindorf cites Meno 98 B ἄλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἄν εἰδέναι (ὁλγά δ' ἄν φαίην) ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τούτο ἐκείνων θείην ἄν ὡς οἶδα. Socrates' νῦν δὲ πέπεισ-μαι (hardly serious) in 328 E is not inconsistent with πειθοῦμην ἄν, since he at once qualifies his assent by πλὴν σμικρὸν τὶ μοι ἐμποδῶν: it is sufficiently represented here by καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. We therefore agree with Heindorf, Wayne, and Turner in retaining the MSS reading: other editors mostly read either εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθο-μην ἄν καὶ σοὶ, or drop πειθοῦμην ἄν and retain καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.

329 C 35. ἔλεγες γάρ: 322 C δικαιοσύνη and αἰδώς are looked on as two distinct virtues.

36. πολλαχοῦ: 324 E—325 Λ: cf. 323 Α and Ε.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Socrates elicits from Protagoras (1) that while Virtue as a whole is one, the single virtues differ from each other and form the whole like the parts of the face: that it is possible to possess one virtue without possessing all: and that in all there are five virtues, justice, temperance, holiness, bravery, wisdom, of which the last is greatest (329 D—330 Α): (2) that the virtues differ from each other not only in themselves, but in their δύναμις (330 Α—330 Β): (3) that justice is just, and holiness holy (330 Β—330 Ε). The refutation of Protagoras does not begin till the next chapter.

329 D 4. προσώπου: προσώπου is treated as an abstract conception—'parts of face': cf. ἡπιχ in 313 C κατάρρης τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀφ' ὧν ἡπιχ̣ ἑρεθεῖ: Rep. IV 435 C εἰς φαύλον γε αὐ—σκόμμα ἐπιπεπτόκαμεν περὶ
ψυχής, εἰτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἰδὴ ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῇ εἰτε μὴ. In Aristotelian language, the face is ἀνομοιομερές.

7. ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὀλον: so the mss and Heindorf (who suggests ἀλλήλων τε καὶ τοῦ ὀλον): recent editors mostly omit either ἀλλήλων or τὰ ἑτερα τῶν ἑτέρων. τὰ ἑτερα τῶν ἑτέρων should be taken quite generally, τῶν ἑτέρων (and thus, by implication, τὰ ἑτερα) having its meaning defined by the clause ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὀλον. τὰ ἑτερα τῶν ἑτέρων could be dropped without injury to the sense, but hardly ἀλλήλων: without ἀλλήλων Plato would have written ὅπον διαφέρει τὸ ἑτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὀλον: cf. 330 Α ἁρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἑτερον οἷον τὸ ἑτερον (not τὰ ἑτερα οἷα τὰ ἑτερα): and so 330 Ε, 331 Α, 331 Η, 349 Β, 359 Α.

11. μεταλαμβάνονσιν—μορίων—ἄλλο. μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέ- 329 Ε χειν, μεταδίδοναι and the like take an accusative of the part as well as a genitive of the whole. μεταλαμβάνειν μορίων=‘to receive a part of a whole’: μεταλαμβάνειν μορίου=‘to receive a part of a part’.


15. καὶ ταῦτα: for σοφία and ἀνδρεία have not yet been named —only δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη and ὁσιότης. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

17. καὶ μέγιστον γε σοφία: Protagoras speaks as a σοφιστής, 330 Α glorifying his profession.

18. ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο: equivalent to τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο. τὸ δέ, τὰ δὲ etc. without preceding τὸ μὲν, τὰ μὲν etc. is a frequent idiom. Crat. 399 Λ πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ' ἐξαιροῦμεν. Soph. Ο. Τ. 1229 οἴμαι γὰρ οὔτ' ἄν Ἰστρόν οὔτε Ψάσων ἢν ἵλει καθαρ- μῷ τῆς τῆς στεγῆς σοι κεύθει, τὰ δ' αὐτίκ' εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακά.

20. ὄσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου: we have placed the mark of interrogation before ὄσπερ: see on ἄλλο γε in 311 Ε. The sentence ὄσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός οἷον τὰ ὡτα thus corre- sponds exactly to ἁρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἑτερον οἷον τὸ ἑτερον. For τὰ τοῦ προσώπου followed by its parts in the same case compare infra 349 Α ἑκείνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δε and Theaet. 151 Α οἷς ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι—ἔνιοις μὲν—ἀποκωλύει σωφρι- ναί, ἔνιοις δὲ ἐδ. For the asyndeton regular in explanatory and ampliative clauses see note on Apol. 22 Α.
NOTES ON XVIII 330 B

330 B 27. ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἐφη, ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες. So T: B has only ἄλλ οὕτως, ἐφη. The longer form of answer is more suited to Protagoras' style.

330 C 32. ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τι ἐστιν. Compare infra 332 A ἀφροσύνην τι καλέσι; 332 C, 358 D. Plato frequently begins a train of reasoning in this way.

34. καλ ἐμοί: so T: B has καλ μοι. καλ ἐμοί seems slightly better than κάμοι, as forming a more effective balance to ἐμοί μὲν in the last line.

35. ὁ Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Σώκρατες: but ἐμε τε καλ σέ as Greek usage requires. Protagoras is addressed first on the principle seniores priores and honoris causa; contrast 311 D, and compare 353 A (Kroschel).

330 D 47. οἷον ἀνόσιον ἐλναι ἡ οἷον ὁσιον. Notice the identification of the 'not ὁσιον' with ἀνόσιον: see below on 331 A.

330 E 49. εὐφήμει, ἃ ἀνθρωπε. ἃ ἀνθρωπε is somewhat brusque: so ἃ ἀνθρωποι in 314 D above. ἀνθρωπε without ἃ would border on rudeness: e.g. Gorg. 518 C ἵως ἄν ὄν ἡγανάκτεις, ἐλ σοι ἐλεγον, ἀνθρωπε, οὐδὲν ἐπάλεις περὶ γυμναστικῆς. εὐφήμει is frequent to express shocked surprise, real or feigned: e.g. Rep. I 329 C, Meno 91 B ('Ηράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὁ Σώκρατες), Gorg. 469 A, Euthyd. 301 A.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates endeavours to refute Protagoras and to shew that Justice and Holiness are identical. If ὁσίωτης is not οἷον δικαιοσύνη, nor δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσίωτης, it will follow (says Socrates) that ὁσίωτης is ἀδικον and δικαιοσύνη ἀνόσιον. This is absurd, and therefore ὁσίωτης is δικαίον and δικαιοσύνη is ὁσιον. Protagoras will only admit that there is a certain likeness between the two virtues.
4. τα της ἀρετῆς μόρια. B and T omit the article, which can hardly be dispensed with—since the assertion was made not of parts of virtue, but of the i.e. all the parts: see 330 Α ἄρπ' οὖν οὔτως καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἔτερον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον—; ἡ δέλα δὴ οτι οὔτως ἔχει κτλ.;

οὔτως—ὡς. ὥστε for ὡς would be more usual: cf. Rep. Π 365 D εἰς ὡν τὰ μὲν πέλοσμεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. Perhaps the ὡς of Phaedo 108 E πέπεισμαι—ὡς πρῶτον μὲν—μητὲν αὐτῇ δεὶν μὴτε ἀέρος κτλ. is the same in kind: cf. the old English 'so as'. Here οὔτως—ὡς with the infinitive is natural in view of τοιοῦτον οἷον in the vicinity: 330 C and D.

ΠΙ—ΠΙ. οὐ—σῶς: notice the mock asperity: I expected better things of you.

16. οὐκ ἀρα ἔστιν: the interrogation begins here and ἀρα is illative.

17. ἄλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον. So far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (line 18) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato's dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7 Α θεομοιότες, where are cited Alcib. Π 138 D foll., Rep. ΙV 437 C: add Phileb. 48 B foll. where φθόνος is said to be joy at a friend's misfortune because envy of a friend's success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. ibid. 50 Α), and Euthyd. 276 B οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφολ, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201 Ε—202 Α), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to be content with negations; whence words like ἀνωφελῆς, ἀφθονός acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact ('Αθηναὶν πολίτης Ch. 8 ad fin.) ὅσ ἐν στασιαζόνσι τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθηται τὰ ὀπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332 Α line 3.

18. ἄλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα: Heindorf's emendation for ἄλλα δικαιον ἄρα, the reading of the best MSS, which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shews how to correct. Heindorf's correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἄρα is illative. For τὸ μὲν un-expressed (the words are equivalent to ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἀδικον ἄρα) before τὸ δὲ see on 330 Α ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

22. ὀτι is 'because', not 'that': see note on line 24 below.

23. δικαιότης ὅσιότητι. Socrates gives the words the same termination to suggest their closer likeness ('justness' to holiness): δικαιότης is found also in Gorg. 508 Α as a balance to κοσμιότητα.
Plato was fond of this suffix and coined by it the word ποιότης
Theaet. 182 a.

24. καὶ μάλιστα πάντων—οἷον δικαιοσύνη. Kroschel objects
to the emphasis, and inclines to doubt the genuineness of this clause.
If ὅτι in line 22 is translated as 'because' and not as 'that',
the difficulty disappears. ταύτα ἀν ταύτα in line 22 thus means simply
that δικαίοσύνη is ὅσιον and ὅσιότης δίκαιον (lines 20—21), which
is the meaning also assigned to ταύτα ἀν ταύτα by Protagoras in his
reply (line 27 foll.). Socrates (for Protagoras) will reply that
δικαίοσύνη is ὅσιον and ὅσιότης δίκαιον for two main reasons: (1)
because δικαιότης is the same as ὅσιότης—this he does not much
insist on—or because δικαιότης is ὅ τι ὑμιᾶτατον ὅσιότητι—this he
insists on more: (2) because δικαιοσύνη is ὅσιον ὅσιότης ὅσιον
δικαιοσύνη—this he insists on most of all (μάλιστα πάντων), and with
reason, because it expressly refutes Protagoras' assertion in 330 a—b.
On the other hand if ὅτι is translated as 'that', Kroschel's objections
can hardly be got over—viz. that ἦτοι ταύτων—δικαίοσύνη is not the
same as Socrates' reply on his own behalf; that the words are ignored
both by Protagoras in his reply and by Socrates himself in 333 b;
and that the emphasis of μάλιστα πάντων is strained and unnatural.

331 C 28. ἀπλοῦν: opposed to ἀλλὰ τι μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον
εἶναι in 29. Plato uses ἀπλοῦν, as opposed to διπλοῦν, διάφορον,
σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον and the like, of that which is
uniform, simple, true without any difference or qualifications: Bonitz in
Hermes i (1867) p. 307 foll.

32. μὴ μοι: see on μὴ ὄντως in 318 b.

33. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο—ἐλέγχεσθαι, cf. infra 333 c τὸν γὰρ
λόγου ἠγωγε μάλιστα ἔξετάξω, συμβαινει μὲντοι ἵσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν
ἔρωτώτα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔξετάξεσθαι. Here τὸ, as often, intro-
duces a quotation.

34. τὸ δ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ τοῦτο λέγω: τοῦτο (cf. line 33) belongs
to the τὸ δ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ and not to λέγω in the usual sense of τοῦτο
λέγω 'I mean this'.

331 D 38. τὸ γάρ λευκὸν τῷ μελαν. Anaxagoras went so far as to say
that snow was black (because it is still water, though congealed):
Ritter and Preller § 128 note b.

39. ὁπη: an old emendation for δ μῆ.

44. ταύτα: the parts of the face.

331 E 47. κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔξοδο τὸ ὁμοιον. This (the MSS reading)
is successfully defended by Kroschel. The emphasis is on the first
part of the sentence (‘it is not right to call what has some likeness like—any more than to call what has some unlikeness unlike—even if the likeness be very small’), to which accordingly καὶ πάντως σμικρὸν ἐχθρὸ τὸ ὦμως reverts: compare Socrates’ reply, which says nothing of τὸ ἀνόμως, in the next sentence. The German editors (except Cron and Kroschel) either reject τὸ ὦμως (Schanz, Sauppe, Bertram), or read τὸ ἀνόμως ἢ τὸ ὦμως (Heindorf) or reject altogether the words οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμως τι ἐχόντα ἀνόμως (Kral).

**CHAPTER XX.**

Without establishing more surely the identity of justice and holiness, Socrates now seeks to prove the identity of temperance and wisdom, and begins to discuss the relation between temperance and justice.

The proof that temperance and wisdom are the same is briefly as follows: ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σοφία, and also of σωφροσύνη: but a thing can have but one opposite: therefore σοφία and σωφροσύνη are identical. It is admitted at once that ἀφροσύνη and σοφία are opposites: the proof that ἀφροσύνη is ἐναντίον σωφροσύνη is of some length and (as well as the assertion that a thing can have but one opposite) assumes the identity of the contrary and contradictory. The usual sense of ἀφροσύνη (intellectual folly) and the meaning natural from its derivation (as the opposite of σωφροσύνη) are also—as is natural to one who holds that vice is ignorance—identified, and the whole argument is unnecessarily spun out.

1. ἀφροσύνη τι καλεῖς. See above on 330 c.

3. πότερον δὲ ὤταν. Here begins the proof that σωφροσύνη is ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνη. (1) τὸ ὀρθὸς and ὑφελλµυς πράττειν is σωφρονεῖ, and σωφροσύνη is that by which one σωφρονεῖ: (2) τὸ μὴ ὀρθὸς πράττειν is ἀφρόνως πράττειν and οὐ σωφρονεῖ: from which it is inferred that ἀφρόνως πράττειν is the opposite of σωφρόνως πράττειν, or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σωφροσύνη. In equating μὴ ὀρθὸς with ἀφρόνως πράττειν in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory and contrary: see on 331 A.

6. ἡ τούναντιον. So Stallbaum, after Heindorf’s ἡ τούναντιον πράττειν: the MSS have ἡ εἶ τούναντιον ἐπράττον, which is faulty both because it in no way corresponds to the answer σωφρονεῖ and because εἶ with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In ἡ τούναντιον it
will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between \(ωφρονέαυ\) and its opposite: see above on line 3.

332 C 19. \(φέρε \ θή\). From here to line 27 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one \(εναντιον\). This is true only if we confine \(εναντιον\) to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the \(εναντιον\) of \(καλόν\) is \(μη \ καλόν\): as soon as we say that its \(εναντιον\) is \(αλοχρόν\) we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since \(μη \ καλόν\) is not \(αλοχρόν\) but may be anything in the whole world except \(καλόν\). This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

332 D 27. \(άναλογογησάμεθα\): of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. 1 330 E, x 618 c.

33—34. \(υπό \ ωφροσύνης—υπὸ \ αφροσύνης\). This has not been admitted in so many words, but with \(ωφροσύνη\) and \(αφροσύνη\) for \(υπό \ ωφροσύνης\) and \(υπὸ \ αφροσύνης\: 332 B\ line 12: cf. C line 18.

332 E 40. \(έμπροσθεν\: 332 A\.

44. \(τὸ\) does not belong to \(ἐν\) but to the clause \(ἔν \ ἐνι \ μονον\ \(εναντιον\ \(εναι\): cf. \(τὸ \ εἰ \ βούλει \ τούτο\ in 331 C\. \(εκείνον\ refers to Chapter XVIII.

333 A 49. \(οὐ \ πάνυ \ μουσικᾶς—συναρμόττοσιν\). “In his lenem agnosco Sophistae irisionem, qui supra § 43” (326 b) \(πάντα \ τῶν\ \(βλον\ \(τῶν \ ἀνθρῶπων\ \(εὐφυγίας \ τε \ καὶ \ εὐαρμοστιάς \δεῖσθαι\ \(διξισσε\\). Heindorf.

333 B 52. \(πλείω \ δὲ \ μή\). B reads \(πλείοσιν\, T \(πλείοσι: \(πλείω is a suggestion of Heindorf’s, adopted by most editors. The nominatives \(ἐν \ μονον\ in line 51 and \(σοφία \ and \(ωφροσύνη in 53 are strongly in favour of \(πλείω\). If \(πλείοσιν\ is retained, it must be regarded as a blemish in Plato’s style.

59. \(τὰ \ λοιπά\). If \(δικαιοσύνης=δισύτης\ and \(ωφροσύνης=σοφία it remains to identify either \(δικαιοσύνη or \(δισύτης with either \(ωφροσύνη or \(σοφία in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that \(δικαιοσύνη=σωφροσύνη\.

60. \(οἱ \ αἰσχικά\: \(οἱ (cf. infra 333 D, and Parm. 155 E) is equivalent to \(κατὰ \ τούτο \ δ: \ cf. Rep. 1 340 D \(ἐπεὶ \ αὐτικά \ \(ίατρὸν \ καλείς \ εὐ \ τὸν \ \(εξαμαρτάνοντα \ \(περὶ \ τοὺς \ κάμνοντας \ \(κατ’ \ αὐτὸ \ τούτο \ \(δ \ \(εξαμαρτάνει; \ \(οἱ \ the relative and \(οἱ \ the conjunction shade into one another here. There is much to be said for Cron’s view that the words should be written alike: see on Apology, Appendix II. p. 123.

333 C 62. \(πολλοὶ \ γέ \ \(φασιν\). In Rep. 1 348 B foll., Thrasymachus
assists that ἀδικία is εὐθυλία, ἀρετή, καλὸν and ἵσχυρόν: compare also Polus in Gorg. 469 b foll. Notice that Protagoras' ὁ πίν opinion—that ἀδικία is not compatible with σωφροσύνη—makes for the identification of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη.

65. τὸν τῶν πολλῶν: on account of the τῶν here, Heindorf wished to insert ὃ before πολλοὶ in line 62, but such a view could hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf. Rep. I 348 E εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικλαί ἐπίθεσο, κακλαί μὲντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ εἰναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινὲς, εἰχομεν ἢν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες κτλ. As Sauppe points out, the article τῶν refers only to the above-mentioned πολλοῖ. With the situation compare Rep. VII 527 E foll. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει, ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους ἄλλα σαυτοῦ ἐνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μην οὐδ’ ἢν ἄλλω εἰ τίς τι δύναι τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁνομαθαί.

66. εὖτ’ οὖν—εἰτε: see on Apol. 34 E.

CHAPTER XXI.

Before Socrates has completed his proof that σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are identical, Protagoras takes occasion to deliver an irrelevant though carefully constructed harangue on ἀγαθά.


6. ἐστω. Protagoras has already disclaimed this view in 333 b.

8. οὕτι ἀδικοῦσιν: Hirschig suggested δ’ τι ἀδικοῦσιν, but see on 333 b. Schanz rejects the words, but without sufficient reason.

9. εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες. εὖ is here primarily of success, and κακῶς of failure, but the collocation of εὖ πράττειν with ἀδικεῖν is intended to suggest that the view which Protagoras is defending is a paradox. Plato frequently makes use of the double sense (as we should call it): but see on Euthyphr. 3 a) of εὖ πράττειν, εὖ ξῆν and the like, to imply that the virtuous life is the happy one: e.g. Alcib. 116 b foll.: Rep. I 353 E foll.: Charm. 172 A, 173 D: compare Euthyd. 281 c.

10. λέγεις οὖν ἄγαθα. Socrates proceeds to elucidate the definition of εὖ in εὖ πράττειν.

12. ὥφελμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Xen. Mem. iv 6. 8 ἄλλο δ’ ἢν τι φαίνει ἄγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὥφελμον; οὐκ ἐγὼ, ἐφη. τὸ ἄρα ὥφελμον
NOTES ON

333 E 15. ἀγωνιάν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. The martial metaphor in the desiderative ἀγωνιάν is carried on by παρατετάχθαι, which is the mss reading, and means literally ‘to be set in array’, cf. Thuc. iv 43. 3 οὗτοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἑσχατοί. For the metaphorical use cf. Rep. iii 399 B ἐν πάσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτεροῖν-τως ἀμυνουμένον τὴν τύχην. The whole clause describes the outward demeanour of Protagoras, which causes Socrates to fear an imminent personal conflict. Kock’s παρατετάσθαι, accepted by Schanz, does not suit, since παρατετάσθαι means ‘to be tired, worn out’, e.g. Euthyd. 303 B καὶ γελώντε καὶ κροτώντε...ὁλγον παρετάθησαν, cf. Ar. Clouds 213. It is noteworthy that συντεταγμένως and συντεταγμένωσ are frequently found as variants in Platonic mss.

334 A 20. οἶδαμός, ἐφη. The argument is here broken off, and not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is ὑφέλιμον for man is for hίμ ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore been: σωφρονείν, it is said, is ἀδίκειν. But σωφρονεῖν = εὖ φρονεῖν = εὖ βουλευοθαι if (but only if) εὖ πράττειν (i.e. ὑφέλιμα πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words ὑφέλιμα πράττειν = ἄδικειν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the Gorgias to refute.

πολλὰ ὁδ’ ἄ. The speech which follows may be from some work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie v 2, p. 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν, mentioned by Diog. Laert. ix 8. 55 (since ἀρετή is a general word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion ‘true’ was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος) as relative, so here the notion ‘good’ is represented as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.

21. ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὑφέλιμα: ἀνθρώποις μὲν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the sentence would be very cumbrous, running somewhat as follows: ἔγγυε τολλὰ οἶδ’ ἀ ἀνθρώποις μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἀνθρωφήλῃ ἑστὶ, καὶ σίτια—μυρία, <τοῖς δὲ ἀλλοις τιποῖς καὶ φυτοῖς ὑφέλιμα>, τὰ δὲ γε <ὑφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δὲ ἀλλοις ἀνωφελῆ>. For μὲν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήματι in Euthyphr. 3 c, and on 330 A above for τὰ δὲ without a preceding τὰ μὲν. ἀνωφελῆ is ‘hurtful’, as frequently: see above on οἶον μὴ δοσιν in 331 A. With Protagoras’ classification of ὑφέλιμα—
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άνωφελή—οὐδέτερα compare Gorg. 467 ε ἂρι οὖν ἐστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὥς οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθὸν· γ' ἐστὶν ἡ κακὸν ἡ μεταξύ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν (where see Thompson's note) and infra 351 D.

24. οὐδένι: Schanz follows Naber in reading οὐδέσι against the MSS both here and in Euthyd. 302 c. The plural would be more appropriate here, but what is denied of all individuals is denied of the species, and the dative plural of οὐδέσι seems to lack authority.

28. el δ' εἴθελοις—πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν. Heindorf suggests el δ' 334 B ἐθέλεις—the indicative being generally used in this phrase, e.g. Alcib. 1 122 B el δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι κτλ.—αἰσχυνθείης ἄν ἐπὶ σαντῷ: but Goodwin MT. p. 188 § 500 quotes a precisely similar example from Thuc. II 39. 5 καὶ ἐπὶ ἐλαυνυμάλλον ἥ πόνων μελέτη—ἐθέλοιμεν κινήσεσθαι, περιγγιγνεῖσθαι ἧμῖν κτλ. In both examples the present in the apodosis contains a reference to the future.

30. φυτοίς—πάγκακον. Theophr. Hist. Plant. IV 16. 5 πολέμιον γάρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ἐλαιον) πάσι· καὶ ἐλαιον ἐπιχέονσι τοῖς ὑπολείμμασι τῶν μικρῶν· ἵσχυε δὲ μάλλον τὸ ἐλαιον ἐν τοῖς νέοις καὶ ἀρτι φυμένοις· ἀπεθανέστερα γάρ κτλ.

ταῖς θριξὶν—ἀνθρώπου. Arist. peri ζύψων γενέσεως V 5. 785a 30 foll. says that a mixture of oil and water is a remedy against grey hairs.

34. ἐνταῦθα, i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

36. ταύτων. This form, not ταὐτῷ, of the neuter of ὁ αὐτός is 334 C almost regular in Plato: see on 314 B.

38. μέλλει, sc. ὁ ἁσθενῶν: see on 319 D.


τὴν δυσχέρειαν—δυσοίς. The nausea is of course that felt by a sick person at the smell of food: so far there is therefore no reason for holding μινῶν to be corrupt and reading χυμῶν (as Kroschel formerly read), still less ευκρινῶν with Bergk. But it is not clear how oil could thus prevent nausea, nor does there seem to be any parallel among the ancients to such a statement. It is known that the ancients (like many modern peoples) used oil in cooking much as we use butter (see Blümner's Privataltherthümer p. 228), but the present passage seems rather to point to the use of some kind of fragrant oil sprinkled on the food after it was cooked. The Greeks were at all events not unfamiliar with the use
of scents in banqueting: see Xen. Symp. II 2 foll. Kroschel thinks Plato is making fun of Protagoras by putting into his mouth the word ‘ρινών pro πικρῶν vel χυμών’, but this view will hardly command assent.

CHAPTER XXII.

This and the next three chapters form a kind of interlude. In this chapter Socrates, protesting against Protagoras’ long replies, remembers an engagement and is about to go, and Callias beseeches him to stay.

334 D 11. καὶ βραχυτέρας πολεῖ. Hirschig would reject the words, but they explain the metaphor in σύντεμυν: see on 314 A κυβένης τε καὶ κυνδύνευς.

334 E 15. οὖσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Compare Gorg. 461 D τί δέ; οὐκ ἔξεσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

19. καὶ αὖ βραχέα. Sauppe cites Gorg. 449 C καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τούτο ἐν ἐστιν ὃν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέρους ἐμοὺ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. τούτου μὴν δέ, ὥ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπιδείξων αὐτῶν τούτου πολλαί, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαύθις: cf. also Gorg. 461 D and Phaedr. 267 B.


See on 311 E.

26. ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρον ὄνομα. With ἐγένετο ὄνομα (for which Kroschel reads ἐλέγετο ὄνομα) cf. Apol. 20 D τί ποι’ ἐστιν τούτῳ δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν: γλυκεσθαι is the usual passive to ποιεῖν. With the sentence generally cf. Euthyphr. 4 B—5 A where Euthyphros says οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὀφελοῖ εἰτ’, ὥ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τώ ἄν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ κτλ.: see note in loc. for more parallels.

27. οὔκ ἢρεσεν—καὶ—οὔκ ἔθελησον. The combination of indicative and optative in the same sentence in indirect speech is fairly common: Goodwin MT. p. 261 § 670.

335 B 30. ἡγησάμενος. Heindorf conjectures ἡγησάμενος ὅΤι, but οὗν may be dispensed with after a short parenthesis.

40. ἑνα συνονοσία ἐγίνετο. For this construction see note on Crito 44 D el γὰρ ὄφελον—οἷοι τ’ εἶναι—ἐνα οἷοι τ’ ἡσαν. A secondary tense of the indicative is found with ἑνα and ὅπως (without ἄν) in final clauses dependent on a wish which can no longer be fulfilled, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: Goodwin MT. p. 120 § 333. The idiom is frequent in Plato and sometimes corrupted by scribes e.g. Meno 89 b ἡμεῖς ἄν παραλαβόντες—ἐφολάττομεν—ἐνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἄφικοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρῆσιμοι γιγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσι—where perhaps we should read ἄφικοντο and ἐγίνετο. See Cobet’s Variae Lectiones pp. 102, 359.

47. τρίβωνος. The ordinary clothing of an Athenian consisted of a χιτών, or shirt, with a ἱμάτιον or short mantle worn above it. The τρίβων was a short cloak of coarse material worn by the Spartans and sometimes by the Laconisers in other states to take the place of both χιτών and ἱμάτιον. It was the ordinary garment of Socrates (Symp. 219 b), and was afterwards much affected by the more ascetic philosophers, such as the Cynics (Diog. Laert. vi 1. 13). Its use was supposed to be a mark of sturdy simplicity and austerity of manners.

50. οὔδ’ ἄν ἐνός. The two parts of οὐδεὶς are sometimes separated by ἄν or a preposition, often with the effect (as here) of increasing the emphasis by making οὐδεὶς—ne—quidem, cf. infra on 343 D οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑνα λόγον.


54. φιλοσοφίαν. The original meaning of the word φιλοσοφία was ‘love of knowledge for its own sake’, no particular kind of knowledge being specified. The verb φιλοσοφεῖν is first found in Herod. I 30 ὡς φιλοσοφιζέων γῆν πολλῆν δειρήση εἰνεκεν ἐπεθελνυσαι. In the present passage (as in Thuc. II 40 φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μακαλιᾶς) the word retains its original wider meaning, viz. ‘love of knowledge’ in general; but side by side with this in Plato it has the more restricted meaning of ‘Philosophy’, e.g. Rep. VI 496 A πάνομομικρὸν ὅτι τι...λείπεται τῶν κατ’ ἄξιαν ὀμιλούντων φιλοσοφοῖς. The wider meaning is also found in Aristotle, where he calls Theology the ‘Highest Study’ (πρῶτη φιλοσοφία), and elsewhere.

57. Κρίσων. Criso of Himera, a famous σταδιοδρόμος, won 335 E
three times at Olympia, viz. Olymp. 83, 84, and 85 (448, 444, and 440 B.C.). His chastity during his prime as an athlete is mentioned in Laws VIII 840 A. ὑμεραῖοι ἀκμάζοντι is rejected by some editors, but ὑμεραῖοι should be taken with ἰμεραῖοι and ἀκμάζοντι with ἔπεσθαι: ‘to keep up with Criso, the runner of Himera, when he was in his prime’—presumably at the assumed date of this dialogue he was past his ἀκμή.

58. δολιχοδρόμων: δολιχοδρόμοι εἰσίν οἱ τῶν δόλιχον τρέχοντες, says the scholiast: see on 329 A.

ἡμεροδρόμων. Heindorf quotes Livy XXXI 24. 4 “Hemerodromos vocant Graeci ingens die uno cursu emietentes spatium”. Such was Phidippides; see Hdt. VI 105 ἡμεροδρόμην τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετώντα.

59. διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι. dia- in compounds frequently denotes competition: for διαθεῖν cf. Theaet. 148 C εἰτα διαθέων τῶν ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ὄττήθησ. As the emphasis is on ἔπεσθαι (‘keep up with’) διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι is equivalent to διαθέων ἔπεσθαι: cf. note on 317 C ἐνδείξαοσαι καὶ καλλωπίσασαι, where καὶ καλλωπίσασαι is (so to speak) enclitic as διαθεῖν τε καὶ is proclitic [cf. the English “Some—must be talked over by the hour before they could reach the humblest decision, which they only left the office to return again (ten minutes later) and rescind’”].

336 A 63. συγκαθεῖναι: intransitive as in Rep. VIII 563 A οἱ δὲ γέροντες συγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις: so παρέχω for παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν infra 348 A ἑτοιμὸς εἰμὶ σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος: cf. also ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀπέκρυψαν (sc. ἐαυτοῖς) Thuc. v 65. 5. The omission of the reflexive pronoun is a well-recognised way of making transitive verbs into intransitive.

336 B 68. χωρίς. Soph. O. C. 808 χωρίς τὸ τ’ εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ καλρία. “In talibus locis δίχα, χωρίς etc. non ut vulgo, seiosis et separationem, sed diversitatem et oppositionem significant”. Kroschel. The usage is frequent in Plato. διμηγορεῖν is contionari —platform oratory.

70. ὅρας. Almost like our colloquial ‘don’t you know’ (when used parenthetically and without interrogative force): the ἀλλά belongs in strict logic to ὅκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν. Heindorf quotes parallels from Aristophanes e.g. Peace 330—331 οὐκ ἄν ὄρχησαμεθ’, εἰπερ ὕφελῆσαιμέν τι σε. ἀλλ’ ὅρατ’, οὕτω πέπανοθε. Where ὅρας or ὅρατε stand in this way as the first word of a sentence, editors generally regard the usage as interrogative, e.g. Eur. Orest. 581 ὅρας: Ὅδυνσεως ἄλοχον οὐ κατέκτανε.
72. kal σύ. So the original hand in T: B has kal σοι. If we read kal σοι, the construction is ἄξιων αὐτῷ τε ἐξείναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σοι ἐξείναι κτλ., but Protagoras has nowhere asked that Socrates should be permitted to converse as he likes: quite the contrary. With σύ the construction is καὶ σὺ δικαία δοκεῖς λέγειν ἄξιον διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως ἂν κτλ. i.e. and your demand that Protagoras should converse as you wish likewise seems fair. Protagoras asked to be allowed to use his own style in 335 Α: Socrates requested that Protagoras should converse as Socrates wished in 334 D, 335 C, 335 E. Alcibiades’ defence of Socrates in the next chapter seems also to imply the reading σύ here. The only objection to this view lies in the position of τε after αὐτῷ: we should expect it to follow Πρωταγόρας. τε is however frequently misplaced (see above on 316 D). σοι can only be retained if we either (1) take kal σοι as altogether independent of ἄξιων—which is barely possible, or (2) regard Plato as guilty of inaccurate writing.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Alcibiades defends Socrates, and together with Critias and Prodicus hopes that the conversation will be continued.

1. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ Καλλία. The jingle is intentional: Handsome is that handsome says. Plato loves to play upon the names of his interlocutors (ὁ λόστε Πώλε in Gorg. 467 ν): see Riddell’s Digest of Idioms, § 323, and cf. the Editor’s notes on Euthyphr. 2 E, 4 E, 5 C.

6. λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι. We should expect τε to follow δοῦναι: see on 316 D.

11. ἐκκρούων. “Vox ducta a pugilatu, cuius proprium κρούειν de rep. IV p. 422 Β οὐδ’ εἰ ἐξείλῃ—ὑποφένυοντι (τῷ πῦκτῃ) τὸν πρότερον αἰεὶ προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν etc.” Heindorf. The simple verb is used metaphorically in Theaet. 154 E of beating arguments with arguments ἥδη ἂν—συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην ἄλληλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκκρούομεν, and the compound in Phaedr. 228 Ε ἐκκέρκουκάς με ἐλπίδος. Here the idea is of beating off, staving off by force, i.e. here by μακρηγορία: ἐκκρούειν δίκην is used by Demosthenes of staving off a trial by συκοφαντία and the like.

15. οὐχ ὅτι: ‘not but what’. The idiom (as if οὐ λέγω ὅτι, 336 D oμiλlo quod) is tolerably common in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 450 Ε οὖχ ὅτι
NOTES ON XXIII 336 D

τῷ βῆματι οὕτως εἴπεσ, Theaet. 157 B τὸ δ’ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρέ-τέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς—ἡμαγκάσμεθα—χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

21. πυλωνικὸς. The mss read φιλωνικὸς and presently συμφιλω-νεικεῖν. It is however clear that the word comes from φιλο- and νίκη, not from φιλο- and νεῖκος (in which case the form would be φιλωνικής: compare φιλοκερδής, φιλοκυνής, but φιλότιμος, φιλόδοξος, φιλόθηρος and the like). Schanz has found only two traces of the original spelling with iota in Plato’s mss (A, B, T): viz. in Laws xi 935 B where Paris A has ἀριστεῖον πέρι φιλωνικής, and Alcib. 1 122 C where φιλωνικάν appears as a correction for φιλωνικάν in T. We might in consequence be tempted to suppose that Plato himself wrote φιλωνικὸς through the influence of a false etymology, were it not that the derivation from νίκη alone suits the meaning, and that in more than one passage he shews himself conscious of the connexion of the word with νίκη, notably in Rep. IX 586 C τὶ δὲ; περὶ τὸ θυμωνιδὲς οὐχ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γιγνεσθαι, δς ὁ ύπο τοῦτο διαπράττηται η φθόνω διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἡ βία διὰ φιλωνικάν (φιλω-νεικίαν A) ἡ θυμίω διὰ δύσκολαν, πλησιονή τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἀνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Compare also ib. 581 A-B. The orthography of this word is an old subject of dispute (see Stallbaum on Rep. VIII 545 A): Schanz (Preface to Vol. VI p. x) declares himself, after a full discussion, for φιλωνικὸς.

25. ὁ Πρόδικος—ἐφη. Prodicus contrives to make his remarks an ἐπίδειξις on ὀρθότης ὄνομάτων, which was his leading subject of instruction: see Euthyd. 277 E and cf. above on 314 C. The distinctions drawn by Prodicus are on the whole sound if somewhat wiredrawn and pedantic. The carefully balanced style of the speech finds a parallel in the story of Heracles in Xenophon Mem. II 1. 21 foll.: compare especially §§ 31—33.

28. κοινὸς—ἄκροατὰς—ἴσους. κοινὸς and ἴσος are found as epithets of ἄκροατὴς in the orators: e.g. Dem. De Cor. 7 τὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ὑστέρων δικαια εὐνοίκως προσδέχεται καὶ παρασχῶν ἐαυτὸν ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρος ἄκροατὴν οὕτω τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιησεται περὶ πάντων, and Andoc. in Alcib. § 7 δέομαι δ’ ἵμων, τῶν ἱληγῶν ἴσους καὶ κοινοῦς ἵμων ἐπιστάτας γενέσθαι (Heindorf).

31. τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον κτλ. In other words ἰσότης γεωμε-τρικὴ and not ἰσότης ἀριθμητικὴ should be observed by the audience (Gorg. 508 A): the regard paid to the speakers should be in proportion to their merit.
CHAPTER XXIV.

Hippias, anxious for a compromise, proposes the selection of an umpire in a speech marked by his characteristic doctrines and style.

If we may judge from this speech, Hippias must have been devoted to metaphor: e.g. ὑπαρχεῖος, πρυτανείον in D, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαίτητῶν in E, and in 338 έφειναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμιας, κάλων ἐκτείναντα οὕρια ἑφέντα, πέλαγος λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, μέσων τι τεμεῖν, ῥαβδοῦχον and πρύτανιν. Zeller (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie v 2, p. 175) thinks that the opening part of the speech may have come from some book of which Hippias was himself the author.

2. ἀπεδεξαντο means simply ‘assented’: cf. Theaet. 162 E.

A. P.
5. ήμας is Heindorf’s correction for ὑμᾶς: “uti mox ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν etc., neque video cur se a ceteris h. l. segreget Hippias”.

6. φύσει οὗ νόμῳ. The opposition between φύσις and νόμος frequently appears attributed to different sophists or their representatives in the Platonic dialogues: the historical Hippias was a leading champion of φύσις (see Introd. p. xxii.). Usually however νόμος is represented as a convention binding men together into friendship and φύσις (whose teaching is that might is right) as responsible for the enmity of man to man in the savage state: e.g. Rep. Π 358 D foll., Gorg. 482 D foll. From the natural principle of ‘Like to like’ is here deduced something like the Stoic doctrine of the kinship between wise men.

τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Gorg. 510 B φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἐκαστὸς ἐκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶον τε μάλιστα, δινπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Laws IV 716 c. The proverb appears in the most various forms in Greek literature from Homer (Od. XVII 218 ὡς αει τὸν ὁμοίον ἄγει θεός ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον) downwards. For more examples of its use in Plato see Stallbaum on Gorg. I. c.

337D 7. τοῦραννος—βιάζεται. Hippias has in view the lines of Pindar quoted in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλέως θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων—ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαίτατον ὑπερτάτω χειρι κτλ.

12. πρυτανείον τῆς σοφίας. The prytaneum (like the temple of Vesta at Rome) was the religious centre of a Greek πόλις. It was sacred to Ἑστία, in whose honour fire was always kept burning, and contained what was called the ‘Common Hearth’ of the city: see Frazer in Journal of Philology, Vol. xiv pp. 145—172. The editors refer to Athenaeus v 187 D τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν, τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσείον, ἦν ὁ μὲν Πινδάρος Ἕλλαδος ἔρεισμα ἐφθ, Θουκυδίδης δ’ ἐν τῷ εἰς Εὐρυπίδην ἐπιγράμματι Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα, ὁ δὲ Πύθιος ἑστιαν καὶ πρυτανείον τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

337E 17. συμβήκαι—ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων. συμβαλὼν forms a passive to συμβιβάζω as πᾶσχεν to πουεῖν, whence ὑπὸ: see note on Apol. 17 λ. συμβιβάζω is regular in the sense of bringing together, effecting an arrangement between: compare (with Sauppe) Thuc. Π 29. 8 ἔννεφισας δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι. Note that ἡμῶν has no preposition with it—this is frequent (but not universal) in similes where ὡσπερ and a preposition precede the object compared, and the effect is almost to make the simile an identification: if on the other hand the object compared comes first, the preposition must be expressed twice. Compare
Theaet. 170 άσπερ πρός θεός ἐξειν τούς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἁρχοντας (which might have been πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἁρχοντας ἁσπερ πρὸς θεός ἐξειν) and see notes on Crito 46 c, Euthyphr. 2 c.

20. Διαν: with ζητεῖν: κατὰ βραχὺ as in Gorg. 449 b ἄλλ’ 338 ά ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

21. ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμιας τοῖς λόγοις. For the metaphor Kroschel compares Laws III 701 c καθάπερ άχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον κτλ.

23. ἡμῖν: so most editions: ΒΤ have ὑμῖν, which can hardly be right, as Hippias is at this moment addressing Socrates alone. “Πρὸ υμῖν dici potuit sol, sed υμῖν recte explicari nequit.” Kroschel.

24. πάντα κάλων ἐκτέινατα. παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν πάσης προβημῖα χρωμένων, says a Scholiast (quoted by Sauppe). This nautical metaphor means to stretch out every reefing rope and so set all sail: κάλως does not refer to the sheet, which is ποῦς. κινεῖν, σεῖν, ἐξεῖναι, ἐφείναι, ἐκλύειν are also found with κάλων in much the same sense.

οὐρία ἐφέντα: see on συγκαθείναι 336 ά. For the asyndeton before these words Heindorf compares Euthyphr. 4 c συνδήσας τοὺς πίδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλῶν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δειφρο ἀνδρὰ κτλ.


ἀποκρύψαντα: like Virgil’s “protinus aerias Phaeacum abscondimus arces” (Aen. III 291): cf. the use of καταδῶ in Callimachus Epigr. 2 ἡμῖν ἐν λέσχῃ κατεδύσαμεν and Virgil’s imitation “saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles” (Ecl. IX 51).


ὁς οὖν ποιήσατε καλ ἰπέθεσθε. ὥς (so B: T has ὡς) is best understood as for οὕτως—a rare usage, except after a preceding ὡς or ἁσπερ as in 326 δ, but it is found in Thuc. III 37. 5 (with ὡς and a
form of ποιεῖν as here) ὡς οὖν χρῆ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας—παραπεφθα. For ποιήσατε the MSS read ποιήσετε, which is very harsh before πειθεθέ, and is probably a mistake for ποιήσατε, due to the influence of the common construction of ὁποῖος with 2nd person Fut. Ind. It is however possible that this use of the future as well as the use of ὡς for ὀφθα was characteristic of Hippias’ style.

27. ῥαβδοῦχον—πρύτανιν. ῥαβδοῦχος, ἐπιστάτης and βραβευμένος are said of umpires or presidents at games: ῥαβδοῦχος εἰπε τοὺς κριτᾶς τοῦ ἄγωνος, says the schol. on Ar. Peace 733: for ἐπιστάτης cf. Laws xii 949 A γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἰππικῶν ἄθλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβεύμ. πρύτανις is an old word with lofty associations for ruler or prince. Cron thinks Hippias made this proposal with a view to be chosen President himself: he was probably still sitting on his θρόνος, cf. 315 B, 317 D.

338 B 28. τὸ μέτριον μῆκος: Phaedr. 267 B αὐτὸς (sc. ὁ Πρώδικος) εὐρηκέναι ἐφή ὡς δεὶ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὕτε μακρῶν οὕτε βραχέων, ἄλλα μετρίων.

CHAPTER XXV.

Socrates protests against appointing an umpire, and in order that the conversation may go on is willing that Protagoras should become the interrogator. The others assent, Protagoras reluctantly.

2. ἐμέ γε. The MSS read τε not γε: γε is due to Heindorf. The position of τε is usually explained as due to displacement (see on 316 D), e.g. by Kroschel “nam haec dicit Socrates; omnes laudabant meque et Callias retinebat et (omnes) orabant ut praesidem deligerem”: but Καλλίας can hardly be coupled in this way with an unexpressed πάντες. If τε is right it must be taken (with Turner) as coupling the whole clause ἐμέ ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσεως with καὶ ἑλέοντο ἐπιστάτην: this is possible, but strikes us as harsh.

338 C 9. ἄλλα δή like at enim introduces a possible objection: see on Crito 54 A. The fuller form of the comparative (βελτίωνa and the like) is less common in Plato than the contracted.

11. ὡστε. Heindorf cites (inter alia) Phaedr. 269 D τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὡς Παῖδρε, ὡστε ἀγωνισθήν τέλεον γενέσθαι. The insertion of ὡστε with the usual infinitive after ἀδύνατον increases the emphasis of ἀδύνατον by making it appear more than a mere auxiliary notion. Badham’s conjecture ἀδύνατον ὅν ὑμῖν ὡστε deserves mention for its ingenuity. For Πρωταγόρου see above note on 318 D.
14. τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Gorg. 458 D τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει. τὸ γ' ἐμὸν is frequent in Plato for quantum ad me attinet.

17. εἰ μὴ βούλεται. For the asyndeton see above on 330 A.

28. πάντα μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν: οὐκ ἤθελεν is virtually one word: 338 E 'was very reluctant'. The phrase is quite different from οὐ πάντα: see on οὐ πάντα τι in 321 B above.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Here begins an episode (lasting down to the end of Chapter XXXII), in which Protagoras cross-examines Socrates upon a poem of Simonides. For the bearing of this episode on the general subject of the dialogue see Introduction p. xxv. foll.: and for the different restorations of the poem Appendix I.

3. περὶ ἐπὶν δεινόν ἐναλ. ἐπὶν is 'verses'. As education in poetry formed part of the usual curriculum at Athens, it was natural for the Sophists to pose as poetical critics, and Sauppe gives a number of references to show that they did so: it will suffice to quote Isocrates Panath. 18 ἀπαντήσαντες γὰρ τινές μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἢ τέταρτες τῶν ἄγελαίων σοφηστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἰδέναι—διαλέγουστο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσίοδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως κτλ.: compare infra 347 A, where Hippias says he has a speech ready on the poem, and Hipp. Minor 363 c foll. καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἢμῶν ἐπιδεέεται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου. Protagoras appears as a critic of poetry in Arist. Poet. 19, p. 1450b 15 ff. (where he censures Homer δι' εὔχεσθαι οἴδενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν 'μὴν ἄειδε θεό') and in Soph. El. 14, p. 173b 19 ff. The popularity of such discussions as the present may be inferred from the well-known scene between Euripides and Aeschylus in the Frogs 1119 foll.

9. νῦν διαλεγόμεθα: so B and T: the editors mostly read νῦν δὴ 339 A (νυνὴ) διαλεγόμεθα. νῦν does not mean 'at this present moment', but simply 'now', 'on the present occasion', =ἐν τῇ νῦν συννοουσά: translate 'about the same subject as you and I are now discussing', i.e. about the subject of our present discussion. A discussion which has never been finished (see on 334 A) and is to be resumed (cf. 338 E ἐπειδὰν ἰκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δῶσει λόγον, and 338 D) ought not to be spoken of as past. We have in fact in νῦν διαλεγόμεθα an indication that the subject of the dialogue is the same throughout: see
Introd. p. xix. foll. νῦν in καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν (line 8) is simply ‘in the present case’ and introduces the application of the general statement contained in ἡγοῦμαι—λόγον δοῦναι: cf. Apol. 17 D—18 οὐσίαν οὐν άν—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν.


11. Συμωνίδης. It is a saying of Simonides of Ceos (circ. 556—468 B.C.) that forms the text on which the discussion in the first book of the Republic is based: see Rep. 1 331 D foll. Plato seems also to allude to him in two other places, viz. Rep. II 355 c ἐπείδη τὸ δοκεῖν, ὥσιν δηλοῦσι μοι οἱ σοφοὶ, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιαται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας κτλ. and Rep. VI 489 β οὖ γὰρ ἔξει φύσιν—τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς πλοῦσιν θύρας ἔλεναι ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενον ἐψεύσατο (compare Arist. Rhet. II 16. 1391a 8 ff. with Cope’s note).

Σκόπαν. The Scopadae were a ruling family at Crannon and Pharsalus in Thessaly. Simonides seems to have frequently been their guest, and wrote poems in their honour: the most famous is that referred to by Cicero de Or. II § 352—353.

339 B 14. ἀγαθὸν is here more than morally good: it includes bodily and external as well as internal well-being: whence χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσί as well as νῶπ: see also note on 344 B line 4 below. The notion of external well-being belonged to the word from very early times: see Grote Vol. III p. 45 note 3: ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are applied in Theognis and Solon “to wealth as contrasted with poverty—nobility with low birth—strength with weakness—conservative and oligarchical politics as opposed to innovation”. This sense survived in classical times in the political meaning of καλὸς κάγαθος, e.g. Xen. Hell. II 3. 12, Pl. Rep. VIII 569 Α.

16. τετράγωνον. Simonides avails himself of a Pythagorean notion: among the Pythagoreans the number 4 was sacred, as being the first square number: see Ritter and Preller II § 54. The expression τετράγωνον ἀνήρ became afterwards almost proverbial for a perfect man: Sauppe refers to Arist. Rhet. III II. 1411b 27 οὖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον· ἀμφότερος γὰρ τέλεια.

19. καὶ πάνυ μοι—μεμεληκός. From this and 347 A, where the same is implied of Hippias, it would seem that the poem was thought to be difficult.

22. ἔφην ἐγὼ καλὸς τε καὶ ὅρθως. This, Bergk’s emendation, is generally accepted. Β has ἔφην ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὅρθως: Τ ἔφην ἐγὼν καὶ ὅρθως.
28. ἐμμελέως—νέμεται. ἐμμελέως belongs to εἰρημένον and 339 C νέμεται is poetical for νομίζεται: cf. (with Sauppe) Soph. O. R. 1080 ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτὸν παῖδα τῆς τύχης νέμων. The story is (Schol. to Plato Hipp. Maior 304 E quoted by Sauppe) that Pittacus, when ruler of Mitylene, on hearing of Periander's rapid conversion into a tyrant, sat down at an altar and begged to be released of his rule, assigning as his reason ὃς χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί. The Scholiast adds that Solon when he heard the remark capped it with χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. Pittacus is mentioned side by side with Bias and Simonides as one of the σοφοὶ καὶ μακάριοι ἄνδρες in Rep. I 335 E.

33—35. ὀμολογείσθαι—ὀμολογείν. The middle is said of things, and the active of persons, according to the general rule.

38. ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόςθεν: these words as 339 D well as προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος in 339 C are in favour of the supposition that some verses are wanting between ἄνευ ψόγου τετυμένον and οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως: see App. I p. 198.

44. τὸ πρότερον: adverbial.

45. θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἐπαινοῦ. θόρυβος denotes only 'noise', 'tumult' (cf. Rep. vi 492 C θόρυβον—τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαινοῦ): καὶ ἐπαινοῦ is needed to show that the noise was favourable. So supra 334 C ἀνεθορύβησαν ὃς εὖ λέγοι. With παρέχεν in this sense cf. the phrase παρέχεν γέλωτα in Gorg. 473 E and Theaet. 174 c.

47. ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς. For the metaphor 339 E compare Enhyd. 303 A ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ὡσπερ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκείμην ἀφώνοι. Socrates describes the effect of Protagoras' questions on himself in words which recall the descriptions of his own dialectic in its effect on others: compare e.g. Meno 80 A foli.


49. ὡς γε—ἀλήθη: see on 309 A.

50. ἐγγέννηται: B and T have ἐγγέννηται: ἐγγέννηται is Heindorf's correction, now found in a Vienna MS (Kral's 1): cf. Phaedo 86 E ἐνα χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τι ἐροῦμεν.

53. σὸς μέντοι—πολίτης. Iulius in Ceos was their native place. μέντοι is 'surely'. Notice the emphasis on σὸς and compare σὲ in lines 54 and 59.

54. παρακαλεῖν is future: cf. Theaet. 183 D ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ—340 A οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ: Phaedr. 228 C δοκεῖσ οὐ οὔδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν;
tr. 'therefore I think I will call you to my assistance'. ἐγὼ and σέ are contrasted in view of the illustration which is about to follow.

ὡσπερ ἔφη κτλ.: ὡσπερ corresponds to καὶ ἐγὼ in line 59: as, according to Homer, Scamander called on Simois, so look you, I call upon you. For ὡσπερ used in this way see above note on 330 A. The other editors take δοκῶ οἶν ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ with the ὡσπερ clause, and, regarding παρακαλεῖν as a present, print a full stop after σχῶμεν in the quotation: but (1) there is a certain awkwardness in the repetition 'I think I am summoning you' and 'so look you, I am summoning you'; (2) the quotation does not finish with σχῶμεν, but ἐκπέρσῃ in I. 60 belongs to it also—a point which is against separating φιλε κασίγνυτε—σχῶμεν from the following clause. In the view which we have taken a fresh start begins with ὡσπερ, after which the actual summons follows in the present ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σέ παρακαλῶ.

55. ἔφη Ὅμηρος. Iliad xxii 305 foll. οὐδὲ Σκάμανδρος ἔληγε τὸ δὲ μένος ἄλλ' ἐτι μᾶλλον χῶτο Πηλεϊῶν—Συμβεντὶ δὲ κέκλετ' ἀύσας. Φιλε κασίγνυτε, οὕτως ἄνερο άμφότεροι περ σχῶμεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἀνακτο ἐκπέρσει. Τοῦτο ἐκπέρσει explains the occurrence of ἐκπέρσῃ in line 60, although (as Heindorf shews) the same metaphor is occasionally found in tragedy (but hardly in prose), e.g. Trach. 1104 τυφλῆς ὑπ᾽ ἀτης ἐκπεπόθημαι τάλας.

59. ἀτὰρ: cf. supra 335 D.

61. μονσικῆς: 'culture', as often; here not without some sarcasm, in reference to Prodicus' ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, exemplified in 337 A foll.

340 B 62. βούλεσθαι—ἐπιθυμεῖν. βούλεσθαι is of will: ἐπιθυμεῖν of desire. The distinction is generally well marked in Plato: see note on Apol. 25 c and compare Cope on Arist. Rhet. ii 19. 9. Prodicus does not touch on this example in his speech in 337, but it is quite in Plato's way to select a fresh example (compare Theaet. 147 A—B, 166 E by the side of 159 C, 169 A—B), which may in this case be supposed to come from Prodicus' lectures (cf. 341 A). We should expect the article to be repeated with ἐπιθυμεῖν, as the two words are to be distinguished (cf. infra in line 67 τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι): but the article is sometimes dropped with the second of two words even when the words are contrasted, e.g. Euthyphr. 9 C τὸ ὃσιον καὶ μή. Here the effect of its omission is perhaps to suggest that the two notions are after all more like than different.
67. γενέσθαι—είναι. The distinction though long ago recognised by the philosophers was not always present in ordinary speech: otherwise (as Kroschel points out) Protagoras' censure of Simonides would be too absurd, and Socrates' pretended bewilderment out of place. But that Simonides in this poem drew a distinction between γενέσθαι and είναι is certain: whether it was the same distinction as Socrates himself draws later is another question; see on γενόμενον δὲ ἄδυνατον in 344 B.

73. τὸ αὐτὸν. B and T here have τὸ αὐτὸν, which Schanz retains: 340 C the form occurs on inscriptions and once or twice in Plato's MSS: v. Schanz Vol. xii p. vii.

74. ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι. So Heindorf. ἔλεγεν is 'said', not 'meant', and the sentence is intended to prove what is stated in the last sentence, viz. that Pittacus ὅ τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἔλεγεν (said), ἀλλ' ἄλλο. τὸ goes with the whole clause χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν; the emphasis is on γενέσθαι: for which reason τὸ εἴμηναι ἐσθλὸν χαλεπὸν) suffices. It is unnecessary (with Schanz and Kroschel) ἔλεγεν(ν) χαλεπὸν, τὸ γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν, or ἔλεγε χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν with Sauppe.

79. Πρόδικος οὐδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ. Socrates dissociates himself from the others, because he is about to give a different solution of Simonides' apparently contradictory statements (in 344 B foll.).

80. Ἡσιόδον: in Works and Days 289 foll. τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς 340 D ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρασθεν ἐθηκαν ἠθάνατοι: μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὁρθοὶ οἷος ἐσ αὐτὴν καὶ τριχύς τὸ πρῶτον: ἐπὶ δ' ἐλ' ἄκρων ἵκηται, ῥημίθη δῆπετα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἑοῦσα. This passage was very famous in antiquity: Plato cites it again in Rep. II 364 C, Laws IV 718 E. Hesiod in effect says it is difficult to become good, but easy to be good. Simonides himself refers to Hesiod's verses in Frag. 58 (Bergk) ἔστι τις λόγος τὰν ἀρετὰν ναειν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις, νῦν δὲ μν θεῶν χωρὸν ἄγγον ἀμφέπειν, ......οὔδ' ἀπαντᾶν βλεφάροις θνατῶν ἐσοπτον, ὥ μὴ δακένυμος ἱδρῶς ἐνδοθεν μόλη 0' ἤκηται τ' ἐς ἄκρων ἀνδρελας.

84. ἐκτῆσθαι: to be taken with ῥηδίθην. B and T read κτῆσθαι, but cf. 349 E. For the form see above on 319 A.
CHAPTER XXVII.

After some dialectical skirmishing, Socrates volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem.

340 E  7. ἰσμενος μεῖξον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Socrates is thinking of the proverb κακὸν κακῷ ἱάσθαι.

9. ποιητοῦ—ἐκτήσθαι. The poet is not of course Hesiod but Simonides. Socrates nowhere said that in censuring Pittacus Simonides implies that it is easy to 'keep virtue', i.e. to be virtuous: the quotation from Hesiod was put in the mouth of Prodicus and ἄλλοι πολλοὶ (340 c). At the same time Protagoras might fairly turn Socrates' fallacies (see on 331 A) against himself and say that if Simonides said it was 'not difficult' to be virtuous, he meant that it was 'easy' to be so.

13. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοι: the art of Prodicus (Socrates means) can lay as good claims to antiquity as yours: cf. 316 D.

14. θεῶ τις εἶναι πάλαι. Kroschel's reading εἶναι καὶ πάλαι would somewhat change the meaning, which is 'has long' been an art divine': divine because practised by poets and the like, cf. Rep. 1 331 E ἄλλα μέντοι—Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ ράδιον ἀπιστεύν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἄνηρ: supra 315 E and note. In ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου there is an allusion to 316 D.

341 A  17. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ, sc. εἰμι. The idiom is frequent in Plato, e.g. Symp. 179 E οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεα—ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσοις ἄπετέμψαν.

μαθητής. Socrates calls himself a disciple of Prodicus also in Crat. 384 B, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D.

19. τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο. τὸ marks χαλεπὸν as a quotation: see above on 331 C.

21. ἄλλα ὥσπερ κτλ. The application of the illustration follows in 341 B line 28 foll. ἵσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν—ὑπολαμβάνοντιν, where see note.

341 B  23. Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστιν. The ἦ ἄλλον τινά is neglected, and Πρωταγόρας takes us back to σέ: cf. note on ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπισάσθαι in 317 C. The collocation σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς is tolerably frequent in ironical characterizations, e.g. Theaet. 173 B δεινὸ τε καὶ σοφὸν γεγονότες, ὡς οἶδαντι.

24. ἐρωτά explains νοοθετεῖ: whence the Asyndeton explication: see on 335 A above.
25. τῷ γὰρ δεινῶν—κακὸν ἔστιν. Prodicus’ canon—which rests on the derivation of δεινῶς from δέος—is not borne out by Greek usage, except to this extent, that when a man is called δεινός, it is generally implied that he is more clever than good.

26. δεινῶν πλούτου κτλ. Genitives of exclamation in the Platonic dialogues are generally (as Turner remarks) preceded by an interjection, e.g. Euthyd. 303 Π υππαξ ὁ Ἴρακλεὺς καλὸν λόγου and ibid. ὁ Πόσειδος δεινῶν λόγων. Here of course the exclamation is left out as irrelevant: the only relevant point is the use of δεινῶς.

28. έσως οὖν καὶ τῷ χαλεπῶν. Sauppe remarks that we should expect οὖτω καὶ τῷ χαλεπῶν to introduce the apodosis to the ώσπερ clause (341 A line 21): καὶ is however enough to shew that we have reached the application: οὖν is introduced on account of the parenthesis from τῷ γὰρ δεινῶν to κακὸν οὖτος: and έσως marks the suggestion as only tentative.

32. φωνήν: ‘dialect’ as often, e.g. Phaedo 62 καὶ ὁ Κέβης—ἐττῶ Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.

33. κακὸν, ἔφη. Prodicus enters into the spirit of the joke: 341 C in view of C and D it would be absurd to take this seriously: see note on ἀλλὰ παἶξειν in D below.


40. ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ: a malicious exaggeration inspired by the odium philologicum.

49. ἀλλὰ παἶξειν. The editors suppose that Socrates is here 341 D turning the tables on Prodicus, who it is supposed meant his criticism seriously, but the tone of the passage seems to imply that Prodicus is in league with Socrates to make fun of Protagoras, who is represented throughout the whole dialogue as lacking all sense of humour. It would not be wit, but sheer buffoonery in Plato to represent Prodicus as seriously believing that Simonides had censured Pittacus for having said: ‘It is bad to be good’.

καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρασθαί. δοκεῖν is not pleonastic after οἴμαι but means ‘think fit’—a very idiomatic use, cf. Aesch. Ag. 16 ὅταν δ’ ἀλλοθεῖν ἢ μνύσεσθαί δοκῶ. See Classical Review III
NOTES ON XXVII 341 D

p. 148, where Mr Arthur Sidgwick discusses and illustrates this usage.

341 E 54. οὐ δῆπον τοῦτο γε λέγων. οὐ δῆπον goes with λέγων, which is ‘meaning’ not ‘saying’, and τοῦτο is explained by κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμεναῖ. For the asyndeton see on 335 A: and for the use of εἶτα compare 311 A and Symp. 200 Πστερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καλ ἑρᾶ; εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καλ ἑρᾶ, ἢ ὃνκ ἔχων;

55. τοῦτο γέρας. Heindorf reads τοῦτο τὸ γέρας as in 344 Β: but γέρας may be regarded as predicative and going closely with ἀπένειμε, so that τοῦτο—τοῦτο balance each other. Sauppe compares Symp. 179 C εὐαριθμητοῖς δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοὶ.

56. ἀκόλαστον—οὔδαμῶς Κεῖον. This seems to be the earliest passage making allusion to the sobriety and uprightness of the Cæans, to which, perhaps, Aristophanes sarcastically alludes in Frogs 970 (οὐ Χῖος, ἀλλὰ Κεῖος). In Laws 1 638 B (quoted by Sauppe) Plato cites the subjugation of the Cæans by the Athenians as a proof that victory does not always favour the more virtuous side. Strabo (Χ 486) quotes from Menander the lines καλὸν τὸ Κεῖον νόμῳ ἐστι, Φανίαν µὴ δυνάμενος ζῆν καλῶς οὐ ζῆν κακῶς and explains them by saying that a Cæan law required those above the age of 60 to take hemlock so as to make their country’s produce suffice to feed the others.

342 A 60. ὅ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο refers to περὶ ἐπὶ ὕλη 338 E. For the idiom cf. the usual τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, e.g. Symp. 221 B.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Socrates introduces his exposition of the poem with a paradoxical theory that Sparta is the oldest home of philosophers. The wise men of old accordingly expressed their wisdom in pithy Laconic sayings, and such a saying is that of Pittacus. Simonides, as a rival craftsman, wrote this entire poem to overthrow that saying.

This chapter is intended as a kind of counterblast to Protagoras’ claim on behalf of σοφιστικὴ in 316 D foll. In general tone as well as in many of the particular statements it is elaborately ironical: but it should be remembered that Plato thought highly in many respects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions and borrowed much from them in constructing his ideal city.

3. φιλοσοφία γάρ κτλ. Compare 316 Ε ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιὰν κτλ.
4. τῶν Ἑλλήνων: ‘among the Greeks’. The genitive belongs rather to ἐν Κρήτη τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονι than to πλείστη: cf. Thuc. II 18. 1 νε δὲ στρατὸς—ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόνην. Similarly in γῆς ἐκεί, γῆς belongs to ἐκεῖ rather than to πλείστοι: there would seem to be no exact parallel to justify us in taking πλείστοι γῆς together. For the meaning of σοφισταὶ see on 312 C.

6. ἕξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται. σχηματίζονται of ‘posing’ 342 B as in Soph. 268 A ἀγνοεῖ ταύτα ἄ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ώς εἰδὼς ἐ σχηματίζονται.

9. οὓς—ἐλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς: viz. in 316 D. The attraction is common enough, e.g. Crito 48 C ὡς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης κτλ. and infra 359 D.

12. τὴν σοφίαν. So B and the second hand in T: the first hand omits the words (so Schanz, Kroschel and Kral).

13. τοὺς—λακωνίζοντας. The editors refer to Ar. Birds 1281 ἐλακωνομάνον ἄπαντες ἀνθρωποῖ τότε, ἐκβομοῖ, ἐπεινὼν, ἐρρύτων, ἐσωκράτων and Demosth. κατὰ Κόνωνος 34 μεθ’ ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκαι καὶ λακωνίζοντες φασὶ καὶ τρίβωναι ἐξουσί καὶ ἀπλᾶς ὑποδέχεntαι. The Laconisers in Athens were tolerably numerous: Plato himself (Rep. VIII 544 C) places Ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία nearest in merit to his ideal city.

14. οἱ μὲν ὀτά τε κατάγνυνται: thanks, of course, to boxing: cf. Gorg. 515 E τῶν τὰ ὀτά κατεαγότων (i.e. τῶν λακωνίζοντων) ἀκοβεῖς ταῦτα, ὁ Σώκρατης, and Martial VII 32. 5 "at iuvenes alios viaticia colit aure magister".

15. ἵμαντας περιελπίστονται. The ἵμανται were thongs of 342 C leather bound round the knuckles for greater efficacy in boxing: Hom. Iliad XXIII 685. The caestus, being loaded with balls of lead, was a much more brutal instrument (Virg. Aen. V 404—405).

16. βραχεῖας ἀναβολάς: ‘short cloaks’ in imitation of the τρίβων (the national Spartan dress: see on 335 D). ἀναβολή (here almost concrete) and ἀναβάλλεσθαι were said of the ἵματον, to wear which rightly and like a gentleman was ἐπὶ δεξία ἀναβάλλεσθαι (Theaet. 175 E), not ἐπὶ ἀρσενά (Ar. Birds 1567—1568, a passage which seems decisive against reading ἐπιδέξα in this phrase). From Suidas (s.v. ἀναβάλλει—ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἵματον, οὐ περιβάλλεσθαι λέγοντων) we may infer that ἀναβολή refers not to the throwing back of the ἵματον over the shoulder (since in point of fact it was thrown back over the left shoulder) but to pulling it round the back (from left to right) before throwing the end over the left shoulder in front.
Notes on

20. Δεινλαστας. Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Ar. Birds 1012 ὠσπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι Δεινλαστάναι and Plut. Lyc. 27. 6 τοὺς ἀθροιζομένους ἐπὶ οὐδεὶς χρησίμω καὶ παρεισρέοντας εἰς τὴν πύλην ἀπῆλαυνεν (sc. Λυκούργος), οὗ, ὡς Θουκυδίδης (II 39) φησί, δεδιώς μη τῆς πολιτείας μιμητα γένονται καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι χρῆσιμοι ἐκμάθωσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅτις μὴ διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ τινος ὑπάρξοντος. The reasons assigned by Plutarch are no doubt the true ones.

23. οὐδένα ἐσωιν—ἐξειναι. Plut. Lyc. 27. 5 οὐδ’ ἀποδημεὶν ἑδοκε (Λυκούργος) τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ πλανασθαί Δεινλαστάναι ἢθη καὶ μιμήματα βίων ἀπαιδευτῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀθροιζομένους etc. (see last note). In Laws XII 950 c foll. (quoted by Sauppe) Plato lays down similar though less stringent regulations as to ἀποδημία.

342D 24. ὠσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες. There seems to be no other authority for this statement, but (as Sauppe remarks) the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan institutions is well known.

27. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναικεῖς. Women in Sparta held a position of much greater power and influence than in the rest of Greece, partly at least in consequence of their superior education, physical and otherwise: cf. Arist. Pol. 11 9. 1269b 32 πολλὰ διωριστό ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων) and see Grote Vol. 11 p. 383 foll. Heindorf remarks that wise and pregnant sayings by Spartan women (such as are given in pseudo-Plutarch’s Δακανῶν ἀποφθέγματα, e.g. the famous τέκνον, ἡ τὰν ἡ ἐπὶ τᾶς) were probably already current in Plato’s time.

30. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει—ἐὑρήσει. Compare 324 A.

342 E 33. ἐνέβαλεν ῥήμα—συνεστραμμένον. The aorist is like ‘behold! he has thrown in’: it expresses rapidity by representing the action as no sooner begun than over. The idiom is very frequent in Plato: Turner refers to Stallbaum on Rep. III 406 D ἐὰν δὲ τις αὐτῷ μικράν διαίταν προστάτη—ταχὺ ἐπεν ὃτι οὐ σχολῇ κάμοιν. With συνεστραμμένον compare Arist. Rhet. II 24. 1401a 5 συνεστραμμένοι—ἐπεῖν: the metaphor is apparently from an animal gathering itself for a spring (cf. Arist. Hist. Anim. IX 48. 631a 27 συστρέψαντες
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

34. ὠσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστῆς. With the metaphor compare Theaet. 165 D καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ἀ ἐλλοχῶν ἀν πελταστικός ἀνὴρ μισοθερόφορος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος—ἐμβαλὼν ἀν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν—ἡγεχέν ὅν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείς κτλ., ibid. 180 A ἄλλ' ἀν τινὰ τί ἔρρη, ὠσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ἤρματισκια ἀνυπασπώτες ἀποτοξεύοντες.

35. παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. The phrase is almost proverbial: see on Crito 49 B παιδῶν οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

39. φθέγγεσθαι, here of an impressive (almost mystic) utterance, as often in Greek, e.g. Ar. Clouds 315 αὑταὶ αἱ φθεγξάμεναι τούτο τὸ σεμεύν.

41. Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος κτλ. This list of the seven wise men is remarkable as excluding Periander, who was canonized later (Diog. Laert. 1.13). Plato refused to allow that a tyrant could be truly σοφὸς (Rep. IX 587 D) or even (in the true sense of the term) powerful: see Rep. 1.336 A οἷμαι αὐτὸ (sc. the view that justice is doing good to friends and evil to enemies) Περιάνθρον ἐλπᾶι ἡ Περίκλεικον ἡ Ζέργιον ἡ Ἰσθμιόν τοῦ Όθησιον ἡ τινὸς ᾠδὸν μέγα οἰομὲνον δύνασθαι πλουσίοιν ἄνδρος.

Myson (the least known of the seven) figures as early as Hipponax (Frag. 45, quoted by Sauppe) καὶ Μύσων δυ' Ὡπόλλων ἀνείπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων. According to a tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius 1.106 the Pythian priestess being asked by Anacharsis to say if there was any man wiser than himself replied Οἰταῖον τινὰ φημὶ Μύσων ἐν Χνη γενέσθαι σοῦ μᾶλλον πραπίθεσον ἄρηπτα πευκαλίμους: but another account placed his birthplace in Chen in Laconia, and a third (reading 'Πειθόν τινὰ φημὶ for Οἰταῖον τινὰ φῆμι in the oracle) in Etea, which was variously placed in Laconia and in Crete. Sauppe remarks that the presence of Λακεδαιμόνιος with Χίλων seems to shew that Plato did not regard Laconia as Myson's birthplace, but favoured the view which made him a native of Chenae by Mount Oeta. Thales (flor. circ. 585 B.C., the eclipse of which year he is said to have predicted) is mentioned in two other passages in Plato (in neither of which is his philosophical teaching—that the ἄρχῃ is ὑδωρ—referred to), once as an author of useful inventions (Rep. x 600 Α), and once as the hero of an anecdote illustrating the philosopher's want of worldly wisdom (Theaet. 174 Α). Pittacus (flor. circ. 612 B.C.) and Bias of Priene in Ionia (contemporary with or earlier than Hipponax, who refers to
him in Diog. Laert. i 84) are mentioned together again in Rep. 1 335 ε Βλάντα ὑ Πιτσακών—ὑ τίν άλλον τίνι σοφώ πε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes and Chilon of Sparta (both about the beginning of the 6th century B.C.) are not again referred to by Plato.

The traditions relating to the wise men and many of the aphorisms with which they are credited are given in Diog. Laert. i 22—122: for the authorities for their lives, and for their sayings, see Mullach’s Fragmenta Philos. Graec. ii pp. 203—234. This passage of the Protagoras, apparently the earliest in which seven are named together, probably contributed in large measure to the canonization of the wise men.

44. Δακεδαμώνιος: Heindorf would read ὁ Δακεδαμώνιος, but Plato may well have said ‘a Lacedaemonian, Chilon’.

48. εἰρημένα· οὖτοι. The sentence beginning with οὖτοι shews how one is to learn αὐτῶν τίνι σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν: the asyndeton (as Heindorf observes) resembles that after σημεῖον δὲ, τεκμηρίων δὲ and the like. Here οὖτοι καὶ κτλ. is so far removed from καὶ καταμάθοι—οὖσαν that we might have expected οὖτοι γὰρ καὶ or (as Kroschel reads) ὅτι for οὖτοι, but the emphatic οὖτοι (parallel to οὖτοι in line 44 above) renders the explanatory particle unnecessary. Hermann’s correction εἰρημένα ὅ for εἰρημένα—adopted by Sauppe—gives a wrong meaning: for ἀπαρχή ‘first-fruits’ (line 49) coming after καὶ κοιν ἦ ξυνελθόντες, in marked antithesis to ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, cannot mean merely the sayings of each individual—as it will have to mean if ὅ is read, ὅ being then in apposition to ἀπαρχήν. Kral’s ρήματα βραχέα ἀξιομανημένα <σκοπῶν> ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, ὅ οὖτοι κτλ. suffers from the same fault, besides that it is very unlikely that σκοπῶν should have fallen out.

κοιν ᾧ ξυνελθόντες—ἀνέθεσαν. The editors cite Pausanius x 24. 1 ἐν δὲ τῷ προνάῳ τῷ ἐν Δέλφοις γεγραμμένα ἐστίν ωφελήματα ἀνθρώποις εἰς βίον—οὖτοι οὐν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀφικόμενοι ἐν Δέλφοις ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰ ἀδόμενα Γνώθι σαυτόν καὶ Μηδέν ἄγαν. The same explanation of the presence of these maxims on the temple at Delphi meets us in other authors; but in each case the author is obviously borrowing the story from Plato. Plato states that these two maxims were the cream of the wisdom of the wise men: it would be hardly too much to say that upon them the whole structure of Greek ethical philosophy was based. For the construction, and for the practice of thus dedicating wisdom to a god, Kroschel aptly quotes Diog. Laert.
CHAPTER XXIX.

Socrates develops his theory of the poem and applies it to the first two lines, not without much sophistry.

3. μανικόν. Notice the extreme dogmatism of Socrates, suggesting a weak case: cf. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον (line 5).

5. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον: see on 335 D. πρὸς λόγον = εἴλογον or 343 D εὐλόγου is frequent in Plato: see on 351 E.

6. εἶν μὴ τις ὑπολαβῇ κτλ. The natural interpretation of the μὲν (since it follows ἀγαθὸν, not γενέσθαι) is this. While it is difficult 'γενέσθαι' truly good, it is yet possible to reach a fair standard of ἀρετή. The antithesis is implied if not actually expressed in the sequel: see 345 D and 346 C. Compare Introd. p. xxvii.

8. λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ: a fresh start is made, to explain ὡσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν.

10. εἶπεν but λέγειν in line 8: the past tense is used because Socrates is about to put Simonides' meaning in the form of an actual address in past time to Pittacus.

11. ὡς ἀληθῶς to be taken with χαλεπὸν ἔστιν: see infra 344 A (line 23). Here again Socrates' interpretation is opposed to the A. P.
natural sense of the passage, according to which ἀλαθέως in the poem goes with ἀγαθόν, and has nothing to do with χαλεπόν.

343 E 12. ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ—τὴν ἀλήθειαν. τοῦτῳ is τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and τὴν ἀλήθειαν = τὸ ‘ἀλαθέως’.

14. εὐθές—Σίμωνιδος. As well might Socrates say it is εὐθές to use the word ἄριστος.

15. ὑπερβατῶν is used in its technical grammatical sense. Heindorf quotes Long. de Sublim. 22 ἐστὶν δὲ (sc. τὰ ὑπερβατὰ) λέξεων ἣ νοῆσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἀκολούθιαν κεκινημένη τάξις καὶ οἰονεὶ χαρακτήρ ἐναγωγίου πάθους ἀληθεστάτος.

16. ὑπειπόντα. There is no need to explain ὑπειπόντα here as ‘interpreting’ (a sense for which no exact parallel is quoted). ὑπειπέων is used here in its regular sense ‘to say before’, ‘to say first’ as in Ar. Wasps 54—55 φέρε νῦν κατελπῶ τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον, ὀλγυ ἄτο υπειπόντα πρῶτων αὐτῶσιν ταβί. The meaning is: if we would arrive at Simonides’ meaning, we must regard the adverb ἀλαθέως as transposed, and speak the words of Pittacus first (ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ): i.e. instead of saying ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν first, and quoting Pittacus’ saying afterwards, we should begin with χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί (line 19 εἰπόντα, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι), and make ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν etc. follow as Simonides’ answer (lines 20—23), putting ἀλαθέως last. οὐτωσὶ πῶς shews that ὑπειπόντα is to be explained in the sequel viz. from ὁσπερ ἄν to ἀλαθέως in line 23.

19. εἰπόντα: i.q. τὸν μὲν εἰπόντα: see on 330 Α. Note the precision in the use of the tenses (εἰπόντα, but ἀποκρινόμενον).

344 A 21. οὖ γὰρ εἶναι ἄλλα γενέσθαι μὲν. Compare Crito 43 δ οὔτοι δὴ ἄφικατο ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ήξει κτλ. μὲν without following δὲ is frequent in a clause introduced by ἄλλα, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative clause.

23. οὔτω φανεται. After φανεται the MSS have τὸ: “vel expungendum vel in τοι mutandum hoc τὸ” says Heindorf. For πρὸς λόγον see on 351 Ε.

25. τὰ ἐπιόντα: see Appendix I. p. 198.

344 B 30. τύπον. Socrates’ criticism of the poem so far has been δὲ ἀκριβελας: cf. Rep. 11 414 Α ὡς ἐν τοῦπρο, μὴ δὲ ἀκριβελας εἰρήσθαι. See also note on ὑπογράψαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι in 326 D above.

31. παντὸς μᾶλλον is frequent in Plato for ‘assuredly’: cf. Crito 49 Β.
CHAPTER XXX.

Socrates expounds the next section of the poem in accordance with his theory of the purport of the whole and finds therein his own doctrine that ill doing comes from want of knowledge.

1. \textit{μετὰ τὸῦτο—διελθὼν.} This sentence is somewhat difficult. τὸῦτο means from ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν to ἀνεύ ψόγου τετυγμένον. The reference in ὀλλαγα διελθὼν must be to the verses omitted between τετυγμένον and ὀνδε μοι ἐμπελέως etc. The logical object of λέγει is the sentence (in line 4) γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν etc., which is Socrates' paraphrase of ὀνδε μοι ἐμπελέως etc., but the grammatical object begins with ὅτι γενέσθαι—the stress being, as often happens, thrown upon the δὲ clause: 'While it is truly difficult to become a good man (albeit possible for some length of time), to continue in that state after you have become good and to be a good man etc.' γενέσθαι μὲν ἀνδρα ἀγαθὸν etc. is not, as Socrates says, μετὰ τὸῦτο, but his desire to expound the τὰυτὸ τὸν ὀλον of the poem throughout (διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος) leads him to begin at the beginning, even at the cost of an error not unnatural in conversational style. See Appendix I. p. 196.

ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον: 'as if he were making a speech', i.e. not a poem. The speech begins at γενέσθαι μὲν, for ὅτι here introduces oratio recta.

3. \textit{οἷὸν τε μέντων ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά.} These words do not give the gist of the lost lines: still less are they to be assigned (with Bonghi) to the poem itself, for [as Aars remarks Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras (1888) p. 12 note 3] it is implied by Socrates in 343 D foll. that μὲν in γενέσθαι μὲν has no expressed antithesis: they are educated by Socrates himself from χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. Cf. Infra 346 ἐπὶ τὰντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἕκὼν (ἐνταῦθα δεὶ ἐν τῷ ἕκὼν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἐρδη μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἅκων δ' ἠστιν οὐς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. The likeliest supposition is that of Blass—that the lost verses contained a further elaboration of the idea in ἀγαθὸν ἀλαθέως.

4. \textit{γενόμενον δὲ...ἀδύνατον.} Socrates correctly apprehends the gist of Simonides' objection to the saying of Pittacus, although Simonides himself no doubt read more into the ἐμμεναι of Pittacus than Pittacus intended it to express. Simonides here takes ἐμμεναι to denote a permanent state, and γενέσθαι as not permanent, although in ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι he himself uses ἐμμεναι more
loosely: see infra on 344 E line 27. It is however most improbable that Simonides meant by γενέσθαι 'to become', i.e. 'to be made', as Socrates everywhere implies: by ἀνήρ ἀγαθόν μὲν γενέσθαι ἀλαθέωσ he meant only 'that a man should prove himself truly good', i.e. quit him like a perfect man: compare Hdt. vii 224 Ἀεωνίδης—πίπτει ἀνήρ γενήμενος ἄριστος, Xen. Anab. ι. 26 ἐρωτᾶν ἐὰν τις αὐτῶν ἐστιν δὲτις ἀνήρ ἀγαθός ἑδέλου γενέσθαι. The usage is thoroughly idiomatic.

344 C 7. ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἄν μόνος—γέρας. Plato Symp. 204 A θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὔδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι: ἐστι γάρ.

8. ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ—καθέλη: see below on 344 E line 30.

12—14. οὐ τὸν κείμενον—τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ. For the repetition compare (with Sauppe) Gorg. 521 εὖ πρὸς χάριν λέγων—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βελτιστόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον.

344 D 15. οὖντα ποτε—καθέλοι. ποτε goes with καθέλοι as with καταβάλοι in line 13.

19. καὶ λατρὸν ταῦτα ταῦτα. ταῦτα ταῦτα is virtually adverbial as in Meno 90 D οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐθήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα;

20. ἔγχωρει κακῷ γενέσθαι. Socrates says γενέσθαι, although Simonides said ἐμμεναι; see on E (line 27) below.

21. παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ. Xenophon Mem. I 2. 20 μαρτυρεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὃ τε λέγων 'ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάκτωι ἤν δὲ κακοίσι συμμίσθης, ἀπολείπει καὶ τὸν ἑυτὴν νῦν'; καὶ ὁ λέγων 'αὐτὰρ ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλὸς'. The first of these quotations is known (see Meno 95 D) to be from Theognis, so that it seems clear that the second must be from some other poet. It is difficult to resist the impression that the author of this line intended ἄγαθος, κακός, and ἐσθλός to have a political sense, and was alluding to the ups and downs of an aristocrat's life in times of civil dissension: compare Theognis 1109—1110 Κύρ', οἱ πρόσθ' ἄγαθοι νῦν αὖ κακοὶ, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ πρὶν νῦν ἄγαθοι· τὶς κεν ταύτ' ἀνέχουν' ἐσορῶν; Euripides Hecuba 595 foll. (quoted by Cron) pointedly contradicts the sentiment of this line (as interpreted by Socrates) ἀνθρωποι δ' ἀεί δ' μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλῆν κακός, δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλός, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπὸ (alluding to Simonides' poem) φύσιν διέφθειρ', ἀλλὰ χρηστὸς ἐστ' ἀεί.

344E 25. εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἄγαθον. εὐμήχανος is identified with ἄγαθος by means of the middle step σοφὸς: σοφία being ἄγαθον because it is one of the virtues. See on τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπιστοῦντι in Crito 47 B.
26. οὐκ ἦστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. If Simonides had consistently carried out the distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία attributed to him (in part rightly: see on 344 B line 4), he would have used γενέσθαι, not ἔμμεναι here. Socrates throughout interprets ἔμμεναι as equivalent to γενέσθαι in this part of the poem, in spite of his previous distinction: but so (apparently) did Simonides: see on 344 B.

28. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν κτλ. τὸ δὲ ‘whereas in point of fact’ is very frequent in Plato: see on Apol. 23 A. Notice how Socrates reverts to the beginning of the poem: see note on 346 D and Appendix I. p. 196.

29. (δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλὸν. There is not sufficient ground for rejecting (with most of the editors) ἐσθλὸν: its position is a trifle awkward, but not more, since δυνατὸν δὲ is parenthetical, the μὲν after γενέσθαι being balanced by δὲ in ἔμμεναι δὲ. Heindorf reads δυνατὸν δὲ, ἐσθλὸν δ’ ἔμμεναι with slight MS authority.

30. πράξας μὲν γὰρ ἐν κτλ. γὰρ is probably due to Plato, who represents this sentence as adding a reason for ἔμμεναι δὲ δυνατὸν: see Appendix I. p. 199. πράξας εṅ is ‘if he has prospered’: the whole sentiment is the converse of ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἦστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι and is characteristic of the ordinary Greek moral code: cf. Homer Od. XVIII 136—137 τοῖς γὰρ νῦσ ἐστὶν ἐπιξοθούνων ἄνθρωπων οἷον ἐπ’ ἡμαρ ἄγγει πατὴρ ἄνδρὼν τε θεῶν τε. The view that affliction involves moral degeneracy appears in the transition of meaning in πονηρός and μοχθηρός from ‘afflicted’ to ‘depraved’: the common view that ‘prosperity’ brings virtue is involved in the usual equivocation on εὖ πράττειν ‘fare well’ and ‘do well’: see on Crito 47 E and Euthyphr. 3 A. After κακός δ’ εἶλ κακός, is to be understood ἐπραξεν.

32. τὸς οὖν εἰς γράμματα κτλ. In order to read into Simonides 345 A the doctrine that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, Socrates assigns to πράξας εὐ in the poem the meaning of acting well, rather than faring well.

36. κακός δὲ κακῶς, sc. πράξας: a free rendering of κακός δ’ εἶλ κακῶς of the poem, which Kral (following Ast) reads here against the MSS.

40. κακῶς πράξαντες, i.e. εἶλ κακῶς πράξασεν, as the words of the poem shew. Socrates’ reasoning is: to become a bad doctor by practising badly, you must first have been a good doctor: for if you cannot become a doctor by practising badly, obviously you
cannot become a bad doctor. The argument is as fallacious as it is ingenious: it assumes that 

\textit{kakós iatρós} is a twofold notion, and more than \textit{iatρós}, whereas it is a single notion and less. It would be more in conformity with experience to say that the \textit{idiótēs} does become by practising badly a \textit{kakós iatρós}.

345 \textbf{B} 45. \textit{αὐτῇ γὰρ μόνη—στερηθήναι.} This sentence (necessary as the converse of the statement in 345 \textbf{A} that good action comes from knowledge) is introduced as an explanation of \textit{ὑπὸ χρόνου κτλ.}, because \textit{χρόνος, πόνος, νόσος}, etc. produce \textit{ἐπιστήμης στέρησις}.

47. \textit{μέλλει—γενέσθαι.} See on 312 \textbf{C} above.

345 \textbf{C} 50. \textit{διατελοῦντα ἀγαθὸν} explains \textit{ἀγαθὸν} more precisely: cf. 344 \textbf{B} \textit{γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν.} \textit{διατελεῖν} without a participle seems not to be elsewhere found in Plato, though it occurs in Thucydides and others.

52. \textit{ἐπὶ πλεῖστον: “diutissime, ut ἐπὶ πολὺ saepe significat diu”}. \textit{καὶ} is ‘also’ not ‘and’, and balances \textit{οὗδ} \textit{ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν:} \textit{οἱ} \textit{θεοφιλεῖσ are also ἀμιστοὶ}.

\textbf{CHAPTER XXXI.}

The rest of the poem is now expounded and the theory that no man sins willingly discovered in it.

3. \textit{δηλοὶ (sc. εἰρμένα) is used as in Soph. Ant. 242 δηλοῖς ὃς τι σημανῶν κακῶν}.

6. \textit{κενεάν} goes proleptically with \textit{μόραν αἰῶνος}.

8. \textit{πανάμομον ἀνθρωπον} in apposition to \textit{τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν}. Kroschel compares Simonid. Amorg. \textit{πάμπαν δ᾽ ἀμωμος οὐτὸς οὐδ᾽ ἀκήριος (Frag. 4)}.

\textit{εὐρυεύσῃ δοσοὶ—χθονός.} Hom. Iliad \textit{VI 142 βροτῶν οἱ ἀροῦρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν, Hor. Od. III 14. 10 “quicumque terrae munere vescimur” (Heindorf)}.

345 \textbf{D} 10. \textit{ἐπὶ θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὐρων ἀπαγγελέω:} after Bergk’s emendation for the \textit{ἐπειθ᾽} \textit{ὑμῖν} of the MSS, which cannot be made to scan: see Appendix I. p. 199. It might be possible (in view especially of \textit{φησὶν} in the next line) to regard \textit{ἐπείτα} here as no part of the poem, were it not for 346 \textbf{D} where it must be part. \textit{ἐπὶ θ᾽} \textit{ὑμῖν} is the most probable of the many emendations proposed and accounts by far the most easily for the reading of the \textit{MSS}. \textit{ἐπὶ} is to be taken with \textit{εὐρων}, and \textit{τε} is like the quasi-gnomic \textit{τε} in Homer, e.g. II. 1 218 ὁς κε θεοὶς ἐπιπεληθεῖται, μάλα τ᾽ ἐκλυον αὐτοῦ. Translate “‘trust me,
I will tell you when I’ve found your man’, says he”. ὑμῶν (a kind of ethic dative) does not belong so much to ἀπαγγελέω as to ἐφευρόν. What Simonides himself wrote was no doubt ἐπὶ τ’ ὑμῶν (availing himself of the Aeolic form as in the next line); this Plato put in Attic as ἐπὶ θ’ ὑμῶν, from which to ἐπείθ’ ὑμῶν the step was easy. Sauppe’s ἐπὶ δὴ μιν εὗρων and Kroschel’s ἐπεὶ οὕτω εὐρῴων are hardly happy.

11. φησίν applies only to the last line: the former φησί γάρ covers the first sentence.

13. πάντας ὅστις: so infra in line 18 ὄστε τοῦτον φάναι ἐπαινεῖν ὃς ἄν and in line 25 ὃς ἄν—τοῦτων: see also note on 319 D.


19. ὃς ἄν ἐκὼν—ποτή: but ἐκὼν ὅστις ἐρδη without ἄν above, as often in poetry: Goodwin MT. p. 208, § 540.

21. οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν—ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν. The doctrine that no one sins willingly—a corollary of the view that vice is only ignorance—is characteristic of the ethical teaching both of Socrates and Plato (compare note on 324 A and on Euthyphr. 2 C), but not of all Greek sages, and it is only by the most perverse sophistry that Socrates here reads it into Simonides, ignoring entirely the words ἀνάγκη δ’ οὐδὲ θεό μάχονται.

25. καὶ δὴ καὶ: see on 343 B above.

28. καλὸν καγαθόν: see on Apol. 21 D.

29. καὶ ἐπαινετήν. The words φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν which follow in the mss were ejected by Heindorf.

30. μὴτέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον. Sauppe remarks that from Homer onwards μὴτέρα generally comes first in such enumerations—an interesting survival, perhaps, of the greater importance assigned to the mother in primitive Greece. ἀλλόκοτον (‘eccentric’ as in Rep. vi 487 D) from ἀλλος (in its sinister sense) and κότος (i.q. τρόπος, ἴδος, ὄργη) according to Phrynichus (quoted by Kroschel).

31. ἡ πατρίδα: see Crito 50 E—51 C.

36. ἐτὶ μᾶλλον: not = μᾶλλον ἡ κατ’ ἀξίαν, but—as is presently explained—because they ‘add voluntary feuds to those which they cannot avoid’.

38. ἀναγκαλαί: Heusde’s correction for ἀνάγκας of mss.
NOTES ON XXXI 346 B

επικρύπτεσθαι—ἀναγκάζεσθαι. Plato is probably thinking of Socrates after his trial as he depicts him in the Crito. ἀναγκάζεσθαι ‘are constrained’ is of course passive.

41. παραμεθέσθαι, like mulier, as often. Sauppe quotes Hor. Epod. xiii 18 “deformis aegrimoniae dulcisibus alloquius”.

43. ἡγήσατο—ἀναγκαζόμενος: ‘believed—that he had praised etc.’ Plato deals a sly thrust at Simonides’ notorious avarice, as Pindar (quoted by Sauppe) does in Isthm. ii 6 ἄ Μοίσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς πω τότ’ ἤν οὕδ’ ἐργάτης. The words ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενον contain the sting: for the life of the χρηματιστὴς is βλαίος (Ar. Eth. Nic. i 3. 1096a 5).

346 C 48. ἐμοίῳ ἔξαρκει κτλ. See Appendix I. pp. 196 foll. for the arrangement of this part of the poem.

50. γ’ ὀνησίπολιν. The MSS read γ’ ὀνήσει πῶλιν, which G. Hermann emended to τ’ ὀνησίπολιν, Bergk to ὀνασίπολιν.

51. οὐ μὴν: so the MSS, and so, most probably, Plato; but Simonides can hardly have written this, which will not scan; see Appendix I. p. 199.

53. οὐ γὰρ εἰμὶ φιλόμωμος probably belongs to an earlier part of the poem (before ἐμοίῳ ἔξαρκει: cf. οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε ψέγω, διʼ εἰμὶ φιλόψυχος in line 47): see Appendix I. p. 199.

55. γενέθλα is Stephanus’ correction for γενέθλα of the MSS, a mistake due to supposing that ἀπείρων (not from ἀπειρος) went with ἓλθων: it belongs to γενέθλα.

58. πώντα τοι καλά—μέμικται sums up the whole moral teaching of the poem.

346 D 63. καὶ οὐ ξηρῶ κτλ. Socrates recapitulates part of the poem by way of interpreting the final text: see note on τὸ δ’ ἔστιν γενέσθαι κτλ. in 344 b above and Appendix I. p. 196.

65. τοῦτον γ’ ἑνεκα: “si hoc spectetur s. requiratur, τὸ πανά-

μωμον ειναι” Heindorf: cf. Phaed. 85 B ἀλλὰ τοῦτον γ’ ἑνεκα

λέγειν τε χρη καὶ ἐρωτάν ὅ τι ἄν βουλησθε. The sense is: if I must

wait for perfection before beginning to praise, I shall never praise

anyone.

346 E 69. ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων: not serious, of course, nor true.

71. διαλαβεῖν: i.e. make a division, ‘pause’, virtually ‘punctuate’. The editors compare the use of διαστῆται in Ar. Rhet. III 5. 1407b 14 τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστηταί ἐργον διὰ τὸ ἀδηλον εἶναι

ποτέρω πρὸςκεῖται.

72. ἀκὼν δ’ ἔστιν οὕς: see on 344 B.
74. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γάρ. Compare Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ—οὐ γάρ 347 A ἔστιν and note in loc. Here διὰ ταῦτα sums up the clause σφόδρα γάρ—λέγειν.

CHAPTER XXXII.

The original question is now resumed, Socrates expressing himself disparagingly on poetical criticism. With some reluctance Protagoras consents to submit himself again to Socrates’ interrogatory.

6. ἔστι μέντοι καὶ ἐμοι κτλ. Imitated in Hipp. Maior 286 A where Hippias says ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν πάγκαλος λόγος συγκελμένος καὶ ἄλλως εὐ διακελμένος τοῖς ὀνόμασι. Like Socrates in his recent exposition, Hippias looks upon poetical criticism as a legitimate field for the exercise of sophistry and wit.

7. ἐπιδείξω: see on ἐπιδειξάμενος in 328 D. 347 B

9. ὠμολογησάτην: in 338 D, where however the terms of the agreement are somewhat more stringent.

15. περὶ μὲν ἁμάτων—έασωμεν. Heindorf quotes Alc. I 113 D 347 C ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὑπότερα συνολεῖ συνάξειν. 347 C

18. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι κτλ. This passage (from τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως down to καὶ πάνω πολὺν οὖν πλοῖσιν) is quoted by Athenaeus III 51. It is doubtful whether Plato is here animadverting on Xenophon’s Symposium, in which (2. 1 and 9. 3 foll.) both a flute-girl and a dancing-girl appear: the words τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων would contain a very pretty hit at Xenophon, if the evidence for the allusion were more complete. There is a similar passage in the Symposium of Plato (176 E) εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἀρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἐαυτῇ ὡς βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον: this passage Athenaeus (XI 112) cites in support of his theory of a literary rivalry between Plato and Xenophon.

20. ἀγοραίων: like the Latin circumforanei, “ἀγοραῖος, vel ut critici veteres volunt, ἀγόραιος, est ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ τεθραμμένος, s. qui totos dies forum conterit, quem ἀγορᾶς περίτρεμα Comicus appellat, vilis et ex ima plebe homo, Aristoph. Eqq. 181 ὡτῇ πονηρός καῖς ἀγορᾶς εἶ καὶ θραυσὶ: 214 τὰ δ’ ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά, φωνῇ μιαρᾷ, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγόραιοι εἰ” Heindorf.

27. καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι. So Athenaeus (III 51) and the second hand in T: B and T read πεπαιδευμένοι. Schanz brackets πεπαιδευμένοι, but ὑπὸ ἀπαίδευσις in line 23 is in its favour.

οὐκ ἄν ὑδόις—ψαλτρίας. Compare Theaet. 173 δ ἔνιπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίᾳ κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὅναρ πράττει προσισταταί αὐτοῖς (i.e. τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις).

347 Ε 32. καὶ πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίων: like Socrates in the Symposium: see 220 Α, 223 Κ. In Laws I 637 B foll. Plato argues that wine properly used is the means of teaching self-control, since the man who will be σωφρόν when drunk will a fortiori be σωφρῶν when sober: cf. ibid. Π 673 Ε foll.

33. εὰν μὲν κτλ. μὲν suggests that in different society the same would not be the case—an antithesis which is already expressed in 347 Κ—Ω. Compare Apol. 17 Β ei μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντι, ὑμολογοῦν ἄν ἐγγέτοι κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. For λάβωνται cf. (with Sauppe) Symp. 218 Α νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἄφνοις ὅταν λάβωνται (sc. οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοι).

35. οὔτε ἄνερέσθαι—ἐπαγόμενοι τε: for the sentiment see on 329 Α above: for οὔτε—τε on 309 Β: for αὐτοῖς after ὅν on 313 Α. ἐπάγεσθαι is the regular word for ‘cite’, e.g. Rep. Π 364 Σ μάρτυρας ποιήσας ἐπάγονται.

38. ὅ ἀδυνατοῦσιν: ὅ, not in B and T, was restored by Heindorf: it has since been found in a Vienna MS.

40. ἐδοξίν: the subject is supplied from ἄνδρῶν οἴολπερ ἕμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν εἶναι.

348 Α 43. καταθεμένους: for the asyndeton see on 330 Α. Both here and in Tim. 59 Σ καταθεμέθθαι is not used in the sense of laying aside for good, but rather (as generally) putting away to be resumed again. ‘Putting the poets on their shelves’ would give the effect of the Greek.

47. παρέχειν: see on συγκαθείναι in 336 Α above.

348 Β 53. καὶ νῦν: as before 336 Β.

56. ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῆμεν. Symp. 193 Ε ei μὴ συνήδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθων δεινοῖς οὗτοι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά. In σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι συν- goes with ἐμαυτῷ—I am conscious with myself that I am good—by the convenient fiction which separates the observing εἰσο from the observed. Cases where the dative is not a reflexive pronoun are later in development and presuppose only knowledge about, not knowledge along with, the object.
58. ὡς γέ μοι. B has ὡστε μοι: T ὡς γ' ἐμοι (sic). There is 348 C no occasion for the emphatic form of the pronoun.

60. τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι. σχεδόν τι need not be accompanied by πάντες: compare Phaedo 59 C ἄλλος δὲ τις παρήν; σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

61. προντράπετο. No other example of the aorist middle of προτρέπω is quoted from any Attic author, but ἐτραπόμην is common, e.g. Apol. 21 B μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

62. ἐκέλευεν: the imperfect of this verb is used in narrative style for the aorist.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

After a prefatory compliment to Protagoras, Socrates again asks whether the five virtues are only different names for one thing or differ in reality from one another.

5. τὸν Ὀμηρον τό. τό goes with the whole quotation to which τι is in predicative apposition (cf. τί τοῦτο λέγεις and the like), literally ‘I think that what Homer says etc. is something’, i.e. ‘I think there is sense in what Homer says’. Schanz brackets τὸν Ὀμηρον, so as to make the articular clause the subject to λέγειν as in Ar. Knights 334, but there is no occasion for the change. The quotation had become almost proverbial (cf. Symp. 174 D, Alc. II 140 A) for “Two heads are better than one”: it is from Iliad x 224 ff. where Diomedes says: σὺν τε δῦ’ ἐρχομένων, καὶ τε πρὸ ὦ τοῦ ἐνόησεν, διππως κέρδος ἐγ’ μοῦνος δ’ ε’ πέρ τε νοήσῃ, ἄλλα τέ οί βράσσων τε νός λεπτῇ δὲ τε μῆτις. Leaf (in loc.) explains ἐρχομένων as a pendent accusative and for the order of words in πρὸ ὦ τοῦ cites II. v 219 ἐπὶ νῦ τῷδ’ ἀνδρὶ.

8. εὐπορώτεροι—ἐμεν, i.e. οὕτως ἔχοντες (viz. σὺν δύο ἐρχομένων); 348 D it is hardly necessary to read οὕτως πῶς or to change πῶς into οὕτως as Heindorf suggests.

10. αὐτικὰ περιμῶν—ἐντύχη. The ἐπιδείξεται and βεβαιώσεται —deliberative subjunctives—of the MSS would imply too much eagerness: the change to ἐπιδείξεται and βεβαιώσεται is adopted by Sauppe and others. This mistake (or the reverse) is tolerably frequent in Plato’s MSS, cf. Gorg. 489 A (βεβαιώσωμαι T, βεβαιώσομαι B), 505 E (ποιήσωμεν BT), 510 A (ἀδικήσωμεν BT).

12. ἐνεκα τοῦτο refers to the following clause introduced by
Heindorf refers to his note on Phaedo 102 D λέγω δὲ τούθ’ ἐνεκα, βουθέμενος δῆξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοι.

The reference is to 316 D foll. καὶ does not go with ἀλλων but with the whole sentence (as Sauppe points out).

Hypokrememos ‘having had yourself heralded as a sophist’: compare Aeschin. in Ctes. 41 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκρεμένοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους. The force of ὑπο- is probably the same as in ὑπείπον: see note on 343 E. Notice the effect of the double σειαυτῶν (both of them after a natural pause): σειαυτῶν ὑποκρεμένος—σειαυτῶν ἀπέφηνας: the -αυτῶν is brought out so strongly as to suggest that Protagoras is the only true Αὐτὸς or Master.

μισθὸν—ἀρνυσθαι: 328 B, where however it is not said that Protagoras was the first to take a fee. The Homeric word ἀρνυσθαι is occasionally used by prose writers in the phrase μισθὸν ἀρνυσθαι: whence μισθαρνεῖν.

ἐκεῖνα—τα μὲν—τα δέ: see above on 330 A.

Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage and knowledge in a cumbersome proof, against the validity of which Protagoras rightly protests.

μόρια μὲν. The antithesis to μὲν was already expressed in ἐφησθα ὄνω ὅν τὸν ὁνοματα ἐπὶ ἐν ἐναι 349 B.

Η δὲ ἁνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates’ arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been discussed: see on 333 C and D and Introd. p. xiv.

ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: like Otho (Tac. Hist. II 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:
"And strange to say, the sons of pleasure, They who have revelled beyond measure In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure, Die calm, and calmer oft than he Whose heritage was misery".

10. ἄνδρειοτάτους ἔδει διαφεροῦντως. The extreme difference (cf. πάντα πολὺ διαφέρον in line 5) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359 β the διαφερόντως is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23 C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὐσα πόλις ἀριστή πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως: compare also Gorg. 487 B ἀληθευτηρέω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

11. εἰκε δὴ. "Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam 349 E viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460 Α, aut revocatur, qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349 D". Wohlrab on Theaet. 186 B.

12. πότερον τοὺς ἄνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἄνδρειοι are θαρραλεῖοι: (2) ἐπιστήμονες are θαρραλεῖοι (349 Α line 19—350 Β line 28): (3) none who are θαρραλεῖοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἄνδρειοι (350 Β line 28—line 33). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμονες) are ἄνδρειοι, i.e. that σοφία is ἄνδρεια. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to assume (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλεῖοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλεῖοι with knowledge, and θαρραλεῖοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in Chapter xix foll.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμονες is ἄνεπιστήμον. Now as ἄνδρειοι are θαρραλεῖοι and no ἐπιστήμονες (in the class θαρραλεῖοι) are ἄνδρειοι, it follows that ἄνδρειοι are ἐπιστήμονες, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted—that ἐπιστήμονες are ἄνδρειοι, since ἄνδρειοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμονες. Socrates—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when
about to draw his conclusion in 350 B lines 34 and 38: where see note.

13. kal iitas γ', ἕφι: i.e. they not only have θάρρος (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἔναυ Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of ἔτης: Sauppe refers to the Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 444 ἔτης. ἑταμβός, ἀναίδης, καλ δὲ αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρείας is coupled with ἔτης in Symp. 203 D and with θρασύς in Ar. Clouds l.c.

14. φέρε δὴ κτλ. This section (from φέρε δὴ to ὥς οἷῶν τε μάλιστα in line 19) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on line 12) in 350 B: see note on line 32, and compare Laches 192 C, where the proof that ἀφρων καρτέρησις is not ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way: σχέδων γὰρ τι οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἤγεις σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

15. ei μη μαίνομαι γε: 'as I'm a sane man.' This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283 E, Rep. X 608 D (ei μῆ ἄδικῳ γε), Gorg. 511 B οἶδα—ei μῆ κωφός γ' εἰμι.


350 A
20. κολυμβῶσιν. This and the next example are given also in Lach. 193 B foll. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.


27. αὐτοὶ ἐαυτόν—ἡ. The notion 'than' is expressed twice: see note on Crito 44 C καὶ τοὶ τίς ἃν αἰσχρῶν εἶνα ταύτης δόξα ἡ δόκειν κτλ., and cf. infra 350 E and (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII 86 ἐγένοτο—μεκρὸ ἀμέμοιονα αὐτοὶ ἐωυτῶν ἡ πρὸς Εὐθολῆ.

350 B
32. αἰσχρόν μεντάν—ἀνδρεία: and if aἰσχρόν, not ἄρετῆ (which it is), since all ἄρετῆ is καλὸν (349 E). Compare Lach. 182 C ἡ δὲ γε ἀνδρεία ὤμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι and with the general sentiment Meno 88 B ὁ οὖν ἀνδρεία, ei μὴ ἔστι φράσεις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄλλ' ὁ οὖν θάρρος τι', οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σῶν νῦ, ὡφελείται.

34. λέγεις: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὀπέρ λέγω in Apol. 21 A. With λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense compare Symp. 199 E πειρώ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἔρως ἐρως ἠστίν οὐδενός ἡ τιμός;
οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι. This Protagoras did not say, but only that οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλεῖοι: see 349 E. For this reason Sauppe and others reject τοὺς before θαρραλεῖους, and in favour of this urge the reply of Protagoras (καὶ νῦν γε): but inasmuch as (1) οὐκοῦν οὖτοι—μανῆμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be incompatible with τοὺς ἀνδρεῖους οὐχὶ—εἶναι, (2) θαρραλεύσατοι δὲ οὖντες ἀνδρεῖστατοι in line 38 clearly implies that θαρραλέους are conceived of as ἀνδρεῖοι (no less than ἀνδρεῖοι as θαρραλεῖοι), we must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS reading. Protagoras’ καὶ νῦν γε is an unwary admission: he does not at first catch the difference between οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶν οἱ θαρραλεῖοι and οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ θαρραλεῖοι, and Socrates avails himself of his opponent’s slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this misrepresentation could only be expressed as ἀνδρεῖοι are σοφοὶ (= ἐπιστήμονες), not σοφοὶ are ἀνδρεῖοι: see on 349 E and 350 D.

37. έκεῖ, i.e. in the case of θάρρος based on σοφία, illustrated in 350 C 350 A. Sauppe (after Schöne) reads οἱ σοφώτατοι, οὖτοι κτλ.: but οἱ σοφώτατοι need not go closely with οὖτοι (which is resumptive) any more than οἱ οὖνθε θαρραλεῖοι οὖντες with the preceding οὖτοι. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order οὖτοι—οἱ—θαρραλεῖοι)(οἱ σοφώτατοι οὖτοι.

40. οὐ καλῶς—μεμημονεύεις κτλ. Protagoras sees now that ‘All brave are bold’ is not equivalent to ‘All bold are brave’, and rectifies his καὶ νῦν γε by pointing out that he originally said only ‘All brave are bold’: but he confines his attention to this point, without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates’ argument from 349 E to 350 B.

43. ὁμολόγησα in 349 E.

44. τότε ἣροι. So B and T. In τότε there is perhaps a latent contrast to καὶ νῦν γε of line 35. Protagoras is correcting his recent slip—had you asked me then (viz. at 349 E), I should have answered rightly. τοῦτο has inferior MSS authority.

45. τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρεῖους ὡς οὐ θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν. The οὐ after ὡς is 350 D due to a confusion between (1) τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρεῖους ὡς οὐ θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν, οὔδαμον ἐπέδειξας and (2) οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν, τὸ εὖν ὁμολόγησε, οὔδαμον κτλ. The insertion of οὐ is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is refuted, whence ἐλέγχεω ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγεω ὡς οὐ etc.

49. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἷς κτλ. Protagoras ignores Socrates’ third
52. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ., i.e. you might as well argue (1) ol ἵσχυρόλ are δύνατολ, (2) ol ἐπιστῆμονες are δύνατολ, therefore ol ἐπιστῆμονες are ἵσχυρόλ. This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted ol δύνατολ are ἵσχυρόλ. To make Protagoras’ picture of Socrates’ argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are δύναμι without ἵσχυρόλ—but this is not true, whereas Socrates’ third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates’ reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras’ objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates’ conclusion as expressed in 350 c (37—40), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

351 A  62. ἀπὸ ἐπιστῆμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ. Protagoras says in effect: δύναμις and ἵσχυς are of the body, θάρσος and ἀνδρεία of the soul. δύναμις may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: supra 350 E), or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance: such men have no real physical strength or ἵσχυς as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of δύναμις). ἵσχυς comes from natural constitution (φύσις) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly θάρσος may result from art (τέχνη is substituted for ἐπιστῆμη in view of the illustrations in 350 A), from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna): ἀνδρεία comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III 410 D τὸ θυμοεἰδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—θρῆν μὲν τραφέν ἀνδρείον ἄν εἰ, μάλλον δ’ ἐπιταθέν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλιπόν γλυκοίτ’ ἄν, ως τὸ εἰκόσ).
4. εῦ γὰρ λέγω: i.e. 'I mean' not 'I say': cf. infra line 25 351 C in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an affirmative answer. After ἥδεα in the next line Heindorf would insert τὰ ἥδεα, but the subject is easily supplied.

20. ἐστὶ μὲν ἢ κτλ. See on ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὤψειμα in 334 A. 351 D 28. εἶν μὲν πρὸς λόγον κτλ. πρὸς λόγον does not (except per accidens) mean 'relevant' but is equivalent to εἰςλογον: compare the phrases μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγου; and, for the use of πρὸς, πρὸς ὀργὴν, πρὸς βίαν and the like. So in 343 D, 344 A. Here the meaning is further explained by the clause καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ—ἀγαθόν. τὸ σκέμμα is quite different from σκέψις: it is not the inquiry itself, but the proposition to be inquired into, viz. that Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it, if only we catch the force of πρὸς λόγον, σκέμμα and ἀμφισβητήσομεν.

33. δίκαιος—σύ. Plato very frequently omits the copula

A. P.
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epiν: εἰ and ἐσμέν more rarely: εἴναι often: ἣν rarely: parts of the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae 31—35.

κατάρχεις: a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony) with religious associations; the middle is used of beginning a sacrifice. Cf. Symp. 177 ε ἄλλα τῷ ἀγαθῷ καταρχέτω Φαίδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἐρωτα and ibid. 176 Α.

352 A 36. η πρός ἀλλο τύ. It is not of course implied that ὑγιεία is an ἔργον σώματος, i.e. something ὑ σῶμα ἐργάζεται. Examples of σώματος ἔργα would be different kinds of bodily labour. η πρός ὑγιείαν κτλ. is equivalent to πῶς ἑχει η πρός ὑγιείαν κτλ.: cf. infra 352 B πῶς ἑξεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην;

37. τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας: the rest being covered by clothes. χείρ is not hand here (otherwise χεῖρας ἄκρας would be the tips of the fingers), but the arm, as in Homer's φίλας περὶ χείρε βαλὼντε;

39. ἐπισκέψωμαι. The word is apt here, as it is often used of a medical inspection: compare Phaedo 117 ε ἐπισκοπεῖ τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη. With the whole passage compare Theaet. 162 Α ἄρα κἂν εἰς Δακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν—πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἁξίοις ἄν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνλους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδώμενος;

41. θεασάμενος: with the usual asyndeton: see on 330 Α.

352 B 44. καὶ τοῦτο: καὶ refers to 351 Ε—Φ.

47. ήγεμονικόν: this word was afterwards selected by the Stoics to denote τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ὃ ἢ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὀρμαῖ γίνονται (Diog. Laert. VII 159).

48. ὃς περὶ τολοῦτον αὐτοῦ ὄντος: see on 337 Ε.

53. περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὁσπερ περὶ: see the reference in the last note. Aristotle alludes to this passage in Eth. Nic. VII 3 1145 b 23 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνοῦση, ὃς ἐφέ Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτόν ὡσπερ ἄνδραποδον.

56. ἐάντερ γυγώσκῃ—μὴ ἀν κρατήθηναι: a frequent theme in Plato, e.g. Meno 77 Β ff., Gorg. 466 Β ff., two passages which contain much in common with the discussion in this and the next chapter.

58. η ἄ ἄν η: the reading of Stephanus: B has ἦ ἄ ἦ: Τ ἦ ἄν ἦ.

Although pleasures are sometimes called evil and pains good, it is in such cases their consequences which are intended to be so called: at the time itself all pain is evil, and all pleasure good.

The argument proceeds by these stages: First, the meaning of ἕττω εἶναι τῶν ἤδονῶν is explained (353 c): next, it is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they bring pain in their train or loss of pleasure, not because they are pleasant themselves (353 c—354 A), and that pains are called good because they bring pleasure in their train or escape from pain, not because they are painful themselves (354 A—354 C); therefore pleasure in itself is good, and pain evil (354 C—E). The rest of the chapter forms an introduction to the chapter which follows.

3. ἐλέγομεν is more humble than λέγομεν—the idea is ‘used to call’ till you said it was wrong.

4. ἄκούστε δή: Socrates bespeaks ‘Attention!’ like a herald. ἄκούστε λέφ (e.g. Ar. Peace 551) was the usual way of beginning a proclamation at Athens. Compare Apol. 20 D, 32 A, Theaet. 201 D.

6. ἄλλο τι. This, the shorter form of this particle of interrogation, is probably not a deliberate abbreviation for ἄλλο τι ἡ. Thus ἄλλο τι τούτο ἄληθὲς ἔστων = ‘this is true—anything else?’ i.e. isn’t it?, the words being thrown in parenthetically like nicht wahr and n’est ce pas.

7. ἐν τοῖςδὲ—οὖν: τοῖςδὲ would lead us to expect an enumeration of the cases: as it is, only examples are given. The effect of the Greek may be brought out by ‘in the following cases—that often for example etc.’ With this punctuation it is needless to write (as Kroschel does) τοῖςδὲ for τοῖςδὲ.
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9. γιγνώσκοντες οτι πονηρά ἑστιν: compare Meno 77 c ἡ γάρ δοκεί σοι, ὃ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ οτι κακὰ ἑστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν; μάλλοτα.

353D 16. κάν εἶ: see note on 328 A above.

17. ο郤μως δὲ ἀν κακὰ ἦν. So the MSS: most recent editors (except Kral) read εἶν. The imperfect is used because the answer ‘No’ is expected and desired: would they be evil just because they give us pleasure? Certainly not. See Goodwin MT. p. 190 § 503. Schleiermacher wrongly rejected δὲ after ὅμως: the ‘apodotic δὲ’ is frequent after ὅμως, ὡσαύτως, οὕτω and the like.

18. ὅ τι μαθόντα ποιεῖ κτλ. So the MSS. A variety of emendations have been proposed for μαθόντα, such as ἀμαρτόντα (Schleiermacher, followed by Heindorf), ἀμαθάλοντα (Orelli), παρόντα (Hermann), παθόντα (Sauppe and others), while Kroschelt doubts the entire passage ἦν—ὁπηθοῦν, saying “Totus autem locus ita comparatus est ut de eius emendatione desperandum esse videatur”. It would be natural to regard this particular passage as corrupt if this were an isolated example of the idiom in question: but—not to mention other authors—it occurs also in the following passages of Plato: Apol. 36 B τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίνα, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βλε ὄντι ἣνυξίαν ἦγον: Euthyd. 283 E εἰ μὴ ἀγροκότερον—ἡν εἰπεῖν, εἰπὼν ἄν, σοι εἰς κεφαλήν, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐμοῦ—καταφεύει κτλ.: ibid. 299 Α πολὺ μέντοι—δικαιότερον ἄν τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμ, ὅ τι μαθῶν σοφῶς νεῖσι οὕτως ἐφυσεν. In each of these cases the MSS reading μαθῶν (not παθῶν) should be retained. In the direct speech τί μαθῶν is used in an impatient question: τί μαθῶν τοῦτο ἐπολήγεια is ‘whatever made you think of doing this?’ (e.g. Ar. Clouds 1506, Wasps 251, Ach. 826): cf. the idiom τί ληπαίς ἔχων; in which τί depends on ἔχων (see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 624). τί μαθῶν becomes in the indirect ὅ τι μαθῶν, but in every case in which this phrase occurs in Plato ὅ τι μαθῶν means not ‘why’ but ‘because’. The transition in meaning is sometimes explained as parallel to the use of οἱον, ὡς, ὡς etc. for ὅτι τουοτος, ὅτι τοσοτος, ὅτι οὕτως, so that ὅ τι μαθῶν = ὅτι τοῦτο μαθῶν: but a simpler explanation is perhaps possible (see my edition of the Apol. Appendix II. p. 123). ὅ τι μαθῶν is an impatient ὅ τι just as τί μαθῶν is an impatient τί: but as ὅτι and τί are in reality the same word (see on 333 B), and ὅτι means ‘because’, ὅ τι μαθῶν comes also to mean ‘because’ (impatiently), the original interrogative force being lost. Similarly, in sentences like ληπεῖς ἔχων, the interrogation is dropped, and
the participle alone survives, conveying the same sense of blame or impatience as in τὴ ληπεῖς ἔχων; which is probably the form of sentence in which this idiom originated. Here μαθὸντα is of course the nom. plur.: if (as we suppose) the original force of the participle is no longer felt in this idiom, there is nothing harsh in finding it in agreement with a neuter subject.

31. οὖκοιν πάλιν ἄν—ἐρολμέθα. There is no sufficient reason 354 A for changing ἄν to αὖ or for omitting ἄν: ἄν points forward to the apodosis in line 37 φαίειν ἄν and is just as idiomatic as ἄν in ὀσπερ ἄν εἶ, e.g. in 311 B above.

33. οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ. Rep. II 357 C τρίτων δὲ ὀρᾶς τι—εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ὕφῳ γυμναζόσθαι καὶ τὰ κάμμωντα λατρεύεσθαι καὶ λάτρευσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπιτονα φαίμεν ἄν, ὥφελεν δὲ ἦμας, καὶ αὐτά μὲν ἐαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὖκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γιγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.


35. καύσεων τε—λυμοκτονίων. Gorg. 521 E πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὀδὲ εἰργασάται ἄνηρ (σ. ὁ λατρός)—τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἵσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων—πικρότατα πῶματα διδοῦσι καὶ πεινήν καὶ διψήν ἀναγκάζον. Λυμοκτονία ("Hungerkur", says Stallbaum) is part of the μεκρά δλαίτα of Rep. III 406 D.

42. ἄλλων ἀρχὰλ: 'dominions over others'—not ἄλλων πόλεων: 354 B cf. Gorg. 452 D αἵτινος ἀμα μὲν ἑλευθερίας αὐτοῦς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἀρχεῖν εν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστῳ. Heindorf's conjecture ἄλλα (i.e. 'besides') is not necessary, in view of Gorg. 514 A (quoted by Sauppe) η χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἡ ἀρχὴν τινων ἡ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡμτινον.

45. τέλος. The philosophical sense of this word—as an end of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: compare Gorg. 499 Ε ἀρα καὶ σοι συνδοκεὶ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν κτλ.

46. ἄλλ' η ἱδονάς is Stephanus' emendation for ἄλλ' ἱδονάς. 354 C

49. ὥς ἄγαθον ἄν: the copula is attracted to the predicate, as regularly: cf. infra 359 D τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἐαυτοῦ ἑπέθη ἀμαθία ὁδά.

66. εἰ μὲ ἀνέρουσθε: without the φαίνῃ ἄν which we should expect. Socrates apostrophises the ἀνθρώποι as if they stood before
him; the φαίνω ἀν ἐγώγε of line 68 is part of what Socrates says to the ἀνθρώπου.

70. ἐν τούτῳ: see on 310 D above. πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις means all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.

71. ἀναθέσαι suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in Rep. vi 487 B—C.

73. η τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι. B and T have η before ἄλλο τι by a natural mistake: it is corrected in T by a later hand.

79. ἀνθρώπως: so the MSS, but ὁ ἀνθρώπως in line 82. Kroschel refers to the variation in 321 D ἀνθρώπων—τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ—ἀνθρώπῳ—ἀνθρώπως. Compare infra 355 E.

81. καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε. We should of course expect λέγετε, but the second part of a logically subordinate clause in Greek tends to become an independent clause: see on 313 A.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The meaning of the phrase ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ is now explained in conformity with the results of the last chapter.

If we substitute ‘good’ for ‘pleasure’, the common saying that we do evil, knowing it to be evil, because overcome by ‘pleasure’, becomes ‘we do evil knowing it to be evil, because overcome by good’ (355 B—C). ‘To be overcome by good’ is shewn to be the choosing of greater evil in place of lesser good (D—E). Similarly, substituting pleasure for good, we have the sentiment ‘we do pleasure, knowing it to be pleasure, because overcome by pleasure’, and here also ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains (355 D—356 A). No doubt in this case the pleasures are present and the pains remote, but we make allowance for this in our process of weighing pleasures and pains against themselves and one another (356 A—C). ‘Near’ and ‘Far’ have the same bewildering effect on the eyes when we look at size and number: but there the arts of measurement and of arithmetic resolve our perplexity (356 C—357 A). In like manner there must be some art or knowledge whose function it is to settle the value of ‘more’ and ‘less’, ‘near’ and ‘far’ etc. in their application to pleasure and pain. In other words τὸ ἡδονῆς ἡπτάθεαι is due to ignorance (357 A—357 E).

2. χρώμεθα ἅμα. ἅμα is due to a correction in one inferior MS,
approved by Cobet and Kroschel: BT have χρώμεθα ἀρα. If we read χρώμεθα ἀρα, there are difficulties serious enough to suggest an error in the reading: (1) the position of ἀρα is to say the least most unusual: no example is quoted of ἀρα coming at the end of a conditional clause in this way: (2) is ἀρα to be taken with εἶν in the usual sense (si forte) or as inferential? The inferential meaning strikes us as somewhat farfetched, and the other is both inappropriate here and impossible from the position of the particle. On the other hand ἀμα is almost necessary to the sense: without ἀμα, the words εἶν μη—χρώμεθα would not correctly describe Socrates’ procedure in the following discussion, in which he does use all four names. But as he does not use them together, his procedure is accurately described by the addition of ἀμα to χρώμεθα.

7. θέμενοι—οὐτο: οὐτο is explained by ὅτι γιγνώσκων—αὐτὰ ποτει: ‘let us lay it down and say etc.’ The thesis of the many is stated in order to be demolished. With the style of reasoning which follows compare Gorg. 499 A—B where (as a reductio ad absurdum of the view that pleasure is good and pain evil) it is argued that in that case the bad man would be just as bad and just as good as the good man since he feels just as much pain and pleasure as the other: see also Alc. I 116 Α ἄρε ὁ ν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὸν καλὸν, ἡ δὲ κακὸν αἰσχρόν; ναλ. τὴν ἀρα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δὲ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἥ εἶ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δὲ.

11. οὐτο μὲν ἥδονῆ. The antithesis is not expressed by a μὲν 355 C clause but in ἐκείνῳ δη—τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ below.

12. μετείληφεν: the subject is ἥδονῆ and τὸ ἀγαθὸν is in apposition to ἄλλο ὅνομα. ἀντὶ τῆς ἥδονῆς means in place of pleasure, i.e. the name pleasure.

19. ἐν ὑμῖν: not ‘before your tribunal’, but ‘in you’, i.e. 355 D inside you, in your souls. The idea is of a conflict between the good and evil in the soul before you do the evil. ἐν ὑμῖν might have been ἐν αὐτῷ, but the ὑβριστής now selects his interlocutors as his examples. The subtle reasoning which follows may be put thus: We do evil, knowing it to be evil, because we are overcome by good. But—since that which we do is evil—the good which overcomes is less worthy than the evil in us which it overcomes. ‘Less worthy’ (to overcome) means that ‘there is less of it’: to be overcome by good is therefore to choose less good than evil. The
argument is extraordinarily ingenious but hardly sound—the flaw lies in substituting 'the evil in us' for 'us': it was not 'the evil in us', but 'we' who were overcome by good. See also Introd. p. xxix. The usual way of taking ἐν ὑμῖν as 'before your tribunal' or the like (cf. Gorg. 464 D) makes the false step much more serious—since it substitutes not 'the evil in us' but simply 'the evil' for 'us'.

23. ἀνάξια ἐστὶν τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν should be translated literally—'the good is unworthy of the bad'. The expression—in Greek as in English—is somewhat strained in order to correspond to οὐκ ἄξιον above (line 19): but after all 'I am unworthy of you' is much the same as 'I am less worthy than you'. The Greeks can even use ἀνάξιος in the sense of 'more worthy than', 'too good for': e.g. Soph. Philoct. 1009.

24. τὰ μὲν μελξὸν—ἡ: i.e. when τὰ κακὰ are μελξὶν and τὰ ἁγαθὰ σμικρότερα, then τάγαθα are ἀνάξια τῶν κακῶν: τὰ κακὰ are ἀνάξια τῶν ἁγαθῶν, when τὰ ἁγαθὰ are μελξὶν, and τὰ κακὰ σμικρότερα. Similarity with πλειω and ἐλάττω. It must be borne in mind that ἄξιος does not here denote moral, but rather physical strength or value: good is ἄναξιον κακῶν, because it is smaller or less numerous.

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25. πλειω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἡ. See on 330 Α.

28. μεταλάβωμεν, i.e. 'let us change and take the names pleasant and painful and apply them to etc.' Compare infra 356 D. ἐπὶ follows ὀνήματα as in τίθεσθαι ὀνομα ἐπὶ τινι and the like.

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33. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀνάξια. This—the MSS reading—is undoubtedly right. Plato coins the word ἀνάξια for 'unworthiness' to complete the parallel with D above: cf. lines 19—23 οὐκ ἄξιον ὑπὸ τῶν νικῶν—κατὰ τί δὲ—ἀνάξια ἐστί τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν κτλ. Similarly in Phaedo 105 Ε Plato coins ἀνάρτιος, in 106 λ ἄθερμος (rightly accepted, in spite of MS authority, by editors) and ἄψυκτος (see MSS, but Wytenbach's ἄψυχρος is—we think rightly—accepted by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to ἄρτιος, θερμός, ψυχρός. Cicero's translation "quaetigitoret essem dignitas voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine alterius utrius posita?" (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313) shews that ἀνάξια was read in his time: so in Ficinus' "quaet vero alia inest ad dolorem dignitas voluptati quam excessus intet se atque defectus?" The word ἀνάξια hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is ἀπαξια. ἡδονή (now found to be the reading of some MSS) for ἡδονή is due to Heindorf.
35. ta\ota \de\ 'estl: as Sauppe remarks, we should expect ta\ota \de\ 'estl t\o meli\w—\g\ine\se\bai, but the words are said as if for kai tis \al\a\a anaxia k\tl. had been written kai \pi\o\s \a\l\l\wes anaxia ta \hde\a pr\o\s t\o \l\u\p\hr\a, \al\l \h \u\p\h\rb\al\l\o\nta \a\l\l\hr\lw\o\n kai \e\l\l\e\l\o\nta;

37. \m\a\l\lo\n kai \h\t\t\o\n: this case is not given above (D—E) because the notion of intensity is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. Phileb. 24 A foll. with 27 E \h\d\o\n\h kai l\u\p\hr\h pe\r\h\s \e\xe\to\n, \h t\o\n t\o \m\a\l\lo\n te kai \h\t\t\o\n de\x\h\m\e\n\w\h\o\n \e\s\t\o\n; vai, tw\o\n t\o \m\a\l\lo\n, o \S\o\k\r\a\r\a\t\e\s.

t\o \g\a\p \t\i\s \l\e\g\o\i. So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are now, the pains remote. Socrates tries to shew that this makes no real difference.

38. \t\o \p\a\r\a\x\p\h\r\h\m\a \h\d\o. When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present pleasure and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply kai l\u\p\hr\o\n after \h\d\o.

41. \a\l\l \o\s\p\e\p\r \a\g\a\b\d\o i\s\t\a\n\a k\tl. Compare Rep. x 602 D 356 B \a\p' o\n\h o\n t\o \m\e\t\r\e\i\n kai \a\r\i\b\m\e\i\n kai i\s\t\a\n\a b\o\h\d\e\i\a \c\h\r\i\e\s\t\a\t\a\i\p\r\o\s a\u\t\a \e\f\a\n\h\s\s\a\n, \o\s\t\e \m\h \a\r\c\h\e\i\n \e\n \h\m\i\n \t\o \f\a\i\n\h\m\e\n\w\h\o\n \m\e\i\z\o\n \h \e\l\a\t\t\o\n \h \p\l\e\o\n \h \b\a\r\o\t\e\r\o\n k\tl.

42. kai \t\o \e\g\g\u\s k\tl.: in order that a near pleasure might count for more than a remote.

44. \e\a\n m\e\n \g\a\p \h\d\e\a k\tl. Compare Laws v 733 B \h\d\o\n\h b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a \h\m\i\n \e\n\h, l\u\p\hr\h d\e \o\b\h a\i\r\o\b\m\e\b\a o\u\t\e b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a, \t\o \d\e \m\h\d\e\t\e\r\o\n \a\n\t\i\r \m\e\n \h\d\o\n\h\h o\u b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a, l\u\p\hr\h d\e \a\l\l\a\t\t\e\r\h\a b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a. l\u\p\hr\h d\e \e\l\a\t\t\o \m\e\t\a \m\e\i\z\o\n\o\s \h\d\o\n\h b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a, \h\d\o\n\h d\e \e\l\a\t\t\o \m\e\t\a \m\e\i\z\o\n\o\s l\u\p\hr\h o\u b\o\u\l\o\m\e\b\a k\tl.

47. \e\a\n t\e \t\a \e\g\g\u\s k\tl. When once you have equated ‘near’ and ‘far’ (see last note), then (but not till then) your final choice is not affected by the question of proximity in time. Theoretically, no doubt, this is right: but no man is so \a\g\a\b\d\o i\s\t\a\n\a as to weigh \e\g\g\u\s\o and \p\o\r\r\w\o correctly; whence the saying “Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die”. ‘Near’ and ‘far’ can only be weighed aright on the supposition that man is immortal and will live hereafter under the same moral laws as rule us here: but of immortality there is no hint in this dialogue.

49. ta\ota: i.e. t\a \h\d\e\a.
53. ὁτε: the notion of time readily passes into that of cause as in quoniam and cum.

54. φαίνεται ὑμίν κτλ. Two examples are given: (1) size—of which παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι (according to the Greek and Roman way of viewing sound) are special varieties, (2) number, i.e. τὰ πολλὰ. The specific varieties παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι are not dealt with in the sequel. With what follows compare (besides Rep. x 602 D cited above) Euthyphr. 7 B foll. and Alc. I 126 C foll., and with the present passage Phileb. 42 A and Rep. vii 523 C—524 C. The resolution by the intellect of such contradictory sense-perceptions is made the basis of Plato's scheme of higher education in the Republic.

57. αἱ ἱσαί is Heindorf's correction for ἱσαύ.

59. μῆκη—πράττειν: as we ἦδεα πράττομεν. πράττειν (with μῆκη) is explained by λαμβάνειν: see above on 314 A.

61. ἧ μετρητικὴ τέχνη. See Introd. p. xxxii.

62. ἡ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις. ἡ is omitted in B and T.

'The power of that which appears' is its power to affect us.

63. ἐπιλάνα καὶ ἐπολεί κτλ. ἄν is not to be supplied. Plato is reverting to the illustration in c. The imperfect is idiomatic for 'causes us, as we saw, to wander' etc. (viz. because τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη seem to us both μείζων καὶ μικρὸν): it is what Goodwin calls the 'philosophic imperfect': compare Crito 47 D διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, δ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο (becomes as we saw), τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. By adding καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι—σμικρῶν Plato treats his hypothesis that εἶ πράττειν is to select μεγάλα μῆκη as a fact: he does so also in ἄν ἐπολήσας κτλ. i.e. 'would have made', viz. if we had made use of it, but we did not. If the hypothesis were still treated as a hypothesis, we should have had ἄν ἐπολεί (and not ἄν ἐπολήσε) to correspond to what would then have been ἄν (expressed or understood) ἐπιλάνα καὶ ἐπολεί.

ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω. ἄνω κάτω (Theaet. 195 C) and ἄνω καὶ κάτω (Gorg. 495 A) are other forms of this proverbial phrase.

73. ἀριθμητικὴ. In Gorg. 451 B foll. ἀριθμητικὴ is said to be a science concerned with τὸ ἀρτιῶν τε καὶ περιττῶν, ὅσα ἐκάτερα τυχαναι ὅτα: whereas the function which is here assigned to ἀριθμητικὴ is there given to λογιστικὴ: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστιν τὸ τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλῆθος (cf. lines 73 ff. τὸ πλέον—τὸ ἐλλεῖτον ἐν
αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἢ τὸ ἐτερον πρὸς τὸ ἐτερον) ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιτόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστικὴ.

81. ἐλευ—ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ. The MSS read ἐπειδὴ δὲ, but after ἐλευ Plato regularly uses δὲ δὴ in coming to the application of a train of reasoning or illustrations: compare 312 Ε ἐλευ· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; and 311 Θ ἐλευ—παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν κτλ.

90. εἰσαχθὲς σκεψόμεθα. Siebeck, who asserts (Zur Chronologie der Platonischen Dialogen p. 121 foll.) that this and similar formulas were intended by Plato to be a distinct promise of future dialogues (if not a reference to a later part of the same dialogue) finds here a reference to Politicus 283 Η foll., where the 'measuring art' is discussed and described as the βασιλικὴ τέχνη.

93. ἡμικα ἡμεῖς—ὡμολογοῦμεν: 352 Β foll. 357 C

96. ἐφατε: in 352 Η. The original ἠρεσθε has to be repeated in consequence of the introduction of this independent clause.

98. ἠρεσθε: in 353 Α.

101. ἐπατε: but ἐπατων in 353 Α: otherwise there is no change in the quotation. Β and Τ have ἐπετε, but Stobaeus (who cites from τοσοῦτον in 357 Β to μεγίστη 357 Ε in his Florilegium) reads ἐπατε. According to Rutherford (New Phrynichus p. 219) ἐπετε is not Attic, but this is doubtful, if any faith can be placed in MS authority.

107. ἦς τὸ πρόσθεν. This—the reading of the best MSS—has been unjustly rejected in favour of εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν; but εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν can hardly be justified here. Sauppe refers to 339 Β ὀλγον δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν, where however εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν goes with προελθὼν, and in all the cases which he quotes there is a verb containing the idea of progress to go with the phrase, and so in Ar. Knights 751 ἀλλ' ἐς τὸ πρόσθε πρὸς παρεῖν' ἐς τὴν πρόνα (where probably we should read παρεῖν' for παρεῖν as in Ach. 43 πάρειτ' ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν). Where there is no such verb (which is very rarely the case) the phrase means 'with a view to what lies in front', e.g. Alcib. I 132 Β οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται. It need hardly be said that the phrase cannot mean simply εὑρημοσθέν. On the other hand ἦς seems to be just what is needed: the construction in full would be καὶ οὗ μοῦν ἐπιστήμης (ἐνδελ.), ἀλλὰ καὶ (ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνδελ) ἦν τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτὶ ὑμολογήκατε ὧν μετηρητικὴ (sc. ἡμῖν: for the omission of ἡμῖν after ὧν cf. infra 359 Α ἀπεδείχθη ἢρτι ὧτι ἄδονατων): 'and from lack, not merely of
knowledge, but of the knowledge which you have further admitted above to be measuring knowledge. The attraction of the relative extends to μετρητική also in spite of ὅτι: compare Apol. 37 ὥν εὑ ὁδ' ὅτι κακῶν δυντων for τούτων ὃ εὑ ὁδ' ὅτι κακὰ δυντα (ὅτι being used with the participle as in Gorg. 481 ε: see note on Apol. l.c.).

357 E 111. ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη: compare Laws III 689 A τὸς ὁδὸν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;—ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἰναί τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δὲ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

II. οὕτε αὐτός: the verb hangs fire: we should expect Plato to continue οὕτε οἱ υμέτρειοι παίδεσ ἐρχονται κτλ. Stephanus thought προσέρχεσθε had fallen out after αὐτός, Madvig ἔτε, while Kroschel suggests οὐτ' ἐροῦντε αὐτός. It seems probable that the text is corrupt: at all events no parallel has yet been adduced. The two cases quoted by Sauppe (Dem. πρὸς "Αφοβον § 54 and pseudo-Dem. πρὸς Τυμόθεον § 52) are more than doubtful in respect of their text, which (as Sauppe quotes it) is not according to the mss. Madvig’s ἔτε is simplest, but the future seems out of place: perhaps ἔτε should be read.

115. ὃς οὐ διδακτοῦ δύντος: i.e. τοῦ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Socrates begins to apply the results of the previous discussion to the subject of his dispute with Protagoras.

Pleasure is good and evil, and no one willingly encounters what he believes to be evil. But fear is the expectation of evil: therefore no one will willingly encounter what he fears.

358 A 3. ὡ Ἡπτία τη καὶ Πρόδικε. Here and in 358 E and 359 A ὡ has dropped out in the mss after preceding -ω. The effect of its omission would be to render the address unduly abrupt.

4. υμίν. So the mss. Sauppe's ἡμῖν is not necessary. υμίν means all three sophists: and ὁ λόγος is not the discussion as a whole, but the speaking, viz. in answer (cf. δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον). Throughout this chapter all the Sophists make use of their united admissions to destroy Protagoras alone.

9. διαλέσει τῶν ὄνομάτων: see note on 314 C.

358 B 10. ἔτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὁπως—ὄνομάζων. This mode of address insinuates that Prodicus was a θεῖος ἀνήρ, since a God was addressed in a similar way. See Crat. 400 E ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαίς νόμος ἐστίν


In the actions but cf. there is a proverb τὸ θείον ἐξαιρό ὁ λόγον: cf. Rep. vi 492 E θείον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου. The multitude of epithets given to gods is best illustrated by such a hymn as the Homeric Hymn to Ares line 1 foll. *Ares ὑπερμενέτα, βρισάρματε, χρυσεοπήληξ, ὄβριμοθυμε, φέρατι, πολισαδε, χαλκοκορυστά κτλ. In the multitude of names the suppliant hopes to include the acceptable one.

12. πρὸς ἡ βούλομαι: emphatic ‘with a view to my meaning’

13. ἐπὶ τοῦτο. This usage can only be on the analogy of ὁ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων δῶς and the like: actions are looked on as ways leading to a goal or destination or τέλος: cf. supra 354 C and D. To take the words (with Sauppe) as ‘in the case of this’ ‘in this domain’ would give a wrong meaning: the moral character of an art being determined by its end, it is καλὴν only if it aims at the end. The expression is however very curious, and perhaps unique. I once thought that ἀπάσαι might conceal some present participle such as ἀγονσαῖ—agreeing with πράξεις: but the occurrence of ἀπάσαι below in 359 E shews ἀπάσαι to be probably genuine here. The reasoning is this. Pleasure, the end, is good, pain evil: consequently all actions aiming at the end are καλαί, and therefore good (as usual ωφελίμοι is but a synonym for ‘good’): therefore—as no one willingly selects evil rather than good—no one willingly does the worse (i.e. selects evil actions) when he might act better. As it is with πράξεις that bravery and cowardice are concerned it is necessary for Plato to establish that ‘no one willingly seeks the worse’ is true of individual acts as well as of ultimate ends.

15. ἀρ’ οὐ καλαί. The words καλὸς ωφελίμοι which follow οὐ καλαί in the mss. are rightly rejected because they anticipate the identification in the next line.

18. ἡ ἡ ποιεῖ, καὶ δύνατα is Heindorf’s emendation of the corrupt ἡ ἡ ἐποιεῖ καὶ δύναται of the mss.

20. ἡπτω εἶναι αὐτοῦ κτλ. The phrases ἡπτων αὐτοῦ and 358 C κρείττων εαυτοῦ are here substituted for ἡπτων τῆς ἠδονῆς and κρείττων τῆς ἠδονῆς. Compare the discussions in Rep. iv 430 E foll. and Laws i 626 E foll., where κρείττω and ἡπτω εἶναι εαυτοῦ are inter-
preted as the victory of the better part in us over the worse and conversely. As the worse part is the part which seeks ἡδονή, i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the identification is just.

358D 31. καλεῖτε τι δέος. Heindorf’s emendation for καλεῖτε δέος of the MSS. See note on 330 C above.

33. προσδοκίαν τινά—κακοῦ: a common definition: cf. Lach. 198 B δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μελλόντος κακοῦ. φόβος in Laws 1 644 C is defined as ‘expectation before pain’ (πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς).

358 E 36. δέος, φόβος δ’ οὗ. Prodicus’ distinction is just, though often dropped in practice: in φόβος ‘the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παραντικα πτόνησις, says Ammonius) is the leading idea’, in δέος the apprehension of evil to come (κακοῦ ἐπιθυμία). See note on Euthyphr. 12 B, where Plato implicitly recognises the difference.

37. ἄλλα τόδε: sc. διαφέρει. οὖδὲν διαφέρει does not of course mean ‘there is no difference’, but ‘it doesn’t matter’.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

It is here proved that courage is wisdom.

Socrates first reverts to the point at which the discussion on ἡδονῆς ἡπτάσθαι began (359 A—C): next, Protagoras asserts that ἀνδρεῖοι and δειλοὶ are willing to encounter opposite things, but Socrates shews that both encounter what they take to be θαρραλεὰ, i.e., so far, the same things (359 C—E). Protagoras thereupon objects that ἀνδρεῖοι will encounter e.g. war, while δειλοὶ will not. Socrates replies by shewing that if cowards do not willingly enter upon war, the reason is their ignorance (359 E—360 A). In general, while brave men fear and feel courage honourably, i.e. well, the reverse is true of cowards, owing to their ignorance (360 A—360 B). And since it is through δειλία that men are δειλοὶ, and we have shewn that men are δειλοὶ through ἀμαθία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, cowardice is ignorance, and consequently bravery is wisdom, viz. δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ δεινῶν (360 B—360 E).

359 A 5. τότε: 330 A foll.

359 B 18. ἤρόμην: 349 E.
19. καὶ ἵππα γ’, ἐφή. The recapitulation stops here. ἐφήν ἐγὼ in the next line is the usual ‘said I’ of narrated dialogue.

359 C 22. ἐπὶ τί: so MSS: the second hand in B reads ἐπὶ τίνα, but cf. infra line 27 where the question is repeated with ἐπὶ τί. For the
common passage from singular to plural the editors compare Phaedo 58 c τι ἐν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα;

25. δεινα': the mss read δειλά by mistake, and so in 360 c below δειλών three times for δεινων.

30. ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις: see on 342 B. 359 D

33. ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἢττω—ἀμαθία οὖσα. The only proof given that we 'encounter evils believing them to be evils' was the phrase ἢττω εἶναι ἰδονής (for which ἢττω εἶναι ἑαυτῷ is here substituted: see on 358 c). We have demolished this proof by shewing that the phrase means ἀμαθία, and we therefore infer that ἐπὶ α δεινὰ ἱγείται εἰναι οὐδεὶς ἔφρεται (δεινά being a subdivision of κακά).

34. ηὐρέθη. The mss have εὑρέθη: but see on 315 B.

39. αὔτικα: "veluti, ne longe hinc abeam" (Kroschel) and so 'for example': a very frequent use in Plato.

40. πότερον—καλὸν ὅν κτλ. Compare 349 E.

42. ἐξπροσθεν: 358 B.

53. καλλιόν τε. The mss read καλὸν τε. Stephanus made the 360 A necessary change.

58. καὶ οἱ δειλοί καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαυνόμενοι. In 350 B 360 B foll. those who are θαρραλεοί without ἐπιστήμη are called μαυνόμενοι by an expressive metaphor. Here the μαυνόμενοι—which is suggested, but no more—by the μαυνόμενοι in 350 B—are treated as a distinct class: the word is to be understood of literal madmen like Ajax in the play of Sophocles. The word θρασεῖς has an evil connotation as in Laws 1 630 B θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ύβρισται καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἀπάντων: Plato could not have said θαρραλεοί here since θαρραλεοί throughout the dialogue is applied also to ἄνδρείοι. It would be better to reject (with Kral) both καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς and καὶ οἱ μαυνόμενοι than only καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς with Sauppe and Schanz: we should then—as throughout this chapter—have only one negative to ἄνδρείοι, viz. δειλοί, but we may allow some latitude of expression to Socrates, and καὶ after οὐκοῦν is slightly in favour of supposing that other classes follow οἱ δειλοὶ, though it may go with the whole sentence.

69. ἐπένευσεν: Protagoras dies hard: see on Euthyphr. 8 A. 360 C

75. οὔτε—τε: see on 309 B.

77. αὐτὸς—πέρανον. Gorg. 506 c λέγε, ὡγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανον.

81. φιλονικεῖν—τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι. For the orthography of φιλονικεῖν 360 E see note on 336 E above. Apparently φιλονικεῖν is not elsewhere
used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. I 338 A we have προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

CHAPTER XI.

Socrates points out that while Protagoras’ theory would point to the conclusion that virtue is not teachable, he himself in trying to prove that virtue is knowledge goes near to maintaining that it is. Thus the interlocutors have as it were changed places. The dialogue ends with mutual compliments.

4. αὐτὸς ἡ ἀρετὴ: ‘virtue itself’, literally ‘virtue, the thing itself’. Compare Crat. 411 D εἶ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἔστιν ἔσις: Theaet. 146 E γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ δὲ τι ποτ’ ἔστιν: “αὐτὸ (per se) substantivis et adjectivis adiunctum rei alicuius naturam ac vim per se et universe spectatam significat”, says Ast. This use of αὐτὸς furnished Plato (as in αὐτοκόπηρωπος and the like) with a convenient way of denoting his Ideas, but here of course αὐτό does not denote the Idea but is ipsum as opposed to τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

361 B 14. πάντα χρήματα: exaggeration—as if Socrates held ἐπιστήμην to be the ἄρχη of the universe and said ἐπιστήμην πάντα as Heraclitus might say πῦρ πάντα.

19. ὅλον: i.e. ἡ ἀρετὴ—therefore the gender is like αὐτό in line 4. Sauppe cites Meno 79 B ἐμὸν δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν.

361 C 22. ἐσθικὴ σπεύδουτε: a frequent usage in Plato: see on Apol.

27 Α ἐσθικὴ γὰρ—διαπειρωμένη.

24. ἄνω κάτω: see on 356 D above.

27. ἔξελθειν—ἐπὶ. There is a slight hint of military metaphor: ‘fare forth against virtue also to see what she is’, ‘also attack the question what is virtue’: cf. Rep. II 374 A δ (στρατόπεδον) ἔξελθον—διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιστῶσιν: cf. the similar use of ἕνας ἐπὶ in Rep. V 473 C ἐπ’ αὐτὸ δή, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, εἶμι δ’ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. Here ἔς- is appropriate, because the first campaign is as it were ended (ταῦτα διεξελθόντας): it is moreover natural to retain it, on account of the tendency noted on 311 A. A later hand in T has ἐλθεῖν, but the mss reading is unobjectionable, nor is there any need to read διεξελθεῖν or διεξελθεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν as Kroschel suggests. For the sentiment cf. Meno 100 B τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα.
XL 362 A  PLATO'S \textit{PROTAGORAS.}\hfill 193

tòte, ὃταν πρὶν ὄντων τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ ζητέων τι ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή.


29. μὴ πολλάκις: \textit{ne forte}, as often in Plato. What often happens may \textit{happen} in a future case: so Lucretius uses ‘saepe’ for ‘ut saepe fit’.

32. \textit{Προμηθέας—προμηθουμενος}. Puns on proper names are \textit{frequent} in Plato: see Riddell’s Digest of Idioms § 323.

35. κατ’ ἄρχας, viz. 348 c ff., 320 b.

38. οὔτε—τε: see on 309 b.

41. δὲν ἐντυγχάνω: a somewhat rare attraction, since in the unattributed form the relative would be in the dative and not in the accusative case: compare Theaet. 144 A δὲν δὴ πῶποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πᾶν πολλοῖς πεπλησιακα—οὔδένα πώ ἡσθῆμην κτλ., where Wohlrab cites also Gorg. 509 A.

42. \textit{τηλικούτων}: Socrates was about \textit{36} at the date of action of the Protagoras.

47. ἐφὴν: 335 c.

\textit{Καλλία τῷ καλῷ:} see on 336 b above. For καλῷ cf. Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ένα καλός παρὰ καλὸν (viz. Agathon) ἐω. Sauppe reminds us of the use of καλός on vases, and also cites Ar. Ach. 143 ἐν τοῖς τολχοῖς ἔγραφ' 'Ἀθήναωι καλὸν (of Sitalces) and the famous \textit{Κριτία τοῦτ' ἔστω τῷ καλῷ} of the dying Theramenes (Xen. Hell. II 3. 56).

A. P. 13
APPENDIX I.

ON THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.

The difficulties of this poem are well known, and have called forth many pages of comment. The restoration proposed by Schneidewin has met with most favour, and is printed in most texts of the Protagoras, not because it is thought to be certain, but as the nearest approach to certainty of which the case admits. It may be at once allowed that no restoration can claim to represent with certainty just what Simonides wrote in the order in which it was written. Plato is seldom careful to make his quotations accurate, and the perverse exposition of the meaning of this particular poem is hardly calculated to increase our confidence in his verbal accuracy here. Nevertheless, Plato is our sole authority for the poem in question, and consequently that restoration will be the most probable which, while it satisfies every metrical requirement, involves the fewest changes in the text and sequence of the poem as it stands in Plato.

The words apparently quoted from the poem, as they occur in the Bodleian manuscript, are according to Schanz as follows (we note obvious corrections at the foot of the page).

339 B. ἀνδρά αγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῆν τετράγυρων ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον

1 On p. 20 of his fourth edition of the Protagoras, Sauppe enumerates the discussions on the subject down to 1884. The most important contribution since that year is Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras, von J. Aars, Christiania, 1888. Aars’s restoration has received the approval of Peppmüller (in the Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift for 1890, p. 174 foll.) and others: and there now seems to be some prospect of finality in the criticism of the poem. In his program (Das Simonideische Gedicht in Platons Protagoras und die Versuche dasselbe zu reconstruiren, Graz 1889) Schwenk follows Aars in every essential point.

2 ἀνδρά. 3 χερσίν.
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339 C. οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκιον¹ νέμεται καλτοὶ σοφοὶ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον χαλεπὸν φάτο² ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι

341 E. θεὸς ἄν µένος τοῦτον τοὺς ἔχει γέρας

344 C. ἀνδρα δὲ ὡκ ἔστιν⁵ µὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι δὲ ἄν ἁμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ

344 E. πράξας μὲν γὰρ εἴ πᾶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς κακὸς δὲ εἰ κακὸς

345 C. ἐπὶ πλειστόν δὲ καὶ ἀριστοὶ εἰσὶν οὗ ἢν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶν

345 C. τούτων οὐ ποτε ἐγώ τὸ µὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διζήμενος κεν ἔν⁶ ἐστὶν ἀπρακτὸν ἐπιτίθη µοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλὼν πανάμωμον ἀνθρωπὸν εὐρυδόος οὐκ Καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς ἐπειδ’ ὕμων εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέων

345 D. πάντας δ’ ἐπανήμην⁷ καὶ φιλέω ἐκὼν ὡσίς ἐρῆθη µηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ἀνάγκη δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ µάχονται

346 C. ἐμοιγε ἔξαρκεὶ δς ἀν µὴ κακὸς ἢ µηδ’ ἀγαθὸς αἰῶνος εἰδῶς γε δυνῆσει πόλων⁸ δικὰν ύψης ἀνήρ οὐ µὴν ἐγὼ µωµησοµαι οὐ γὰρ εἴµι φιλόµορος τὸν γὰρ ἥµιθαν ἀπείρων γένεθλα⁹ πάντα τοι καλὰ τοῖς τ’ αἰσχρὰ µὴ µέµκιται.

In 346 D—E part of the poem is paraphrased and repeated in the words οὐχὶ πανάμωμον ἀνθρωπὸν εὐρυδοῦς οὐκαὶ τοὺς αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς, ἐπειδ’ ὕμων εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέων· ὡστε τοῦτον γ’ ἐνέκα οὐδένα ἐπαινετοµαι, ἀλλὰ µοι ἔξαρκεὶ δν ἢ µέσος καὶ µηδὲν κακὸν ποτὶ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπανήμηκε ἐκὼν ὡσίς ἐρῆθη µηδὲν αἰσχρόν.

The only words whose place in the poem is somewhat doubtful are ἐμοιγε’ ἔξαρκεὶ and οὐ γὰρ εἴµι φιλόµορος. They are excluded both by Bergk and Blass, but it is not likely that they come from Plato, since µοι ἔξαρκεὶ occurs also in the final recapitulation, and οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε φέγγο, δι’ εἴµι φιλόψογος is said (346 C) as well as οὐ γὰρ εἴµι φιλόµορος. Bonghi (quoted by Aars¹⁰) assigns the words οἰκὸς τε µένοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά in 344 B to a place in the poem after ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένου: it is however tolerably clear that they come from Socrates, who is merely developing the latent antithesis in χαλεπὸν.

Schneidewin’s¹¹ restoration is as follows:

Στροφῆ.

"Ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν µὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν χερσὶν τε καὶ ποιλ καὶ νῶθ τετράγωνον ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

(Desunt quinque versus.)

¹ Πιττάκιον (i.e. Vind. suppl. Phil. gr. 7) rightly.
² φάτο.
³ τοῦτο.
⁴ δ’.
⁵ ἐστὶ.
⁶ κενεάν i. rightly.
⁷ ἐπανήμην.
⁸ γ’ υψιστόπολιν after Bergk: Hermann υψιστόπολιν.
⁹ γένεθλα.
¹⁰ p. 8, note i.
¹¹ In his Delectus poesis Graecorum, p. 379.
APPENDIX I.

There is little probability in this arrangement. Schneidewin altogether neglects the evident metrical resemblance between the words from ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ to τούτου τ' ἀλοχρὰ μῆ μέμικται and the other sections of the poem. But the obvious and indeed fatal objection to Schneidewin's restoration is that he makes a wide departure from the order of the words as they come in Plato, placing the ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ κτλ. of 346 C before the τούνεκεν οὕστορ' ἐγὼ of 345 C. That Socrates reverses in 346 D to τούνεκεν οὕστορ' ἐγὼ κτλ. is no reason for placing these words in the last part of the poem, any more than we should place the words Ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως κτλ. after ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ. because Socrates reverts to them in 344 E. A man who professes to be giving a continuous exposition of a poem may revert to the middle of it when he has come to the end, in order

1 See the restoration below on p. 198.
to illustrate the sentiment with which the poem concludes, but it would be the superfluity of naughtiness to put the end of the poem into the middle, which is what Schneidewin makes Socrates do. If οὐ ἔγκρ. κτλ. in 346 D were in reality the conclusion of the poem, we ought to frame our Στροφή β' out of these very words, and not from τοῦνεκαν οὖνοτ' ἐγώ κτλ. We should then have to omit the words ἀνάγκη δ' οὗδε θεοὶ μάχονται, because they are not found in 346 D—E, but it is beyond question that these words are part of Simonides’ poem. It is tolerably certain that in 346 D we have but a recapitulation of part of the argument, presented as a commentary on the concluding text πάντα τοι καλὰ κτλ., which sums up the whole ethical teaching of the poem. This is practically admitted by Schneidewin himself when he writes his final strophe not as it appears in 346 D, but as it stands in 345 C—D.

Bergk\(^1\) arranges the poem in three complete strophes. His restoration has the merit of recognising the similarity in rhythm between Schneidewin’s Epode and the other parts of the poem: several of his emendations are also in all probability right\(^2\). It may however be doubted whether he does well in altogether excluding from the poem the words ἐμοιγ’ ἔξαρκει and οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος, and he deserts the Platonic order even more ruthlessly than Schneidewin when he places δς ἀν ἃκος—μη μέμκται directly after ἀνευ ψόγου τετνυμένον, besides that Plato clearly indicates by the words προϊντος τοῦ ἄσματος (339 C), ὀλγον—εἰς τὸ πρόδεθεν προελθὼν (339 D), and ὀλγα διελθὼν (344 B), that there is a lacuna after τετνυμένον.

Blass\(^4\) agrees with Bergk in regarding the poem as a sequence of strophes, but discovers four of these in place of three. In the first strophe Blass’s arrangement agrees with that of Schneidewin: in the second, he supposes the two first verses to be lost, and the rest to contain δς ἀν ἃκος κτλ. down to τοῖς τ’ ἀλοχρὰ μη μέμκται: the third consists of οὐδε μοι ἐμμελέως—τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλώσων: the fourth and last extends from τοῦνεκαν οὖ ποτ’ ἐγώ to ἀνάγκη δ’ οὗδε θεοὶ μάχονται. This arrangement (which further agrees with that of Bergk in rejecting ἐμοιγ’ ἔξαρκει and οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος) upsets even more completely than either of the others the sequence of the poem as it is given by Plato, and for that reason is most unlikely to be right.

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1 Poetae Lyr. Graeci\(^4\), III p. 384 ff.  
2 See the footnotes on p. 195.  
3 Bergk’s emendation for μη.  
4 In the Rheinisches Museum for 1872, p. 326 ff.
APPENDIX I.

The only arrangement which faithfully adheres to the Platonic order of citation is that of Aars, in the treatise referred to already¹.

STROPHE 1.

1. "Ανδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
2. χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῦν τετράγωνον, ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

Verses 3—7 are wanting.

STROPHE 2.

1. Οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
2. καλτοι σοφοῖ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπῶν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί.
3. Θεὸς δὲ νῦν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἀνδραὶ δ' οὗκ ἐστὶ μὴ οὐ κακῶν ἐμμεναί,
4. διὶ ἄμηχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
5. Πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς,
6. κακῶς δ' ἐλ κακῶς <τίς>.,
7. καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἀριστοῖ, τοῦς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

STROPHE 3.

1. Τούνεκαν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν
2. διζήμενος κενεάν ἐστὶν ἀπρακτὸν ἑπτίδα μοίραν αἰῶνος βαλέων,
3. πανάμοιον ἀνθρωπον, εἱρυθοῦτος ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χρονός·
4. ἐπὶ δ' ὅμοιν εἰρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.
5. Πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημη καὶ φιλέω,
6. ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρθη
7. μηδέν αἰσχρὸν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

STROPHE 4.

1. Wanting.
2. — — — — — [οὐκ εἰμ' ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος'] ἔφαρκεῖ γ' ἐμοί,
3. δὲ δὲ θ' κακὸς μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὄνησιπολιν δίκαιν,
4. ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ, οὐδὲ μή μιν ἐγὼ
5. μομήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἠλθίων
6. ἀπείρων γενέθλα·
7. πάντα τοι καλά, τοῦτ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμκται.

This restoration seems to us on the whole the most probable. In line 4 of Strophe 2 Plato no doubt wrote δὲ δὲν (the MSS reading) for δὲν, using the more common construction in defiance of metre,

¹ p. 194, note 1.
just as in line 5 γάρ after μέν is due to the desire to shew the sequence of thought. In lines 6 and 7 of the same Strophe Plato omits some monosyllable after κακῶς, perhaps τίς or τι or αὖ: Hermann’s view that καλ of the next line should be written in line 6, and line 7 be made into τοὐπαπειστον ἄριστοι κτλ., is perhaps less probable. For line 7 we should prefer as nearer to the words of Plato καπλ πλειστον ἄριστοι κτλ. In the third Strophe we prefer ἐπὶ τ’ ὕμμων for the reasons given in the note upon the passage on p. 166. In the last Strophe ὅς ἄν ἥ κακὸς is Bergk’s emendation for ὅς ἄν μὴ κακὸς ἥ: here again Plato substitutes the commoner idiom for the rarer and more poetic, with which we may compare Aristophanes Birds 694 γῆ δ’ οὐδ’ ἀὴρ οὐδ’ οὐρανὸς ἥν. It is however more likely that Simonides wrote ὅς ἄν ἥ κακὸς μὴ τ’ ἀγαν ἀπάλαμον, i.e. μὴ τε κακὸς μὴ τε κτλ., for this idiom is seldom found with μηδὲ or οὔδε: see Jebb on Sophocles Philoctetes 771. To take μηδὲ for ἀλλὰ μὴ would give a wrong meaning, as can be seen from the paraphrase in 346 D ἀλλὰ μοι ἔξαρκεί ἄν ἥ μέσος καλ μηδὲν κακόν ποιῇ. It seems better too, in this line, to take εἰδὼς γ’ ὄνησιτολιν δικαίν ὕψης ἀνήρ (sc. ἐστίν) together, and print colons before εἰδὼς and after ἀνήρ. In line 4 οὔδε μὴ μιν is Bergk’s restoration for μὴν of the MSS. The position assigned by Aars to οὐκ εἰμ’ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος (in line 2) is only tentative, but it is slightly supported by οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε ψέγω ὅτι εἰμ’ φιλόψυγος coming before εἰμοῖ γ’ ἔξαρκεί in 346 c. There is nothing in Plato to indicate that the first line (with part of the second) is wanting in Strophe 4, but neither is there anything to prove the reverse, and (since the poem is not in any case preserved entire, five verses being omitted in the first Strophe) it is much more reasonable to assume an omission here than violently to distort the sequence of the poem as quoted by Plato.

Whether the poem is to be ranked as an ὕδη ἐπινικός, an ἐγκώμιον, or a σκόλιον is a question which should not be raised until the poem has first been restored from the quotations in the Protagoras. If the restoration given above is even approximately correct, the poem cannot be classed as an epinikion: an encomium it is not likely to be, since no one is praised. There is no reason whatever for identifying it with the famous encomium referred to by Quintilian (XI 2. 11). Blass holds that the poem was a scolion, and this is by far the most probable view, but no certainty is attainable on the point. With the exception of the lacunae which we
have noted, the poem is most probably complete, for Socrates is trying to prove that Simonides attacks Pittacus throughout the whole poem: see 345 D οὐτω σφόδρα καὶ δὲ ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττάκου βήματι and 343 C, 344 B.

We add a translation of the poem, incorporating the few changes which we have made in Aars’s restoration.

**Strophe 1.**

It is hard to quit you like a truly good man, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without blame.

(The five lost vv. may have further elaborated the meaning of 'truly good').

**Strophe 2.**

Nor do I deem the word of Pittacus well said, wise though he was that spake it: 'it is hard,' he said 'to be noble.' To a god alone belongs that meed: a man cannot but prove evil, if hopeless calamity overthrow him. Every man if he has fared well is good, evil, if ill: and for the most part best are they whom the gods love.

**Strophe 3.**

Therefore never will I cast away my portion of life vainly upon a bootless hope, seeking what cannot come to be, an all-blameless man, of us who take the fruit of the broad earth: when I find him, look you, you shall hear. I praise and love all them that willingly do nothing base: against necessity even gods do not contend.

**Strophe 4.**

--- [I love not fault-finding]: enough for me if one be not evil nor exceeding violent: yea sound is the man who knoweth justice, benefactress of cities: nor will I find fault with him: for the tribe of fools is infinite. Surely all is fair wherein is no alloy of soul.

The easy-going morality of the poem is in harmony with what we know both of the life and poetry of Simonides: he was ever 'a genial and courtly man,' anxious to make the most of life, "dwelling with flowers like the bee, seeking yellow honey" (Sim. Frag. 47).
APPENDIX II.

PROTAGORAS' LIFE AND WORKS.

We give the life of Protagoras as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (ix 50—56) and add the fragments of his works, according (in the main) to Frei's arrangement¹.

**BIOΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΟΤ.**

Πρωταγόρας ἂντεμώνοις ἢ, ὃς Ἀπολλώδωρος καὶ Δέινων ἐν Περσικοῖς, Μαιανδρίου, Ἀβδηρίτης, καθὰ φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποιντικὸς ἐν τοῖς περὶ νῆμων, δὲ καὶ Θουρίοις νῆμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτῶν ἡ δ’ Εὐπολις ἐν Κόλαξι, Θηῖος· φησι γάρ,

"Ενδον μὲν ἐστὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ Θηῖος.

οὕτος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος λόγους ἀναγινώσκοντες ἥραντοντο· καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρα φησὶ παρόφωνον εἶναι τὸν Πρόδικον. διήκουσε δ’ ὁ Πρωταγόρας Δημοκρίτου, ἐκαλεῖτο τὸ Σοφία, ὡς φησι Φασβώμον ἐν παντοταπῇ ἱστορίᾳ. καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δὺ λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις· οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἢρξατό που τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· 'Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἀνθρώπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστί· τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν." ἔλεγε τῇ μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχήν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεατήτῳ) καὶ πάντ᾽ εἶναι ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἄλλαχοὶ δὲ τοῦτον ἢρξατό τὸν τρόπον· 'Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὕθ᾽ ὡς εἶναι οὐθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ εἶσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύσατα εἰδέναι, ἥ τ᾽ ἀδηλότητι καὶ βραχὺς δὲν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. διὰ ταὐτὴν δὲ τὴν ἁρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη πρὸς Ἄθηναν· καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ὡς κήρυκε ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ᾽ ἐκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων. οὕτως πρῶτος μισθὸν ἐλεπράξατο μνᾶς ἐκατόν· καὶ πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διώρισε καὶ καίροι δύναμιν ἕξαθετο

¹ Quaestiones Protagoreae, p. 176 foll., where the references are fully given.
APPENDIX II.

καὶ λόγων ἀγώνας ἔθετο, καὶ σοφίσματα τοῖς πραγματολογοῦσι προσήγαγε· καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείς πρὸς τοῦνα σαλέβη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπισπολάζον γένος τῶν ἐρειστικῶν ἐγένετον· ἦν καὶ Τιμων φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπιμετος ἐρίζεμεναι εἰς εἰδῶς.

οὕτως καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἔδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκκίνησε· καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένειον λόγον τὸν πειρόμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς ὦκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν, οὕτως πρῶτος διελεξεῖται, καλὰ φησὶ Πλάτων ἐν Εὐδοκήμω.

καὶ πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησίν Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χρίστυππον. καὶ πρῶτος τὴν καλομέμνην τύλην, ἐφ' ἦς τὰ τὰ δορία Βαστάξουσι, εὐρεῖ, ὡς φησίν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας· φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος τοῦ φησὶ. καὶ τούτων τὸν πρῶτον ἤρθι1 πρὸς Δημόκριτον, ἔστε δεδεκὼς ὁφθεῖς. διειλεὶ τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέταρα· εὐχωλήν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν· οἱ δὲ, εἰς ἐπτά· διήγησιν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν, ἀπαγγελίαν, εὐχωλήν, κλήσιν, οὔς καὶ πυθμένας εἰπε λόγων. Ἀλκιδάμας δὲ τέταρας λόγους φησὶ· φάσιν, ἀπόφασιν, ἐρώτησιν, προσαγόρευσιν. πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑαυτοῦ ἀνέγνω τὸν περὶ θεῶν, οὗ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνω παρεθέμεθα· ἀνέγνω δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τῇ Εὐρυπίδου οἰκίᾳ ἦ, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι δ' ἐν Δυκέλη, μαθητοὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρῆσαντος Ἀρχαγόρο τοῦ Θεοδότου. κατηγόρησε δ' αὐτοῦ Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου2, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' Ἐυθαλλὸν φησιν.

ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ σωζόμενα αὐτοῦ βιβλία τάδε. Τέχνη ἐρειστικῶν. Περὶ πάλης. Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων. Περὶ πολυτελείας. Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Περὶ ἀρετῶν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄϑου. Περὶ τῶν ὧν ὅρθως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρασσομένων. Προστακτικός. Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Ἀντιλογιῶν δύο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ βιβλία. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων εἰς αὐτῷ διάλογον.

φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλέοντος αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικελίαν, τὴν ναῦν καταποντώθηκαί· καὶ τούτῳ αὐτὸστεθαι Εὐρυπίδην ἐν τῷ Ἰέλων. ἔνιοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὅδον τελευτῆσαι αὐτῶν, βιώσαντα ἑτη πρὸς τὰ ἐνενήκοντα· Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ φησιν ἐβδομήκοντα, σοφιστεύσαι δὲ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἀκμάζει κατὰ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ ὑγιοκοστήν Ὀλυμπιάδα. ἔστι καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἥμων ὄντως ἔχουν,

Καὶ σεῦ, Πρωταγόρη, φάτνι ἐκλογι, ὡς ἅρ' Ἀθηνέων
"Εἰκ ποτ' ἱην καθ' ὅδον πρέσβυς εἰών ἔθανε.
Εἰλετο γάρ σε φυγεῖν Κέκροπος πόλις· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν που
Παλλάδος ἀστυ φύγεις, Πλούτεα δ' ὕοι ἐφύγες.

1 (?) ἤχθη.

APPENDIX II.

λέγεται δὲ ποτ' αὐτὸν ἀπαίτοντα τὸν μισθὸν Ἑβάθλον τὸν μαθητὴν, ἐκείνου εἰπόντος, ἃλλ' οὐδέπω νῖκην νενίκηκα, εἰπεῖν, ἃλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν νικήσω ὅτι ἐγὼ νικησάμην λαβέων με ἐδει· ἐὰν δὲ σὺ, ὅτι σὺ.'

γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Πρωταγόρας, ἀστρολόγος, εἰς ὃν καὶ Ἐὐφορίων ἐπικήδειον ἐγγαρέε· καὶ τρίτος στοιχίος φιλόσοφος.

FRAGMENTS.

A. Physical.

1. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρωπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἐστι (from Ἀλήθεια ἢ περί τοῦ ὄντος s. Καταβάλλοντες: see Pl. Theaet. 152 A).

2. περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὡς εἰσίν οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι· ἡ τε ἄδηλοτης καὶ βραχύς ὃν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (from περὶ θεῶν ap. D. L. IX 51).

From Protagoras' περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἁϊδον no fragments seem to survive.

B. Ethical.

Of the περὶ ἄρετῶν there seem to be no fragments.

3. τῶν γὰρ ὑλῶν νευμῶν ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὅκτῳ δὲ ταῖς πάσηι ἡμέρῃ ἀποθανόντων νηπευθέως ἀνέτλη. εὐδίης γὰρ ἐξετω, ἐξ ἃς πολλῶν ἁντο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν εἰς εὐποτμίην καὶ ἀνωδυνήν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαι. πᾶς γὰρ τίς μιν ὄριων τὰ ἐωντοῦ πένθεα ἐρρωμένων φέροντα μεγαλόφρονα τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἐδόκει εἰναι καὶ ἐωντοῦ κρείσσω, κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἐωντοῦ ἐν τοιούτῳ πράγμασι ἀμηχανίν (from (?) περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρασομένων ap. Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. 33. 118 E—F. The subject is the fortitude of Pericles on hearing of the death of his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus).

The περὶ φιλοτιμίας is known only from Diogenes' catalogue (IX 55).

C. Political.

Of the περὶ πολιτείας nothing (so far as is known) survives.


D. Grammatical.

Of the περὶ ὀρθοεπελάς (mentioned in Pl. Phaedr. 267 c) nothing remains.

1 The Ionic is as it appears in Plutarch. Following the example of Frei, we have not written the other fragments in Ionic.
E. Rhetorical.

5. (?) δῦο λόγοι εἰσίν περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικεῖμενοι ἀλλήλων (from the ἀντιλογιῶν δῦο ap. D. L. ix 51).


The δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ (D. L. ix 55) and the “rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci” (Cic. Brut. 46) have apparently left no trace.

F. Various.

7. φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῦται, καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν (from the μέγας λόγος—probably identical with the Προστακτικὸς—: see Cramer Anecdot. Paris. i p. 171).

8. [Προταγόρας ἔλεγε] μηδὲν εἰναι μὴτε τέχνην ἄνευ μελέτης μήτε μελέτην ἄνευ τέχνης¹ (perhaps from the same, ap. Stob. Flor. 29. 80).

Another fragment, probably from the same work, is quoted by J. Gildermeister and F. Bücheler from a Syriac translation of Plutarch’s περὶ ἀσκήσεως [Rhein. Mus. vol. xxvii (1872) p. 526]. The original perhaps ran:

9. οὐ βλαστάνει παιδεία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν μὴ τις εἰς βυθὸν ἔλθῃ.

Of the περὶ μαθημάτων, and the περὶ τέχνης (of which perhaps the περὶ πάλης was a part) nothing (so far as is certainly known) survives. Gomperz’s ingenious and learned attempt² to prove that the ‘Defence of Medicine’ which under the title of περὶ τέχνης appears in the collection of Hippocratean works³ was written by Protagoras and belongs to the treatise περὶ τέχνης has not, as yet, commended itself to critics⁴.

¹ Compare Gomperz (cited in the next note), p. 11.
³ Littré, vi i—27.
⁴ See Wellmann in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, v p. 97 foll.
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